REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

ON

THE USE BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

September 8, 2006 - Ordered to be printed
The Honorable Ted Stevens  
President Pro Tempore  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Select Committee on Intelligence, we submit the following unclassified reports, together with additional and minority views, for filing with the Senate: (1) Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How they Compare with Prewar Assessments and (2) The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress.

Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976) charges the Committee with the duty to oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government, and to report to the Senate concerning those activities and programs. Pursuant to its responsibilities under Senate Resolution 400, the Committee has undertaken an in-depth examination of the matters described in the reports.

Both reports have been approved by the Committee in both classified and unclassified form. The classified reports are available to Members for reading at the Committee. The classified reports will also be provided to appropriately cleared officials of the Executive branch.

The unclassified versions of the reports, which are hereby transmitted for printing, are intended to provide the Senate, and through it, the American public, a substantial factual record upon which to consider the issues covered by the reports.

Sincerely,

Pat Roberts  
Chairman

John D. Rockefeller IV  
Vice Chairman
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
United States Senate

109th Congress

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I. INTRODUCTION

(U) On February 12, 2004, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence agreed to refine the terms of reference of the Committee’s ongoing inquiry into prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq. The Committee agreed that five of the new elements, including “the use by the Intelligence Community of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC),” would be reviewed in “phase II” of the Iraq inquiry. The Committee released the first phase of the Iraqi review, the Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, on July 9, 2004.

(U) In reviewing the “use by the Intelligence Community of information provided by the INC,” Committee staff endeavored to keep the scope of the review consistent with specific terms of reference to which Committee Members unanimously agreed on February 12, 2004. Consistent with the overall scope of the inquiry – “prewar intelligence with regard to Iraq” – this report focuses only on the Intelligence Community’s use of prewar INC information, information provided to the Intelligence Community prior to the March 19, 2003 start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The report describes, in brief, the fact that the Intelligence Community did continue to use and fund the collection of INC information for over a year after the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, but does not provide details regarding how the Intelligence Community used that information and does not include a review of the quality or utility of INC information after the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

(U) This report also does not focus on the Intelligence Community’s use of INC information in the early and mid-1990s. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was the agency with primacy in handling the INC following the 1991 Gulf War, has had a long and tumultuous relationship with the INC, in particular, with the INC’s executive council Chairman Ahmed Chalabi. In
reviewing the history of this interaction, the Committee found significant differences of opinion regarding what led to the termination of the relationship, with each side blaming the other for its failure. The report describes the history of that relationship to provide context to the Intelligence Community’s later interaction with the INC, but does not attempt to resolve lingering questions regarding what led to the CIA’s and INC’s mutual disaffection.

(U) Finally, the report does not provide a review of the INC’s collection efforts or methods, the INC’s analysis of its own information, or information the INC may have provided to parties other than the U.S. Intelligence Community. The Committee understands that the INC made an effort to widely disseminate its information and brought its information to the attention of U.S. and foreign government officials, think tanks, the international media, foreign intelligence services, and others, all of which are outside the scope of the terms of reference agreed to by Committee Members. The report describes INC defector referrals to U.S. government and former government officials, the media, and foreign intelligence services, only when those referrals pertain to the Intelligence Community’s use of the information.

(U) The report describes the general history of the Intelligence Community’s use of INC information and the genesis of how the handling of INC information transitioned from the CIA to the Department of State and, eventually, to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The report focuses on information provided to the Intelligence Community by the INC, in particular, whether and how the Intelligence Community used that information, the inclusion of that information in Intelligence Community analysis, and whether the information played a role in the Intelligence Community’s judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities and links to terrorism.
(U) For clarity, the report makes a distinction between information provided to the Intelligence Community by members of the INC and information provided by sources who were referred to the Intelligence Community by the INC. Because those sources were not members of the INC, the report refers to them as INC-affiliated sources.

(U) The Committee notes that the Intelligence Community may have received information from additional INC-affiliated source information from foreign intelligence services that has not been identified as INC-related. The CIA told the Committee “we believe it is likely that some reporting from INC sources may have been fed to the US Intelligence Community via liaison services.” CIA said this belief reflected its lack of visibility into liaison sources and anecdotal information that the INC was bringing sources or allegations about Iraq WMD to other intelligence services, including key liaison partners.

II. BACKGROUND ON IC RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE INC\(^1\)

(U) In the Spring of 1991, President George H. W. Bush approved efforts aimed at influencing those in the Iraqi government and military to undertake action to change the Iraqi leadership. This authorization included encouraging individuals or groups, both inside and outside Iraq, who wished to remove Saddam from power and supporting those efforts in a material fashion. It was not the objective or intent of the U.S. Government that Saddam Hussein, or members of his regime, be physically harmed, but this authorization took note that there was a strong possibility that violence of some degree would occur.

\(^1\) This section of the report has been redrafted substantially from the classified version to accommodate classification restrictions.
(U) In response to the authorization, and in an effort to reach out to opposition groups and generate ideas to carry out the efforts, in May 1991, the CIA approached Dr. Ahmed Chalabi, a secular Iraqi Shiite Muslim, who had been living in exile since 1956 and was already a well known opposition figure. With mutual goals of establishing a focal point for rallying the Iraqi opposition, Chalabi and the CIA began to work together.

(U) In June of 1992, more than 200 Iraqi opposition leaders met in Vienna. This conference saw the creation of the INC and established a general committee, and smaller leadership and executive committees, to direct opposition efforts against the Iraqi regime.²

(U) After the Vienna meeting, Ahmed Chalabi says he began to plan for a larger conference that would include a wider spectrum of opposition parties, including the Islamic groups, which had not participated in the Vienna conference. In October 1992, several hundred representatives attended the INC’s conference in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. The INC elected a three-member leadership council, chose a 25-member executive council, and elected Chalabi as its Chairman. The INC also established an office in northern Iraq and announced its political program which included three primary goals: 1) the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime; 2) the establishment of democracy in Iraq; and 3) putting Saddam Hussein and his regime on trial.³

(U) While the US and the INC continued to work toward mutual goals of undermining Saddam Hussein, the relationship experienced some difficulties, in part due to differing views of Chalabi’s role in CIA’s Iraq intelligence efforts. The CIA officers interviewed by Committee staff commented that Chalabi was

²Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 31, 2006.
³Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 31, 2006
difficult and some said that Chalabi did not provide useful intelligence and did not deliver on assurances that disaffected Iraqi military officers wanted to defect to the opposition.\(^4\) Several officers also believed that the INC’s radio stations and other media outlets were not as productive as they should have been.\(^5\) Some CIA officers complained about Chalabi’s efforts to lobby Members of Congress, while other officers said that Chalabi’s security force was too large, too much like a private army of Iraqi dissidents.\(^6\)

\[(U)\] Chalabi told Committee staff that he was the leader of a political process and not a US intelligence asset. He did not believe he had an obligation to act under CIA control. Chalabi told Committee staff that his strategy from the beginning was to get support for the INC from Congress. He acknowledged that this strategy caused “friction” with CIA officers who were uncomfortable with him talking to Congress. Chalabi also told Committee staff that he was not tasked to collect intelligence until October 1994. Chalabi said that before that time, the INC did collect information, including from Iraqi military walk-ins, but that the information was used by the INC for their own media operations.\(^7\)

\[(U)\] The Chief of the Iraq Operations Group at the CIA told Committee staff that Chalabi was a “very controversial character” and “came with some baggage,” but said that of all of the opposition, Chalabi “was always the one who really got things done.”\(^8\)

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\(^4\) Staff interviews with CIA officers.
\(^5\) Staff interviews with CIA officers.
\(^6\) Staff interviews with CIA officers.
\(^7\) Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 31, 2006.
\(^8\) Staff interview with CIA officer.
(U) In October 1994 the INC provided a steady stream of low-ranking walk-ins from various Iraqi army and Republican Guard units who generally had interesting information.\textsuperscript{9} CIA officers described Chalabi’s propaganda operations noting that:

parts of the operation were very impressive given the isolation of [the location] and the power problems. ... Less than impressive was the TV programming [deleted text]. The facilities are not plush, but expenses are high because of the high cost of spare parts, power and items imported through tenuous supply lines. The conditions at the protective force compound are especially spartan. The INC, however, could easily rent down to a less ostentatious HQS building. It is rarely used and not worth whatever the cost is.\textsuperscript{10}

(U) Former CIA officials also described problems with Chalabi as the result, in part, of squabbles within the CIA about which Iraqi opposition members to support. Several current and former CIA officers told Committee staff that there was a degree of “clientism” within the agency in which operations officers with primacy in dealing with specific opposition members tended to side with, and at times adopt the views of, those individuals.\textsuperscript{11} CIA reports indicate that Iraqi opposition members constantly complained about each other and about their perception that CIA gave more time, attention and funding to some opposition members over others.

(U) Nonetheless, according to a 1997 CIA report on Chalabi, “Chalabi was

\textsuperscript{9} CIA Operational cable, December 1995.
\textsuperscript{10} CIA Operational cable, December 1995.
\textsuperscript{11} Staff interview with CIA officers.
the only INC leader willing to devote his time and energy to the organization."\textsuperscript{12} The CIA awarded Chalabi for his efforts in 1994 in recognition of his distinguished service in facilitating a cease-fire agreement between two warring Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. The award submission praised Chalabi and another INC leadership council member noting:

Their display of perseverance and fortitude during this trying and dangerous time was invaluable in helping concerned parties to bring about a cease-fire and establish mechanisms for policing a sustained period of calm. Due to their combined efforts, negotiations were successfully carried out between the two principal Kurdish leaders and the viability and integrity of INC efforts in Northern Iraq were sustained.

\textbf{(U)} Despite this process, problems between Chalabi and the CIA escalated in late 1994 and early 1995 when a tenuous cease-fire between the two Kurdish parties in northern Iraq was breaking down while, at the same time, the opposition was making plans to overthrow Saddam Hussein.

\textbf{(U)} In December 1994, the INC leadership council member reportedly made claims that the U.S. supported a plan to lead an opposition force into Iraq to join with military commanders of an Iraqi Corp in an attack against the regime. This plan was reportedly an attempt to prevent renewed fighting between Kurdish opposition groups, by telling the two groups that renewed fighting would interfere with the operation against the Saddam regime. The plan was soon abandoned due to an admonishment from CIA.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} CIA's Relationship with Ahmad Chalabi, July 1997.
\textsuperscript{13} CIA Operational cable, January 1995.
(U) At the same time, Chalabi was also concerned about the continuation of Kurdish fighting and reports that the Iranians intended to send their own "mediators" into northern Iraq. In late January 1995, a senior Department of State officer went to northern Iraq to meet with Chalabi and the Kurdish leaders to discuss a possible cease-fire. In response, the US encouraged a cease-fire agreement by offering U.S. funding for INC mediation efforts and suggesting that the U.S. would cease enforcing the northern Iraq no-fly zone if the two groups did not agree. The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) agreed to accept a cease-fire based on that understanding.

(U) In early February 1995, the CIA learned of a new opposition plan to remove Saddam Hussein from power. A former senior Iraqi intelligence official said the plan centered on seizing Saddam when he visited his residence in the town of Ujah, where he assessed Saddam would go if he felt vulnerable in Baghdad. A clan member of the former official and military instructor at a nearby tank school was to provide armor to take Saddam’s Ujah residence complex. Another military officer, who was assigned to Saddam’s special security detail, was responsible for informing them of when Saddam was about to leave for Ujah. The CIA learned that the former official wanted to implement the plan within two-to-three weeks and said nothing other than minimal assistance was needed, although the former official would expect strong U.S. public support for the coup immediately after Saddam would be seized.

