REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

ON

POSTWAR FINDINGS ABOUT IRAQ’S WMD PROGRAMS AND LINKS TO TERRORISM AND HOW THEY COMPARE WITH PREWAR ASSESSMENTS

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

September 8, 2006 - Ordered to be printed
recovered a draft contract between Niger and Iraq supporting the purchase of crude oil by Niger in exchange for cash.64

(U) In May 2003, the ISG recovered a report dated May 20, 2001, from the Iraqi Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, to the Foreign Affairs Ministry regarding an offer from a Ugandan businessman to supply uranium, allegedly from Congo, to Iraq. However, the document indicates that the Iraqi Embassy refused the offer emphasizing that Iraq does not deal with those materials due to international sanctions.65

B. Biological Weapons (BW) Assessments

(U) The main assessments in the 2002 NIE regarding Iraq’s biological warfare program were that Iraq “has biological weapons” and that “all key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war.”66

(U) The Intelligence Community also said:

• We assess that Iraq has some BW agents and maintains the capability to produce a variety of BW agents.67

64 Id. at p. 11.

65 Id. at p. 10-11.


67 Id. at p. 36.
• In the absence of UN inspectors, Iraq probably has intensified and expanded research and development in support of Iraq’s BW program.\textsuperscript{68}

• We assess that Baghdad also has increased the effectiveness of its BW arsenal by mastering the ability to produce dried agent.\textsuperscript{69}

• We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq’s WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad’s vigorous denial and deception efforts.\textsuperscript{70}

(U) A primary judgment that supported the conclusion that Iraq had biological weapons was the assessment that “Baghdad has transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents and may have other mobile units for researching and filling agent into munitions or containers, according to multiple sensitive sources.”\textsuperscript{71} This assessment was based largely on reporting from one liaison service source, codenamed CURVE BALL, to whom the Intelligence Community did not have direct access. The Intelligence Community said in the NIE that the information was corroborated by three additional sources.\textsuperscript{72}

(U) The President’s summary of the NIE said, “we assess that most elements of Iraq’s BW program are larger and more advanced than before the Gulf War. We judge Iraq has some BW agent and is capable of quickly producing (in both mobile and fixed facilities) a variety of such agents, including anthrax. It can

\textsuperscript{68}Id. at p. 43.

\textsuperscript{69}Id. at p. 37.

\textsuperscript{70}Id. at p. 5.

\textsuperscript{71}Id. at p. 41.

\textsuperscript{72}Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, S. Rept. 108-301, July 7, 2004, pp. 188-189.
deliver these BW agents by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives."

(U) Intelligence agency judgments about Iraq’s biological weapons efforts did not change in assessments published after the NIE. Intelligence Community agencies did not provide the Committee with any assessments of the results of UN biological weapons related inspections.

1. SSCI July 2004 Report Conclusion - Biological

(U) In its July 2004 report, the Committee concluded that the judgment in the NIE that “Baghdad has biological weapons” overstated what was known about Iraq’s biological weapons holdings, did not explain the uncertainties underlying the statement, and did not explain that the conclusion that Iraq had a mobile biological weapons program was largely based on the reporting from a single source. The Committee also concluded that the Intelligence Community’s judgments that “all key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War” were not supported by the intelligence reporting provided to the Committee.

(U) The Committee said the following:

The information provided to the Committee indicated that Iraq was renovating and expanding fixed dual-use facilities, was capable of producing biological warfare agents, and was engaged in research that was suitable for biological weapons. All of these activities were

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73 Committee staff notes of President’s NIE Summary dated October 1, 2002.


75 *Id.* at p. 187.
dual-use, however. Therefore, all of the activity could have been related to legitimate, non-biological weapons activity. Few intelligence reports suggested specifically that the activity was related to biological weapons. The Intelligence Community also had reporting which indicated that Iraq may have had a mobile biological weapons production capability, but most of that intelligence was obtained from a single HUMINT source to whom the Intelligence Community never had direct access.

The Committee believes that it was reasonable for the Intelligence Community to be concerned about these activities and to point out its concerns to policy makers that these activities could have been related to biological weapons production. But, the Community also had an obligation to explain to the reader that it was equally possible that the dual-use activities had nothing to do with biological weapons and that the intelligence on the mobile biological weapons capability was largely from a single source to whom the Intelligence Community did not have direct access. This intelligence did not indicate that Iraq’s biological weapons research and development, production, or weaponization were larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War, a time when Iraq had an active biological weapons program.  

