Alexander Yakovlev, Memorandum for Gorbachev
“Toward an Analysis of the Fact of the Visit of Prominent American Political Leaders to the USSR (Kissinger, Vance, Kirkpatrick, Brown, and others), February 25, 1987

To Comrade Gorbachev M. S.

I. What does the fact of the visit signify?
The main purpose of this group’s visit is, to a minor degree, to analyze the state of current relations in the sphere of Soviet-American relations. The strategic basis rationale is to form an assessment of the prospects of our country’s future development on the basis of “original sources” in the light of the probable election in the United States in 1988 of a president who would represent the next generation of the U.S. governing elite. From here [the next step] is to study the possibility of [establishing] new substance and forms of relations with the Soviet Union.

By the beginning of the 1980s, the grave miscalculation of American Sovietology, in all its divisions, became obvious. Two dominant “scenarios” of the future development of the USSR existed before the start of the current decade.

According to the first one, the Soviet economy was approaching the brink of an avalanche-like crisis, which would lead to an open expression of social discontent (approximately following the “Polish version”). Open phases of such a crisis were predicted by the proponents of that concept for 1983-1984. It is precisely on the basis of these assessments that the Reagan policy in particular was built immediately after his coming to power in January 1981.

According to the second one, the crisis in Soviet society would not assume open forms, at least in the current decade, due to a very high level of patience among the population, [the occurrence of] historical tragedies, and a powerful control apparatus. However, the Soviet economy’s development would slow down, and most importantly, the USSR’s economic, scientific-technological, and social backwardness (lagging behind)—not only in comparison to the West but also to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and in the future even to China—would grow. As a result, some time after 1993-1995, the Soviet Union would lose material prospects for development as a world power and its moral and political authority, and it would cease to represent a military, political and social threat to the West.

In essence, beginning from 1975 after the signing of the Helsinki Act, all versions of U.S. long-term strategy—both those that constituted the basis of the administration’s official course and those proposed as alternatives to that course—started from the assumption of the USSR’s downward socio-economic development in the long-term perspective.

In this case, such an approach is not simply a class-based denial that communism has a future. Such perceptions are not just “routine” exercises in propaganda. The actual
assessments were based on data from the CIA, the Department of Commerce, and academic, financial and industrial research centers, supported by information from émigrés arriving from the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe.

The latter source deserves special consideration.

When a substantial wave of emigration started arriving from our country in the beginning of the 1970s, and when the émigrés attributed quite negative characteristics to the internal processes in the USSR, such information was initially received in the United States with considerable qualification, even with mistrust. In essence, nothing but negative opinions about all things Soviet was expected from the émigrés.

However, when by the end of the last decade and at the turn of the 1980s Soviet official statistics and our own public assessments started, in the American view, to confirm the information provided by the émigrés, the latter were given special credence. In a way, a certain mutual strengthening of the traditional negative perception of our country and the current intelligence took place. That resulted in [certain] evaluations of our country’s development prospects for the future up to the XXI century.

That is why the shift in the development of Soviet society after the April (1985) Plenum of the Central Committee had a shocking effect on the American political elite.

Events in the USSR shed bright light on the strategic mistakes of American Sovietology and policy, because the theoretical recommendations of the last decade did not even consider the abstract possibility of change in the USSR—not even as a hypothesis.

It is precisely in this context that one should consider the “intelligence-gathering” political mission of the above-mentioned group, which consists of representatives of the highest echelon of the political elite. In the discussions, which they held after their conversations in Moscow, the following main directions could be identified.

1. **Do developments in the USSR represent an “explosion of idealism” or are they a thought-out and conscious policy?**

Members of the group devoted special attention to trying to discover to what extent people in the USSR see the interconnectedness between economic, social and other aspects of the current course, and how they assess the essence of the problems and the prospects for development “at the intersections” of the social and economic, and social and political, and economic and military spheres.

What they heard in Moscow led them to conclude that the policy of *perestroika* was based on a thought-out conception. They see the “conflict between the demands for economic efficiency and the demands of the social sphere” as the main contradiction in the development of Soviet society. Members of the group noted that judging by the discussions that had taken place, people in the USSR see and understand this contradiction (Peterson, Vance, Kirkpatrick, Jones, Kissinger). Diminishing the
sharpness of this contradiction would change the face of the country, and would raise its social prestige.