(U) Immediately thereafter, the CIA received many additional details about the plan, including the fact that "the coup will occur on either 4 or 5 March, depending on when Saddam travels to Ujah" and that the former official expected

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14 CIA operational cable, January 1995 and staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi.
15 CIA operational cable, January 1995 and staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi.
16 CIA Operational cable, February 1995.
the U.N./U.S. to declare a no-fly zone, noting that the movement does not need air support, just a warning for the Iraqi air force not to fly.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{(U)} In early February 1995, the CIA learned about continuing tensions between the Kurdish opposition groups. One Kurdish leader said unless an INC peace-keeping force was immediately deployed to the confrontation lines, he could not show continued restraint.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{(U)} In mid-February 1995, the U.S. learned that a cease-fire was agreed to only because of strong U.S. support, including for an INC mediation force. A CIA report stated:

While an uneasy truce has generally held since the cease-fire proposal was agreed to on 22 January, it will not last unless [fighting Kurdish] forces soon are separated by an INC force. Should the U.S. not fund the INC peace-keeping force and another round of fighting occurs, any attempt for the U.S. to mediate a second cease fire would be unlikely to succeed.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{(U)} In mid-February 1995, the CIA received information that the official was continuing to contact his network and was prepared to implement his plan as early as February 22, 1995. The CIA explained that the U.S. is not a participant in the coup and is not funding the coup. The CIA told the former official the U.S. believes Iraq would be better served with a different government and that “the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} CIA operational cable, February 1995.
\item \textsuperscript{18} CIA operational cable, February 1995.
\item \textsuperscript{19} CIA operational cable, February 1995.
\end{itemize}
U.S. will itself not remove Saddam, but rely on the Iraqi people to do so,” the same message that had been passed to other prominent opposition officials.²⁰

(U) In mid-February 1995, CIA Iraq elements inquired about support for the INC peace-keeping force. Chalabi had informed them he only had funds to pay his security force until February 15, at which time he would have to start letting personnel go. Chalabi had been informed by the State Department that U.S. support would be available before mid-February. CIA elements were seeking to expedite the payment.²¹

(U) On February 17, 1995, CIA Iraq elements were informed that policymakers wished to pursue the proposal as an overt U.S. diplomatic initiative with Department of State leading the effort’s funding and administration. Department of State lawyers tentatively concluded that State had the legal authority to fund the initiative and were seeking to verify whether there were “any actual funds available.” Chalabi still owed the Department of State a budget for the INC effort, and CIA headquarters commented that Chalabi’s “own administrative weaknesses are not serving his case well.”²² An immediate response from the CIA Iraq elements attached a budget that Chalabi had previously passed to CIA which they believed had previously been given to the Department of State.²³

(U) On February 17, 1995, headquarters received a field report describing the status of opposition politics in northern Iraq. The cable noted that Chalabi was focusing on the plan to detain Saddam in Ujah, but Chalabi did not believe

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²⁰ CIA operational cable, February 1995.
²¹ CIA Operational cable, February 1995.
²² CIA Operational cable, February 1995.
²³ CIA operational cable, February 1995.
Saddam could be removed simply by detaining him in Ujah and waiting for the Iraqi people to rise up. The plan would only be workable if there were large diversions in Mosul and Kirkuk, coordinated with uprisings in the Shi’a south. Accordingly, the cable noted that Chalabi was in close contact with the Kurdish groups about these plans and was attempting to reinvigorate ties with Iran and Shi’a opposition exiles in Iran. The cable said that the KDP and PUK were too busy fighting each other to think much about Chalabi’s plan. The field report concluded that instability in Iraq could “provoke the opposition to implement its ‘plan’ on very short notice. CIA Field elements estimated that opposition ‘planning’ that may seem farfetched at this point could, with another sharp downturn of the situation in Iraq, come to pass.”

(U) In early March, field reports noted a deteriorating situation in northern Iraq, including the movement of Turkish troops along the Iraqi border and Iraqi tanks shelling the town of Kifri. Unilateral CIA reporting indicated that the KDP intended to attack PUK positions, and might have been cooperating in a Turkish plan to launch large-scale counterinsurgency operations against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a militant Kurdish terrorist group, in PUK controlled areas. The reporting also noted that the plan to detain Saddam in Ujah appeared to be gaining support in the south and the north. In early March, a CIA representative met with a representative of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), who said SCIRI’s armed wing, the Badr Corps, Shi’a tribes, and other Shi’a resistance groups in the south would support the early March coup attempt. The details of the plan were outlined in a March 2, 1995 CIA intelligence report.

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24 CIA Operational cable, February 1995.
26 CIA Operational cable, March 1995.
(U) A CIA representative accompanied Chalabi to discuss the plan and seek the participation of other senior opposition figures. According to Chalabi and CIA officials, the CIA representative went to these meetings to imply U.S. support for the planned effort. These senior opposition officials told the CIA representative they would support the plan. One promised to send 15,000 troops to create a diversion and the another promised to move its own troops around Mosul.

(U) On March 3, 1995, Chalabi made contact with Iranian intelligence officials to discuss Iran’s position on the proposed action and their support for possible action against southern Iraq. In response to questions from Committee staff, the CIA representative who had been liaising with Chalabi said he was aware of the meeting ahead of time and was aware that the purpose of the meeting was to gain both Iranian support for the opposition action and signal to the Iranians that the U.S. was supportive of the plan. CIA headquarters denied his request to join the meeting. He was informed, however, that it was not a problem for Chalabi to seek the help of the Iranians. Nonetheless, the CIA representative said that he was present outside the meeting space, was seen by the Iranians, and was aware that Chalabi intended for the Iranians to see him there as a signal of U.S. support.

(U) In early March 1995, a foreign government provided the U.S. information on the Iranians’ view of this meeting. It was indicated that Iran thought that the U.S. was seeking Iranian support for the Iraqi oppositionist uprising against Saddam Hussein planned for early March 1995. Iranian officials also believed that the U.S. person involved in the matter was a CIA officer. Indications were that Chalabi “handed” the Iranians a message at the meeting, purportedly from the U.S., that said America would welcome the involvement of Islamic forces in the operations against Saddam Hussein, on the condition that the

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27 Staff interviews with CIA officers, and staff interview of Ahmed Chalabi, January 31, 2006.
28 Staff interview with CIA officer, February 17, 2006.
independence and unity of Iraq are preserved, and the Iraqi borders are not changed.

(U) The same foreign government information provided additional details about a meeting between Chalabi and SCIRI representatives the day prior to his meeting with Iranian intelligence. When the SCIRI representatives questioned Chalabi about the seriousness of the uprising, Chalabi exited the meeting and returned with the previously identified American. The Iranians believed the American to be a member of the National Security Council. It was reported that the American told the SCIRI representatives that he wanted to kill Saddam and that he was serious.

(U) The CIA representative told Committee staff that he did not tell the SCIRI representatives that he wanted to kill or assassinate Saddam Hussein but he did say that we, meaning the U.S., wants to “get rid of him.”

(U) Further intelligence about the same meeting indicated that Chalabi told the SCIRI representatives that America has promised to prevent any action by the Iraqi army and to target them; to impede Iraqi army tank movements in the cities, not in the marshes, via aerial bombardment; and to prevent Saddam’s army from suppressing this initiative, through exploitation of resolutions 688 and 949.

(U) Several CIA officers told Committee staff that there was a firestorm in the National Security Council after receiving this information, with urgent phone calls to the CIA to find out what was happening in Iraq and why a CIA agent was posing as a member of the National Security Council and allegedly planning an
assassination of Saddam Hussein. Senior CIA officials immediately sought to ascertain whether there was any truth to the information.

(U) In early March 1995, CIA elements confirmed that they continued to tell the parties involved that:

This is not a U.S.-backed action. It is purely an Iraqi “plan.” No money or material support has been or will be given to it. The U.S. military will not provide a no-fly zone, or in any way will the U.S. military support the action. The U.S. will not support assassinations or unnecessary bloodshed. [A CIA representative] has underscored the point that the U.S. is opposed to an action that leads to civil war or a popular uprising. The U.S. strongly opposes the Kurds attempting to occupy Mawsil and Kirkuk for the sake of making these Kurdish cities.

(U) This was the first time the CIA representative reported that opposition leaders had been informed that the U.S. would not provide a no-fly zone or that the U.S. opposed an action that would lead to a popular uprising.

(U) In early March 1995, on the day the operation was set to go forward, the U.S. Government, at the instruction of the National Security Council (NSC), delivered to all of the opposition members involved a message which outlined two points:

A) The action you have planned for this weekend has been totally compromised; and

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29 Staff interviews with CIA officers.  
30 Staff interview with CIA officer.  
31 CIA Operational Cable, March 1995.
B) We believe there is a high risk of failure. Any decision to proceed will be entirely on your own.

(U) A third point, to be delivered only to Chalabi, said:

C) To eliminate any possible ambiguity, the U.S. government has not sought through you or any other channel to pass a message to the government of Iran on this matter.\(^{32}\)

(U) When Chalabi was given the NSC message, the CIA representative told him that the message left it up to Chalabi whether to proceed with the plan.\(^{33}\) Chalabi, believing it was too late to turn back, went ahead with the planned operation. Chalabi reportedly called another opposition figure and told him that the "U.S. no longer supported the plan."\(^{34}\) The former Iraqi official leading the operation believed that it was too late to stop the internal networks from carrying out their assigned tasks.\(^{35}\) Chalabi told Committee staff that one opposition leader whom he phoned agreed to go ahead with the operation as planned, a third opposition leader had left even before the message had been passed and would provide limited symbolic support to the operation, only because attacks were highly popular with the Kurds.\(^{36}\)

(U) In response to the U.S. message, Chalabi and the former official leading the operation indicated they "have never claimed U.S. military support" for the

\(^{32}\) CIA Operational cable, March 1995.

\(^{33}\) Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 31, 2006, and staff interview with CIA officer, February 17, 2006.

\(^{34}\) CIA Operational cable, March 1995.

\(^{35}\) CIA Operational cable, March 1995.

\(^{36}\) CIA Operational cable, March 1995.
plan. One added that he “had never claimed or will claim the U.S. has promised military, financial, or material support for the March plan.”\(^{37}\) After the start of the action, the former official said that, because phone lines were cut off within Iraq, he was unable to communicate with Iraqi officers inside Iraq and requested that the U.S. fly a single airplane over Sammara to reassure the people and warn Iraqi helicopters not to fly. In response to this request, the Iraqi Operations Group sent instructions to the CIA representative that “if asked, and only if asked, about a response to [the former official leading the operation’s] request for a flight over Sammara, you should state ‘there is no response.’”\(^{38}\)

(U) Both CIA officials and Chalabi told Committee staff that the initial stages of the plan had worked to some extent. Exchanges of light infantry weapons and artillery fire were observed. Iraqi military equipment and several hundred Iraqi soldiers had been captured. While one group of opposition forces were occupied fighting Saddam’s military, another opposition group used the opportunity to attack the other from the rear, which effectively ended the operation.\(^{39}\) Nonetheless, there was never confirmation that Iraqi military units had followed the plan and the Iraqi people did not rise up against the regime.

(U) Afterwards, CIA headquarters sent word to the opposition members. The points for Chalabi were:

A) In the wake of this weekend’s events, we need to clarify the basis on which we can work together in the future.

\(^{37}\) CIA Operational cable, March 1995.

\(^{38}\) CIA Operational cable, March 1995.

\(^{39}\) CIA Operational cable, March 1995, Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 31, 2006, and Staff interview with CIA officer.
B) As you know, we were surprised by your plan to move this weekend and were very concerned about claims that this plan had U.S. support.
C) This cannot happen again if we are to work together. The U.S. government must not be put in the position of having its name invoked, or having to make decisions which could involve American lives, without adequate prior consultation.
D) We are concerned that in the aftermath, a desire to assign blame will lead to the weakening of the opposition to Saddam Hussein. We hope this urge will be resisted.
E) The task now is to regroup around our common objective. Saddam Hussein is increasingly isolated. Our efforts among UNSC members have helped ensure the maintenance of sanctions.
F) Saddam has to believe his position is eroding. Efforts in the period ahead need to be focused on exploiting his weaknesses rather than on recriminations.\footnote{CIA Operational cable, March 1995.}

\textbf{(U)} CIA field and headquarters officials responsible for Iraq told Committee staff they believed that the NSC had been surprised by the opposition plans because the Chief of CIA’s Near East (NE) Division made himself the only channel of communication with the NSC and did not tell the NSC about the uprising plans.\footnote{Staff interview with CIA officers.} The Chief of NE told Committee staff that he made himself the point of contact with the NSC to avoid mixed messages coming from the NE Division, but he said that his role in no way limited the CIA Iraq Headquarters element’s ability to disseminate intelligence reporting on their activities. The Chief of NE also said he did not recall field elements sending in a “sharply articulated plan” and did not believe that the plan would succeed.\footnote{Staff interview with CIA officer, March 10, 2006.}
(U) The intelligence report disseminated on March 2, 1995 that explained the coup plan never made it to the White House, according to the Iraq Operations Group chief. He told Committee staff that he knew the National Security Council was surprised by the plan because after the uprising “numerous offices were torn apart trying to find this report, and eventually I believe it was found in the office of the DDO and that it didn’t go to the White House.”

(U) Animosity toward Chalabi from some groups within the CIA grew, particularly from those officers who had prior problems with Chalabi. For example, a cable from a European Station referring to the opposition operation as “the recent unpleasantness” recommended removing Chalabi from northern Iraq. The cable stated, “we hold Chalabi responsible for the debacle in the north” while recognizing that “he accomplished much for us before going off the rails. We would not be as far along as we are in the total effort against Saddam if we had not been able to stand on Chalabi’s shoulders.” A response from CIA headquarters stated:

We are unsure of what station holds [Chalabi] responsible for, per [Station cable’s] debacle reference. If this applies to the infighting, that is the Kurdish “fact of life,” which the INC has always attempted to prevent. If this refers to [Chalabi’s] ill-advised association with [former official who planned the operation] and the Iranians, we concede his poor judgment. That said, the low-level series of attacks by opposition elements on the Iraqi military’s northern positions have had the salutary effect of further lowering Iraqi army morale and placing increased pressure on the Iraqi government.

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43 Staff interview with CIA officer, March 14, 2006.
44 CIA Operational cable, March 1995.
45 CIA Operational cable, March 1995.
(U) In a June 1998 letter to the Committee in response to the questions from Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, the CIA stated:

The failed uprising with [a former regime official] in March 1995 caused us to reassess our relationship with Chalabi because he had unilaterally entered into this plan without consulting CIA while at the same time claiming that the United States supported the uprising.