(U) Regarding the assessment of Iraq’s mobile biological weapons capability, the Committee said that the information from HUMINT sources combined with information from UN inspections that Iraq may have been interested in mobile biological weapons production capability, “should have made analysts concerned that Iraq may have been pursuing such a program. However,
the definitive statement that Iraq 'has' such facilities was not supported by the intelligence."

(U) The Committee noted that concerns about the liaison source CURVE BALL had been raised in CIA operations cables, but were not disseminated to analysts outside the CIA. Despite these warnings, and perhaps in part because of their limited dissemination, the Intelligence Community judged CURVE BALL to be "credible" or "very credible." Uncertainties about his reliability should have been taken into account by the operations officers who provided the judgment of his credibility, should have made the analysts who were aware of them wary about relying so heavily on his reporting, and should have been noted in the NIE. In addition, these concerns should have been passed on to policymakers, who used CURVE BALL's information publicly."

(U) The Report to the President from the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission) identified additional concerns about CURVE BALL within the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations (DO) prior to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Specifically, officers in DO's Europe Division told the WMD Commission that they had raised concerns with CIA leadership about CURVE BALL, cautioning them that the foreign service that handled CURVE BALL had not been able to verify his reporting.

(U) In one instance, in response to a CIA headquarters inquiry about using CURVE BALL's information in an upcoming speech before the UN General Assembly (what became the Powell UN speech), the relevant CIA station specifically cautioned CIA headquarters about using CURVE BALL's information in a public speech. A January 27, 2003 station cable said:

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77 Id. at p. 190.
78 Id. at pp. 188-189.
[The foreign liaison service handling CURVE BALL] has not been able to verify his reporting. [This foreign service] has discussed CURVE BALL with US [and others], but no one has been able to verify this information. . . . The source himself is problematical. Defer to headquarters but to use information from another liaison service’s source whose information cannot be verified on such an important, key topic should take the most serious consideration.79

(U) Because this cable was not provided to the Committee during the first phase of its Iraq review, the Committee was unaware that Europe Division officials had relayed concerns about the public use of CURVE BALL’s information. This prompted an additional Committee inquiry about specific issues raised by the WMD Commission. This ongoing inquiry is examining several issues, including claims by the Europe Division Chief that a representative of the foreign service handling CURVE BALL told him in the fall of 2002 that he believed CURVE BALL was a “fabricator,” and that officials in the Europe Division had raised concerns about CURVE BALL’s credibility with the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence before Secretary Powell’s UN speech.

(U) In addition, the Committee is examining the facts surrounding a December 20, 2002, cable from the relevant CIA station which transmitted comments from a letter to the DCI and a discussion with the Chief of Station from the head of the foreign intelligence service that handled CURVE BALL. The cable noted that the head of the foreign intelligence service said experts from a number of foreign intelligence services had analyzed the CURVE BALL information and believed “the information was plausible, but were unable to verify it.” The head of the foreign intelligence service also said his own service had not verified the report on mobile facilities.80 The CIA station sent the actual letter from the head of the foreign intelligence service with a verbatim translation on


80 CIA operational cable, December 20, 2002.
February 10, 2003. The former DCI, George Tenet, testified before the Committee that he never saw and was not aware of the existence of the cable or the letter. The Committee is continuing to examine this case.

(U) The Committee has already examined several thousand documents and conducted numerous interviews regarding this issue. The Committee intends to continue its review of the Intelligence Community’s handling of CURVE BALL and will report resulting findings and conclusions when that review is complete.

2. Postwar Findings - Biological

(U) The ISG judged that actions between 1991 and 1996 demonstrated Iraq’s intention to preserve its BW capability and progress to a mature BW program when and if the opportunity arose. The ISG found no evidence that Iraq had plans for a new BW program or was conducting BW-specific work after the UN supervised 1996 destruction of Iraq’s primary BW production facility.81 Further, they found “no indications that biological agents were researched for BW purposes after 1991.”82

(U) The ISG judged that in 1991 and 1992, Iraq “appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW weapons and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent,” but lacked evidence to document complete destruction. Iraq retained some BW-related seed stock until their discovery after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 83

(U) The ISG found undeclared covert laboratories used by the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) until the mid-1990s for research into BW agents.

