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U.S. Policy Toward Iran

Dynamic political evolution is taking place inside Iran. Instability caused by the pressures of the Sanctions war, economic deterioration and regime infighting create the potential for major changes in Iran. The Soviet Union is better positioned than the U.S. to exploit and benefit from any power struggle that results in changes in the Iranian regime, as well as increasing socio-political pressures. In this environment, the emergence of a regime more compatible with American and Western interests is unlikely. Soviet success in taking advantage of the emerging power struggle to insinuate itself in Iran would change the strategic balance in the area.

While we pursue a number of goals, our primary short-term challenge must be to block Moscow's efforts to increase Soviet influence (now and after the death of Khomeini). This will require an active and sustained program to build both our leverage and understanding of the internal situation so as to enable us to exert a greater and more constructive influence on Iranian politics. We must improve our ability to protect our interests during the struggle for succession.

U.S. Interests and Goals

The most immediate U.S. interests include:

1. Preventing the disintegration of Iran and preserving it as an independent strategic buffer which separates the Soviet Union from the Persian Gulf;

2. Limiting the scope and opportunity for Soviet actions in Iran, while positioning ourselves to cope with the changing Iranian internal situation;

3. Maintaining access to Persian Gulf oil and ensuring unimpeded transit of the Strait of Hormuz; and

4. An end to the Iranian government's sponsorship of terrorism, and its attempts to destabilize the governments of other regional states.
We also seek other broad and important, if less immediately urgent, goals.

(1) Iran's resumption of a moderate and constructive role as a member respectively of the non-communist political community, of its region, and of the world petroleum economy;

(2) continued Iranian resistance to the expansion of Soviet power in general, and to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in particular;

(3) an early end to the Iran-Iraq war which is not mediated by the Soviet Union and which does not fundamentally alter the balance of power in the region;

(4) elimination of Iran's flagrant abuses of human rights;

(5) movement toward eventual normalization of U.S.-Iranian diplomatic consular and cultural relations, and bilateral trade/commercial activities;

(6) resolution of American legal and financial claims through the Hague Tribunal; and

(7) Iranian moderation on OPEC pricing policy.

Many of our interests will be difficult to achieve. But given the rapidity with which events are moving, and the magnitude of the stakes, it is clear that urgent new efforts are required. In moving forward, we must be especially careful to balance our evolving relationship with Iraq in a manner that does not damage the longer term prospects for Iran.

Present Iranian Political Environment

The Iranian leadership faces its most difficult challenges since 1981. The regime's popularity has declined significantly in the past six months, primarily because of intensified disillusionment with a seemingly unending war, the continued imposition of Islamic social policies on a population increasingly reluctant to accept such harsh measures, and a faltering economy brought on primarily by declining oil revenues. The impact of these problems is intensified by the realization that Ayatollah Khomeini's mental and physical health is fragile, which in turn casts a pall of uncertainty over the daily decision-making process.
Unless the acceleration of adverse military, political and economic developments is reversed, the Khomeini regime will face serious instability (i.e. repeated anti-regime demonstrations, strikes, assassination attempts, sabotage and other destabilizing activities throughout, increasingly involving the lower classes). This condition will sap officials' energies and government resources, intensifying differences among Iranian leaders as the government tries to avoid mistakes that would provoke popular upheaval and threaten continued control.

While it is impossible to predict the course of the emerging power struggle, it is possible to discern several trends which must be accounted for by U.S. policy. As domestic pressures mount, decision-making is likely to be monopolized by individuals representing the same unstable mix of radical, conservative and ultra-conservative factions that now control the Iranian government. The longer Khomeini lingers in power, the more likely the power struggle will intensify, and the greater the number of potential leaders who might affect the outcome of the struggle.

The ultimate strength of various clerical groups and the power coalitions they may form are not known. However, the weaknesses of various opposition groups -- inside Iran and abroad -- are evident, especially the lack of a leader with sufficient stature to rival Khomeini and his ideas. The most likely faction in a power struggle to shift Iranian policy in directions more acceptable to the West -- should their influence increase -- are conservatives working from within the government against the radicals. Radicals within the regime, and the leftist opposition, are the groups most likely to influence the course of events in ways inimical to Western interests.

The Iranian regular armed forces represent a potential source of both power and inclination to move Iran back into a more pro-Western position. Representatives of every faction inside and outside the regime recognize the potential importance of the military and are cultivating contacts with these forces. However, as long as the Army remains committed in the war with Iraq it will not be in a position to intervene in Tehran.

The other instrument of state power, the Revolutionary Guard, is becoming increasingly fractured. It will probably come apart following Khomeini's death, and might even engage in a major power struggle before then. In any scenario, the Guard will be at the center of the power struggle.
The Soviets are well aware of the evolving developments in Iran. They will continue to apply carrot-and-stick incentives to Iran in the hope of bringing Tehran to Moscow’s terms for an improved bilateral relationship that could serve as a basis for major growth in Soviet influence in Iran. Moscow will clearly resist any trend toward the restoration of a pro-Western Iranian government.

