The Honorable Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Helms:

Enclosed herewith is the Report of General Lauris Norstad, 
Dr. Eugene Fubini, Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant and 
the undersigned responsive to the Terms of Reference of 11 
September 1967. The following reflects, in very general terms, 
its findings and recommendations.

1. There is need for a long-range National Intelligence Plan 
within which periodic guidance can be provided to assure that the 
most effective resources are available and used to meet the present 
and foreseeable requirements of the United States Government.

2. Guidance must be target-oriented and relate the value of 
information received to the particular resources which produced it.

3. The creation of the National Intelligence Resources Board 
and the broadening of the programming and planning staff of the 
Director of Central Intelligence should be helpful in providing both 
such a long-range plan and the required periodic guidance.

4. There is need for a point of central review within the 
Department of Defense where all intelligence programs, including 
COMINT and ELINT, are looked at as a whole. Otherwise, as 
targets multiply both in numbers and sophistication, the magnitude 
of the effort will reach unacceptable proportions. In the reduction, 
the most effective resources may suffer along with the least.
5. There must be authoritative management over each of the several COMINT and ELINT programs.

6. Authority of the Director, National Security Agency, over all COMINT resources must be reaffirmed and clarified, including his authority over the Service Cryptologic Agencies as to all COMINT resources within their control. He should have the right to enter objections to the inclusion within the Service Cryptologic Agencies of other resources to the extent they would detract from the major mission of the Agencies in carrying out the NSA mission.

7. The Director, NSA, should strengthen his programming and planning staff by including more high-level military and civilian personnel from other agencies having expertise in the cryptologic area. In this connection, consideration should be given to integrating the programming and planning staffs of the Service Cryptologic Agencies into NSA. Military tours of duty at NSA should be extended and the establishment of career opportunities for military cryptologists within the Armed Forces should be encouraged.

8. The removal of resources by the military from the control of NSA should be discontinued. This will only be successful if the military can be assured that the COMINT resources developed by NSA will effectively perform in both the Direct Service and Direct Support roles.

9. The overall centralization of ELINT resources within NSA as contemplated by the Security Council Directive of 1959 is neither workable nor necessary, and the Directive should be amended accordingly. This is essential if the present confusion and duplication of ELINT resources is to be eliminated and avoided in the future.

10. Those ELINT resources essential in providing radar order of battle and conducting electronic warfare should be designated, assigned to, and programmed by the Services and included within their several budgets.
11. Those ELINT resources not falling within these classifications should be managed by the National Security Agency. There should be placed within the Services only those ELINT resources which provide information which cannot adequately be supplied by the National Security Agency. The several types of ELINT are not subject to exact definition but decisions can and should be made on a case-by-case basis. Some duplication will, and probably should, result.

12. The NSA should provide, and the Services should use, the training, technical and other support facilities essential to the operation of military ELINT resources within their control.

13. The management, collection and processing of satellite ELINT is generally satisfactory. Some clarifications in the directive establishing the National Reconnaissance Office are suggested to reflect currently satisfactory practices.

14. An effort should be made by NSA and NRO to eliminate the least efficient ELINT satellite payloads and more importantly, to ascertain whether some substantial part of ground, sea and air efforts cannot be eliminated with the increasing effectiveness of satellite collection.

15. Authority over the tasking, collection and processing of satellite COMINT and Telemetry should be definitely placed within the NSA as these satellites become effective.

16. The present effort to consolidate and close overseas bases should be encouraged and extended. Caution should be exercised not to abandon, voluntarily, any area of the world for reasons of economy, if they may one day become important again, and once abandoned cannot be re-entered. Caution must also be exercised in returning second-echelon processing to the US to ensure that military requirements, both present and future, will not suffer.
19. No firm recommendations have been made with respect to either the programs.

In conclusion, there must be no slackening in the US cryptologic effort if essential military and other national needs are to be met. The task of the future will be to determine those resources best calculated to meet the growing requirements and to assure their efficient management.