2. How realistic are the plans of the Soviet leadership? Only one member of the group—Hyland—called these plans “unrealistic.” At the same time, one could clearly see in the reaction of this professional Sovietologist (a liberal one by American standards) deep irritation with the fact that the prognoses of Sovietology turned out to be completely overturned. He took part in developing those prognoses himself.

The rest of the [participants] described the plans for socio-economic development in the USSR with varying degrees of optimism. Not one of them allowed for the possibility of fully realizing those plans. But at the same time, in their general assessments, there has been a shift toward greater optimism and a greater willingness to believe in the success of our initiatives. Such a reaction was especially noticeable in Vance and Peterson.

3. Is it good or bad for the USA if the USSR experiences upward development? Only Hyland expressed himself to the effect that strengthening the Soviet Union could be accompanied with problems for the USA, mainly from the perspective of foreign policy and relations with Western Europe. The rest of them think that a developing USSR would be more beneficial for U.S. interests than a possible [source] of any sort of shock in their country. (Jones said directly—“we wish [them] luck.”)

Some members of the group expressed concern that both countries’ focus on competition with each other would lead to a mutual weakening, and thus simultaneously to a relative strengthening of third countries, above all Japan. In this connection, Kirkpatrick and certain others spoke in favor of reducing military expenditures in the light of domestic interest in the USSR and the USA.

4. To what extent has the new political thinking become a part of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy? The spectrum of judgments played out as follows. Kirkpatrick, who believes that it was only a matter of Gorbachev’s personal style, was at one pole. In her assessment, she “did not expect that the Soviet Union could have such an open and democratically inclined leader.” As far the content of USSR foreign policy, in her words, “there were only limited new expressions with the old background.”

Vance represented the opposite pole within the group. In his opinion, a lot of new things had already been introduced as part of the content of USSR foreign policy, and it was especially important that the principal elements of that new [content] be confirmed in the decisions of the XXVII Congress, such as for example the concept of an interdependent world. One cannot fail to see, he noted, that the actions of the Soviet leadership are coordinated with those general principles; we are not just talking about propaganda.

The subject of Afghanistan was in the very center of the discussion about new thinking among the group’s members.
Proponents of the point of view that “the new thinking is nothing but words” shared the position that “there is no reason for the United States to help the Soviet Union get out of Afghanistan.” At most, U.S. “neutrality” toward a political settlement in Afghanistan would be possible “in exchange for cutting all USSR assistance to Nicaragua, including economic [assistance]” (Hyland).

Vance, Tarnoff, and Swing spoke to the effect that now the USA does not gain any real benefit from the war in Afghanistan, but more and more they are risking the likely collapse of Pakistan and the possibility of an American-Indian confrontation. Taking that into account, in their view, the USA should not interfere with a political settlement in Afghanistan, if the USSR finds a formula of such a settlement.

5. **About joint venture enterprises.** This concept drew a lot of interest both from the practical (Peterson) and the ideological (Kissinger) points of view. The main issue, which is still unresolved, in the opinion of the Americans, and which constrains the practical implementation of such projects, is how the contradiction between western companies’ focus on extracting profit, on purely business criteria, and the need to abide by the requirements of Soviet law would be resolved. All the practical issues, first of all those having to do with the share of joint venture enterprises in the USSR’s domestic market, and those regarding procedures for repatriating the profit—require more explanations.

6. **What does the sphere of common Soviet and U.S. interests consist of today?** All members of the group were united in the opinion that the principal sphere of common interests lies in preventing nuclear war, and creating and strengthening guarantees against its outbreak.

Members of the group also considered the two countries’ reduction of military expenditures as a sphere of growing common interest. Peterson emphasized that in the last two or three years in U.S. business circles a serious concern has arisen about the consequences of the growth of military spending and the corresponding **U.S. national budget deficit**. He mentioned that fears of a deficit were very strong in business circles, especially because its impact could affect literally everything—U.S. internal life, relations with allies and with the “third world,” and so on.

As a result of conversations in Moscow, the belief in the idea of “exhausting the USSR with the arms race” was undermined. Members of the group noted that in the face of the USSR, the way it is imaginable in the future, the USA would not be able to allow itself excessive military spending (Peterson, Tarnoff, Jones, Vance); otherwise, they would exhaust themselves.