(U) Yet, CIA’s reporting outlined previously shows that Chalabi did not enter the plan unilaterally and did consult CIA from the beginning. Both field elements and CIA Headquarters’ Iraq officials told Committee staff that Chalabi did inform field elements about the plan and that the CIA representative’s role in working with Chalabi to seek the support of the Kurdish leaders did signal to the opposition that the plan had U.S. support.\textsuperscript{46}

(U) Concerns about Chalabi’s meeting with the Iranians also fueled CIA resentment toward Chalabi. A 2004 assessment of Chalabi says the CIA placed him under scrutiny following this incident due to concerns about his “coziness” with Iranian intelligence and accused Chalabi of fraudulently acting on behalf of the U.S. Government when he alleged to Iranian intelligence that Washington was interested in enlisting Tehran’s support for operations against Saddam. The assessment said, “Chalabi passed a fabricated message from the White House to an MOIS officer in northern Iraq. In addition, Chalabi claimed that U.S. warplanes would come to the aid of oppositionists.”\textsuperscript{47} The CIA representative that communicated with Chalabi in this period told Committee staff he had learned from investigators of this incident in which Chalabi had fabricated a message on National Security Council stationary that Chalabi let the Iranians see. He also told

\textsuperscript{46} Staff interview with CIA officers.  
\textsuperscript{47} Ahmad Chalabi’s Ties to CIA, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, July 1, 2004. p. 2.
Committee staff, however, that he knew Chalabi intended to seek Iranian support for the operation and knew that his presence outside the meeting was intended to signal U.S. support for the plan.48

(U) Chalabi told Committee staff that he did seek Iranian support for the operation, but never fabricated a written communication from the White House or any part of the U.S. government.49

(U) A Committee staff review of intelligence on the Iranian view of the meeting with Chalabi determined it was imprecise in its characterization. It did not indicate that Chalabi handed the Iranian intelligence officer a message, rather that Chalabi said the White House had sent the message that America welcomed Iranian involvement in the uprising.

(U) Chalabi also told Committee staff that he had long worked openly with the Iranians as part of his efforts to establish and maintain the INC, given that much of the Iraqi opposition was living in Iran and much of the opposition that traveled to northern Iraq had to transit through Iran.50 CIA officers told Committee staff that they were aware at the time of Chalabi’s frequent contact with the Iranians and travel to Iran.51 One CIA officer told Committee staff that “we always knew he was close with the Iranians” and added, “I did not want the [field elements] to be dealing with the Iranians. So sort of in absentia the only way you could know what the Iranians were doing would be through what Chalabi

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48 Staff interview with CIA officers.
49 Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 31, 2006.
50 Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 31, 2006.
51 Staff interview with CIA officers.
would tell us or not tell us and what we might pick up through corroborating intelligence.”

(U) The CIA reduced contact and support for the INC after the failed uprising and began intensifying efforts to develop contacts within the Iraqi military and other opposition groups.

(U) Chalabi said that despite his problems with the CIA, he still tried to warn them of specific Iraqi intelligence operations targeting U.S. intelligence capabilities. He said that in March of 1996 he arranged a meeting with then DCI John Deutch and the NE Chief and alerted them of one such attempt. The NE Chief told Committee staff that he did attend the meeting with Chalabi and the DCI, but did not recall Chalabi making this point. He remembered Chalabi trying to sell himself as the only trusted opposition figure. The CIA was unable to locate any operations traffic outlining the details of this meeting, but did provide a cable written in response to a news story about the meeting. The cable stated that the NE Division Chief said Chalabi made only perfunctory and general comments that CIA’s activities against Saddam were ineffectual and that whatever the CIA hoped to do against Saddam would not succeed without Chalabi’s involvement.

(U) The risk allegedly articulated by Chalabi was real and intelligence capabilities and assets were exposed. CIA officers told Committee staff that Saddam’s regime did use this vulnerability to communicate to a CIA asset in a Middle Eastern country that the CIA operation was exposed and that his children

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52 Staff interview with CIA officer.
53 Staff interview with CIA officers.
54 Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 31, 2006.
55 Staff interview with CIA officer.
56 CIA Operational cable, April 2000.
would be executed. Saddam arrested hundreds of Iraqi soldiers and executed many of them, including the CIA asset’s three children.\(^{57}\)

(U) Fighting between the Kurds continued into the summer of 1996. Chalabi told Committee staff that he learned that one Kurdish leader intended to invite Saddam’s forces into northern Iraq to help him topple the other Kurdish group and that Chalabi alerted the CIA.\(^{58}\) CIA officers told Committee staff that they were aware, from intelligence reporting, that Saddam was massing forces toward the border with northern Iraq.\(^{59}\) In August 1996, Saddam’s forces entered northern Iraq, executed 100 members of the INC, and forced the rest to evacuate.\(^{60}\)

(U) In December 1996, the Deputies Committee met and approved the termination of the CIA’s relationship with the INC. According to a January 1997 memorandum:

As a result, however, of the incursion of the Iraqi army into Northern Iraq in August 96 and the subsequent evacuation of INC employees from Iraq, the INC lost its ability to serve as a unifying force in the Northern Iraq opposition milieu. Dr. Chalabi’s general credibility within the Iraqi opposition, in particular with the KDP, as well as with USG’s regional partners, has also diminished. Since the INC can no longer serve as a neutral arbiter in Northern Iraq and has limited effectiveness as an umbrella opposition organization, we concluded that the CIA should cease funding of the INC.\(^{61}\)

\(^{57}\) Staff interviews with NE Division Chief, and Ahmed Chalabi, January 31, 2006.
\(^{58}\) Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 31, 2006.
\(^{59}\) Staff interviews with CIA officers.
\(^{60}\) Staff interviews with CIA officer.
\(^{61}\) CIA Memorandum, January 6, 1997.
(U) Former DCI George Tenet told the Committee in July 2006 that "there was a breakdown in trust and we never wanted to have anything to do with him anymore."  

(U) Chalabi told Committee staff that he was unable to keep the Kurdish factions from fighting because the U.S. did not provide the funding promised to help the INC establish a mediation force. In February 1997, the CIA terminated its relationship with Chalabi and the INC.

(U) In 1998, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which authorized U.S. assistance to support a transition to democracy in Iraq and required that the President designate one or more Iraqi opposition organizations as eligible to receive federal assistance. In 1999, after President Clinton designated the INC as one of seven eligible organizations, the INC established the Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation (INCSF) as a tax-exempt corporation organized in the United States. Beginning in March 2000, the Department of State entered into a series of cooperative agreements with the INCSF which included funding of almost $33 million for several programs, including a weekly newspaper publication, radio and satellite television broadcasts into Iraq, a public information campaign, and the collection of information on the Saddam regime's war crimes and crimes against humanity.

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62 Committee interview with former DCI George Tenet, July 26, 2006.
63 Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 31, 2006.
64 Funding for the INCSF came from appropriations made to carry out the Economic Support Fund provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and was subject to all statutory conditions applicable to the obligation and expenditure of those appropriations.
65 GAO Report to Congressional Requesters, State Department, Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation (GAO-04-559), April 2004 and responses to questions from Committee staff, April 24, 2004 (SSCI# 2004-3535). While the first grant including funding for Information Collection activities was signed in September 2000, activities and expenditures were not ultimately authorized under that program heading.
(U) From the outset, the Department of State was uncomfortable with part of the INC's original proposal that called for an INC office inside regime-controlled Iraq. According to a General Accounting Office (GAO) report that examined issues affecting funding of the INCSF, State officials said, "the presence of U.S.-funded INCSF staff within Iraq could open the door to potentially disastrous diplomatic situations if INCSF operatives were caught and/or killed by Iraqi troops." The Department of State told the Committee it was concerned about funding what it believed constituted a clandestine intelligence capability inside Iraq. According to the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, the bureau that handled the INC grant, he believed there was an incompatibility between the use of State Department Economic Support Funds—which usually fund economic and social development activities—for the INC and the INC's sense of its own mission, which was a national liberation movement. He told Committee staff that operations inside regime-controlled Iraq "whether for espionage purposes or for other purposes wasn't clear to me, but that was a constant element of tension between us and the INC. And I make no judgments on the validity of their agenda, simply that for an ESF-funded program it did not seem to me to be a good fit."

(U) The INC resisted the policy prohibiting operations inside Iraq, believing that doing so was essential for the success of its programs. The conflict between State and the INCSF about this issue delayed authorization and funding for INC collection activities until a March 2001 amendment to the cooperative agreement

until March 2001.

66 According to Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, the policy prohibiting INC programs inside regime-controlled Iraq was set by the Principals' Committee after extensive and thorough consideration of the risks and rewards of such action by the INC. The policy was reviewed on a number of occasions but remained unchanged until just prior to start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. August 24, 2004.


68 Committee staff interview with former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Near East Asia, July 14, 2006.
when the INCSF agreed that it would not operate in Iraq. This cleared the way to finding the Information Collection Program (ICP). The March 2001 amendment authorized the INC to “continue its Information Collection Program from countries surrounding Iraq” and provided an office in Washington, D.C. for the “purpose of testing, analyzing, translating and distributing information received from Iraq.”

(U) Under the ICP, the INC used offices in Tehran, Damascus, and Cairo to maintain contact with Iraqi dissidents and collect information from them on the political, economic, and military activities of the Saddam Hussein regime. One of the goals was to “collect evidence on the Saddam regime’s war crimes and crimes against humanity and conduct media work to promote human rights and democracy in Iraq.” The information collected under the program was disseminated primarily through an aggressive publicity campaign that relied on media outlets to bring defectors and their information to the public. The Department of State told the Committee that it was generally aware that the INCSF was using the information from the ICP in the media, but did not provide the INCSF specific guidance in this area.

(U) In an October 2001 report to the Department of State, the INCSF provided information on ICP activities. The report, in outline form, included under field activities and training, “Release of internal reports,” “Collect sensitive information that reveal Iraq’s link with September 11th aftermath and anthrax

70 U.S. Department of State, Amendment to Federal Assistance Award, Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation, March 31, 2001, p.3.
71 INC Proposal for a Grant Awarded by the U.S. Department of State to the INCSF to Advance and Establish Operational Programs, 2000.
72 Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, August 24, 2004.
exposures in USA," "Successfully chasing after the Iraq intelligence activities in both Europe and USA," and "Contacting defected Iraqi officers and held a meeting with them for better coordination."  

(U) The Department of State remained generally uncomfortable with handling the ICP, despite the INC’s agreement to stay out of Iraq. The April 2004 GAO report noted that "concerns grew in State that there were serious mishandling of money issues that needed to be examined in INCSF to avoid a potentially embarrassing situation for the administration and for State." In addition, allegations of fraud circulated within State. The GAO report said that "in State’s view, the potential for fraud in an officially State-sponsored program posed a risk that State was not prepared to take."  

(U) A State Department Office of Inspector General (OIG) audit conducted September 2001 found financial management and internal control weaknesses. In particular the audit identified concerns about INCSF’s travel reimbursement procedures and its cash payment practices, but found no evidence of fraud. The OIG found that many of the deficiencies occurred because of a lack of understanding of and unfamiliarity with U.S. government laws and regulations related to Federal Assistance awards. For example, the OIG found that INCSF did not use U.S. flag carriers for overseas travel or always certify when non-U.S. flag carriers were used as required by federal travel regulations. In a mid-2002 follow-up audit, OIG found that the INCSF had taken "significant steps to

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75 Id. at 8-9.
77 Id. at 16.
implement OIG’s recommendations.” The INCSF had not fully implemented all portions of the two recommendations, in part, because a lack of funding from the Department of State prevented them from paying for full implementation of several accounting upgrades.78

(U) The April 2004 GAO report also said that State “doubted the value of information obtained through the information program.”79 However, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs told Committee staff that “my view all along was that there was apparently information being collected that I didn’t see and therefore couldn’t evaluate. I never held the view that I doubted whether the information was useful or not. I simply didn’t know what it was, and therefore couldn’t make an assessment.” He added “my people were totally professional throughout, but I think there was clearly a greater degree of frustration farther down the line than I had to feel, and that probably led people from time to time to express a view that they doubted there was anything there, that there was really any substance in the [ICP] program at all.”80

(U) In a written response to the Committee, the State Department said the Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), which had overall responsibility for the program, believed it was unable to judge the ICP’s “effectiveness because it did not have sufficient access to the information being produced.” For example, in early 2002, Department of State staff visited the Washington, D.C. offices of the INCSF to observe INCSF operations. According to the Department of State, INCSF staff refused to allow the Department of State

79 GAO Report to Congressional Requesters, State Department, Issues Affecting Funding of Iraqi National Congress Support Foundation (GAO-04-559), April 200, p. 8.
80 Committee staff interview with former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Near East Asia, July 14, 2006.
staff members access to ICP materials.\textsuperscript{81} NEA also believed it was unable to determine, without a professional assessment by the Intelligence Community, the value of the information the ICP did share.\textsuperscript{82} NEA believed, therefore, that the program should be managed by other agencies more experienced in managing intelligence collection.\textsuperscript{83} These factors, in conjunction with the concerns about INCSF’s accountability of funds and operational costs, prompted State to discontinue funding of the INCSF.\textsuperscript{84}

(U) In May 2002, the Department of State notified the INCSF that it had decided to cease all funding for the ICP.\textsuperscript{85} The National Security Council Deputies Committee decided that the program should be continued and, on July 25, 2002, directed that the program be moved to the Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{86} The Department of Defense assigned DIA to administer the ICP. DIA told the Committee it did not have advance knowledge of the Deputies Committee decision to move the ICP to the Department of Defense. CIA told the Committee that it provided memos to the NSC in December 1996 advising of the termination of CIA’s relationship with the INC and that between January 1997 and July 2002 “there were several exchanges of views on the subject of the end of the CIA’s relationship with Chalabi and the INC.”\textsuperscript{87} The Department of State retroactively approved a grant agreement to cover ICP costs incurred in June and July 2002 and ceased all funding of the INCSF on September 30, 2002.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{81} Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, March 31, 2006, Q3.
\textsuperscript{82} Id.
\textsuperscript{83} Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, August 24, 2004, #4b.
\textsuperscript{84} Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, August 24, 2004.
\textsuperscript{85} Id.
\textsuperscript{87} CIA response to question from Committee staff.
\textsuperscript{88} Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, August 24, 2004.
(U) During the time it managed the program, the Department of State did not interview or debrief INC-affiliated sources. The Department of State did receive documents from the ICP, which it provided to the Intelligence Community for review and analysis. A discussion of the analysis of those documents follows later in this report. Several Intelligence Community agencies conducted debriefs of INC-affiliated sources during this time period, details of which are also discussed later in this report.

