MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

DATE: September 8, 1987
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 1:15 p.m. -- 2:15 p.m.
FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI

I. PURPOSE

To review US positions in START and Defense and Space in preparation for upcoming meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in order to determine (1) if the United States should alter its position in advance and (2) what flexibility Secretary Shultz should have to respond to Soviet moves.

II. BACKGROUND

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will have a series of meetings in Washington on 15-17 September. These meeting will deal with all four aspects of the U.S. - Soviet relationship: human rights, regional issues and bilateral issues as well as arms control. The principal focus of this NSPG, however, is arms control since there are no policy decisions required in other areas. This NSPG will be your only opportunity to personally review the outstanding arms reductions issues with your senior advisors before providing guidance to Secretary Shultz, who will conduct the bulk of the meetings with Shevardnadze.

The most important arms reductions issues facing us are whether (and if so how) to modify our START and Defense and Space position in order to move closer to an acceptable START Treaty. I propose the NSPG focus on this issue. Discussion will be based on the options in the two compartmented papers I provided you previously.

On START, discussion will focus on whether to modify our position and allow mobile ICBMs, whether to modify our position on ballistic missile sublimits, and how to deal with sea-launched cruise missiles. The most contentious issue concerns mobile ICBMs.
In Defense and Space, several options have been proposed which are listed in the paper I provided you and which I will summarize at the opening of discussion. I anticipate that Secretary Weinberger will argue against any change in our current position of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1994 in return for an assured right to deploy thereafter. Secretary Shultz will probably favor modifying our position.

Although the background paper I forwarded you suggests some support for extending the non-withdrawal period through 1997, I doubt this will be expressed strongly in the meeting. Most agencies agree there is no reason to alter our position vis-a-vis the Soviets now. Some believe, however, that we must review our policy because of concerns by the Joint Chiefs of Staff over what they perceive to be the automatic end to the ABM Treaty under our current proposal. Most of your other advisors disagree with this interpretation of our policy and thus see no need to change our position.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Participants at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

The agenda is at Tab A. I will open by asking for your comments; suggested talking points are at Tab C. I will then ask George Shultz to provide a brief overview of the meeting. We will then spend 20 minutes discussing options for change in our START position, followed by a similar period on Defense and Space. No decisions are required at the meeting; decision documents to modify or reaffirm our positions will be forwarded to you later in the week.

Attachments

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Prepared by:

Linton Brooks

Will Tobey
NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING
Tuesday, September 8, 1987
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Suggested Opening Talking Points for the President

-- For several years we've had consistent arms reduction goals: to get verifiable deep reductions and to preserve our ability to move to a safer world through SDI.

-- It appears we are near agreement in INF. Now we must finish the task in other areas.

-- I don't accept the suggestions of some that it is too late for us to get a START agreement before I leave office. I want a START agreement, but only if it is a good one, one we can verify and which enhances our security.

-- At the same time, I believe fully in our policy of seeking a stable transition to strategic defenses.

-- We must set the stage for one day deploying effective defenses, and seek to do so in a manner that will strengthen strategic stability.

-- George's meeting next week is a chance to move toward these two goals. I want your thoughts today on how we can best use that meeting. Are we better served by movement in our position, or are our current positions the best way to gain our objectives?

-- I'm looking forward to your views so we can help prepare George for his discussions.