NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS (NST)

SUMMARY

Round VIII began April 23 in INF, May 5 in START and DSS — no ending date set.

Draft START Treaty tabled by U.S., May 8; Soviets, July 31. Soviets also tabled draft Defense & Space agreement, July 29.

April 27, USSR raised issue of U.S. warheads on FRG Pershings.

Soviets accepted global double zero, July 23; U.S. agreed to forego conversion, July 28.

Shevardnadze urged Kampelman, August 7, to prepare "options" for discussion at September Ministerial on FRG Pershings, Defense & Space (permitted/prohibited activities).

Also acknowledged need to agree in START by March 1988, but charged U.S. was introducing new "obstacles" (Backfire bomber, seven-year reduction period, definition of ALCMs).

INF

Aside from schedule of reductions and FRG Pershings, remaining differences mostly involve verification. Soviet "suspect site" inspection provision broader than ours, encompassing any U.S. military base or manufacturing plant, public or private, anywhere in the world.

START

Most long-standing differences unchanged by Soviet draft Treaty — mobiles, sublimits, throw-weight, linkage to DSS.

Soviets questioning lack of U.S. positions on ALCM definition, counting rules, SLCMs.

DEFENSE & SPACE

Soviet draft agreement merely restated their position, including "narrower than narrow" interpretation. Provides first details of proposed list of prohibited space devices.

U.S. continues to call for non-withdrawal for the purpose of deploying operational strategic defenses through 1994, followed by right to deploy unless otherwise agreed. Data exchange, "open labs", and observation of tests proposed to provide desired predictability.
SOVIET vs. U.S. DRAFT TREATY

- Soviet draft tabled July 31. Structure similar to U.S. May draft; will facilitate preparation of joint bracketed text.
- No movement on key issues — mobiles, sublimits, throw-weight, SLCMs, linkage to D&S agreement.
- Incorporates Reykjavik understanding — 1600 SNDVs/6000 warheads, and bomber weapon counting rule.
- Permits mobile ICBMs, but verification provisions are vague.
- On sublimits, includes 50% cut of heavy ICBM launchers to 154; beyond this, each side free to determine structure of remaining forces. (U.S. – 4800 ballistic missile warheads; up to 3300 on ICBMs and 1650 on heavy/highly-fractionated ICBMs.)
- Makes no reference to reductions in throw-weight, nor any obligation not to increase throw-weight after reductions. (U.S. – limit on throw-weight at 50% of current Soviet level.)
- Extends limits on non-deployed systems beyond ICBMs/SLEMs (U.S. position) to ALCMs, heavy bombers and their armaments.
- Bans "new kinds" of strategic weapons (other than ICBMs, SLEMs, bombers, cruise missiles); allows new types, modernization. (U.S. – permits new types, "new kinds" and modernization."
- No more than two classes of
- Includes previous Soviet proposal to limit each side to 400 SLCMs on submarines; SLCM verification based on observable differences, OSI. (U.S. – no proposals tabled at Geneva.)
- Accepts on-site inspections, cooperative verification measures.
- START agreement linked to reaching agreement in D&S. If a side develops/deploys ABM defenses beyond those permitted under ABM Treaty, START agreement would automatically terminate. (U.S. – non-withdrawal from ABM Treaty linked to START reductions)
- Provides for follow-on negotiations on further reductions (U.S. – no explicit commitment).

ROUND VIII

- Soviets citing post-Reykjavik "obstacles" introduced by U.S.:
  — five-year period of reductions, extended to seven years.
  — U.S. backing away from SALT-era 600 km. ALCM range threshold.
  — "reintroduction" of Backfire bomber into START.
- U.S. still undecided on RV and ALCM counting rules. No U.S. SLCM proposals on the table (at Reykjavik, we mentioned possibility of unilateral statements on SLCM program plans).
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF)

I. GENEVA ROUND VIII

- INF Round VIII began April 23, no end date scheduled.
- Soviets accepted double global zero (LRINF and SRINF) on July 23, but included provision that U.S. warheads for FRG Pershings be eliminated.
- U.S. put forward approach July 28 which foregoes conversion under double global zero. U.S. continues to reject inclusion of FRG Pershings, insists on right to maintain established pattern of cooperation with allies. Chancellor Kohl’s unilateral statement of August 24 removes any conceivable legitimacy of Soviet expressed concern about sides continue work in Geneva to remove brackets from joint draft treaty.
- Despite progress, much work remains to be done, particularly on verification.

II. SRINF

- Soviets first demanded inclusion of FRG Pershing warheads April 27 — claim it became necessary in light of zero SRINF proposal.
- Some Soviets in Geneva have said their stance on Pershing IAs is political, not military; hint that German promise not to modernize Pershings may suffice. Soviets continue to make this an issue, knowing despite Kohl’s August 24 statement our own insight that we would withdraw if in Kohl’s words, “the missiles are German,” this argument might still work.
- Soviets have mounted intense propaganda campaign aimed at isolating Germans, attempting to force them to give up Pershings rather than impede agreement (e.g., August 6 Shevardnadze comment to CD).