(U) In late October 2002, the DIA assumed formal responsibility for the program. The letter of agreement between the Department of Defense and the INC stated that “the information collection effort will place primary emphasis upon debriefing Iraqi citizens worldwide who can establish and maintain a continuous flow of tactical and strategic information regarding Iraq, in general, and the Saddam Hussein regime, in particular.” Under the terms of the agreement between the DIA and the INC, the INC committed to “NOT publicize or communicate in any way with anyone any of its information collection operations or announce the names and activities of Iraqi expatriates without prior written authorization from DIA.” This was a distinct departure from the INC’s publicity activities under Department of State management. The INC also agreed to “NOT conduct any intelligence collection operations in Iraq without prior authorization from DIA.”

In a letter to the Committee in September 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz said the program would, “debrief Iraqi citizens presented by the Iraqi National Congress” as having information on key military and intelligence questions. The letter added:

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89 Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, February 7, 2006.
90 Letter Agreement between the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Iraqi National Congress’ Information Collection Program (INC/ICP) on the Provision of Intelligence Support to INC/ICP, October 25, 2002.
91 Letter to Committee Chairman Bob Graham, September 12, 2002.
The Iraqi National Congress will continue to provide access to Iraqi citizens who have fled Iraq and are believed to have pertinent knowledge. This is a continuation of a program under which the Department of Defense, specifically the Defense Intelligence Agency, has already debriefed certain individuals. The program is of special Congressional interest.\(^2\)

(U) The CIA told the Committee that beginning in August 2002 when the DIA coordinated with the CIA on the ICP, and continuing until early 2004, the CIA "voiced concerns to DIA counterparts about both counterintelligence issues and the overall reliability of the INC in a series of written and oral communications."\(^3\) DIA officials told Committee staff that CIA operations officers did raise verbal concerns that the INC was penetrated by Iranian, and possibly other, intelligence services and that the INC had its own agenda during DIA briefings about its intentions for the program, but provided no concerns in writing. One DIA officer noted that CIA’s comments had a general tone of "better you than us" and "you’ve got a real bucket full of worms with the INC and we hope you’re taking the appropriate steps."\(^4\)

(U) The CIA provided the Committee with one cable sent to DIA in December 2002, in response to a DIA request for information about a senior INC official. The cable said that one source, of undetermined reliability, said the senior official was suspected of being an Iraqi intelligence officer and one source, also of undetermined reliability, said the official was a known Iranian intelligence service agent and was suspected of having ties to Iraqi intelligence. The CIA provided no

\(^2\) Id.
\(^3\) CIA responses to Questions for the Record from the March 4, 2004 Hearing on Iraq Prewar Intelligence, February 25, 2005.
\(^4\) Interview with DIA Officials, November 16, 2005.
documentation to support its contention that concerns about INC reliability were expressed to DIA counterparts in writing or that there were a “series” of concerns expressed to DIA.

(U) DIA officers who were responsible for the program said they were already aware of these issues, and made sure to incorporate them into their assumptions and briefings about the program. 95 October 2002 DIA briefing slides about its plans for the program noted that two of DIA’s assumptions were that the “INC will use the relationship to promote its agenda” and the “INC is penetrated by hostile intelligence services.” 96

(REDacted) DIA’s briefing about its intentions for the ICP also said that DIA planned to have strong counterintelligence support 97 as it implemented the program. DIA told the Committee that it used analysts in debriefing sessions, sometimes meeting directly with sources, to obtain first-hand feedback on intelligence information. DIA counterintelligence officers reviewed DIA’s operations and monitored intelligence and open source information for potential threats to DIA’s efforts.

(REDacted) The DIA provided the ICP monthly payments throughout its operation of the program. In exchange, the ICP provided the DIA

95 Interview with DIA Officials, November 16, 2005.
96 DIA Operational Proposal, October 21, 2002, p.11.
97 DIA response to Committee staff questions, April 27, 2006.
with access to overt sources for debriefings, and after the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraqi regime documents. In the fall of 2003, approximately six months after the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the DIA began making plans to terminate its relationship with the INC to coincide with the establishment of a new Iraqi government in July 2004. A draft DIA memorandum drafted in January 2004 indicated that the DIA assumed the INC would become a full-fledged political party following the establishment of a new Iraqi government and that the ICP would become an intelligence-gathering arm of the party. DIA officials told Committee staff that the DIA believed continued funding of such an organization would be inappropriate.

On May 12, 2004, the DIA notified the Committee that an Iraqi Criminal Court judge had issued an arrest warrant for a senior INC official. The judge was reportedly investigating allegations of fraud and other offenses in connection with members of the INC, charges having nothing to do with the ICP. DIA officials told Committee staff that its recommendation to the Department of Defense to terminate the relationship with the INC had nothing to do with these charges. On May 14, 2004 the Department of Defense notified the Committee that it had decided to terminate its relationship with the ICP. According to the Department of Defense, the decision was part of the process of transferring sovereignty to the Iraqi people in light of the impending standup of the Interim Iraqi Government on 1 July 2004. In addition there were

99 DIA response to questions from Committee staff, Draft Termination of the Relationship Between the DIA and the INC’s ICP.
100 Interview with DIA officials, February 10, 2006.
102 Interview with DIA officials, February 10, 2006.
questions at the time about the reliability of the INC/ICP, and its utility for U.S. military operations in Iraq.\textsuperscript{104} The arrest warrant was subsequently suspended.

III. INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE INC

A. INC Documents

(U) In early 2002, while managing the ICP, the Department of State received one bundle of approximately 300 pages of mostly Arabic language materials from the INC. This material was transferred to the Intelligence Community for analysis in March 2002. The Department of State has informed the Committee that it received no other documents from the INC.\textsuperscript{105}

(U) In August 2002, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) published a memorandum, \textit{Iraq: Evaluation of Documents Provided by the Iraqi National Congress}, which offered a coordinated Intelligence Community assessment of the material’s contribution to intelligence on Iraq. The Intelligence Community made summary translations of the data — in some cases verbatim translations — and analysts with Arabic language capability also reviewed the documents. The material included reports on the Iraqi military order of battle and the Special Security Organization, press clippings, meeting notes, and lists of alleged political victims of the Ba’ath party.\textsuperscript{106} The following are the key points from the NIC memorandum:

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\textsuperscript{104}Letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, April 25, 2006.  
\textsuperscript{105}Department of State responses to questions from Committee staff, April 24, 2004 and Responses to questions from Committee staff, November 25, 2005.  
\textsuperscript{106}Iraq: \textit{Evaluation of Documents Provided by the Iraqi National Congress}, National Intelligence Council, August 9, 2002
\end{flushright}
The written material provided to the Intelligence Community (IC) by the Iraqi National Congress contains little of current intelligence value.

- Overall, the order of battle information throughout the documents was generally accurate – matching existing IC holdings that are based on all-source reporting. In some significant areas that information, although correct, is out of date and no longer useful.


- Some of the documents include long lists of names and titles, but few have addresses or phone numbers that would increase their value.

The intelligence value of almost all the data provided by the INC is diminished by our inability to assess the origin and authenticity of the documents. None of the documents, except press clippings, has sourcing or attribution that can be verified or traced.

- The numerous press clippings included are openly available through the Internet or the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.\(^\text{107}\)

(U) The DIA received documents from INC-affiliated sources before and during its official management of the ICP. In each case documents were disseminated as reporting from sources or as attachments to the source

reporting.\textsuperscript{108} Such reporting is described below in more detail. The CIA told the Committee it did not receive any documents from the INC after 1998.\textsuperscript{109}

\textbf{B. INC-Affiliated Sources}

\textit{(U)} The primary goals of the ICP were to maintain contact with Iraqi dissidents, collect information from them on the activities of the Saddam Hussein regime, and disseminate that information as widely as possible.\textsuperscript{110} At the time the Department of State managed and funded the program, it did not act as a mechanism for the ICP to get its information to the Intelligence Community, except in the one case described above when it received ICP documents. Instead, the ICP used a “publicity campaign” to bring sources to the attention of “anyone who would listen,” which included the media, Congress, members of the Intelligence Community and other government agencies, think-tanks, and other interested parties.\textsuperscript{111}

\textit{(U)} Through this publicity campaign, the INC brought six sources to the attention of the U.S. Intelligence Community, either directly or through current and former U.S. officials. Intelligence Community agencies met with and debriefed five of the six individuals. The sixth individual was said to be planning to defect, but never did. Details of the reporting from all five sources, their use in

\textsuperscript{108} DIA Response to questions from Committee staff, January 17, 2006. After the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the DIA did receive caches of documents from the INC, totaling over 3,000 boxes. These documents were reviewed through DIA’s document exploitation program. Documents were examined for content and those of potential intelligence value are summarized, digitized, and posted to the IC’s HARMONY database. Post-Operation Iraqi Freedom information, including documents, provided by the INC is not the subject of this inquiry.

\textsuperscript{109} CIA Response to questions from Committee staff, December 1, 2005.

\textsuperscript{110} INC Proposal for a Grant Awarded by the U.S. Department of State to the INCSF to Advance and Establish Operational Programs, 2000, and staff interview with INC official, December 6, 2006.

\textsuperscript{111} Staff interview with INC official, December 6, 2005 and Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 31, 2006.
finished intelligence products, and a description of the would-be defector are outlined in detail below.

(U) None of the intelligence reports from the five sources indicated that the individuals were affiliated with the INC in the reports’ source descriptions. The DIA said they did not note an opposition affiliation because the sources were not INC members.\textsuperscript{112} The CIA, which disseminated reporting from one of the sources, did not note the defector’s INC affiliation, although one CIA report from this defector did comment that an INC-affiliated translator participated in a press interview with the source. CIA told the Committee that although the source was a referral from an INC-affiliated defector, CIA did not know how much, if any, support the source received from the INC. Although not specifically identified as INC-affiliated in the intelligence reporting, the information from all five sources, in some cases including their names and information about their contact with the Intelligence Community, appeared in numerous press articles as a result of the INC publicity campaign. Accordingly, the press stories alerted analysts to the sources’ INC affiliations which were noted in numerous intelligence assessments that used the information from the INC sources.\textsuperscript{113}

(U) The Intelligence Community, particularly the CIA, believed that the INC’s efforts to publicize defector information undermined the INC’s credibility. A July 2002 NIC Memorandum noted, “the INC’s pursuit of publicity has undermined intelligence exploitation of these sources. The INC encouraged and sometimes abetted the sources in contravening their agreements with the U.S.

\textsuperscript{112} Staff interview with DIA officers, November 2005.
regarding secrecy. In one instance, the INC’s publicizing of the defector’s story put his life in danger.”¹¹⁴ According to the DIA, only one defector spoke to the media after DIA asked him to refrain from doing so. Contact with that defector was terminated, in part, as a result of the violation.¹¹⁵ Details of that case, and any other cases in which press articles are pertinent to the Intelligence Community’s use of INC information or knowledge of the source’s INC affiliation, are described below in further detail.

(U) The Intelligence Community used reporting from two of the INC-affiliated sources in the October 2002 NIE on Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction. The two sources were not used as the primary basis for any of the key judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities. In one case, reporting from an INC-affiliated defector was assessed by analysts as corroborating other primary reporting about Iraq’s mobile biological weapons production capabilities. In the other case, information from the defector drove Intelligence Community concerns that an Iraqi facility may have had a nuclear association.¹¹⁶

(U) The CIA and the DIA used intelligence reporting from two INC-affiliated sources in intelligence assessments that discussed alleged special operations training of non-Iraqi Arabs at Iraq’s Salman Pak Unconventional Military Training facility. Most of the assessments describe the sources as not having direct access to the information and in some cases as “questionable” and “exaggerated.” The CIA also included INC-supplied information in a 2003 assessment that the Saddam Hussein regime assassinated dissidents. This INC

information was corroborated by a credible body of reporting from other sources. The specific uses of INC-affiliated defector reporting related to these issues are described in more detail below.

(U) The following section of the report provides detailed information on the INC-affiliated sources, the information they provided, and how Intelligence Community analysts and collectors used their information.

1. Source One

[Redacted] Source One, an Iraqi who lived and worked in Baghdad until he defected to Syria. In December 2001, Source One met with INC representatives who facilitated his travel to Asia and his introduction to the international media. According to the DIA, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence notified the Director of DIA that he had been contacted by former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) James Woolsey about Source One. Mr. Woolsey told Committee staff that he did not recall making this referral to the Department of Defense, though he did not rule it out.


[118] Responses to questions from Committee staff, August 26, 2005.

