The following notebook excerpt is one of the more important pieces of evidence to emerge in recent years concerning Jaruzelski’s desire for Soviet military assistance in connection with martial law.\textsuperscript{16} Lt. Gen. Viktor Anoshkin was adjutant to Marshal Kulikov during the crisis and accompanied him as a note-taker on his frequent visits to Poland, including on December 11, two days before martial law. The crucial page reproduced below recounts, according to Anoshkin, a conversation between Kulikov and Jaruzelski that day. (The notes reflect Kulikov’s recitation of the conversation to his adjutant.) Here, the Polish leader is depicted as trying, apparently somewhat excitedly, to establish whether Soviet military aid will be forthcoming. By Anoshkin’s account, after Jaruzelski learns, via Soviet Ambassador Boris Aristov, that the Kremlin’s reply is no, he blurts out: ‘This is terrible news for us!! For a year-and-a-half people have been rambling on about the introduction of troops—and now that’s all vanished. Where does this put Jaruzelski?!’ The most apparent implication from this entry is that Jaruzelski, despite his intensive efforts in recent years to claim that he wanted above all to prevent a Soviet intervention, was in fact counting on Moscow to send help—albeit most likely in the belief that an internal crackdown would fail.

1. – No one will come;
2. – Measures will be taken;
3. – We will not introduce troops;
4. – Baibakov is preparing an answer;

[The following lines are written vertically up left-hand margin of page:]
This is terrible news for us!!
For a year-and-a-half people have been rambling on about the introduction of troops — and now that’s all vanished [otpalo]. Where does this put Jaruzelski?! 


17 The leftward and downward arrows are approximately as in the original, signifying that Aristov’s information, i.e. the four points which follow, came from Rusakov.