III. VERIFICATION

- Although both sides have tabled Memorandum of Understanding on Data and Protocol on elimination, Soviet approach is reactive — not offering details until they see ours.
- Soviets appear to accept on-site inspection of baseline data and destruction. Rather than reject suspect site inspection outright, they are practicing one-upmanship — demanding right to inspect any U.S. military base or manufacturing plant, public or private, in the world.
- Publicly, the Soviets have attempted to sound forthcoming; privately, they admit they need to supply more details.
I. D.S. Round Eight

o Round VIII began on May 5; no date set for conclusion.

o Our latest proposal, including commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty through 1994, remains on table.

o Little Soviet movement during Round, except July 29, when they tabled a draft agreement embodying constraints on SDI beyond those imposed in ABM Treaty.

II. U.S. Position

o Commitment through 1994 not to withdraw from ABM Treaty in order to deploy operational systems other than those permitted under Treaty (contingent on 50% START reductions); research, development and testing permitted by ABM Treaty may continue.

o Right to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1994 unless otherwise agreed.

o "Predictability package" including data exchange, open labs and reciprocal test observations.

o We oppose restricting research to laboratories; ABM Treaty contains no restrictions.

III. Soviet Position

o Draft agreement limits research to laboratories (inside/outside) on Earth and prohibits putting the following into space: missiles, mass accelerators, lasers, particle beam generators, energy-relay devices, SHF (super high frequency) generators, and ABM targeting components (technical criteria to be agreed upon).

o Proposal also provides that if either party "proceeds with practical development of an ABM system" (including testing mobile ABM systems or components), then the other party will be released from its obligations under any START treaty.

o Soviets still apparently seeking to impose constraints on SDI far beyond those in the ABM Treaty; they do not seem to have significantly modified positions intended to cripple SDI.

o Also still apparently refuse to agree on offensive force reductions unless U.S. accepts these additional constraints on SDI.
FACT SHEET: NUCLEAR TESTING

I. BACKGROUND

- Gorbachev has pushed testing halt since 1985, but Soviets seem to recognize early CTB not in the cards.

- Sides agreed in principle at Reykjavik to open testing negotiations.

- Last testing experts meeting July 13-17 in Geneva focused on technical issues. Soviets gave comprehensive explanation of their Joint Verification Experiments (JVEs) proposal.

- On August 11, Adelman initiated discussions with Soviet Embassy (Kutovoy) to develop a joint statement on a negotiating agenda. Adelman also presented a draft text. Several drafts exchanged, but differences not resolved. Latest draft attached.

- In Congress, threat continues that House will attach testing limitations such as 1 KT threshold to spending bills; TTBT/PNET ratification remains stalled.

- Soviets and Natural Resources Defense Council renewed their verification agreement in June; will now focus on 1 KT test ban; Americans will no longer man sites in USSR.

- June 9 Soviets launched multilateral test ban initiative in Geneva CD—an obviously propagandistic "second front" calling for multilateral CTB negotiations, international seismic treaty monitoring.

II. US POSITION

- US wants step-by-step approach beginning with TTBT/PNET improvements. President has publicly committed US to follow-on talks on further limits, in parallel with weapons cuts; CTB as ultimate goal in conjunction with elimination of nuclear weapons.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- Soviets claim US will pocket TTBT/PNET agreement, stall on further movement. They press for a single CTB negotiating forum in which all issues would be addressed; claim US sequence approach could be implemented in this framework.
JOINT STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR TESTING

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have expressed the need for strict verification of compliance with all arms control agreements, including those on nuclear testing. Therefore, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have agreed to seek specific improved measures for effective verification needed to permit the existing nuclear testing treaties — the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty — to be ratified and to enter into force.

In this regard, the two sides have agreed to open full scale, stage-by-stage, negotiations within the framework of a single forum to commence on . . . (date). These new negotiations will incorporate and expand the work of the Nuclear Testing Experts Meetings.

Within the framework of these full-scale negotiations, the Soviet Union and the United States will, in the first stage, agree on effective verification measures for the TTBT and the PNPT. In this context, due consideration will be given to the question of joint verification experiments at each other's test sites. The sides recognize that agreement on effective verification measures could make it possible, as the first step, to ratify the TTBT and PNPT.

After these two treaties have been ratified, and in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons, negotiations would enter the second stage with a view to identifying intermediate limitations on nuclear testing which are compatible with the two sides' respective security requirements as the program to reduce nuclear weapons proceeds.

These negotiations have as their ultimate objective the cessation of nuclear testing in parallel with the elimination of nuclear weapons within the framework of an effective disarmament process which makes such elimination possible while ensuring international security and stability, featuring broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification, expanded confidence-building measures and balance in conventional forces.