Memorandum of conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz. Excerpt. October 23, 1987

Gorbachev: First of all, I would like to extend a warm welcome to you, Mr. Secretary of State. Taking into account the fact that you came here soon after your meeting with E. A. Shevardnadze in Washington, maybe we can say that our relations are becoming more dynamic. We welcome this. The main thing now is the substance. And here, as it appears to us, something is emerging.

Shultz: We always want to concentrate our attention on the substance. At the same time, it is true that more and more active contacts at the upper levels help move the work on the substance of important issues further. Therefore, a certain interconnectedness exists between the process of our interaction and progress on the concrete issues. I think we can make note of considerable progress on the substantive issues. In my toast at breakfast yesterday, I said that in ten years history will register the fact that in Reykjavik we achieved more than at any other summit in the past.

Gorbachev: I agree with you. I would say that an intellectual breakthrough took place in Reykjavik, and that it was very powerful, that it had a shocking effect, resembling a reaction at a stock exchange. Later, when many things calmed down, and when people figured things out, it became generally accepted that Reykjavik opened a new, very important stage in the political dialogue between our countries, especially on the most important issues of security.

I would like to welcome Mr. Carlucci, who arrived with you. We are hoping that he will make a positive contribution to our search for resolutions on the issues under discussion.

Shevardnadze: Mr. Carlucci made a constructive contribution to our work in Washington.

Gorbachev: Why don’t we do the same here?

Shultz: I have worked with Mr. Carlucci since the 1970s, when he was with the government’s Office of Economic Opportunity—the organization, which works on helping to solve such problems as poverty, assistance to the poor, and so on. Then he worked with me at the Office of Management and Budget. That is the organization whose members constantly reject requests for resources from other government bureaus. Overall, Mr. Carlucci has more extensive experience in various government bureaus than perhaps anybody else. He has worked in the departments of Defense and State, in intelligence, and on issues of domestic policy. He has rich experiences and we always work well together.

Gorbachev: Then he should know well that there cannot be any agreement if the interests of the partner in a negotiation are not taken into account. I say this because S. F. Akhromeev and P. Nitze, who are present here, act differently: they want to bargain for
better conditions for their side, to achieve superiority for the Soviet Union and for the USA, respectively.

*Shultz:* I am sure this does not characterize Akhromeev. It does characterize Nitze.

*Akhromeev:* We were able to agree with him on many issues.

*Gorbachev:* I think that the fact that the military takes part in our meetings is also very important. It shows that our relations have reached a new stage. If we don’t intend to fight each other and, more than that, if we are going to disarm, —then our militaries should also know each other and work together.

*Shultz:* I completely agree with that. If one looks at the history of Soviet-American relations, then one sees that in one sphere [our] cooperation was able to survive all the highs and lows of our relations, and to preserve its constructive character. I have in mind the interaction of our navies within the framework of the agreement on preventing accidents on the high seas. Therefore, we would consider it important that meetings be held between our defense ministers and other military representatives, meetings between Marshal Akhromeev and the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe.

*Gorbachev:* Good. Let us now discuss how we are going to conduct our meeting. We are in a process of democratization in our country now. And that means that this issue should also be resolved in a democratic fashion taking into account both your and our considerations. Maybe you could tell us what you discussed with E. A. Shevardnadze. And then it will be clear what we should discuss with you today.

*Shultz:* Good. I would like to summarize briefly the discussions that took place. We have developed a certain process, which allows us to consider all the issues that are of interest to both sides. Within the framework of this process, the work is conducted on the basis of combining meetings in a comparatively narrow circle with the work of the working groups, which discuss more concrete issues. We believe that this is a good process.

*Gorbachev:* Yes, this organization of [our] work has proven itself.

*Shultz:* We have assembled a good group to conduct the main negotiations: from the Soviet side it is E. A. Shevardnadze together with A. F. Dobrynin and A. A. Bessmertnykh; and from our side, myself, F. Carlucci, and R. Ridgeway. We created working groups, which did some good work on such issues as bilateral relations, human rights and humanitarian issues, arms control. We also created, I would say spontaneously, a group on conventional weapons. Nonetheless, the most productive part of the discussion on regional issues took place within the small group.

We discussed a number of arms control issues. The working group on conventional weapons tried as much as possible to help the discussions, which are now conducted in Vienna, about the mandate for future negotiations on conventional weapons. Another
group held a useful discussion, in our view, on chemical weapons. As far as negotiations on nuclear and space weapons are concerned, we had a separate working group on INF and SRINF, as well as a working group, which discussed strategic weapons and space—the ABM. In addition, these latter issues were discussed in a detailed way at the ministerial level.

