April 9, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
   The Secretary of State

   THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
   The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev

Attached is the draft text of a proposed letter from the President to General Secretary Gorbachev. Could I have your personal views as soon as possible on the text and on the timing of its release.

Colin L. Powell

Attachments:
Draft letter (S)
April 9, 1987

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Since it has been some time since you and I last communicated directly, I would like to give you my thoughts on how we might bring to fulfillment what I see as a promising moment in our relations. Secretary of State Shultz will, of course, be ready to discuss these matters in detail during his visit to Moscow.

First let me say that, in reviewing the relationship between our two countries, I am pleased that there has been some progress on the agenda that you and I have set out in our meetings. Senior officials of our governments have begun a new cycle of discussions on regional affairs; the conversations between Under Secretary Armacost and senior Soviet officials last month in Moscow demonstrate that this aspect of our dialogue is becoming more candid and wide-ranging. Our two governments seem close to agreement on establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. An agreement on space cooperation has been concluded, and work is proceeding to expand other bilateral contacts between our governments and peoples. I am watching with great interest a number of developments in your country which touch on the concerns I have discussed with you regarding human rights and humanitarian issues. There has been some modest progress in expanding non-strategic trade between our two countries.
Welcome as these steps are, they are only a beginning. Concrete progress on the large issues must remain our overriding objective.

I must reiterate to you my great concern and continuing opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which imposes a singularly heavy burden on East-West relations. The statements which Under Secretary Armacost heard in Moscow about Soviet determination to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan are welcome. I note that some movement has taken place at the Geneva proximity talks and that the USSR may be studying seriously the possibility of a process of national reconciliation leading to self-determination. However, I want you to understand clearly my view, shared fully by the Government of Pakistan, the Resistance Alliance, and most other governments, that a lengthy timetable for the withdrawal of your troops, far longer than dictated by logistic requirements, and an approach to national reconciliation merely designed to preserve a communist-dominated regime in Kabul will only prolong the war. They will not lead to a lasting political settlement which would benefit both our governments and the countries of the region.

Encouraging statements by Soviet leaders need to be backed up by actual Soviet steps to withdraw Soviet forces. Unfortunately, such steps have not been taken. On the contrary, the Soviet Union and the Kabul regime have stepped up bombing raids against
villages in Pakistan that have resulted in numerous civilian casualties. Such actions serve only to magnify the suffering, to prolong the war, to increase the danger of a larger East-West confrontation, and to call into question the sincerity of Soviet statements that the USSR wishes to withdraw its forces. Such actions will not cause those who oppose Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to reduce or to relent in their opposition.

The United States supports genuine efforts to achieve a political settlement to the conflict that is acceptable to the people of Afghanistan. We seek no strategic advantage in Afghanistan and recognize the Soviet interest in a secure southern border. We have made clear in the past, and I repeat to you, that the United States will lend its political support to an agreement, consistent with United Nations resolutions, which brings about the speedy and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops.

But the critical steps that will allow the Afghan people to live in peace must be taken by the USSR. What is needed, Mr. General Secretary, is a clean political decision by your government to withdraw Soviet forces promptly. I realize this decision will not be easy. But you have shown unusual boldness and courage in addressing the internal problems of your country. No single act by the USSR would do more to convince the world that you intend to apply genuinely new thinking to Soviet foreign policy, or gain you more international respect, than to withdraw quickly from Afghanistan.

within three months time
With respect to human rights and humanitarian concerns, we have seen -- and acknowledged -- positive steps in many of the areas you and I have discussed. I hope that these steps are only a beginning. You have resolved one-half of all our divided family representation list cases, and two-thirds of our separated spouse cases; is it not possible to resolve the small number of remaining cases? You have now released over 100 political prisoners; is it not possible to release those still in prison for expressing their views? Emigration has begun to rise modestly; we hope for a substantial, sustained increase. There is also a particular urgency to the limited number of cases of seriously ill persons seeking to travel for medical treatment abroad.

Finally, I hope you find some means to resolve several cases of special interest to me, including pianist Vladimir Feltsman, refusenik Ida Nudel, separated spouse Galina Goltzman, and dual national Abe Stolar and his family. Continuing progress in these areas will help significantly in improving our relations, and will be welcomed by the entire world.

Add a sentence noting that Mr. Shultz will discuss Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Angola in the area of our bilateral relations, much is developing in promising directions. It is therefore regrettable that I must raise with you the matter of your penetration of our embassy in Moscow which we have lately discovered. Let me get directly to the point. Your government ruthlessly exploits the many advantages it enjoys as a very closed society pursuing intelligence objectives against a very open one; it does so with cavalier (add “unbrage”
disregard for our diplomatic rights and the damage this does to our relationship. If this lack of prudence on the part of the USSR continues, the USSR should expect to suffer the resulting discomfort and political cost equally with the United States.