At the same time, members of the group essentially do not see any other spheres of common interest between the USSR and the USA. The idea of complete elimination of nuclear armaments is being received with alarm. There are three groups of arguments against this idea.
—the belief that nuclear weapons alone have preserved the peace for the last forty years, and would be capable of preserving it in the future.
—The concern that if nuclear weapons were eliminated, the USSR would attain great superiority in conventional weapons.
—That whereas thinking within the “nuclear” framework is sufficiently well developed, the liquidation of nuclear weapons would return foreign policy thinking in the U.S. to the level and concepts of the 1940s-1950s.

Concerns about the prospect of eliminating nuclear weapons are so strong that according to the statements of some members of the group (Kissinger, Brown), the proponents of arms control in the U.S. have “quieted down;” they are frightened of both Soviet superiority in conventional armaments and of the possibility of an unprecedented arms race in this sphere on the basis of new technologies.

The conclusion of the group’s members: nuclear armaments should be considerably reduced on the basis of strategic stability, but not eliminated completely.

7. The prospects for Soviet-American relations, especially for the immediate future. This is the main [subject] that was analyzed and discussed. On this, members of the group expressed two opinions, which, strictly speaking, did not contradict each other.

First: in principle, there exists an opportunity to achieve agreement on disarmament during this period, but only if we “untie” the Reykjavik package. In this case, an agreement on INF could be the easiest to achieve. An agreement on SDI/ABM is not impossible either, but it would require great effort.

Second: even if Reagan “wakes up” in the remaining two years and wants to achieve agreement on something, nothing would come out of it due to the balance of forces in the administration and the power of the extreme right to counter such agreements with allegations to the effect that they would contradict the provisions officially accepted previously by the administration.

It is telling that both the first and the second assessments were expressed by the same people (Kissinger, Vance, Brown, Tarnoff). However, they all emphasized the need in any case not to stop conducting an “intensive policy” toward the U.S., which would by virtue of its existence neutralize the threat of the extreme right. And this threat, according to the general assessment of the group, is real, and its scope is increasing along with the growing difficulties of the administration and with national elections in 1988 drawing closer.

II. Conclusions and Suggestions.

The trip to Moscow, of course, did not lead the members of the group to change their general views—nobody would have expected that anyway. The principal concepts of goals remained the same as well. One thing has changed noticeably, however—the opinion was confirmed that the USSR has started and will continue in the future the kinds
of domestic reforms that might require deep corrections in American prognoses of the future development of Soviet society—corrections of a political, economic and international nature.

Perestroika is not seen as threatening to the U.S. interests, apparently mainly because they are waiting to see how things progress here. U.S. Sovietologists obviously need more time for a deeper analysis of the interconnections between the USSR’s domestic and foreign policies in the future. Judging by everything, members of the group have in mind to work out some kind of alternative to the Reagan course, but at this point they are still unable to present it convincingly to public opinion and to the political elite of the United States. There remains a certain lack of clarity after the mistakes [that have been made] in their theoretical blueprints and practical actions.

Therefore, [we are facing] the task of [applying] incessant and effective political pressure on the United States with the objective of countering Reagan’s course and of providing support for those forces within the U.S. ruling class who stand against this course.

It appears that the most effective step here in the present circumstances could be to “untie the package” that was proposed at the summit in Reykjavik, and to redefine the relationships between its constituent parts. Tactically, such “untying” could be either a one-time event, presented in some “dramatic” form, or more extended in time; either instantly and fully open and public, or containing both public and diplomatic forms. It would be most preferable to do it as a transformation of the “package” into a concept for a “framework agreement” on the 1974 Vladivostok model.

A) The presentation of the “package” in Reykjavik was precise, right, and necessary. We needed a powerful initiative, which would have captured public opinion, conducted an assertive “reconnaissance by fighting” of the administration’s positions, would have illuminated those positions, and would become a means of putting pressure on them. And a powerful initiative should have had reliable insurance. Our initiatives have fulfilled all those functions with distinction:

   a) Reagan’s positions as a proponent of a military-force approach were exposed to the maximum extent;
   b) In terms of domestic support, the SDI is now weaker in the U.S. than it was before Reykjavik—it is not an accident that Weinberger and the far right are rushing with the decision to deploy [SDI]; in the Congress, the mood is predominantly against a full-scale SDI, because of financial considerations as well;
   c) The administration is weaker in terms of foreign policy: Irangate became possible only after and due to Reykjavik, it is a form of retribution against Reagan for Reykjavik (simultaneously from several sides);
   d) A deep split has occurred in public opinion in the West as a whole, which now is using multiple channels of access to all aspects of relations between East and West, as well as within NATO. This split is even more effective due to the fact that it came as a complete surprise to the West;
e) The ideas expressed in the “package” are still at work now, almost half a year after Reykjavik, as a factor in mobilizing the elements of new political thinking worldwide, and in counteracting the line of the Reagan administration. But it is precisely the ideas [themselves], not the “package” as such.