[119] Former DCI James Woolsey met Ahmed Chalabi in the late 1990s when both men were witnesses during a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs hearing on Iraq. Shortly after the hearing, Mr. Chalabi called Mr. Woolsey seeking his legal assistance for eight members of the Iraqi Opposition, including members of the INC, who had been detained in California by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Mr. Woolsey agreed to become co-counsel in the case, eventually winning the release of all eight Iraqis by early 2001. Mr. Woolsey told Committee staff that he came to know Mr. Chalabi slightly in the course of that representation and came to know his clients well. Mr. Woolsey recalled receiving information on two sources, and believed he received the information on one of them from one of his clients or from an INC representative. He did not recall receiving any information on the sources from Mr. Chalabi, but said it was possible
A team of analysts from several intelligence agencies worked with DIA collectors to help vet and debrief Source One. The team’s preliminary assessment of Source One was relayed to CIA headquarters on January 4, 2002. It said that while Source One “does not have access to specific programs at various facilities, his knowledge of [facility] details, individual engineers, and personalities could permit subject matter experts to analyze the data and extrapolate broader program information.”

DIA administered a polygraph of Source One in early 2002, which he passed.

There were no other Intelligence Community polygraphs of Source One prior to the DIA administered polygraph.

On January 10, 2002, the CIA reported that based on senior-level discussions between the CIA and the DIA, “we are now considering this a joint case.”

The DIA produced and disseminated over 250 intelligence information reports from Source One’s debriefings. CIA operations officers and analysts participated in Source One’s debriefings and each report was sent to the CIA for review and coordination before dissemination. The source description described Source One as "with direct access who worked as a"

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120 CIA operational cable, January, 2002.
121 Press stories alleging that Source One failed a CIA polygraph in December 2001 are inaccurate.
122 CIA operational cable, January, 2002.
123 CIA operational cable, September, 2002 and Staff interview with DIA officials.
contractor at several Iraqi WMD sites. Source One reported extensively on the facilities in which he worked, personalities and organizations involved in these facilities, the Iraqi Special Security Organization (SSO), and a variety of related topics. The majority of reports disseminating from Source One’s debriefs focused on facilities on which he had worked. The reporting described him as having direct access to several Iraqi WMD sites.

(U) Two reports from this defector discussed suspect terrorist training sites in Iraq. The first, dated January 2002, said that from 1997-1998, Afghan, Pakistani, and Palestinian nationals were trained by the Fedayeen Saddam at an Iraqi special forces training facility in Salman Pak, Iraq. The report said the camp is “rumored to provide al-Qa’ida terrorist teams with training” and added, “many Iraqis believe that Saddam Hussein had made an agreement with Usama bin Ladin in order to support his terrorist movement against the U.S.” 125 The second report, dated March 2002, provided the general locations of suspected Iraqi terrorist training camps, including one at Salman Pak. The trainees were described as members of various Iraqi groups including the Fedayeen Saddam and Iraqi Special Security Forces. The comment section of the second report provided more detail about how the defector obtained the information for the first report, noting that the information about foreigners training at Salman Pak was from his personal

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account while traveling the highway from one of his work sites to his home. The other information was “common knowledge.”\textsuperscript{126}

(U) In early 2002, after an article outlining Source One’s information about suspect WMD facilities appeared in the media, foreign intelligence services began contacting CIA for information about Source One.\textsuperscript{127} In mid-February, the CIA began forwarding Source One’s reporting to two foreign intelligence services.\textsuperscript{128}

(U) In March 2002, in preparation for a video teleconference to discuss the new source, the DIA provided Intelligence Community counterparts with information on Source One which noted that much of his information “has been corroborated by the IC” and that he had been “vetted extensively” but noted that he “does NOT have specific knowledge of concealed WMD/ballistic missile locations.”\textsuperscript{129}

(U) On March 6, 2002, after receiving the DIA information, a Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) nuclear analyst, who had access to a copy of an \underline{\text{[redacted]}} that referenced Source One’s information,\textsuperscript{130} forwarded the information to an INR chemical/biological weapons analyst noting the following:

On the nuclear side, the source indeed has a remarkable memory and has clearly been to many sites. His information is useful. But

\textsuperscript{126} DIA intelligence report \underline{\text{[redacted]}}, March \underline{\text{[redacted]}} 2002.
\textsuperscript{127} CIA operational cable \underline{\text{[redacted]}}, February \underline{\text{[redacted]}} 2002.
\textsuperscript{128} CIA operational cable \underline{\text{[redacted]}}, February \underline{\text{[redacted]}} 2002.
\textsuperscript{129} DIA briefing slides, March 6, 2002.
\textsuperscript{130} The Department of State informed the Committee that the INR nuclear analyst does not recall how he came into possession of the \underline{\text{[redacted]}} document. The analyst presumed copies were distributed to other Intelligence Community agencies.
beware, because he thinks any site being constructed by personnel formerly connected to the nuclear-weapon program is, by definition, a site for ongoing clandestine nuclear work. (Not necessarily so, esp. since so many nuclear personnel have, since the early 1990s, been assigned to non-nuclear infrastructure related tasks.) . . . Don’t know if similar problems hold for the CBW areas as well.

A July 2002 NIC Memorandum, *The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program*, described Source One as “the most successful INC referral” with “exceptional access to information of interest to the U.S. Intelligence Community.” The assessment, coordinated only with the DIA, the CIA, and the FBI said, “he had access to as many as 150 facilities associated with conventional weapons and, to a lesser extent, to facilities associated with Iraqi WMD programs.” The assessment further noted that Source One’s:

> Information is deemed highly credible and includes reports on a wide range of subjects including conventional weapons facilities, denial and deception; communications security; suspected terrorist training locations; illicit trade and smuggling; Saddam’s palaces; the Iraqi prison system; and Iraqi petrochemical plants. Many reports included geo-coordinates, diagrams, and hand drawings. The source provided

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131 Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research e-mail, March 6, 2002.
limited information regarding WMD facilities in Iraq, but he did not have access to more specific information on Iraq’s WMD programs.\textsuperscript{132}

(U) Following publication of the NIC Memorandum, the Director of the Office of Analysis for Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issues in INR prepared, but never sent, a memorandum to the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia to convey concerns about the NIC Memorandum, in particular about the discussion of Source One’s information. The memorandum outlined the concerns discussed in the INR analyst’s e-mail discussed previously that Source One frequently assigned WMD purposes to facilities in which he worked. \textsuperscript{133}

In short, his information is often very useful, but his claims about WMD work at various facilities are not adequately substantiated in our view.”\textsuperscript{133}

\textit{a. Suspect Nuclear Facility Reporting}

\textsuperscript{133} Draft INR Memorandum for NIO/NESAF, July 29, 2002.
the eastern side of the Tigris river  

(U) The Intelligence Community identified a site they believed matched Source One’s description, however, there were several inconsistencies between Source One’s reporting and the identified site. Source One reported that the construction of the facility had begun in 1999, but construction on the site identified by intelligence began in the summer of 1998. In addition, the facility identified was located on the eastern side of the Tigris river, but Source One told his debriefers he did not recall seeing the river adjacent to the construction site. He described a concrete pit that exited one of the buildings and drained into an open pit, which intelligence could neither confirm nor deny. Finally, Source One drew a sketch of the site indicating at least six small buildings, but intelligence of the site did not match his sketch. In each case these inconsistencies were included in the reporting.  

(U) Source One’s reporting specifically on this facility was included in two finished intelligence assessments, the October 2002 NIE on Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, and a DIA assessment, Iraq’s Reemerging Nuclear Weapon Program, published a month earlier. The NIE included a text box on the reporting on the facility entitled “New Nuclear Facility?” The text box outlined several points about Source One’s reporting that drove the Intelligence Community’s concerns that the facility may have been nuclear related.
Four of the lead engineers for the project reportedly were associated with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.

The source indicated that he had seen cylinders at [the facility] in 2000 that were similar to sketches of large uranium hexafluoride cylinders.

Several buildings reportedly were guarded by Amn Al Khas (the Special Security Organization, SSO) and Manthuma Al Amn security personnel.

The text box also noted that:

The overall description of the site and the timelines of its construction as described by the source were reasonably consistent with details detected through [intelligence]. The site consists of several small buildings of the shape and layout described by the defector, who participated in [the facility’s] construction. The site was constructed rapidly during the summer of 1998, although the defector claimed construction had occurred in 1999. We judge that the defector may have been confused about the year.

(U) The NIE concluded that “additional intelligence reporting is necessary before we can confirm a nuclear association for [the facility].” Source One’s reporting was not mentioned elsewhere in the NIE, was not included amongst the four pages discussing facilities of concern, was not included in the key judgments, and was not one of the six key elements underpinning the key judgment in the NIE that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.\textsuperscript{136}

(U) In contrast to the carefully worded description of the suspect facility as a possible nuclear facility in the NIE, the September 2002 DIA assessment said an Iraqi defector “described a nuclear site near Baghdad” and “reportedly observed new cylinders similar to those used to hold UF6.” The report noted that the defector saw special security at the facility and individuals formerly associated with Iraq’s nuclear program. The assessment concluded that the defector’s report “suggests this site is either a uranium conversion or gas centrifuge facility.” A picture of the site identified as possibly the suspect facility was included with a caption that stated “this facility, just north of Baghdad, apparently is either a uranium conversion facility or gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.”

(______) In addition to the these two assessments, on October 17, 2002, the CIA published an assessment detailing the overall reporting of two Iraq sources, one of which was Source One. The assessment noted that Source One was debriefed by the CIA and the DIA and said the debriefers described him as “cooperative and straightforward.” The assessment said that Source One did not have access to information on the nature of the work being done at the facilities where he worked, but then added:

Reporting shows a complex that Source One alleged was involved in nuclear-related activities. He reportedly observed known nuclear-associated personnel and steel containers labeled with radiation warning markings near two small laboratories. We cannot determine the facility’s function , but its location and heavy security are consistent with other Iraqi WMD-capable facilities. We do not know what was in the containers, but it could have been uranium hexafluoride or another radioactive substance. Source One reported that he never observed

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WMD-related equipment installed in any sites he visited because his work—\underline{\text{redacted}}—was usually completed as the building was being constructed.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{138} CIA, SPWR, \textit{Terrorism: Question About the Two Iraqi Defectors}, October 17, 2002.
\textsuperscript{139} SSCI transcript, Hearing on the History and Continuity of Weapons of Mass Destruction Assessments Pertaining to Iraq, June 19, 2003, p.79.
\textsuperscript{140} CIA, Response to questions from Committee staff, July 6, 2006.
d. Postwar Findings

(U) According to the DIA, the U.S. 75th Exploitation Task Force and the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) visited the suspect facility in the spring and summer of 2003 respectively. Inspectors “reported a walled probable government compound with multiple security posts. Samples collected from the site tested positive for naturally occurring uranium and U.S.-origin depleted uranium consistent with samples collected elsewhere in Iraq and reflecting probably local soils and contamination from U.S. depleted-uranium munitions. The samples did not reveal any enriched uranium or non-U.S. depleted uranium.” No evidence was found to support intelligence assessments that the site may have been involved in nuclear

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Staff interview with CIA analysts, April 21, 2006.
related work. The ISG also visited several other sites identified by Source One and was able to confirm Source One's information pertaining to those facilities. 144

In early February 2004, in order to resolve credibility issues with Source One, Intelligence Community elements brought Source One to Iraq. When taken to the location Source One had described as the suspect facility, he was unable to identify it. According to one intelligence assessment, the “subject appeared stunned upon hearing that he was standing on the spot that he reported as the location of the facility, insisted that he had never been to that spot, and wanted to check a map.” Source One maintained that the facility was in the area, and repeated pointed to the location on the map where he said it was located. Intelligence Community officers confirmed that they were standing on the location he was identifying. 145

During the same visit, when taken to a second facility Source One had identified before the war, he was able to quickly identify a specific room where he said he had worked. The Intelligence Community was able to independently verify his work at that facility. 146

A CIA nuclear analyst told Committee staff that when he visited the site it was very much as Source One described it. He said he did not know how to explain why Source One did not recognize the facility. He, and other officials

144 DIA Information Paper on Suspect Nuclear Site, Iraq, Oct 27, 2005, and Committee staff interviews with CIA and DIA.
146 CIA Memorandum, and Committee staff interviews with CIA and DIA.
from the CIA and the DIA assessed that Source One may have been provided information about the facility second hand.\textsuperscript{147}

During questioning, Source One acknowledged contact with the INC's Washington Director \textsuperscript{147}, but denied that the Washington Director directed Source One to provide any false information.