81 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Biological Section at p. 1.
82 ld. at p. 18, 38, 40.
83 ld. at p. 2.
However, the ISG could not determine the scope and nature of the work done at these laboratories.\textsuperscript{84}

(U) The ISG determined that depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks to months of a decision to do so, but found no indications that Iraq was pursuing this option.\textsuperscript{85} The ISG noted that Iraq would have faced great difficulty in re-establishing an effective BW agent production capability.\textsuperscript{86} Iraq’s bacterial and toxin BW agents were adequately researched and developed prior to the first Gulf war and had weaponized \textit{Clostridium botulinum}, \textit{Bacillus anthracis}, and Aflatoxin in liquid form. The ISG found that Iraq did have the basic capability to work with smallpox, but found no evidence that Iraq retained any stocks of smallpox virus or actively conducted research into the agent for BW intentions.\textsuperscript{87}

(U) The ISG found that Iraq devoted increased resources and effort to biotechnology and genetic engineering activities from 1998-2003, but found no evidence of activity likely to contribute directly to BW. According to the ISG, Iraq actively pursued the goal of drying its BW agent and possessed the expertise and equipment to do so, but the ISG found no evidence of dried agent.\textsuperscript{88}

(U) The ISG conducted a thorough investigation of all information relating to a mobile BW program and found “no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons.” The investigation included an examination of two suspect trailers,

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Id.} at p. 3, 57.
\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Id.} at p. 2.
\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Id.} at p. 2.
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Id.} at p. 3, 18.
\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Id.} at p. 56-8.
found in April and May 2003, which had been previously examined by three investigative teams with different results.

(U) In April 2003, a U.S. chemical and biological intelligence support team (CBIST) examined the first recovered trailer and provided a preliminary field assessment of its findings. The team's report assessed the trailer was "likely of recent construction or refit capable of supporting a limited biological batch production process." A comment from the reporting officer noted a chemical agent or industrial production process could not be ruled out. In addition, the report noted that on-site tests for anthrax, plague, ricin, botulinin toxin, seb, tularemia, brucella, and smallpox were negative.  

(U) Also in April, Joint Task Force Twenty, a joint U.S./U.K. military team, examined the same trailer and assessed that the trailer was "probably the latest generation of the reported Iraqi Transportable BW Production Trailers." The report concluded that "the TBWAPT [transportable biological warfare agent production trailer] is one part of a process to produce biological weapons." CIA told the Committee the Joint Task Force report provided photographs which were shown to CURVE BALL, the key source of the prewar mobile trailer reporting, who identified some of the equipment as associated with the trailers he had described. In addition, CIA told the Committee that three CIA analysts inspected the trailers in Iraq in mid-May 2003 and they "agreed with the conclusions of the Task Force Twenty Report." One of the CIA analysts interviewed by the Committee said when he inspected the trailer he relayed his views to CIA headquarters that "based on the analysis that the TF-20 team did and based on the similarity to the CURVE BALL reporting, we thought that there was a good chance that these were what we thought they were, that they were related to the BW program."

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(U) The CIA told the Committee that the Task Force assessment was the primary assessment used by CIA analysts in writing the May 16, 2003 paper, *Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants*, which described the trailers as "the strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program." The CIA published an unclassified version of the paper on CIA's website on May 28, 2003. The publication was directed by the former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The paper remains on CIA's website today.

(U) On May 25 and 26, 2003, both trailers were examined by a DIA-led interagency exploitation team which provided a technical engineering assessment of the trailer system. The team concluded in a May 27, 2003 executive summary that "although a substantial explosion hazard does exist based on the configuration of the system, it is possible to produce hydrogen gas with the system" and "that the trailer system could not be used as a transportable biological production system as the system is presently configured." A CIA scientist, who had participated in the inspection of the trailer, sent an e-mail to his CIA colleagues with the content of the executive summary. According to one of the CIA BW analysts, the executive summary's findings were discussed at meetings where CIA managers were present. The DIA-led team produced a more extensive report, which had the same conclusion as the summary, in late June 2003. According to DIA, neither the executive summary nor the report was formally disseminated outside the DIA, until the report was posted on the Intelligence Community intranet in 2004.

(U) On June 6, 2003, the CIA provided an assessment about the trailers, *Update on Iraq BW Trailers*, to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. The paper stated that "CIA's judgment that the trailers found in Iraq were intended for

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91 CIA response to questions from Committee staff, June 14, 2006.