In short, we have created an extremely important and effective beachhead for our offensive against Reagan. Today, without losing any time, we should expand it, turn it into a beachhead for an offensive against the positions of the forces of the far right, and of the active proponents of the arms race in general, while at the same time ensuring opportunities for cooperation in this sphere with moderately conservative and liberal groups in the U.S. and Western Europe.

Objective opportunities for this do exist. The Reagan administration stumbled backwards after Reykjavik. Having [now] taken positions on SDI that are even more aggressive than [those presented] during the summit itself, Washington, judging by everything, is now trying to exclude any possibility of a positive shift on any of the issues of our “package” beforehand, even as they state just the opposite publicly. It turns the “package” into a dead end.

The White House, it seems, is deeply convinced that the “package” represents our final position. The responses to your latest statements show that they were waiting for new proposals or concessions from us. Not having received them, they must be thinking now in Washington that any serious progress on the Soviet position is unlikely. In these conditions, “untying the package” would become one more action that finally unmasks the genuine essence of the U.S. position on the issues of limitation and reduction of armaments.

B) We should not let the next U.S. trick go unanswered. For us, the “package” as such is not a goal, but a means. The Soviet side should not allow Washington to sow doubts about our intentions, shift responsibility for the lack of progress in the negotiations to the USSR, [or] capture the political initiative by painting a prospect for “fully realistic” 50% cuts for public opinion, and so on.

There is no guarantee that if we untie the “package,” the U.S. side would assent to balanced agreements with us. The facts suggest a completely different tendency in the development of Reagan’s position. But another point is equally true—in the atmosphere of stagnation, one notices a dilution of borders in Western European public opinion, and partially even in American [public opinion]: both superpowers are being perceived as incapable of responding positively to the aspirations of the masses.

In politics, maximum freedom of maneuver is always valuable. The “package” in its present form only ties our hands. We don’t have likely grounds to expect that everything will work out on its own, that Reagan will have an epiphany—in Reykjavik, he missed his best chance to go down in history not as a clown (lît se dei), but as a statesman. For that, Reagan is not intelligent enough, and too limited in his freedom of choice.
In our analysis of the situation, we should take one more aspect into account. Under the current correlation of forces, the USSR is confronting the USA not only in the international arena, but also inside the U.S. itself. Of course, we cannot elect a “good” President for ourselves, we cannot persuade him to make “good” policy for us. However, we can protect ourselves from the worst. Today this would mean: increasing pressure on Reagan and the circles standing behind him. Adding more flexibility and dynamism to the Soviet approach would strengthen such pressure.

C) Are agreements on separate issues in our interest? I think yes. We never formulated the issue as “all or nothing.” We are not presenting it in such a form now either: we are not linking the “package” with nuclear testing, [or] chemical weapons. What kind of agreements are possible in principle?

1. INF, with a simultaneous discussion about tactical missiles. For us this would be tantamount to removal of a very serious threat. [It] would boost our reputation in Europe. In the end, [it] would make our relations with China easier.

   In any case, it is unlikely that we would have to penetrate SDI, if it is ever built, with intermediate-range missiles. Untying the “package” makes this agreement attainable; preserving the “package” blocks it. Here the benefit of untangling is obvious.

2. A 50% reduction in strategic weapons, with a simultaneous emphasis on our readiness to proceed to full nuclear disarmament. If it were possible, the benefit of such a reduction would be unquestionable in all respects: political, economic, moral, and military. Building up strategic offensive weapons would make sense only in order to penetrate SDI, but we still have to undertake a comprehensive analysis of this issue.