We came here with a task and instructions from the President to complete the bulk of our work on the treaty on intermediate and medium-range missiles, i.e. if not to literally dot the last “i”, then to reach a stage where it would be sufficiently clear that this task is solvable. The President also starts from the assumption that the key issue is strategic weapons. We have also noted your statement to the effect that this is the cardinal problem, as well as another statement in which you said that the work on the strategic offensive weapons could be completed before the spring of next year. We agree with this task and we would like to have a sufficient degree of progress to allow us to talk not about the INF but mainly about strategic weapons during your visit to the USA, which we hope will take place, and to establish a foundation for completing our work in this area. This is our goal.

We clarified a number of issues on INF and SRINF. It relates in particular to the so-called problem of Pershing 1A [missiles] in the FRG, as well as to some other issues. We have to say that we resolved most of those issues at the ministerial level. There remain a number of issues, which the working group was working on last evening and night. I must say that I was disappointed with the report of that working group. I think that we should make them do some serious work. We hear too many statements that such-and-such issue should be left for consideration in Geneva, to which I say: no, this issue should be resolved here because the people working in Geneva receive their instructions from Moscow and Washington. Today, the people who can make the appropriate decisions are gathered here, and it is necessary to resolve those issues.

In short, I was hoping to inform you that the main issues on INF and SRINF weapons have been resolved. Unfortunately, I cannot do that. However, I can say that all of these issues seem to be quite resolvable.

As far as the ABM and space are concerned, those discussions between us and within the working group were, I believe, not useless. I think that we were at least able to identify those key issues, on which we will need major political decisions. It also became clear which issues will require a more comprehensive, detailed working through. I believe that now, when we, while maximizing our efforts, are taking the final steps toward the treaty on INF and SRINF, it has become especially clear how complex the issues of verification are in all their detail and specifics. And when we start talking about the treaty on strategic weapons, where even after the cuts there will remain a large quantity of armaments subject to verification, the complexity and difficulty of control will be even greater.

That is why we agreed that it is necessary right now to step up our efforts seriously in this sphere. This is especially relevant to one big problem, which we admit. I have in mind
our differences on ground-based mobile missiles. As I explained, the problem is not that we have objections in principle to mobile missiles. To the contrary, these weapons in principle have some advantages. The problem is that everything on which we agree should be subject to reliable verification. That is why we agreed that this issue will be given priority attention, so that by the time of your visit, which we hope will take place, substantial work will have been conducted that will help you and the President to discuss that issue.

Shevardnadze: In principle, I agree with the assessments presented by the Secretary of State.

Gorbachev: I see, you have agreed on everything? What is left for me and the President?

Shevardnadze: I said—in principle.

Shultz: If not for the work accomplished by you, Mr. General Secretary, and the President, in particular in Reykjavik, we would now be so mired in a bog that we would not be able to move a step.

Shevardnadze: Of course, the agreement achieved in Washington on the liquidation of two classes of missiles was made possible only on the basis of Reykjavik. One has to say that even after Washington, the positive tendency has continued, thanks to which we have been able to achieve agreement on a number of issues that seemed very difficult. Yesterday we were able to agree on a formula regarding warheads for the Pershing-1A. That is a complex and sensitive matter. On that issue, we were able to find a solution that will be acceptable to the USA, the FRG, taking their alliance obligation into account, and to us as well.

The issue of the overall timetable for eliminating intermediate and shorter-range missiles turned out to be rather difficult. Yesterday we agreed in principle that for medium-range missiles it would be a three-year period, and for shorter-range missiles a year and a half, with consideration for technological capabilities in this sphere.

Discussion of a number of issues will be continued. We had a good discussion on the issue of non-circumvention, not allowing transfers of relevant technologies to third countries. I think a mutually acceptable compromise is emerging in this sphere.

There are still quite a few difficult problems in the area of verification and inspections. These problems can be solved on the basis of an objective approach with the understanding that there are a number of sensitive problems and difficult aspects touching upon the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev: I think Mr. Shultz put it right when he said that the most important issue now is no longer intermediate and shorter-range missiles, but the prospects for resolving the problem of strategic offensive weapons, and the shifting of negotiations to the plane
of practical decisions. As far as the remaining issues of the INF treaty are concerned, they should be resolved in such a way that both of us have complete confidence and there will be no anxiety regarding treaty implementation.

_Shevardnadze_: Yes, this is precisely the basis on which we should continue the discussions. At the same time we emphasize that the United States has its own system of missile production and deployment, which differs from our system. We have our own system. And today we stated that in order to work out a realistic agreement, it is necessary to take these differences into account.