93 DIA response to questions from Committee staff, May 10, 2006.
BW agent production has not changed.” The paper noted that “a DIA-organized team’s findings that the trailers are not ‘suitable for efficient BW agent production’ were considered prior to the publication of the unclassified May 28 White Paper.” The paper said members of the DIA team who believed the trailers were not suited for BW agent production, "still have not been able to find a credible alternate use," and provided two pages of talking points for use with the press offering CIA counterpoints to the DIA-led team’s findings.\(^\text{94}\)

(U) In response to questions raised by these inquiries, the ISG examined the trailers as part of its investigation of the alleged mobile BW program. The ISG found that eleven design features of a fermentor, critical to a BW production capability, were not present on the fermentor in the mobile trailer. Ten of those features would require major reconfiguration to be transformed into a BW-capable fermentor.\(^\text{96}\) The ISG judged that the trailers were impractical for biological agent production and almost certainly designed and built for hydrogen generation.\(^\text{97}\)

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\(^{94}\) CIA, Update on Iraqi BW Trailers, June 6, 2003.

\(^{95}\) Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Biological Section at p. 79, 81.

\(^{97}\) Id. at p. 3.
(U) Regarding the primary source reporting on Iraq's mobile biological weapons program, code named CURVE BALL, the ISG said it "harbors severe doubts about the source's credibility."\(^98\) The ISG team investigating CURVE BALL's story located and debriefed over sixty individuals who could have been involved in a mobile program or were linked to suspect sites or to CURVE BALL. Many of the individuals corroborated some of the reporting on personnel and some legitimate activities the source claimed were covert activities, but none provided evidence to substantiate the claim of a mobile BW program.\(^99\)

(U) The facility which CURVE BALL said housed the mobile production units did not have vehicle entrances on the ends of the buildings as he reported. In fact, the ISG reported that "two two-meter-high block walls around three sides of the building prevent vehicle access into the building through these reported vehicle entrances. ISG determined that the walls were constructed by 1997, which is when the BW production unit was reportedly on site."\(^100\)

(U) A CIA analyst involved in the ISG's investigation of CURVE BALL told Committee staff that in the fall of 2003 the ISG interviewed CURVE BALL's relatives who said CURVE BALL was not in Iraq during key parts of the time he claimed to have worked in the mobile program.\(^101\) A CIA assessment dated May 26, 2004 states that "investigations since the war in Iraq and debriefings of the key source indicate he lied about his access to a mobile BW production project."\(^102\) The CIA and DIA issued a joint congressional notification in June 2004 noting

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\(^{98}\) Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, Biological Section at p. 3.

\(^{99}\) Id. at p. 74.

\(^{100}\) Id. at p. 75.

\(^{101}\) Staff Interview of CIA analyst, June 8, 2005.

that CURVE BALL was assessed to have fabricated his claimed access to a mobile BW production project and that his reporting had been recalled.\textsuperscript{103}

\textbf{C. Chemical Weapons (CW) Assessments}

\textit{(U)} The primary assessment in the 2002 NIE regarding Iraq’s chemical weapons capabilities was “Baghdad has chemical weapons.”\textsuperscript{104} The NIE also said:

\begin{itemize}
  \item We judge that Iraq is expanding its chemical industry primarily to support chemical weapons production\textsuperscript{105} and is probably hiding small-scale agent production within legitimate research laboratories.\textsuperscript{106}
  
  \item Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited CW production hidden within Iraq’s legitimate chemical industry.\textsuperscript{107}
\end{itemize}

\textit{(U)} The Intelligence Community judged in October 2002 that Iraq had probably had a stockpile of between 100 to 500 metric tons, “much of it added within the past year.”\textsuperscript{108} The stockpile estimate was outlined in a footnote of the NIE. It said:

\begin{quote}
Conservative estimates of Iraqi CW precursor stocks and production capacity, combined with Iraqi motivations and military requirements,
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{103} CIA and DIA Congressional Affairs Notification, June 7, 2004.
\textsuperscript{104} National Intelligence Estimate, \textit{Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction}, October 1, 2002, p.5.
\textsuperscript{105} \textit{ld.} at p. 31.
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{ld.} at p. 33.
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{ld.} at p. 35.
\textsuperscript{108} \textit{ld.} at p. 6.
\end{footnotes}
IV. ALLEGED INC-LINKED SOURCES