Unfortunately, many of its recommendations do not meet with their equal enthusiasm.

Fredrick M. Eaton

Enclosure: a/s
GENERAL COMMENTS

1. A re-evaluation of the COMINT and ELINT efforts of the US Government is appropriate because of developments in the more than fifteen years since the establishment of the present organization for the management of COMINT and in the ten years since ELINT was placed in the same framework.

2. The vast increase in signals subject to interception, the rapid advance in the technology for interception from the ground, air, sea and space, the new geographic areas of interest to the intelligence community, give rise to new problems in the programming of requirements and the provision of resources to meet them, now and for the foreseeable future.

3. The intelligence community is generally satisfied with the quality of the product, its dissemination, the technical competence of personnel and the maintenance and modernization of resources.

4. There are problems, however, with respect to several aspects of COMINT and ELINT. These problems, together with suggestions as to how they may be met, are set forth below.
PROGRAM GUIDANCE

1. There is need for a long-term National Intelligence Plan setting forth objectives, targets and priorities essential to provide that guidance to the Secretary of Defense, the intelligence community and formulators of intelligence programs which will assure an adequate and efficient allocation of resources responsive to the present and foreseeable requirements.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence, in providing such guidance, must make authoritative and consistent determinations as to the importance of such requirements in relation to the probable costs of their fulfillment and express authoritative judgments as to the relative effectiveness of intelligence collection programs in the satisfaction of intelligence needs. Thus, requirements of minimal importance can be ruled out or relegated to low priority in favor of those whose cost-benefit ratio appears more favorable. The present listing of Priority National Intelligence Objectives is inadequate for this purpose.

3. Within the scope of such a long-range Plan, which must be updated as conditions change, there is need for periodic guidance to program formulators in connection with annual reviews of the various intelligence programs.

4. Such guidance must be sufficiently specific in character and so relate the value of information to the resources which produced it as to provide a basis for decision as to which resources can be reduced, eliminated or expanded and what new resources are required.

5. Guidance can be meaningful only when given against knowledge and recognition of the cost involved, the capabilities of all available resources and a considered determination of the particular resources which will best cover the target.

6. Guidance must be target, rather than collection, oriented, with resource assignment recommendations where appropriate. This is essential to avoid redundancy of resources and duplication in the coverage of targets, particularly as targets and means of collection multiply both in numbers and sophistication. Otherwise:

(a) Resources will tend to determine information produced, rather than respond to information required;
(b) Demands will be placed upon resources in excess of their capabilities;

(c) Information will be produced more or less on an ad hoc basis, responsive to immediate demands of particular users, rather than to overall national requirements, including the essential demands of the Services for support and other purposes.
THE DCI AND THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES BOARD

1. The creation by the DCI of a National Intelligence Resources Board should be helpful to him in providing both long and short-term guidance. The presence on this Board of the principal user agencies will assist the DCI in evaluating information received against the resources which produced it.

2. In discharging his responsibility for national intelligence planning and program guidance, the DCI should be aware of possible concern arising from the fact that he is both a claimant on intelligence resources to support his intelligence production mission and the final judge of the community's requirements.

3. The DCI should consider not only broadening the functional scope but also strengthening the representation of the military and civilian intelligence community on the staff which assists him in discharging his national intelligence planning and program guidance responsibilities. The inclusion on this staff for extended tours of senior military officers, high-level Foreign Service Officers and others having expertise in all forms of intelligence, policy making and operations would:

   (a) Provide the DCI with a corps of personnel who, by their experience and competence, should contribute to more objective intelligence planning, guidance and evaluation;

   (b) Tend to ensure that the needs of military commanders will not be neglected in favor of other national needs;

   (c) Raise confidence in the National Intelligence Plan and shorter-term program guidance.

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1. Basic to this report is the establishment of a central point within the Department of Defense where COMINT and ELINT programs can be compared and reviewed as a whole and evaluated against the guidance provided by the DCI, including his evaluation of the relative productivity of the several COMINT and ELINT resources in the light of information produced. This central review must take full account of all other available collection capabilities of the community, including photography, radar, and other more esoteric sources, and the CIA Program.