\textsuperscript{147} Staff interview with CIA analysts.
(U) A July 2004 CIA review concluded that “while the subject has provided a good deal of generally corroborated information relating to military infrastructure and conventional facilities, his limited reporting on WMD-related matters remains questionable and, on a nuclear facility, demonstrably incorrect. In the absence of any further [information from Source One we are] left uncertain about the extent to which the INC influenced intelligence information subject passed to the USG.”¹⁵¹

(U) An earlier CIA study on possible Iraqi opposition deception efforts, dated March 8, 2004, said that there were misconceptions about Source One’s reporting that were related to possible “extrapolations” by analysts and case officers.¹⁵² The CIA study cited a February 5, 2004 memorandum prepared by CIA analysts who had participated in Source One’s debriefings from late January to early February 2002. The memorandum stated that Source One did not provide direct reporting on Iraqi WMD programs, but did provide reporting on Iraq’s military-industrial facilities, many of which were assessed as capable of supporting a WMD effort. The analysts wrote that Source One “did not [repeat] not claim that any facility produced or worked on chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Those WMD connections were made by analysts and at times DIA officers writing and disseminating the reporting.” The memorandum said that Source One “never claimed any knowledge of nuclear weapons program-related work at the facility. He simply identified what he thought was a suspect facility and claimed that he saw engineers from the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission there.” In addition, the memorandum noted that Source One had said he thought he had seen something like uranium hexafluoride cylinders only after being shown

¹⁵¹ CIA review, [redacted], July 12, 2004, conclusions.
¹⁵² CIA internal memorandum, [redacted], March 8, 2004, [redacted].
a picture of them by another CIA analyst, "one of the best, documented examples of how [Source One] was asked leading questions by debriefers." The memorandum cites several instances of reports that described Source One as having worked on "several Iraqi WMD sites" although the sites were not known to have been WMD-related.¹⁵³

(U) In the memorandum, the analysts admitted that they knew of no effort to correct the mischaracterizations of Source One’s reporting. They said that the "daily press of business and the fact that—with one well-known exception—his reporting was not used in finished DI products, we did not fight to correct how [his] reporting was characterized by collectors." The memorandum did note that there was one instance in which an effort was made to correct a factual error in one of the reports. One of the CIA analysts told Committee staff that after returning to Washington, he reviewed a report that incorrectly described the length of a missile or rocket as ten meters long when Source One had said it was six meters long and wrote to DIA about the error. The analyst did not know whether the correction was made.¹⁵⁴

([REDACTED]) The memorandum also discussed Source One’s connections to the INC, noting that at the time of the debriefs he was:

... up front about his ties to the INC, describing how the INC helped him escape from Iraq, got him in contact with [DIA][REDACTED], made him do an interview with [the press], and then abandoned him. He explained that some of his earlier reporting was much more inflammatory because that was what the INC told him to do, but during our debriefs he carefully explained what he knew, did not

¹⁵³ CIA internal memorandum, February 5, 2004 and staff interview with CIA analysts.
¹⁵⁴ Staff interview with CIA analysts, November 28, 2005.
know, and what he suspected, and why. We believed he was credible because much of his information could be corroborated and his information did not go beyond his purported access nor did he try to embellish his reporting.\footnote{CIA internal memorandum, February 5, 2004.}

(U) Finally, the analysts’ memorandum commented that Source One’s prolific reporting was “not due to his wealth of knowledge, but partly to a conscious effort to produce as many reports as possible . . . even if it meant splitting up reporting on a particular topic.” The analysts told Committee staff that they did not intend to suggest that Source One did not have a wealth of knowledge, just that his wealth of knowledge did not pertain to WMD. The analysts said they did not believe that breaking up the reporting hampered the reporting and said “it didn’t really change anything.”\footnote{CIA internal memorandum, February 5, 2004 and staff interview with CIA analysts.}

(U) DIA officers dispute the analysts’ assertion that DIA collectors alone were responsible for incorrectly characterizing Source One’s reporting. They told Committee staff that DIA and CIA analysts were part of the debriefing team because they were the subject matter experts. These analysts worked side by side with the collectors, “collaboratively producing the reports, and before the reports were released to us or before the reports were released for dissemination as formal IIRs and they were [coordinated] by CIA . . ., there was a lot of scrutiny that went into that reporting.” They told Committee staff that the source description which said Source One worked on “several Iraqi WMD sites” was written overseas by the debriefing team of analysts, collectors, and a reports officer.\footnote{Staff interview with DIA officers, November 2005 and staff interview with DIA officers, February 10, 2006.}
reports was that DIA attempts to write one report on one subject. The DIA codes its reports to link them to specific collection requirements, so that one report will respond to one specific requirement. The DIA officers said this was not an effort to inflate report numbers for Source One.\textsuperscript{158}

(U) The CIA analysts told Committee staff that the analysts were not involved in writing source descriptions or summaries. The analysts drafted the main text of the reports and the DIA reports officer would take that text and cut and paste it into a template for the intelligence report. The analysts said that after they submitted the text, they did not have access to the reports again until they were disseminated.\textsuperscript{159}

\textbf{(\textmd{[Redacted]})} Regarding the overall authenticity of Source One’s reporting, the DIA and the CIA agree with the conclusion of the CIA review that “there is little doubt that subject was in fact a [contractor who worked at several Iraqi facilities]; and his reporting on Iraq’s military infrastructure and conventional facilities, areas that are commensurate with his access, has generally been corroborated.” The agencies believe that Source One had never been to the facility they identified as the suspect facility and some believe he may have been provided with information about the facility by someone else. The Intelligence Community has never deemed Source One to be a fabricator and has not recalled his reporting.

\textsuperscript{158} Staff interview with DIA officers, February 10, 2006.
\textsuperscript{159} Staff interview with CIA analysts, November 28, 2005.
2. Source Two

(Source Two, a former Iraqi major, was referred to DIA on February 8, 2002. According to the DIA, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence had been contacted by former DCI James Woolsey who said that the INC had access to a potential source. The Principal Deputy passed the information on to the DIA. DIA officials met with INC representatives to establish contact with Source Two.

(U) In February 2002, the CIA notified DIA that a private researcher had interviewed Source Two earlier in the month. The CIA provided the DIA with a copy of Source Two’s interview transcript which was reviewed by DIA analysts. The interview contained information related to Iraqi biological, chemical, and missile programs. DIA analysts prepared an assessment which noted that the “source does not appear to have direct access to new Iraqi CW program information” and “we question the source’s credibility on the CW-related activity unless he can provide more compelling evidence to support his claim on chemical weapons.” Regarding biological weapons, the assessment said, “the source reported no new information on Iraq’s BW program. This source appears to have information that—if deemed credible—may corroborate previous reporting indicating Iraq employs transportable production trailers and mobile R&D laboratories in its BW program.” The assessment said the source provided some new reporting on a recent al-Abbas missile location and that the missile is weaponized with VX, a claim considered suspect by the chemical analysts."

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160 DIA response to questions from Committee staff, December 14, 2005 (SSC1# 2005-4899). Mr. Woolsey did not recall making this referral to the Department of Defense but did not rule it out. Staff interview with Mr. Woolsey.

161 DIA, Analyst Review - February 2002 Iraqi National Congress Interview Transcript.
(U) DIA debriefed Source Two in the Middle East in late February 2002. Source Two told DIA debriefers he was involved in procuring dual-use technology in support of Iraq's WMD program. During these debriefings, DIA asked Source Two to refrain from talking to the media.  

(U) After several meetings with Source Two, the DIA debriefer began to have concerns about his reliability, in particular that he may have been coached and had embellished information. The DIA debriefer told Committee staff that Source Two acted strangely and seemed "affected." These concerns prompted DIA to conduct a polygraph, which Source Two successfully passed.

(U) In March 2002, with the DIA debriefer's original concerns partly allayed by the polygraph results, DIA disseminated two intelligence reports based on Source Two's information. One of the reports relayed information about the activities of a department in the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) charged with developing foreign business contacts willing to sell prohibited goods and equipment to Iraq and to develop methods to secure hard currency in order to finance illegal procurement. The other report stated that in mid-1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile biological research laboratories to evade United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections. The report contained information on the planning, acquisition, manufacture, and storage of mobile biological laboratories in Iraq and organizations and individuals involved in these

163 Staff interview with DIA officer, March 31, 2006.
164 Staff interview with DIA, February 20, 2004; CIA, SPWR, Assessment of the Iraqi defector April 27, 2002; and Letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts from DIA and CIA, January 27, 2004.
165 Staff interview with DIA officer, March 31, 2006.
166 DIA intelligence report, March 6, 2002.
processes. The report did not state that the research pertained to biological 
weapons research, just biological laboratories. Source Two’s DIA debriefer told 
Committee staff he had the impression that Source Two was saying that the 
purpose of the mobile biological labs was for weapons, but said that he is 
confident the intelligence report said exactly what Source Two told him.  

(U) In both reports, Source Two was described as an “Iraqi officer with direct access. First-time reporter who is considered to be 
reliable.” In the report on Iraq’s mobile biological research labs the comment 
section also noted that the “source passed a [DIA]-administered polygraph 
regarding information included in this report.”

(U) In mid-March 2002, the Intelligence Community learned that the 
INC had arranged a press interview for Source Two. 

(U) On March 18, 2002, the CIA told the DIA that, during a liaison meeting 
earlier the same day, a foreign government intelligence service informed the CIA 
that it had debriefed Source Two in December 2001 and believed he was largely 
unreliable and partially fabricated the information he provided. The foreign 
service reported that Source Two was unable to provide specific details on his 
chain-of-command or the facilities where he claimed to have worked. The foreign 
service said it did not publish any intelligence reports resulting from these

168 Staff interview with DIA officer, March 31, 2006.
deb briefings. On March 20, 2002, the DIA directed that all contact with Source Two cease.

(U) In March 2002, CIA’s Directorate of Operations notified CIA BW analysts in an e-mail about the DIA and the foreign service’s concerns about Source Two. All three CIA BW analysts told the Committee that they either received the e-mail or knew about the concerns.

( ) In April 2002, the CIA published two assessments on Source Two. The first assessment, titled [redacted], noted that DIA deb briefings of Source Two “ceased because of recent disclosures to the press of the defector’s name and location and his relationship with the U.S. Intelligence Community.” The assessment noted that the CIA assessed that some of Source Two’s information may be accurate, especially regarding Iraq’s procurement and construction of mobile laboratories, but added that he could have learned that information from press reports. The assessment said that Source Two passed a DIA administered polygraph, but the DIA debriefer had expressed concern that Source Two was being coached by the INC to further its goals.

( ) The second assessment was more expansive, stating that the DIA had “terminated contact with Source Two after four meetings because of suspicions he was a fabricator and because Source Two, against direction of his handlers, continued to cultivate a public profile after the media disclosed his

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170 DIA Information Memo, [redacted], February 2004.
171 CIA, Assessment of the Iraqi defector, April 2002.
173 CIA response to questions from Committee staff, July 18, 2006.
174 CIA, Iraqi defector in [redacted], April 2002.
contact with the U.S. Intelligence Community.” The assessment noted that the foreign intelligence service also debriefed Source Two and assessed that he fabricated at least some of his information.174 The assessment stated:

Source Two demonstrated a general understanding of Iraq’s WMD infrastructure and procurement networks both in his public statements and in his debriefings, but much of his information was in the public domain, lacked sufficient detail to verify his access, or was incorrect. His position as a midlevel [REDACTED] officer suggests that he would not have had direct access to a broad spectrum of compartmented weapons programs. We have not used his information in finished intelligence products.”175

(U) In May 2002, after lengthy coordination with the CIA’s Iraqi Operations Group and Counterproliferation Division, the DIA issued a “fabrication notice” which said “we have determined that [Source Two] is a fabricator/provocateur” and advised consumers that “his information is assessed as unreliable and, in some instances, pure fabrication. We have determined that he had also been coached by

174 CIA, Assessment of the Iraqi defector, April 2002.
175 CIA, Assessment of the Iraqi defector, April 2002.
176 CIA, Assessment of the Iraqi defector, April 2002.
the Iraqi National Congress (INC) prior to his meeting with western intelligence services.”

DIA disseminated the fabrication notice to the all of the analytic agencies that received the original intelligence reports on Source Two, including CIA, DIA, and State INR, and cited the source identification numbers, reference numbers, and titles of both original intelligence reports.

(U) The DIA did not recall the original intelligence reports or reissue them with a warning that Source Two was believed to be a fabricator. The DIA told Committee staff, “we sent out a fabricator notice, not to necessarily recall the information but to warn the intelligence community that some of his information was suspect, that he may have been coached, and, . . . what his modus operandi was.”

(U) A July 2002 NIC Memorandum on the INC defector program also outlined the Intelligence Community’s concerns about information from Source Two, noting that DIA and the foreign intelligence service believed his information was unreliable. The paper said that “although intelligence reporting on the mobile labs was favorably received, this information is now considered suspect.”

(U) Despite the warning from the Directorate of Operations in March 2002, the April 2002 CIA assessments, the May 2002 DIA fabrication notice, the July 2002 NIC Memorandum all suggesting Source Two may have fabricated information, and the fact that Source Two’s intelligence report never actually said the labs were for biological weapons, Source Two was cited specifically in five

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177 DIA fabrication notice, 2002.
178 DIA fabrication notice, 2002.
CIA intelligence assessments and the October 2002 NIE, as corroborating other source reporting about a mobile biological weapons program.

( ) One of the assessments, published in October 2002, *WMD Association at Presidential Sites Unlikely to be Revealed by Inspections*, did not cite Source Two by name or note an INC-affiliation. The information from Source Two said, “mobile BW laboratories, managed by key BW figure Rihab Taha, in 1998 were stored in the Republican Palace garage when not in use, according to a former Iraqi officer.”

( ) The other four assessments: *Iraq: Expanding BW Capabilities* in July 2002; *Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat* in August 2002; Iraq’s BW Capabilities in October 2002; and *Lessons Learned From Iraq’s Past Efforts to Mask Its BW Program* in November 2002, and the NIE, used almost identical descriptions of Source Two’s information. The language in the papers said that in mid-1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile laboratories for BW agent research to evade UNSCOM inspections, according to Source Two, an Iraqi defector associated with the Iraqi National Congress. The two papers described Source Two by name.