_Shultz_: I agree with that. We do not argue with that.

_Shevardnadze_: I think that on some fundamental issues it is necessary to make a decision now, today. We have to be clear. In the opposite case, if we leave these issues open, if we transfer them to Geneva, they could persist for a long time.

_Gorbachev_: Yes, the main issues should be decided here, and leave only technical issues for Geneva. We have the appropriate experience.

_Shevardnadze_: The second group of issues is disarmament. This, as was correctly noted here, consists of the cardinal problem of radical reductions in strategic offensive weapons and the ABM treaty. In this sphere, results have been more modest. I would say that it is hard to speak of any results whatsoever. Yesterday I openly told the Secretary of State that after Reykjavik the Soviet side made substantial changes, which took into account the interests of the United States, and made significant steps toward the U.S. position. However, precisely after Reykjavik, the U.S. administration added a number of complicating factors to its position, which are causing problems in the negotiations and retarding progress on the main issue.

_Gorbachev_: If we recall our Reykjavik marathon, then it was precisely the issue of the ABM in space, which became the main obstacle that we were not able to overcome in the end. Obviously, you drew the attention of the Secretary of State to the fact that space remains the biggest obstacle. One also has to note that while we introduced positive elements, elements of flexibility, into our position, the American side continued to stand on its position of reinforced concrete. And it is precisely that position which impedes progress toward an agreement on this issue, which is not only central to Soviet-American relations, but is the most important issue for the entire world. How are we going to move ahead?

_Shevardnadze_: Yes, it was precisely after Reykjavik that the new elements that are making negotiations more difficult, such as the demand to eliminate all Soviet heavy missiles, appeared in the American position.

_Gorbachev_: And by the way, we were ready to eliminate them, but in tandem with you, in tandem with the elimination of all nuclear weapons.
Shevardnadze: Absolutely true. And the American side is presenting demands to resolve this issue on a purely unilateral basis. They are also raising the issue of banning mobile ICBMs, and proposing to count middle-range bombers as strategic weapons when that question was already decided in 1979 when the SALT II treaty was negotiated. Also, the American side does not agree to resolve the issue of limiting the number of sea-based cruise missiles. As you know, in Reykjavik we agreed to resolve this issue separately, outside the framework of the main strategic triad. However, it is clear that if sea-based cruise missiles are not limited, it could open a new channel in the arms race, and create an opportunity to circumvent the treaty.

The American side raised the issue of stepping up discussions of verification. We believe that if the main fundamental issues of the future agreement are resolved, we would be able to find a solution to the issues of verification.

As far as the ABM treaty is concerned, yesterday I presented our position in detail. The essence of it is that if there is any retreat from the mutual understanding achieved in Reykjavik about the need for a 10-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, along with strict compliance with its provisions, it would make it impossible to achieve agreement on strategic offensive weapons. The American side is aware of the fact that we developed and clarified our position on such issues as laboratory research, research conducted at plants, testing grounds, etc. The USA is also aware of our new proposals regarding development of a list of devices that would be banned from space, and our proposals regarding the specific parameters and characteristics of such devices.

It so happened that we did not have time for a sufficiently comprehensive discussion of this group of questions. But yesterday we reminded the American side that in order for the summit to be fruitful and full-scale, it would be very important to coordinate our key positions on these issues.

As far as chemical and conventional weapons are concerned, they were discussed within the working groups. Today we will listen to their reports on those issues. We also discussed such regional issues as the situation in the Persian Gulf in particular. Yesterday, while discussing those themes, we stayed up almost until midnight. The discussion was serious, and at times sharp.

Gorbachev: On this last issue I would like to say the following. It might seem to you that sometimes we present demands against the position of the American side that are too great. But here are two instances of principal importance. First of all, we are not sure that you have calculated everything well, that you really understand where this policy might lead for you, for us, and for the entire world.

Secondly—although in terms of importance it might be the main instance—we believe that our interaction in the Persian Gulf is the freshest example that proves the possibility of constructive cooperation between the USSR and USA in resolving a most acute international problem. It was precisely this cooperation that led to the adoption of well-known documents by the [U.N.] Security Council. We believe, and we have told you that
and stated it publicly, that we still have substantial potential there. And we need to use our coordinated positions on Resolution 598\(^1\) to the fullest extent, [in order] not to allow that situation to escalate to a new level.