2. With the increasing number and sophistication of targets and collection resources, together with rapid technological advances, an unacceptable burden will be placed upon men, facilities and money unless resources are planned and budgeted as a whole.

3. Such a review will tend to assure that:

   (a) There will be proper trade-offs among COMINT and ELINT resources and resources of other types. Hopefully, this will reduce the normal tendency to impose horizontal cuts to meet budgetary requirements, and thus help to assure that those resources providing the greatest certainty of success will not suffer at the expense of those of lesser capabilities.

   (b) The relative value of all resources can be evaluated against targets to assure the most effective and efficient means of collection and analysis.

   (c) As in the case of the broadened DCI Staff, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to essential military requirements will receive proper consideration in relation to other national needs.

4. The Department of Defense should ensure that all elements of the cryptologic program, in addition to being reviewed against other programs, are subject to a single decision-making procedure, properly time-phased with budgetary guidance. The present system is undesirable as Consolidated Cryptologic Program issues are decided prior to the issuance of such guidance, with resulting duplication.
MANAGEMENT OF THE CRYPTOLOGIC COMMUNITY

1. The correlation of the several programs must be supplemented by efficient resource allocation and authoritative management within each of the intelligence programs.

2. The improvement of long-term and periodic guidance given by the DCI to NSA should help materially in permitting NSA to plan and allocate its resources more effectively so as to meet the requirements of the entire intelligence community.

3. There are indications of a lack of mutual confidence on the part of NSA and the Services as to each other's competence to perform the complementary services essential to the fulfillment of their respective requirements. The Services lack confidence in the ability of NSA to support military operations. NSA is concerned that the Services may convert the bulk of COMINT and ELINT resources to their control and use, with the result that these resources may not be applied to the maximum benefit of all users.

4. These problems are minimal in terms of the total effort, but are serious in that they result in inefficient use of scarce resources. The increasing disenchantment of the Services will tend to encourage them in the acquisition of their own COMINT and ELINT resources, perhaps beyond their requirements. Not only will duplication result, but more importantly, limited personnel may not be most effectively utilized.

5. There are a number of possible causes for the difficulties faced by the Director, NSA:

   (a) Lack of direct access to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense for reporting purposes and a relative remoteness with relation to others within the Department of Defense who have a claim on COMINT and ELINT resources;

   (b) The failure of the directives issued by the Services to the Service Cryptologic Agencies fully to recognize the responsibility placed upon the Director by the Security Council Directive establishing NSA as manager of the COMINT and ELINT programs of the Government;

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   (b) The failure of the directives issued by the Services to the Service Cryptologic Agencies fully to recognize the responsibility placed upon the Director by the Security Council Directive establishing NSA as manager of the COMINT and ELINT programs of the Government;
(c) Diffused and uncoordinated planning by the Service Cryptologic Agencies among themselves and in relation to NSA;

(d) Concern, whether justified or not, that there is inadequate military representation within NSA at management levels;

(e) The physical separation and isolation of NSA from the Services which contributes to an increasing lack of communication essential to mutual confidence.

6. The recent Hubbell Report recognized the need for service personnel at high levels within NSA. The billets recommended have not been filled because of Congressional limitations on the number of general and flag-rank officers and the demanding requirements for senior officers in the Southeast Asian theater.

7. The Services should therefore be mindful that the lack of an adequate military presence in NSA is not solely the fault of the Director, NSA. Unless senior officers are assigned to NSA in sufficient numbers to assure that the requirements of the military are adequately considered, there is a likelihood that these requirements will not be met.

8. To improve the situation, the following comments and suggested actions should be considered:

(a) The authority of the Director, NSA, over activities of the Service Cryptologic Agencies covered by the Consolidated Cryptologic Program should be reaffirmed and, in fact, recognized by the Services. At present, Service directives to these agencies fail to take this authority fully into account and should be modified accordingly.