(U) Source Two was also one of the four HUMINT sources specifically referred to in the part of Secretary Powell’s February 2003 speech before the UN Security Council that discussed the mobile BW production units. Although a DIA Division Chief, who was aware of the fabrication notice, attended two of the

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181 CIA, *WMD Association at Presidential Sites Unlikely to be Revealed by Inspections*, October 11, 2002.
Powell speech coordination meetings on February 2 and 3, 2003, he told Committee staff that he was unaware that the source mentioned in the speech was the same source about whom the fabrication notice had been issued and, therefore, he did not raise any concerns about it. He told Committee staff that he was not provided with the speech until he arrived at the meeting, that the source was not specifically discussed, and that the speech did not indicate that the source was a DIA source. He was later asked to clear about twenty reports for declassification, including the Source Two report, but said he and a DIA declassification team only examined the reports to determine whether their release would expose sources and methods and did not notice that the report was the one on which the fabrication notice had been issued.\textsuperscript{183}

\textbf{(U) The Iraq BW analysts from CIA, DIA, and State INR all acknowledged that the fabrication notice was available in their message handling systems, but they all said they did not see the notice. A joint CIA/DIA notification to the Committee on January 27, 2004 said that the fabrication notice had not come to the attention of relevant analysts from the DIA or the CIA when Source Two’s information was included in the NIE and Secretary Powell’s speech.\textsuperscript{184}}

\textbf{(U) Two CIA analysts, one who was involved in coordinating the Powell speech, said although they were aware in early 2002 that DIA and the foreign intelligence service had concerns about Source Two’s reporting, they believed that the reporting about the mobile labs remained plausible. They said that even fabricators will usually have some truth in their stories. They said that if the reporting has not been recalled, as long as the information was used with appropriate caveats, it could continue to be used in finished intelligence reporting. When asked why the caveats were not included in the Powell speech or explained}

\textsuperscript{183} Staff interview with DIA officers, June 3, 2004.
\textsuperscript{184} Letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts from DIA and CIA, January 27, 2004.
to Secretary Powell, the analyst who coordinated the speech said that "we lost the thread of concern . . . as time progressed I don't think we remembered." A CIA supervisor noted that, "clearly we had it at one point, we understood, we had concerns about the source, but over time it started getting used again and there really was a loss of corporate awareness that we had a problem with the source."\textsuperscript{185}

(U) The analysts also noted that the original reporting was not recalled and was not altered in any way to reflect the fact that a fabrication notice had been issued. In addition, there was not a practice in Intelligence Community at the time of electronically attaching a fabrication notice to the original reporting. As a result, when analysts searched their electronic files even after the fabrication notice had been issued, there was no indication of the notice.\textsuperscript{186}

(U) The CIA and the DIA told the Committee in the January 2004 joint notification that the May 2002 fabrication notice, "was intended to warn analysts reviewing the IIRs that the source may be unreliable. Regrettably, the fabrication notice overstated the reservation DIA had about the source." The notification added that the decision to issue the notice was based on a "determination he had been coached by the INC,\textsuperscript{187} the fact that he was conveying similar information to the news media, and the foreign intelligence service concerns, regarding the veracity of Source Two's reporting based on its prior experience with him. DIA debriefers believed further questioning was appropriate."\textsuperscript{188} Since Operation Iraqi

\textsuperscript{185} Staff interview with CIA analysts, July 26, 2006, (2006-3248).
\textsuperscript{186} Staff interview with CIA analysts, July 26, 2006, (2006-3248).
\textsuperscript{187} The DIA officer who debriefed Source Two told Committee staff that he believed Source Two showed indications of having been coached, but that he had not assessed that the INC had coached him. Staff interview with DIA officer, March 31, 2006.
\textsuperscript{188} Letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts from DIA and CIA, January 27, 2004.
Freedom, the Intelligence Community has been trying, unsuccessfully, to locate Source Two to seek further clarification of his reporting.\(^{189}\)

3. Source Three

\(^{189}\) On September 27, 2001, former DCI James Woolsey contacted the Director of the DIA to advise him that the INC had information about a possible former Iraqi officer who had served as a liaison between Iraqi intelligence and the Fedayeen Saddam from 1998 to 2000 and had information on terrorist training in Iraq.\(^ {190}\) At the same time a Washington representative of the INC contacted the CIA to alert them about the source and the source’s claim that he had information on another individual from the training camp who was now living in the United States.

\(^{190}\) On September 28, 2001, DIA officers met with the INC’s Washington representative; Haydr al Bandar, an INC employee who had spoken to the defector on the telephone; and Dr. Chalabi.\(^ {191}\) According to both DIA officials and Dr. Chalabi, at the meeting, Bandar provided DIA with the details about the source, Source Three, based on his phone call. Bandar said that Source Three was a former Iraqi lieutenant colonel who conducted training of 70 non-Iraqi Arab terrorists at a special Iraqi training facility at Salman Pak. Bandar said that Source Three observed the trainees receiving training on aircraft hijackings. Bandar also reported that Source Three observed frogmen training to blow up mock-ups of U.S. Navy vessels using underwater explosives and booby traps at a separate facility. Following this training, 34 terrorists departed Iraq for the UAE. These 34 terrorists were not identified by Bandar as

\(^{189}\) Letter to SSCI Chairman Roberts from DIA and CIA, January 27, 2004.
\(^{190}\) DIA operational cable, September 27, 2001.
\(^{191}\) DIA operational cable, September 28, 2001.
non-Iraqi Arabs. Later the same day, DIA officers sent a request to a CIA
station requesting the station’s opinion on meeting with Source Three in the
Embassy to debrief him on possible terrorist related information.

(U) Using the information from al Bandar, the DIA disseminated two
intelligence reports. Both reports described the information from Bandar as from
“a former Iraqi citizen, [who] received this information from a subsourse. Source
and subsourse’s credibility have not been determined.” The reports did not
indicate that the source was a member of the INC or that the subsourse was Source
Three.

(U) The first report, disseminated on September 29, 2001, stated that Iraq
trained terrorists in hijacking operations at the Salman Pak intelligence training
facility and that seventy non-Iraqi Arabs trained at the camp, also in hijacking
procedures. The report said that the Iraqis used a second camp at Lake Tharthar
for underwater demolition training and that 34 individuals from this camp were
sent to the UAE in the winter of 2000. The report also said that Faruq Hijazi was
the liaison between Saddam and the terrorists and noted that Hijazi had met Usama
bin Ladin in Khandahar in December 1998. It is unclear if the report was
suggesting that Hijazi was Saddam’s liaison to the training camp terrorist or
terrorists in general. The second report from Bandar provided only one paragraph
of text identifying an Egyptian businessman who maintained a relationship with
the Iraqi intelligence service.

192 DIA operational cable, September 2000.
194 DIA intelligence reports, September and October 2001.
(U) DIA analysts used the first intelligence report in which Source Three was the subsourse in a Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary (DITSUM) on September 30, 2001, titled *Terrorists Allegedly Training at Iraqi Camps*. The DITSUM said “Salman Pak was purportedly used to train non-Iraqi Arabs in hijacking operations while underwater demolition training took place at Lake Tharthar.” The DITSUM comment noted that “there is presently no other indication that terrorists are training at these facilities.”

(U) On October 3, 2001, a CIA station which had been contacted about Source Three by both the DIA and the CIA, asked CIA headquarters to have the INC’s Washington representatives instruct Source Three to come to the U.S. embassy in that country for an interview. On October 4, 2001, the INC’s Washington representative went to the Department of State to discuss Source Three. A CIA officer also attended the meeting. The INC’s Washington representative again noted that Source Three had information about an Iraqi officer who had worked at a terrorist training facility, Salman Pak. An operations cable about the meeting said, “this officer specialized in training non-Iraqi Arabs in hijacking civil aircraft” and had relocated to the United States. At the meeting, the Department of State provided the INC’s Washington representative with the telephone number of the FBI Legal Attache in the same foreign country, with the direction that the INC’s representatives in that country contact the Attache.

(U) On October 5, 2001, U.S. embassy officials received a Department of State e-mail outlining Source Three’s information about the individual living in

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the United States. The e-mail said the FBI Legal Attache should expect a call from an unnamed INC representative who had information on "Iraqi efforts to train non-Iraqi Arabs to conduct airplane hijackings and other terrorist acts against Americans."\(^{201}\) Later that morning, an INC representative called the FBI Legal Attache. The INC representative said he only had second or third hand knowledge of the defector's information and said his role was only in brokering an introduction. The two made arrangements for a debriefing of Source Three.\(^{202}\)

\(\text{[Redacted]}\) On October 10, 2001, the FBI Legal Attache debriefed Source Three. According to the FBI reports about the debriefing, Source Three told the FBI that he had worked for \[\text{[Redacted]}\] and was not a member of the IIS. The FBI, which had primacy on the debrief because of Source Three's information on the individual in the United States, did not continue to pursue discussions with him, noting that he was unable to provide specific information pertaining to terrorist training activities.

\(\text{(U)}\) The FBI referred Source Three to the CIA and the DIA because he demonstrated "a great deal of knowledge about Iraqi politics."\(^{203}\) The FBI did contact the individual in the United States who had been identified by Source Three. The results of those interactions and other FBI and CIA contact with that individual are outlined in the next section of the report.

\(\text{(U)}\) The CIA and the DIA continued to debrief Source Three about information related to the Fedayeen Saddam organization and training. In response to questions from the debriefers about INC attempts to coach Source Three, he told the debriefers that his INC handler did not prime him with

\(^{201}\) CIA operational cable, October 2001.
\(^{202}\) CIA operational cable, October 2001.
\(^{203}\) FBI, October 9, 2001.
information or suggest topics to discuss with any U.S. authorities. Source Three also told the debriefers that he had the impression his INC handler “cared more for the U.S. than for his own INC.”  

(U) In mid-October 2001, following these debriefings, the DIA disseminated an additional three reports based directly on Source Three’s reporting. The reports described him as a “high-ranking Iraqi public official with direct access to reported information. First time reporter who appeared reliable.” None of the reports discussed Iraq’s suspected WMD programs.  

(U) The first report said that Kuwaiti prisoners were being held in two separate locations in Iraq and identified Iraqi intelligence personnel responsible for the prisoners. The second report discussed a special 520 member unit of the Fedayeen Saddam, al-Qarai’a Force, which received specialized training in commando skills, including airborne operations, underwater demolition, hand-to-hand combat, explosives and sabotage. The report included the names of the top 30 members of the unit who were given UAE passports and were to deploy to the UAE under the supervision of Iraqi intelligence. The report noted that the source had no information on the mission or ultimate location of the unit members and that as of October 2000 they had not deployed. The third report described Fedayeen Saddam training at the IIS training facility Salman Pak and said Source Three observed individuals he believed to be non-Iraqi Arabs training in an abandoned aircraft shell. He believed they were either Egyptians, Gulf Arabs, or a mixture of the two, based solely on their dialect and appearance. The report provided additional information on the Qaria’a force, stating that the recruits

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204 CIA operational cable, October 2001.
205 DIA intelligence reports 2002.
207 DIA intelligence report 2002.
received training in “explosives to booby-trap vehicles, preparation of suitcase bombs, and aircraft security operations” which Source Three believed involved both defensive and offensive training.\textsuperscript{208} The DIA told the Committee that analysts determined the intelligence reports related to the Fedayeen Saddam organization and training were “of value.”

(U) In November 2001, the CIA published an assessment of the Salman Pak facility titled \textit{Iraq: Salman Pak Unconventional Warfare Training Facility}. The assessment noted that since the September 11 attacks, defectors of questionable reliability claimed that Salman Pak was used to train non-Iraqis. The report included Source Three’s information that:

Approximately 520 Special Operations recruits of the Saddam Fedayeen were permanently based at Salman Pak, where they received training on the use of explosives to booby trap vehicles, preparation of suitcase bombs, and aircraft security operations. The same source indicated that in 2000 he observed non-Iraqi Arabs – reportedly Egyptians or Gulf Arabs– training on the abandoned aircraft at the facility.\textsuperscript{209}

(U) The report concluded that “since the Salman Pak facility is used by a number of different organizations–and various reports have indicated foreign activity at the site in the past–the reports of non-Iraqi Arabs receiving training cannot be discounted.”\textsuperscript{210}

\textsuperscript{208} DIA intelligence report 2002, [ redacted ]
\textsuperscript{210} CIA, \textit{Iraq: Salman Pak Unconventional Warfare Training Facility}, November 1, 2001
(S) On December 6, 2001, a foreign intelligence service told the CIA that their Iraqi contacts in [REDACTED] said that the CIA was working with Source Three. The foreign service noted that they had previously obtained intelligence from him which had been shared with the CIA. In a written response to questions from Committee staff about this reporting, the CIA said the foreign service usually does not provide the name of their sources. The CIA was able to find four reports from the service dated from March through October 2001 that are sourced to a Fedayeen Saddam officer who left Iraq in late 2000 and whose reporting was similar to Source Three’s. All three reports were disseminated by the CIA as intelligence reports.

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211 CIA operational cable, [REDACTED], December 2001.
212
213 [REDACTED]
A response from CIA’s Counterterrorism Center stated that the information would not be disseminated because the information was previously reported in DIA channels. The response added that Source Three “is under the
influence/control of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and is not considered to be very credible."