Despite strong clerical antipathy to Moscow and communism, Tehran’s leadership seems to have concluded that improvement of relations with the Soviet Union is now essential to Iranian interest. They do not seem interested in improving ties with us. This Iranian assessment is probably based on Tehran’s view of what Moscow can do for -- and against -- Iran rather than on an ideological preference to conduct relations with Moscow. The USSR already has much leverage over Tehran -- in stark contrast to the U.S.

Moscow views Iran as a key area of opportunity.

In return, Moscow is certain to offer economic and technical assistance, and possibly even military equipment. While they have heretofore balked at providing major weapon systems, the Soviets might relax their embargo if the right political opportunities presented themselves. While Moscow would probably not act in a manner that severely disrupts its relations with Baghdad, given Iraq’s dependency on the USSR for ground forces equipment, Moscow possesses considerable room for maneuver if it senses major openings in Tehran for the establishment of a position of significant influence.

Moscow may also pursue a strategy based on support of separatist movements. The Soviet Union has had ample opportunity to cultivate the ethnic groups that cut across the Soviet-Iranian border. Most ethnic groups are unlikely to challenge the central government in Tehran as long as they fear severe reprisals. But in the areas of Iran adjacent to the Soviet border, the Soviets can provide a security umbrella to protect rebellious ethnic groups from reprisals.

The U.S. position in Tehran is unlikely to improve without a major change in U.S. policy. The challenge to the U.S. in the post-Moslem period will be severe. Any successor regime will probably seize power in the name of Islam and the revolution and
can be expected to have a built-in anti-American bias. A more
conservative regime, still Islamic, might lessen the emphasis on
revolution and terrorism and could move cautiously toward a more
correct relationship with the U.S. On the other hand, radical
forces will try to exacerbate anti-American feelings to
strengthen their own positions at the expense of the
conservatives.

Our leverage with Iran is sharply reduced by the current degree
of hostility that springs from the ideology of the radical
clergy, especially as it serves their foreign policy goals.
Moreover, the moderate and conservative elements of the clergy
may also share the radicals’ belief that we are inevitably
hostile to the Islamic government, making accommodation with the
U.S. impossible. The clerical regime continues to believe that
the U.S. has not accepted the revolution and intends to reverse
the course of events and install a puppet government. This
perception has been reinforced by our restoration of diplomatic
relations with Iraq, efforts to cut the flow of arms to Iran, and
direct threats of military action in retaliation for
Iranian-inspired anti-U.S. terrorism.

U.S. Policy

The dynamic political situation in Iran and the consequences for
U.S. interests of growing Soviet and radical influence, compel
the U.S. to undertake a range of short- and long-term initiatives
that will enhance our leverage in Tehran, and, if possible
minimize that of the Soviets. Particular attention must be paid
to avoiding situations which compel the Iranians to turn to the
Soviets. Short-term measures should be undertaken in a manner
that forestalls Soviet prospects and enhances our ability,
directly and indirectly, to build U.S. and Western influence in
Iran to the maximum extent possible in the future. Planning for
the following initiatives should therefore proceed on a fast and
longer-term track. The components of U.S. policy will be to:

(1) Encourage Western allies and friends to help Iran meet its
import requirements so as to reduce the attractiveness of
Soviet assistance and trade offers, while demonstrating the
value of correct relations with the West. This includes
provision of selected military equipment as determined on a
case-by-case basis.
(3) Increase contacts with allies and friends on the evolution of the Iranian situation and possible means for influencing the direction of change, and be ready to communicate with Iran through these or other countries.

(4) Take advantage of growing political fragmentation by:
   -- discreetly communicating our desire for correct relations to potentially receptive Iranian leaders;
   -- providing support to elements opposed to Khomeini and the radicals.

(5) Avoid actions which could alienate groups potentially receptive to improved U.S.-Iranian relations.

(6) Respond to Iranian-supported terrorism with military action against terrorist infrastructure.

(7) Enhance our effort to discredit Moscow's Islamic credentials with a more vigorous VOA effort targeted on Iran.

(8) Develop action plan in support of the basic policy objective, both for near-term contingencies (e.g. death of Khomeini) as well as the long-term restoration of U.S. influence in Tehran.

(9) With respect to the Gulf war:
   -- Continue to encourage third party initiatives to seek an end to the war;
   -- Increase military cooperation with Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and bolster U.S. military capabilities in the Gulf area to enable CENTCOM to be fully capable of carrying out its mission; and
   -- Seek to curb Iran's collaboration with its radical allies (i.e. Syria and Libya).