(b) The Director, NSA, should exercise his present review responsibility for all Service Cryptologic Agency program items related to research, development, deployment and operations of resources within the Consolidated Cryptologic Program and NSA budget. In addition he should be given the opportunity to concur or non-concur with respect to all other Service Cryptologic Agency resources to the extent such resources would detract from the basic mission of those agencies in support of NSA. This would not confer the right of veto.

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(c) The modest start toward the establishment of a cryptologic career within the Services should be encouraged so that it will attract and retain both officers and enlisted personnel of the quality required by this exacting discipline. It should provide an opportunity to rise to the top without the necessity of other assignments, except, and importantly, as required to develop a well-rounded intelligence capability.

(d) Tours of duty at NSA and in the Service Cryptologic Agencies should be extended. Limited tours are not adequate to qualify military personnel for these responsibilities. An infusion of high-level civilians from all intelligence agencies into NSA and from NSA to other intelligence agencies and the Service Cryptologic Agencies for extended periods would be helpful. This will work only if positions of responsibility commensurate with rank and abilities are made available in those agencies.

(e) The tendency on the part of the military, unilaterally, to remove essential resources, both men and equipment, from the approved Consolidated Cryptologic Program is detrimental to the entire effort and should be resisted.

9. Concern has been expressed by the Services over the tendency to centralize certain functions at NSA which have historically been conducted by the Service Cryptologic Agencies in the US or in the operational theaters. With the increasing sophistication of both collection systems and communications, the present and foreseeable political pressures, together with budgetary and foreign exchange necessities, pressures will undoubtedly grow to withdraw from foreign theaters and centralize in the US.

10. These demands and the increasing centralization at NSA referred to above must be approached with the greatest caution because:

(a) There will always be an essential requirement for some collection and processing capabilities within every theater of operation, the need mounting as tension mounts.

(b) The balance between overseas processing and centralization at NSA must be kept under continuous review to be certain that our military capability does not suffer.
(c) Although many overseas billets can be filled by civilians and increased central processing will be necessary, it must not be forgotten that military personnel must be trained and facilities available to fill these exacting needs in times of crises.
NSA STAFF ORGANIZATION

1. The Director, NSA, much like, but to a far lesser degree than the DCI, wears two hats, one for operations and the other for developing and maintaining the Consolidated Cryptologic Program.

2. It is his responsibility to provide the skills and resources necessary to meet the long-range National Intelligence Plan, including resources which will be responsive to the periodic guidance given by the DCI.

3. He has an additional responsibility for day-to-day operations to assure that resources covered within the Consolidated Cryptologic Program are available and tasked and that the task is processed.

4. The Director, NSA, should broaden his staff charged with long-term policy, planning and programming by the inclusion of competent military and civilian officers from the intelligence community assigned for extended tours. As a move in this direction, consideration should be given to transferring parts of the Planning Staffs of the Service Cryptologic Agencies and integrating them with such a broadened NSA Staff.

5. The task of this staff would be to assist the Director, NSA, in preparing the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, including program changes, to assure the availability of resources required to meet national and military demands for information, both long and near-term. This would serve to assure the DCI, the Service Cryptologic Agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, theater commanders and other users that their needs and points of view were represented as decisions affecting their programs and resources were being reached.

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COMINT, TELEMETRY AND ELINT RESOURCES

1. The National Security Council Intelligence Directive establishing the authority and responsibility of the Director, NSA, treats COMINT and ELINT resources as generally subject to the same degree of central control.

2. The experience of the past ten years since control of ELINT was placed in NSA indicates that the large bulk of ELINT resources must be excepted as lying within the responsibility of the Services, rather than NSA. Although the directive recognizes this, it fails adequately to define those exceptions.

3. New classifications of resources—Electronic Warfare, Passive Electronic Countermeasures—are being created by the Services to claim certain resources similar to, if not precisely identifiable as, COMINT and ELINT resources.