3. The following model of a settlement also deserves consideration—a 50% reduction in strategic weapons (the number of delivery vehicles and the number of warheads would be decreased by half in real terms, while each side would have the right to decide the relative proportion of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers); a simultaneous decrease by 50% in U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in the European zone; and a reduction in U.S. forward-based systems by 50%. If the U.S. agrees to adequately reduce its forward-based systems in Japan and South Korea, [we should agree] to bring the number of [our] intermediate-range missiles in Asia (and respectively in the U.S. territory) down to 100 (warheads).

   At the same time, we take into account that the United States links the implementation of measures on INF in Europe with strict verification. Consequently, U.S. territory as such would be left outside of the verification regime, while inspections in England, the FRG, and other countries would require complicated coordinating procedures with the national governments.

   Will the U.S. go for such decisions? It is already clear—not under Reagan! Under these conditions, our readiness for an agreement outside the “package” would have the following pluses for us:
—[it would] uncover the true positions of the U.S., and become a powerful and long-term instrument of pressure on the Americans and their course;  
—[it would] play the role of a stimulus to limit appropriations for SDI in the American Congress; the stimulus [would be] even more effective if we could preserve existing limits and cut at least some armaments, at least the INF. The political and psychological effect of such a step would be very significant, especially taking into account U.S. growing financial difficulties.

4. **SDI proper.** At this point, the Soviet Union stands by its position of a complete rejection of all military technologies that constitute the basis of this American program. If we want to be logical and persuasive in our struggle with SDI on this platform, we have to be ready to put forth the idea of not just limitation but full renunciation of ABM systems, i.e. of a toughening of the requirements of the 1972 ABM treaty. Any limitation is always misleading, it leaves loopholes for circumvention and misunderstandings.

A ban on ABM [systems] would mean very little real change for us, because during the last decade systems have emerged against which there exist no effective counter-systems so far; and the quantitative limitations under the treaty are very poorly linked with the actual scale of possible massive strikes. Consequently, the Moscow ABM district has significance only as a research and testing ground for the contingency in the event the question arises about deploying a system of defense for the national territory.

It appears that the U.S.—at least up to the point of actual testing of the developing technologies on real targets—is not going to engage in negotiations with us on the subject of turning the ABM treaty into a treaty banning ABM [systems]. The latter would become possible only in case testing within the framework of SDI returns disappointing results, or if the systems themselves turn out to be so complicated and expensive that Washington would prefer to cut back the system. However, testing outside the framework of the existing treaty would mean the end of its existence, unless, understandably, the sides agree to something else before such testing.

The issue of making a concession to the Americans in terms of a “broad interpretation” of the ABM Treaty could be raised in practical terms only if there was appropriate compensation on Washington’s part—for example, finding an agreed upon modus on the legal status of space; [or,] further, developing regulations on certain kinds of activities in space, or even better—in relation to objects in space; and finally, formulating objective criteria to distinguish between the defensive and non-defensive character of systems allowed to be deployed in space, and the methodology for verifying implementation of the agreed-upon obligations.

What is the point of putting forth this kind of consideration? First of all, it would not be expedient retrospectively to give our opponents a pretext for alleging that the USSR made success in Reykjavik impossible by linking nuclear disarmament to SDI. Secondly, by providing details of our approach (explaining terms, such as laboratory
research, and so on.) we would demonstrate that a development of this kind was already possible at Reykjavik, had the United States wanted to bring our positions closer together. Thirdly, raising a number of questions for discussion would allow us to weaken the link between the ABM and SDI without any damage to our reputation, and to accept the principle of parallel negotiations.

In general, partial agreements—on SDI and on all other issues—are in our interest in terms of their potential content and by virtue of the fact that their existence as such would expand and strengthen the political and legal basis of Soviet-American relations. We need to clear the way for such agreements as much as possible.

D. The initiative is in our hands now. We put forward far-reaching proposals, and took steps to make their implementation a reality. The U.S. and the West responded with all kinds of “buts” and “ifs,” [both] artificial and genuine doubts. The task now is to remove artificial obstacles and to present for the judgment of world public opinion the genuine, deep motives of American policy. For this we need a new breakthrough—with the understanding, however, that the reaction to such a breakthrough in the United States would follow the familiar pattern (which is more than plausible), and that some time later we might need to further develop our proposals in the interests of maintaining constant pressure on the U.S. (the matryoshka principle in formulating our initiatives).

