apparent reduction toward year's end in the infiltration rate, * higher truck, rolling stock, and watercraft losses, + increased need for imports, and reduced war-supporting capacity. In addition, pacification reports were encouraging.

(S-Gp 3) However, there was also concern that past and current "progress" indicators were not sufficiently thorough or reliable. This was manifested in the Air Force by Secretary Brown's requests for better analyses of the results of the air effort. One consequence was the issuance, beginning in September 1967, of a monthly publication entitled: "Trends, Indicators, and Analyses," by the Operations Review Group, Directorate of Operations. It sought to evaluate progress toward achieving the three basic objectives of the air war in North Vietnam. In the same month, also at Secretary Brown's request, the Air Staff formed a joint Operations Analysis-Rand Corporation study group to better pinpoint operational issues and analyze the effects of the air war in Southeast Asia. At a higher level, the White House on 25 October directed the creation of an interagency task force, chaired by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to improve accuracy in estimating enemy casualties, weapon losses, extent of population control, the effect of the Chieu Hoi or "open arms" reconciliation program, and other "progress" indicators.

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*Although infiltration figures lagged by at least six months, MACV estimates showed a considerable drop between the second and fourth quarters of 1967 (see p 62). In January 1968 MACV estimated 1967 infiltration to have totaled about 54,000 but expected the final total to be about equal to the 1966 total of 87,200.

+MACV estimated that air attacks in North Vietnam and Laos from 1 January through 20 December 1967 destroyed or damaged 5,261 motor vehicles, 2,475 pieces of rolling stock and 11,425 watercraft. The Air Staff concluded that 1967 witnessed for the first time a net enemy loss of about 2,000 trucks above imports with about 8,000 to 10,000 trucks still in North Vietnam's inventory.

++These were: reducing the flow of men and matériel moving from North to South Vietnam, increasing the cost of war to the North, and convincing Hanoi it could not continue its aggression without incurring severe penalties.