A. CURVE BALL

(U) The Senate Intelligence Committee’s July 2004 report, the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, examined the role of a foreign liaison service source, code named CURVE BALL, in the Intelligence Community’s judgments about Iraq’s biological weapons program. CURVE BALL was the source that led the Intelligence Community to judge in the 2002 NIE on Iraq’s WMD capabilities that “Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents.” There were three other sources who the Intelligence Community believed corroborated CURVE BALL’s reporting, but CURVE BALL was the Intelligence Community’s primary source on the BW program, providing more than 100 reports on Iraq’s alleged BW program while the other sources provided one each. As one analyst described to Committee staff, without CURVE BALL, “... you probably could only honestly say that Iraq would be motivated to have a mobile BW program and that it was attempting to procure components that would support that.”

(U) The Committee noted in its July 2004 report that uncertainties about CURVE BALL’s reliability had been raised in CIA operations cables but were not disseminated to analysts outside the CIA. Despite these warnings, and perhaps in part because of the limited dissemination of those warnings, the Intelligence

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323 See pages 148-161 of the Committee’s July 2004 Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq for a discussion of all four sources and their role in the Intelligence Community’s judgments about a mobile biological weapons program.
Community judged CURVE BALL to be "credible" or "very credible" in its reporting. The Committee concluded that uncertainties about his reliability should have been taken into account by operations officers who provided the initial judgment of his credibility, should have made the analysts who were aware of them wary about relying so heavily on his reporting, and should have been noted in the NIE. In addition, these concerns should have been passed on to policymakers, who used CURVE BALL's information publicly. 325

(U) Following publication of the first report, the Committee learned of additional prewar concerns about CURVE BALL's reliability within the CIA. Those issues are discussed briefly in the accuracy section of this report and are the subject of a continuing Committee inquiry.

(U) In the summer and fall of 2003, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) investigated whether Iraq had a mobile biological weapons program as part of its overall investigation into Iraq's WMD capabilities. The primary focus was investigating sites and individuals identified by CURVE BALL and later, CURVE BALL himself. The ISG located and debriefed over sixty individuals who could have been involved in a mobile program, were linked to suspect sites, or to CURVE BALL. Many of the individuals corroborated some of the reporting on personnel and some legitimate activities CURVE BALL claimed were cover activities, but none provided evidence to substantiate the claim of a mobile BW program. 326 Inspections of the facilities CURVE BALL had described also did not support his story. A CIA assessment dated May 26, 2004 states that "investigations since the war in Iraq and debriefings of the key source indicate he lied about his access to a mobile BW production project." 327 The CIA and DIA

325 Id. at pp. 188-189.
326 Id. at p. 74.
327 CIA, Key Mobile BW Source Deemed Unreliable, May 26, 2004
jointly issued a congressional notification in June 2004 noting that CURVE BALL was assessed to have fabricated his claimed access to a mobile BW production project and that his reporting had been recalled.  

(U) During the ISG’s investigation of CURVE BALL, the group learned that CURVE BALL had a close relative who had worked for the INC since 1992, for at least some period in a senior position. This revelation, combined with the fact that CURVE BALL was determined to have fabricated substantial portions of his reporting, led to suspicion that CURVE BALL may have been coached on his story by the INC.  

(U) According to a March 2004 CIA review, in the fall of 2003, CURVE BALL’s close relative, then working in INC offices in Iraq, willingly met with ISG officers. CURVE BALL’s close relative stated that he had contacted CURVE BALL in 2001 on behalf of the INC to ascertain whether CURVE BALL, in the course of his employment with Iraq’s Organization of Military Industry, had any information on secret or sensitive projects that would help boost the case against Iraq at the UN. CURVE BALL told his close relative he did not. The close relative also said that he had minimal contact with CURVE BALL since CURVE BALL defected to a European country, which the CIA says is consistent with records they have been able to locate.  