From the perspective of the USSR’s national security, the “untying of the package” does not present any real “minuses:” the content of the proposals essentially remains the same. The fact of untying in itself does not in any way signify the automatic conclusion of agreements on conditions that are unfavorable to us. We also preserve the possibility of proposing other linkages and packages should such a need arise.

There could be a difficulty of a propaganda nature on the issue of why in Reykjavik we thought it necessary specifically to present a package and not a set of proposals. It seems to me that this difficulty could be overcome by suggesting that we abandoned the “package” principle in response to the initiatives of the West European states, and that this represents a concession [on our part]. Such a step would also expose the positions of West European conservatives, and would show how much their “desire to achieve agreements with the USSR” is really worth.

Would the untying of the “package” be interpreted as an expression of our excessive interest in [reaching] agreements? Of course it would. But this is how everything is interpreted now anyway. The Reagan administration cannot raise the level of their demands to us—it has already been raised to the limit, and the general political atmosphere and the positions of the administration are not at all what they were in 1981-1982. At the same time, it is still a long while before a new administration comes to power.

However, taking into account [the possibility] that with a new administration coming to power more favorable conditions could develop for achieving agreements, including on SDI, it appears most expedient to prepare [our] positions in advance. “Untying the
package” would now be seen as precisely that kind of preparation, beyond everything else. To the contrary, taking this [step] closer to the time of achieving future agreements would give the U.S. further grounds to draw conclusions about our excessive interest in agreements.

A public speech announcing the untying of the package, if it were to take place in the immediate future, could compensate, in the eyes of the world public, for the fact of our reciprocal resumption of nuclear testing. This consideration is not decisive here, but it also needs to be taken into account.

E. It is extremely important now not to lose the tempo we have developed, and not to lose time. If we want to untie the package, we need to do it right now, because later the effect of it will be much weaker:
— at present, nobody expects a step like this from us; on the contrary, it looks as though in the West and in the United States the impression is growing that we have “written off the Reagan administration;”
— the U.S. elections are still a long way away. Closer to the start of the electoral campaign many people would inevitably interpret such a step as an effort to influence the outcome of the elections;
— objectively, we still have several months to complete the agreements before the electoral campaign starts, and under these conditions our approach would be perceived as a natural one;
— for these and many other reasons, we should not create the impression that we are providing any kind of “advance” to a future U.S. administration;
— “Irangate” will conclude in some way. Depending on its resolution, our approach could be interpreted either as “dealing the final blow” to Reagan or, on the contrary, as a concession to the President, who has emerged from the crisis in a “strengthened” position;
— finally, informed people will see this as our positive response to what many prominent foreigners have said in Moscow.

Therefore, if we undertake the untying of the package in the immediate future, it will look objectively as one more expression of our good will and common sense, and a practical expression of our new thinking, the unity of words and deeds.

And one more consideration. This experience demonstrates that the U.S. concludes significant agreements when they sense the strength of our position. The advent of this moment will be connected, beyond everything else, to the demonstration of our unquestionable achievements in the material sphere. Such a time will come, obviously, in several years. It will be at that point that a “breakthrough” of some kind in Soviet-American relations will become possible. Therefore, it is expedient to view the actions we undertake now as an “accumulation” of authority and positions in anticipation of that sort of moment in the future, and as a long-term political investment.

F. Of course, untying the package would present us with new tasks.
We need a profound study of the full spectrum of positions and arguments for contingencies involving both a U.S. refusal to reach agreement with us (in general or on separate issues), and an expression, now or in the future, of readiness for agreement on their part.

In particular, we need to study the entire set of issues regarding the possibility of carrying out joint programs in space (including verifying that certain kinds of military activities do not take place there), as well as cooperative programs in the arena of “high technology.”

In effect, we did not even touch on the possibility of [developing] programs in the military sphere, starting with direct contacts between defense agencies up to, possibly, certain “unified” systems of command and control.

The legal aspects of overflights of national territories by space weapon systems if and when such systems start to be deployed (whether or not they should be shot down in peacetime) should be studied too.

Another big theme for analysis is the possibility of using international procedures and the services of third countries on matters of verification, arbitration, etc., on a mutual basis.

At the same time, it should be emphasized that the issues listed above as well as other problems demand careful analysis on our part in any case, regardless of the “package,” the untying of which might only necessitate a certain acceleration of such work. However, again, an acceleration of that kind would be desirable in any case.

[Source: State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fond 10063, Opis 1 Delo 388 Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.]