However, the United States is apparently offended by the fact that we did not support its demand for sanctions, for a second resolution, and [you] decided to act alone, like “the good old days.” We believe that the cooperation that has developed there is a positive new factor, and is important for our overall relations. However, the United States has preferred to throw away this interaction and to act alone. I will not talk about the reasons for why it happened, but I want to say that your withdrawal from cooperation with us creates disappointment. This political line is wrong. In addition, I repeat, we believe that it could have very serious consequences, which, you, apparently, did not analyze. We are watching America's actions. For our part, we are searching for ways to improve relations with the U.S., ways to lead them to a new stage.

Shevardnadze: Mikhail Sergeevich, I presented our position during yesterday’s discussions in that exact same spirit. We believe that it is very important to preserve the unity of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Soviet Union proceeds from the assumption that resolution of the conflict in the Persian Gulf is possible. But for this it is imperative to use the capabilities of the UN Security Council, in particular an organ such as the Military Staff Committee, to the fullest extent.

I would like to summarize. The agreement on INF and SRINF does not look like a distant possibility any longer. Given mutual desires, I believe it is possible to complete all work on this treaty in, let’s say, three weeks’ time. As far as the key principles of strategic offensive weapons and the ABM are concerned, here some serious work is required. But now, regrettably, we do not have a serious basis for resolving the issue of a 50% reduction in strategic offensive weapons under conditions of preserving the ABM Treaty. I think that our task is to prepare a serious, solid basis for resolving this problem for the summit.

Shultz: Speaking broadly, we have approximately the same impression. Nothing to argue about here. As far as INF are concerned, I think that we should try to resolve the majority of issues on the list prepared by the [working] group today. All that should be left for Geneva would be editing work, dotting the last “i’s”. We would prefer not to leave the resolution of serious issues for Geneva, where participants in the negotiations would have to wait for instructions from Washington and Moscow.

Gorbachev: We would welcome such approach.

Shultz: As far as strategic weapons are concerned, this is a very important sphere where we want to achieve some progress. E. A. Shevardnadze told me that you personally have devoted a lot of time and attention to these issues, and that you probably would have some thoughts, which you will present today personally. We would like to hear them.

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\(^1\) A key Security Council resolution calling for an end to the Iran-Iraq War.
Several words about the Persian Gulf. As you noted, one very good opportunity has emerged—the cooperation between us within the framework of U.N. diplomatic efforts. We want this cooperation to produce results. We believe that it could help resolve this military conflict, which is poisoning the entire international situation. We think that there could be nothing better to strengthen the prestige of the U.N. than to achieve success in resolving a difficult problem. A success of that kind would be miraculous medicine for the United Nations. Success would show people that if we undertake something, we are capable of achieving our goals.

I would like to assure you that we do not strive to act alone. We want the process to function, to work within the U.N. framework. As far as our ships in the Gulf are concerned, there are now more ships from European states and from the Gulf states there. American ships constitute only a third, or maybe a fourth, of the overall number of ships there. Why do we and others find ourselves there? Because Iran and the war in this regions represent a threat—a threat to our friends in the Gulf and to the flow of oil, the main source of energy for the countries of the West. We have to provide support for our friends in the Gulf. We have to ensure the safety of supplies of such an important source of energy. Because now and in the future this region will remain one of the main suppliers of oil for the entire world.

I told your Minister that our forces deployed in the Gulf would be reduced if the acuteness of the problem is reduced. They are deployed there precisely in connection with this problem, not to create a permanent presence there. […]

[…] We cannot discount that. At the same time we are not looking for confrontation. However, we cannot allow the Iranians to have a blank check.

Yesterday we discussed this issue in detail. We discussed it from the perspective of the situation in the Security Council. In the immediate future the U.N. General Secretary will present a new version of a package solution on implementing the Security Council Resolution for consideration by all sides. Iraq will accept this proposal. We discussed the issue of what we would do if by the end of the month it becomes clear that Iran is continuing to play games. How should we act in the Security Council in that case? We believe that we should take this to the end. We cannot allow Iran to make a laughing stock out of the U.N. Security Council. The Council has defined its position and it is necessary that it take this to the end.

Gorbachev: I don’t want to get into detailed discussion of this issue right now. But it is a serious, important issue. This problem could bury many things, including, unfortunately, things in our relationship. I only want to say: we hope that you will weigh all this, that you will not be overpowered by certain forces and emotions. This is very serious business. It might lead to very serious consequences. Let us continue the line that we have worked out together. Its potential has not yet been exhausted.

Shultz: I can agree with that. Indeed, we need to work within the U.N. framework because something really important has happened at the U.N.
Gorbachev: I would like to return to what we were discussing earlier. Indeed, we can see that it is not just that the tempo of our progress that is accelerating. There is also a certain amount of progress on the concrete issues under consideration. I would say that if one takes a look at the progress from Geneva through Reykjavik to today, we have succeeded in clarifying many issues.