4. Duplication of resources, collection, processing and control will reach unacceptable proportions unless the allocation of resources is clarified.

5. The military commands have a clear need for information requiring the development and deployment of resources capable of supporting their operations and for obtaining control, delegated or otherwise, of certain of these resources as the military situation may require.

6. COMINT and ELINT resources and the responsibility for their programming and operation should generally fall within the following categories:

   COMINT Resources

   1. This category includes all resources devoted to communications intelligence to fulfill national, including military, requirements, exclusive of resources in support of Electronic Warfare as defined below [p. 14, para. 6(1)].

   2. Management responsibility over all such COMINT resources has been placed under the Director, NSA, and should remain there. Portions of these resources will, from time to time, be required by the
military commanders for direct support of their operations. This need can be met within the spirit of the Direct Support Concept Paper of November 1967, as agreed to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director, NSA.

3. The concept provides a means by which prompt decisions can be made as to whether and when certain resources engaged in Direct Service activities should be transferred for Direct Support. It should be adequate, provided that resources exist and are designed to produce the information required by the combat commanders with the requisite degree of accuracy and timeliness. Unless this condition is met, the COMINT system will have failed in the performance of a major function, and the Services will, of necessity, have to develop their own resources.

4. It should therefore be made clear that the Director, NSA, working closely with concerned military authorities, has the responsibility for ensuring that the total COMINT resources planned and programmed will include the best possible mix of resources possessing the physical characteristics and operational capabilities for performing in either the Direct Service or Direct Support roles.

5. Fulfilling this responsibility will necessarily require the Director, NSA, to make program decisions in full consideration of military requirements and to provide for military influence in the crucial areas of concept formulation, system design, operational doctrine and other policy matters which directly affect the quality and quantity of the Direct Service and Direct Support which military commanders can expect to receive.

Telemetry Resources

Telemetry intercept was not included as either COMINT or ELINT in the 1958 Security Council Directive. It is similar in security handling to ELINT, but it is an information-carrying signal whose analysis and exploitation more closely resembles COMINT. Its processing is for the most part managed by NSA at present, and this situation is generally satisfactory. It is recommended that Telemetry intercept be treated as COMINT except for its security regulations, and that NSA exercise developmental, operational, tasking and technical control over Telemetry intercept resources, subject to certain exceptions in satellite Telemetry collection as noted below.
ELINT Resources

1. Over the past ten years, it has become apparent that the decision to place ELINT as a whole within the COMINT structure of NSA has not proved to be workable. While COMINT is properly the subject of centralized control, there is no need for such control of ELINT.

2. In budgetary terms, ELINT resources, except for those in the NRP, are a comparatively small part of the CCP. Their usefulness, particularly to the Services, however, is very great. As signals subject to interception multiply, and as collection vehicles become more responsive, the military importance of ELINT will increase. This is not to indicate that certain ELINT resources, and a substantial part of all the ELINT take, are not important to other national intelligence objectives nor to the function of COMINT.

3. With respect to a large part of the ELINT resources, it must be recognized that they differ generally from COMINT resources in the manner in which they are controlled and used, their products, the security protection accorded them and the skills required to use them.

4. Perhaps as a result of these differences, although COMINT is now all but entirely under the management of NSA, only a small part of ELINT resources, national in character, is under such management. The impact of ELINT and ELINT-related activities on military operations is too direct, continuous and useful for the control of these operations to reside entirely in NSA.

5. NSA should manage the collection (except that under NRO) and the processing of ELINT signals of national strategic importance, such as those related to the control of foreign strategic offensive forces, of foreign space and ABM programs.
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The inflated dissemination list for COMINT products places a heavy load on communication circuits and courier service. Large numbers of publications are sent electrically or carried to a large number of addressees whose need is often marginal at best. This is essentially an internal management problem within the Department of Defense. It is recommended that there be a careful screening of requests for distribution from the Services and theater commands to eliminate unnecessary distribution of COMINT materials.