Regarding arms control, my points of departure are our agreement in Geneva to expand common ground and the advances we made in our meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik. Both meetings were stepping stones to the goals we have mutually set. From your own recent statements, and in view of the encouraging work now underway at the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva, I believe we are in accord on the urgency of moving forward from Reykjavik. Our task is to find ways to bridge remaining differences.

Our two sides have filled out many of the details of potential agreements on deep and stabilizing reductions in nuclear forces. Other important aspects still await resolution. Solving these questions is essential if reductions agreements are to realize the goal of greater military stability.

The United States places the highest priority on achieving substantial reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Thus, I am heartened that we are getting closer to agreement on deep and equitable reductions in longer-range INF missiles, as we work toward their total elimination. To this end, our negotiators have begun addressing the specific details of treaty language to
implement the formula that we agreed on in Reykjavik. And, while we have yet to have the benefit of detailed Soviet proposals, we are in a position with mutual effort to begin to make progress on the elements essential to ensure effective verification.

As we have made clear since 1981, an INF agreement must have appropriate concurrent constraints on shorter-range INF systems. Your agreement to this principle at our meeting in Reykjavik was a significant advance, although work remains to be done on the specific nature of those constraints. In particular, such constraints must be based on equality of rights between us. I hope that we can work together to resolve our differences about the nature of those constraints.

Regarding strategic offensive forces, the formula for 50 percent reductions that you and I developed and agreed upon in Geneva and Reykjavik provides us with an historic opportunity to move toward a better, safer world now. Limiting both sides to 6000 warheads on 1600 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and heavy bombers -- with appropriate warhead sublimits, counting rules, and verification measures -- would be a dramatic and effective step toward that goal. We should strive toward a rapid and uncomplicated achievement of such an agreement without imposing unnecessary conditions on its realization.
I recall your expressed concerns regarding the uncertainties you perceive to be associated with our SDI program. In your February 28 speech, you expressed concern that this program might lead to the deployment of weapons in space. In direct response to your concerns that we assure predictability in the strategic regime of the next decade, and, in an effort to move the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms forward, I am prepared to sign a treaty now that would commit the United States and the Soviet Union through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying operational defensive systems whose deployment is not permitted by the treaty. After 1994, we would both be able to deploy strategic defenses unless we agreed otherwise.

It goes without saying that I stand by my previous offers to find appropriate methods to share the benefits of any such defenses in the context of an agreed transition permitting the increasing contribution of defenses and moving us toward the elimination of ballistic missiles. I would be prepared to add this element to any new Defense and Space agreement, as well as to consider certain other ideas which could give us both more predictability about each other's efforts in the area of strategic defenses.

At the same time, you and I would sign a treaty implementing the agreed-upon 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms, within seven years.
with appropriate warhead sublimits. On the vital issue of ballistic missile warhead sublimits, both our sides have made several proposals that are very close and in some cases identical. The American proposal for a sublimit of 4000 ballistic missile warheads is essentially the same as the Soviet proposal for an 80 percent sublimit. Our proposed sublimit of 3300 ICBM warheads draws upon your 60 percent suggestion. Your proposal to reduce heavy ICBMs by half addresses some of the concerns dealt with by our proposed third sublimit on especially dangerous ICBMs.

In recognition of your concerns that such sublimits would force a rapid restructuring of your forces, I suggest that we agree to extend the period to complete the 50 percent reduction to seven years from the date a treaty takes effect. With this additional time, it should be possible for both sides to implement such sublimits without undue burden.

My proposal, therefore, is that we instruct our negotiators to focus immediately on drafting treaties to implement the principle of 50 percent reductions in seven years with agreed, appropriate sublimits, and a mutual commitment through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying defensive systems whose deployment is not permitted by the treaty. [I have asked Secretary Shultz to explain this approach in greater detail during his impending visit.]
I hope you will consider these ideas seriously. My effort is to bridge our differences and remove obstacles on the way toward our agreed goals. Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze should explore these ideas further when they meet in Moscow next week.

I believe these proposals can lead to rapid progress in the NSP negotiations. As we move ahead toward reductions of nuclear forces, I wish to stress the importance of addressing other potential sources of military instability, particularly imbalances regarding conventional forces and chemical weapons. As you know, representatives of the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are discussing with representatives of the Warsaw Pact a new mandate for negotiations to achieve a stable balance on conventional forces in Europe at lower levels. The U.S. and Soviet Union are discussing bilaterally and multilaterally the many issues related to a global ban on chemical weapons.

In all these negotiations, it will be vital to develop effective means of verification to ensure confidence in the agreements reached. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have expressed concerns about effective verification in the past. The strongest possible verification regime is in the interests of both our nations.
Mr. General Secretary, our two countries have worked hard to
establish the basis for accords that would strengthen peace and
security. Much remains to be done to make 1987 the year that
will bring these efforts to fruition, and I am prepared to embark
on an intensive process to see that this is accomplished.

The discussions between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze will, I hope, prove to be an important step in this
process.

Sincerely,