[...] In their search for solutions the sides undertook concrete steps to meet each other halfway. I must say sincerely: in our view, we undertook more of those steps. And in you we still detect a tendency to squeeze as much as possible out of us. What can one do, somebody has to do more, take this additional step, and we decided to do it. But this movement that started gave birth to great expectations among our peoples, and in the entire world. Therefore the anticipation that the next stage of our relations should produce concrete results is completely natural. They have been waiting for them for a long time now. If that does not happen, it would be a big loss both for the American administration and for us. You cannot discount that.

It is from this perspective that I react to reports about the work conducted by you and E. A. Shevardnadze. I have the impression that in the immediate future we could finalize our work on the agreements on INF and SRINF. I agree that the principal issues should be resolved here, in Moscow, while leaving our delegations in Geneva only technical, editing issues.

I would even say: if we complete our work like this, that would be very important in and of itself. It would be a very important event in the eyes of the peoples of the world. But then people will rightfully ask: if we understand the importance of that agreement and if we conclude that agreement in the immediate future, why would we then continue any kind of activity in the sphere of production, testing and deployment of mid-range missiles? Therefore, the right thing to do would be to announce a joint moratorium on such activities. It could be introduced beginning November 1. I repeat, if we have an agreement in principle that we will sign the treaty, then a joint moratorium on deployment and any activities in the sphere of INF would be an important step that would strengthen this political decision. It would show that the agreement would start working de facto even before we actually sign it. I think that this important step would determine the degree of our accord on this issue.

Now I move to the central issue—the issue of strategic offensive weapons and space. You recalled my words in this connection. I confirm those words. We believe that resolution of the issues of strategic offensive weapons and space would indeed be extremely important for the security of the USA and the USSR because it is precisely these matters that define the strategic situation. Therefore, finding mutually acceptable solutions to nuclear and space questions becomes especially important and pressing.
In Reykjavik we had a serious exchange of opinions on those issues. After Reykjavik we tried to do something to reaffirm our readiness to reach resolutions on the complex of those problems. What is the essence of the mutual understanding reached in Reykjavik? The essence is the 50% reductions in offensive strategic weapons and the 10-year non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. And what is happening in Geneva? Essentially, bargaining is taking place there. Therefore we have been thinking a lot about what else we could do to move ahead with a resolution to this problem in Geneva. Many issues are being discussed there, a lot is being said. However, if you put it all aside, there are two genuinely big issues. The first is ensuring strict compliance with the ABM Treaty, and the second is the optimal correlation between the elements [that constitute] strategic forces, the strategic triad.

As far as the first issue is concerned, we proposed to the United States not to use the right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for ten years. We also proposed a second version, which is also connected with the idea of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Trying to meet the U.S. halfway, we proposed to discuss which devices could be deployed in space, and which could not. We are waiting for your reaction.

As far as the second issue is concerned—the issue of optimal correlation between the different elements [comprising] strategic forces, we considered this matter carefully once more. We are proposing a new formula, on the basis of which we could determine the limits on concentrations of warheads for each element of the triad. Besides, each side would have an opportunity to compensate for the lower number of delivery vehicles on one kind by increasing the number of delivery vehicles of a different kind within the overall limit.

Therefore, we propose [the following]: the United States agrees to legally undertake an obligation not to use its right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for ten years under strict compliance with all of its provisions. The Soviet Union agrees to establish limits on concentrations of warheads on different kinds of U.S. and Soviet strategic armaments. Within the [overall] limit of 6,000 warheads, we propose to have not more than 3,000-3,300 warheads on ICBMs, no more than 1,800-2,000 warheads on SLBMs, and not more than 800-900 warheads on air-launched cruise missiles.

We believe that this kind of movement toward each other’s positions would lead us in the nearest term to work out key positions on these issues. This would prepare the ground for the next step—the move toward concluding the agreement. In that case, as I understand it, when I arrive in the U.S., we would create the agenda, which we discussed during your visit in April of this year. First of all, we would sign the treaty on the elimination of INF and SRINF. Secondly, we would agree on the key provisions regarding strategic offensive weapons based on the new compromise proposals. And finally, we would incorporate the agreement about initiating negotiations on the problem of nuclear testing that was reached between you and E. A. Shevardnadze. I think that would be a solid agenda.
We see that not everybody in the United States is in favor of such agreements. There are those who wish to undermine this process. They use all kinds of arguments for this purpose, in particular the issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar station. I have to say that we also have complaints about American radar stations. We could remove these complaints on a reciprocal basis. Now I would like to inform you about our unilateral step. The Soviet Union announces a 12-month moratorium on all work on the Krasnoyarsk radar station. We are expecting a similar step from the U.S. in regard to the American radar station in Scotland.