(U) When the CIA was finally given access to CURVE BALL in March 2004, CURVE BALL refused to discuss anything about his family. In a response to questions from Committee staff, the CIA said its officers did not ask about

328 CIA and DIA Congressional Affairs Notification, June 7, 2004.
329 CIA operational cable, April 2004.
CURVE BALL’s close relative’s INC connections, fearing that CURVE BALL would terminate discussions with the CIA. CIA never asked CURVE BALL about any affiliation with the INC, judging that he would have terminated the discussion if they had.\footnote{CIA response to questions from Committee staff, January 10, 2006.}

\textbf{(U)} The CIA believes that CURVE BALL’s close relative’s connection to the INC is coincidental, and is not an explanation for his fabrications. The CIA told Committee staff in a written response to questions that CURVE BALL’s defection did not fit the pattern of the typical INC-influenced defection in that the INC did not broker his introduction to the Intelligence Community and did not put him in front of the media.\footnote{CIA response to questions from Committee staff, January 10, 2006.} In 2003, a CIA analyst told the Committee that CURVE BALL was located when he sought asylum in a European country, when officials reviewed his asylum paperwork, noticed that he was an Iraqi chemical engineer, and approached him to be interviewed. The analyst said CURVE BALL did not come forward with information himself. In explaining why she did not think CURVE BALL was affiliated with the INC she said that the INC would “shop their good sources around town, but they weren’t known for sneaking people out of countries into some asylum system. This isn’t the way they were known to operate. It would have been more blatant if the INC—at least in our estimation—had been putting him forward.”\footnote{CIA internal memorandum, March 8, 2004.}

\textbf{(U)} A study of possible Iraqi opposition deception efforts against the U.S. noted that CIA has never formally collected against the INC and has no information on their processes and procedures for disseminating information, a key element to assess potential deception programs and tactics.\footnote{Interview with CIA analysts, December 4, 2003.} However, CIA
officials told Committee staff that they were able to observe how the INC operated openly and that the judgments about CURVE BALL were made from those observations.\textsuperscript{336} The CIA acknowledged that there is no concrete evidence that CURVE BALL was not working at the behest of or influenced by the INC, but assessed that "CURVE BALL’s connection to the INC was coincidental."\textsuperscript{337}

\textbf{(U)} Ahmed Chalabi and two other INC officials have told Committee staff that the INC had no involvement with CURVE BALL and, to this day, they do not know who CURVE BALL is. Chalabi said that the INC had done their own investigation to find out "who he was" and whether there was any truth to suggestions that he had a close relative in the INC. Chalabi said the investigation did not turn up anyone in the INC who had this close relative in the European country, where CURVE BALL resides. CIA officers told the Committee that it was hard to believe that no one Chalabi knew in the INC did not have this close relative in the European country. One officer added, "I find that a non-credible statement." When asked if they had any examples of any INC officials who do have this close relative in the European country in question, a CIA officer said, "we didn’t follow the INC with that kind of detail so I can’t answer that."

\textbf{(U)} Chalabi and two other INC officials denied ever attempting to bring any sources to the Intelligence Community, or anyone else, without openly identifying the INC’s involvement.\textsuperscript{338}

\textsuperscript{336} Interview with CIA officers, July 20, 2006.
\textsuperscript{337} CIA response to questions from Committee staff, January 10, 2006.
\textsuperscript{338} Staff interviews with INC officials.
B. Source Nineteen

(•••) On February 27, 2002, Source Nineteen, an Iraqi defector, walked in to a third country Embassy in the Middle East. Officers from both the CIA and the third country’s intelligence service debriefed him four times. Source Nineteen claimed to have worked as a civilian employee in the IIS from 1988 to 2001, initially as a driver. He claimed that he was aware of four trucks in Iraq that carried biological and nuclear material and that in 1995 al-Qa’ida sent some of its members to receive training at a Baghdad intelligence school. He also provided the names of individuals he said were Iraqi intelligence agents posted abroad. The July 2002 NIC Memorandum noted that he “provided somewhat sensational information on subjects to which he seemed unlikely to have access,” including Iraqi involvement in terrorist training, IIS assassination techniques, locations of biological and nuclear weapons material, subsonic bullets, and a secret weapon that fired poison darts. He was also unable to provide basic organizational information on the IIS that would show familiarity with the organization.339

(U) Operations traffic regarding Source Nineteen said that while he “has not apparently been associated with the Iraqi opposition, his purported access to the several areas of sensational information reminds us of another high-profile case that was run . . . by the INC. There may be no INC angle to this case, but subject’s claims regarding al-Qa’ida and Iraqi atrocities could easily wind up in the press.” Another operations cable noted that Source Nineteen did speak with a journalist from an unnamed Iraqi opposition newspaper while in the Middle East, but said he broke contact because the journalist refused to pay him for interviews.