I think that we can take on the issues of strategic offensive weapons and space as they are connected in a substantive, fundamental way.

_Shultz:_ Thank you. I would like to respond to the proposals you have outlined. Of course, every time you introduce proposals on important issues, we study and analyze them carefully. Now I can provide you some considerations based on our analysis.

First of all, I welcome what you said on the INF, and your words about your readiness to give additional stimulus to this work. We are also instructing our representatives so that the main issues will already be resolved in Moscow.

As far as the ABM and related issues are concerned, among other things we have been trying to clarify what your proposals consisted of. We believe that there is a certain amount of progress here. I would like to have total clarity as to whether I understand the proposals that you presented. This does not presuppose that the President agrees with them. As you know, for him this is a very delicate, sensitive issue. I would like to have an opportunity to present the factual substance of your position to him as precisely as possible. Thus, as I understand it, you are proposing that we define a ten-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty with strong compliance with the Treaty in the form in which it was developed.

_Gorbachev:_ As it was before 1983. Then we did not have any differences. And besides, that was not just our point of view. That is the point of view of the U.S. Congress. And the Congress is, I am convinced, a very serious, very important body, which receives reports, including reports from departments in which Mr. Carlucci has worked, from the National Security Council, in which Mr. Matlock worked then, and other detailed information. At that time we shared the same position.

_Shultz:_ I would like to clarify—do you have in mind compliance with the Treaty in the form in which it was presented, for example, in the report of our Defense Department from March 1985? I mention this report because it was mentioned by your representatives at the negotiations.

_Gorbachev:_ In the form as this Treaty was understood and adhered to by both sides before 1983.
**Shultz:** I would not want to enter into any secondary arguments right now, because different opinions exist about what was adhered to and how, and what they had in mind. In our country, some people believe, for example, that the Soviet Union insists on an even more narrow interpretation of the Treaty than the narrow interpretation itself. I named one document for a reference, which your representatives cited, in order to understand your point of view better.

**Gorbachev:** I repeat: we are talking not only about that, but also about the fact that before 1983 the Treaty was interpreted and effectively enforced by both sides in the same way. If now this creates some difficulties for you, I told the President in Reykjavik that I am ready to help him out of the situation that was created as a result of the launching of the SDI program. Our proposal—to agree on what can and cannot be deployed in space under conditions of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty—allows [you] to conduct research within the SDI framework. In particular, the second version proposed by us presupposes defining concrete parameters for devices that are allowed to be deployed in space. With that, naturally, it is understood that there should be no weapons in space. But as far as the orders you have already placed with companies and research organizations, they can be carried out within the limits of these agreed-upon parameters. This proposal represents a compromise.

Besides that, we are moving in the direction of your requests regarding limits. For example, when I say that there would be a limit of 3,000-3,300 ICBM warheads within the total limit of 6,000 warheads, this represents 50%. This is what I promised the President. As you can see, we are true to our word.

**Shultz:** I would like to clarify certain aspects. You should not interpret the fact that I am clarifying certain issues related to space and ABM as indicating that I was accepting your positions. I am not able to do that. I can only report on them to the President. Do I understand correctly that within the ten-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, activities which correspond to the Treaty in its traditional interpretation would be allowed, along with activities in space within the limits of the ceilings proposed by you? At the same time, such activities could not include deployments prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

**Gorbachev:** As well as weapons tests in space. As far as permitted activities are concerned, we could discuss and define that together.

**Shultz:** I think that enough has been said on this issue within the bounds of what can be said at the present stage. I repeat, I was only asking clarifying questions, which do not signify agreement with your proposals on behalf of the President. I believe that we should conduct our conversation directly and openly.

Now another side of the question—how to implement the 50% reductions of strategic armaments in practice? We believe that significant progress has been achieved on this issue. I would like to present an alternative proposal for your consideration. Realizing that the idea of sub-limits, at least of certain kinds of sub-limits has repeatedly caused
problems, in particular during our discussions in April during my visit, we undertook an analysis of the situation. Now we have a joint draft text of the treaty, at this point with many brackets. We agreed on a total limit on warheads—6,000. We agreed that the number of delivery vehicles and bombers will be 1,600. We agreed on the limit of warheads on heavy missiles—1,540. We agreed on the rule of counting the bombers. We have an agreement that the throwweight would be reduced by 50%, and now we would like to achieve a legal affirmation of that in the text of the treaty, as well as a confirmation that after such a reduction in throwweight there would be no future increases. In principle, I think we have an agreement on this; however, we would like to confirm that in the formulations of the Treaty. One of the limitations, which we have proposed, and which was reflected today in your response, is the limitation on the number of warheads on ICBMs—3,300. In Washington you proposed a sub-limit of 3,600 units, but that was proposed as a maximum level for any of the elements of the triad.

We believe that the most serious difference between the elements of the triad is the difference between ballistic missiles and warheads that are delivered by air and jet-propelled systems. Of course, land-based missiles are more precise than SLBMs. However, the main distinction is between ballistic missiles and non-ballistic means. Therefore, we would like an agreement to have as a minimum a certain number of warheads on the air-based part of the triad. For this purpose, we proposed a limit of 4,800 for ICBM warheads. In the interests of moving forward, we would be ready to remove our proposal about establishing separate sub-limits for ICBM and SLBM warheads in return for your accepting the proposal on a summary sub-limit of 4,800 units for ICBM and SLBM warheads. Within this ceiling, each side would be free to determine the constituent parts.

As I said before, when we start talking about mobile missiles, it becomes very important to be confident that the limits stipulated by the treaty could be verified. We are ready to engage in work on this issue in Geneva. Frankly speaking, we do not see a satisfactory answer to the problem of verification of mobile missiles. But maybe you can show us how that can be done. Maybe we will be able to work on this issue before your visit to the U.S. At the same time, I have to admit, I do not see how to solve this problem. However, we are ready to work on it.

So here is the structure that we propose. Yes, and there remains the sub-limit of 1,650 units that we proposed. However, as you can see, in general we are making the problem of sub-limits easier, on the condition that there would be a general limit on warheads on ballistic missiles.

Gorbachev: I think that if we find an approach that would allow us to begin movement on all the complex of issues of strategic offensive weapons and space in their interconnectedness, then we should be able to resolve the issue of mobile missiles. By the way, you too are planning to build mobile missiles. You are already building railway-based MX missiles. Therefore it is a problem both for you and for us.
Shultz: Yes, indeed, we are working on this. However, I would like to assure you that we would prefer to introduce a ban on mobile missiles; we are ready to abandon this program.

Gorbachev: But mobile strategic missiles already exist. Besides, as I said in Reykjavik, they have a very short flight time. And what do you do with such a mobile system as a submarine? They come very close to our territory. Besides, while it is known where ICBMs start their flight, it is unknown with SLBMs.

Shultz: Both missiles have a short flight time. Beside that, once ballistic missiles are launched, it is impossible to recall them. In short, ballistic missiles represent the greatest threat, and that is why we consider it necessary to establish a limit on ballistic missile warheads in view of their differences with air-based means.

Gorbachev: You have your own concerns, and we have ours regarding your strategic armaments. I think that these issues should be discussed at the negotiations.

Shultz: I agree.

Gorbachev: I want to reiterate again what I have said many times before. We do not want the United States, after the reductions, to find itself in a situation that would be unfavorable for you, that would weaken your security, weaken your confidence in your security. That would be bad for us as well. Because if one of the sides finds itself in such a situation, it would try to find a way out of it, to seek the possibility of compensation. Experience shows that both of us have found [such] answers. But it is clear that this would not correspond to our interests.

Shultz: You expressed that idea in Geneva. I believe that it is a strong, important idea. I agree with it. You also emphasized the differences in the structure of our strategic forces then, the fact that neither of the sides could force the other to imitate an alien structure. Precisely for this reason, having analyzed the situation, we decided to propose a joint limit on the number of warheads on ballistic missiles, within which the sides would have freedom—at least at the present stage—to determine the combination of warheads. We cannot achieve everything at once. But it seems that it is possible to move considerably ahead on this basis.

Gorbachev: I think now we have a basis on which to work on the key elements of strategic offensive weapons. This could become the central element of the Washington summit because as far as the agreement on INF and SRINF is concerned, all that remains is to sign it. Signing key positions [on strategic weapons] could become the most important outcome of the summit. We could give our delegations concrete instructions on the basis of these key positions to work out a draft text of the treaty, which the President and myself could sign during the President’s visit to Moscow.

Recently some of your representatives, Mr. Kampelman, for example, said that we need to start seriously developing a treaty on strategic offensive weapons. They said if we
could do that, then it would be easier to resolve the space issues. I want to say at the outset, this is an unrealistic position, an unrealistic approach. Let’s not waste time on such approaches. Issues of strategic offensive weapons and space need to be resolved together because they are interconnected. On this basis, we are ready to move forward, taking into account as much as possible each other’s security interests.

**Shultz:** I think that in terms of numbers and parameters, we have said all that we can for now. I think that we sense a certain flexibility, a readiness for collective work. I have the impression that it is unlikely that our representatives in Geneva will be able to produce much in this sense. These are questions for you and for the President. However, our delegations could create a good foundation for a fruitful meeting between you and the President. I have several thoughts about this.

First of all, we could say to our delegations in Geneva that they should tackle the problems of verification energetically and as their priority, especially the verification of mobile missiles. Now we see how difficult the problems of verification are. We should not leave them for February or March. We should focus on them seriously now.

As far as concrete positions are concerned, I think that our delegations in Geneva should not so much bargain about numbers as place an emphasis on clarifying each side’s principal approaches. We should talk about why you consider certain provisions important, and why we consider other provisions important. I think that that would help you and the President find resolution to those problems during your meeting.

Finally, I would propose that in addition to continuing our work on removing the brackets in the joint text, which is useful, we should focus on the goal of having your meeting with the President result in joint instructions for our delegations in Geneva regarding parameters for the future treaty. I think that would be a good result of the meeting, which would complement the work that will already have been done on coordination of the treaty.

**Gorbachev:** From the very start I see weak spots in your proposals. First of all, you did not even mention the problem of space. But if we leave this issue outside the boat, then moving ahead on strategic offensive weapons will not make any sense. We have to consider them as interrelated. Why does the American delegation in Geneva avoid discussing the space issues, especially discussing the latest Soviet proposals?

Overall, I have an impression that with your three considerations, it is as if you are throwing away the idea of developing key positions on strategic offensive weapons and space. Instead, you propose to limit ourselves to some foggy formulas, talk about the need to clarify positions, etc. Of course, resolution of the verification problem, clarification of positions, removal of brackets—all this is necessary. However, our goal should be the preparation of key positions, which we could consider and sign, so that by the time of the President’s visit to Moscow, we would have an agreement on the entire set of these issues.
Your approach strikes me as undefined and foggy. In essence, it rejects everything that we said for the purpose of clarifying [our positions] and signaling flexibility on concrete problems.

I would like to repeat: we propose that our delegations in Geneva concentrate on developing key positions for their adoption during the visit. Then it would make sense. Otherwise, everything is moving beyond the term of the present administration. And that would be too bad. Because we wanted to resolve [these issues] precisely with the present administration. And this is possible. A lot has been already done. And we, as we see it, are capable of concluding a good treaty with the current administration. Precisely a good treaty: neither one of us needs a bad one.

Shultz: I would not object to defining coordinated positions. I do not want to offer you anything foggy, not at all. I want to look ahead. Some things are already agreed upon, mainly as a result of the agreements achieved by you and the President in Reykjavik. The question is—what should be done in order to prepare these key positions, these instructions for our negotiators. With all respect for our representatives in Geneva, the main, key positions should be adopted by you and the President. Our representatives in Geneva do not have political mandate for that. But they can prepare the grounds, and we can work to prepare the grounds for your decisions. That is why I emphasize the need for more precision, for working on the issues of verification, especially regarding the mobile missiles.

Gorbachev: Let’s still prepare a draft of key positions before we, as you propose, start discussing the issues, so to say, in a scattered way.

Shultz: Of course, the more we could move ahead before the summit, the better. The main decision will have to be taken by you and the President. We, as well as you, want the achieved breakthrough to be be written in the treaty, to receive a practical implementation. It would be very good for you and for us, and would be a present to the entire world.

Gorbachev: Yes, Reykjavik already has a place in history. But a second Reykjavik will not happen. We should not meet with the President and engage in improvisation. I think it is very good that we stood for Reykjavik. There were many people who wanted to bury it. But if everything is limited to a second Reykjavik, it might lead to big political losses both for you and for us. And to the contrary, if we find right political decisions, it would bring both of us great political benefits. You need to decide what you want.

I have an impression that you still cannot decide what it is you want. Maybe it is Ambassador Matlock who informs you in such a manner that you still cannot figure it out? Do you want the Soviet Union to develop successfully, or you don’t want that? [Do you want] the Soviet Union to develop in the direction of greater democracy or in the opposite [direction]? [Do you want] us to have stagnation or to move forward?
Shultz: It is your business. It is all up to you to decide, but I can give you my opinion: what is happening in your country is very interesting, and I follow all these changes very closely.

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