Following his debriefings with U.S. intelligence, Source Three’s story began to appear in the press. The CIA judged the press reports to be more sensational than the accounts provided to the Intelligence Community. In January 2002, the CIA published an intelligence assessment which described the Intelligence Community’s contact with Source Three and a description of the contents of a media story. The assessment said, “the information Source Three provided to debriefers was less sensational, more detailed, and more credible than depicted in recent [press].” The assessment pointed out several discrepancies between the two accounts:

The magazine reported that Source Three was a Brigadier General in the Iraqi intelligence service who personally directed a special operations unit in Saddam’s Fedayeen, the al-Qarai’a Force, which trained to conduct airborne operations, underwater demolition, sabotage, and VIP security. Source Three told debriefers that he was never an intelligence officer and never controlled these forces.

The magazine indicated that the al-Qaria’a force consisted of 1,200 personnel stationed at the IIS’s Salman Pak special operations facility who were trained for suicide missions. Source Three told debriefers that the al-Qaria’a force was composed of only 520 personnel capable of unconventional warfare missions but trained more as an internal security force. He opined that perhaps two men out of a hundred would actually perform suicide missions if directed.
The intelligence assessment concluded that:

Source Three’s claim that the Fedayeen has a special unit trained for special operations, [REDACTED], is consistent with other intelligence reporting, but the precise mission, size, location, equipment, and intended targets of this unit are unclear. [Other intelligence] [REDACTED] shows a special operations training facility [REDACTED] that includes a village mock-up, a derelict aircraft, and string of three railcars identified by Source Three.

– Several Iraqi security organizations use the [REDACTED] facility. Source Three’s report of non-Iraqis training there is possible, but Source Three was clear that he had no firsthand information linking activities at [the facility] to 11 September.223

(*** Confidential) In February 2002, a CIA station [REDACTED] drafted another intelligence report based on information from Source Three about suicide

222 CIA, Iraq: Defector [REDACTED], January [REDACTED], 2002.
223 CIA, Iraq: Defector [REDACTED], January [REDACTED], 2002.
commandos preparing for missions abroad in 2000, this time from a station contact.\textsuperscript{224} An operations cable accompanying the report said that the station contact attributed the information to a subsourse, Source Three, and noted that headquarters had previously decided not to disseminate comparable information from the same subsourse.\textsuperscript{225} CIA operations cables do not clarify whether the station contact obtained the information directly from Source Three, or from press accounts of Source Three’s information. The station contact said that he was not affiliated with the INC, but was a member of the Officers Movement for Salvation of Iraq, a separate Iraqi opposition group. He said his group was being actively courted by, but had not joined with, the INC.

(U) On February 6, 2002, CIA’s Iraq Operations Group (IOG) disseminated a cable attempting to summarize the Intelligence Community’s various interactions with Source Three and the station contact. The cable outlined the IOG’s conclusion regarding Source Three that:

Although we can verify a few elements of his story, we have determined that much of his information is inaccurate and appears aimed at influencing U.S. (and probably western) policy on Iraq. The fact that he has reiterated this same story to numerous audiences—including the media—had further damaged his credibility with our service

a. Mistaken Identity

(U) On June 7, 2002, another CIA station requested a name trace on a former Iraqi military officer.\textsuperscript{224} According to a station

\begin{footnotes}
\item[224] CIA operational cable, [date] February 2002.
\item[225] CIA operational cable, [date] February 2002.
\end{footnotes}
asset, the individual fled Iraq to Europe via a number of other countries. The same day, the CIA’s Iraq Operations Group responded to the station that headquarters “is quite familiar with subject . . . whose name is [Source Three.] . . . [Two other CIA stations] are likewise very familiar with Source Three, and we find it rather telling that he neglected to mention the Immigration Service [in the country where the station was located] that he has been debriefed in both of those locations. We have no information that he has spent any time in [one of the countries mentioned in the cable], and we assess his story in ref to be entirely fabricated.” The cable advised the station against any contact with him. In a response to Committee staff questions about why the Iraq Operations Group was so certain that the station contact was the same individual as Source Three, especially considering that the personal data and the reporting from the two did not match, CIA noted that “in hindsight, it is possible that there were in fact two individuals, as Arabic names are often very alike.”

(U) Similarly, in August 2002, a CIA domestic station wrote to CIA headquarters requesting assistance in accessing or interviewing an unnamed defector discussed in the media. The station noted that an FBI office was very interested in information the defector was said to have on the Mujahideen e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group. The CIA’s Iraq Operations Group responded on September 6, 2002 that “the individual referred to in ref is [Source Three], a former Iraqi Fedayeen Saddam officer who did, in fact, flee to Europe in mid-2001.” The Iraq Operations Group outlined its assessment

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226 CIA operational cable, June . , 2002.
228 CIA operational cable, August . , 2002.
that Source Three embellished his access and advised against further contact.\textsuperscript{229} In fact, the subject of the media article was not Source Three, it was Source Two.

\textit{b. Intelligence Assessments}

\textbf{(U)} CIA analysts included Source Three’s information in three extensive assessments about Iraq’s links to al-Qa’ida, a June 2002 paper, \textit{Iraq and al-Qa’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship}, and September 2002 and January 2003 versions of \textit{Iraqi Support for Terrorism}. All three assessments noted that reporting surged after September 11, 2001 from Iraqi defectors claiming that al-Qa’ida and other non-Iraqi Arabs engaged in special operations training at Salman Pak.\textsuperscript{230} The two \textit{Iraqi Support for Terrorism} papers more explicitly described the information as:

Press and sensitive reporting about al-Qa’ida activity at Salman Pak—ultimately sourced to three Iraqi defectors—surged after 11 September. The defectors claimed that al-Qa’ida and other non-Iraqis engaged in special operations training at Salman Pak. It was subsequently determined, however, that at least one of these defectors, whose story appeared in [the media], had embellished and exaggerated his access. The other two reported similar information but apparently did not have

\textsuperscript{229} CIA operational cable\underline{[Redacted]}, September 11, 2002.
first-hand access to it. No al-Qa’ida associates detained since 11 September have said they trained at Salman Pak.231

(U) All three defectors referenced were affiliated with the INC. The first of the three defectors, described as having embellished and exaggerated his access, is Source Three. CIA officials told Committee staff that the comment that he had “embellished and exaggerated” his access referred to the press stories, not to his debriefings with the Intelligence Community. In addition, these officials acknowledged that they do not know that it was Source Three who exaggerated, only that they believe the press story was an exaggerated version of what Source Three told his Intelligence Community debriefers.232 The second of the three defectors referenced in the paper was also debriefed by the Intelligence Community agencies and is described in further detail below as Source Four.


232 Interview with CIA officials, February 2006.

233 Interview with CIA officials, February 2006.
(U) Despite the assertion in *Iraqi Support to Terrorism* that the “defectors claimed that al-Qa’ida and other non-Iraqis” trained at Salman Pak, Committee staff found no reports from these defectors claiming that it was members of al-Qa’ida who received the training. In fact, Source Three and Source Four (who is discussed below) specifically told their debriefers that they did not know whether the non-Iraqi Arabs were al-Qa’ida members.  

[1] The Intelligence Community did not have any further direct contact with Source Three after [REDacted]. The Intelligence Community has no information on his location after that time.  

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234 [REDacted]  
235 [REDacted]  
236 CIA intelligence reports.  
237 CIA operational cable, [REDacted], September 2002.
4. Source Four

(U) In October 2001, Source Four, a former Iraqi Fedayeen Saddam captain, living in the United States, was referred to the Intelligence Community by Source Three as someone who could confirm Source Three’s story. He provided Source Four’s name, address and telephone number to the debriefers.

(FOX) Before the any members of the Intelligence Community met with Source Four, the INC arranged a meeting between him and a U.S. journalist. During the meeting, an INC member acted as the interpreter and several INC officials participated in the discussion. The CIA received an advance copy of a draft media article based on the interview with Source Four. According to a CIA cable about the article, it said Source Four was an Iraqi terror school instructor and said that the methods used at the training school, in Iraq, were similar to those used by September 11 hijackers. A CIA cable discussing the draft article
noted that CIA debriefers had been notified about Source Four from another Iraqi defector, Source Three (see previous discussion), who had referred Source Four because he was [REDACTED] Commander’s deputy at the training camp and would have a good overview of the training there. Source Three said that Source Four had no terrorist connections.\(^{239}\)

(\(\text{U}\)) The FBI and the CIA debriefed Source Four in October 2001. The FBI report from the interview says that Source Four was an Iraqi army Captain who [REDACTED] brought his personnel to the camp as part of their training in 1995. The FBI report said that the purpose of the Fedayeen, according to Uday Hussein, was to strike against America and American interests. Source Four said the camp had a train, a bus, and a Boeing 707 aircraft to train in hijacking operations. Source Four was not a terrorist instructor, but did provide his soldiers with weapons training.\(^{240}\)

(\(\text{U}\)) The FBI report said Source Four saw the hijacking training of his soldiers which included training to gain control of the cockpit using any type of weapons they could get, including guns, knives, sticks, or toy guns. Source Four said Iraqi intelligence also trained non-Iraqi Arabs in hijacking techniques at this facility. Source Four told the FBI that he had no specific information that tied the training he observed directly to the September 11 attacks, but said the training he saw was nearly identical to the methods used by the September 11 terrorists.\(^{241}\)

(\(\text{U}\)) The CIA has not provided the Committee with contemporaneous operations traffic that discusses its interview with Source Four. The CIA did disseminate three intelligence reports from Source Four’s debriefs prior to

\(^{239}\) CIA operational cable, [REDACTED], October 2001.
\(^{240}\) FBI, Interview of Source Four, October 30, 2001.
\(^{241}\) FBI, Interview of Source Four, October 30, 2001.
Operation Iraqi Freedom, however. The first report, dated October 31, 2001, said that the former Fedayeen Saddam captain said U.S. news accounts of his activities at the training camp had been distorted because the INC translator involved in the press interviews had distorted what he said. This was the only mention of the source's INC-affiliation in any of the three disseminated reports. The report said that Source Four had never provided training in terrorist techniques. He oversaw two groups of Fedayeen Saddam trainees, taking care of their administrative needs and providing rifle and pistol training. He was at the camp for only eight months, but did observe Iraqi intelligence trainers teaching techniques for hijacking aircraft, buses and trains. The report also said he occasionally observed men he believed to be non-Iraqi Arabs receiving terrorist training in these tactics. He observed between 70-75 non-Iraqi Arab trainees. He could not evaluate their nationalities, nor whether any of them participated in the September 11 attacks. The source description said Source Four was "a contact with excellent access who spoke in confidence but who does not have an established reporting record."243

(U) The second report described details of a typical training day at the camp. The report described a typical camp hijacking scenario which would involve a five-member team, two to control the crew and three to control the passengers. The report said that between 1994 and 1995 approximately 75 non-Iraqi Arabs or Arab extremists trained at the camp. The third report provided information on the Fedayeen Saddam and locations associated with the Fedayeen Saddam and the Ba'ath Party in Baghdad and another Iraqi city.245

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242 In a response to questions from Committee staff, CIA said it omitted Source Four's INC affiliation from its reporting because CIA did not know how much, if any, support Source Four had received from the INC.
244 CIA intelligence report, November 2001.

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The CIA included reporting from Source Four’s debriefs in the assessment on the facility describing him as a former Iraqi Saddam Fedayeen captain who observed 70-75 non-Iraqi Arabs receiving terrorist training at Salman Pak from October 1994 to May 1995. “According to the former captain, his role has been distorted in open source accounts, which described him as training members of Saddam’s Fedayeen to conduct kidnappings, assassinations, and hijacking operations. He insists his duties were strictly administrative in nature, aside from instructing recruits in marksmanship training.”

(U) The CIA case officer who debriefed Source Four told Committee staff that Source Four did not say that he knew his remarks had been distorted, rather that Source Four believed he had been distorted because after some of Source Four’s short responses, the INC translator would speak in English for long periods.

(U) Committee staff reviewed a tape recording of a press interview with Source Four in which several INC officials participated and an INC member translated. A U.S. government contract translator reviewed the tape recording and told Committee staff that the defector was not mistranslated. In a few cases the translator added “definitely” to the defector’s response and added “all over the world” to his comment that the terrorist training was intended to target American interests and the American military. Neither Source Four, nor the translator, ever claimed that the defector provided the terrorist training himself, only that he was at the camp where such training was provided and that he was at the camp for only a year. In several instances the translator responded to the reporter’s questions without actually asking the defector, most often because the defector had already

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247 Staff interview with CIA officer.
responded to the question previously. Much of the interview involved the INC officials providing information about another INC-affiliated source.248

(U) The CIA included the intelligence reports from Source Four’s Intelligence Community debriefs in three comprehensive assessments about Iraq’s links to al-Qa’ida that included Source Three’s information: the June 2002, Iraq and al-Qa’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, and September 2002 and January 2003 versions of Iraqi Support for Terrorism.249

Source Four is one of the two “other” defectors cited in the Iraqi Support for Terrorism papers as follows:

[Three] defectors claimed that al-Qa’ida and other non-Iraqis engaged in special operations training at [redacted]. It was subsequently determined, however, that at least one of these defectors, whose story appeared in the media [redacted], had embellished and exaggerated his access. The other two reported similar information but apparently did not have first-hand access to it.250

(U) Because Source Four’s source description said he had “excellent access,” Committee staff asked for the basis for saying in Iraqi Support to Terrorism that he “apparently did not have first-hand access to” the information.

248 Source Four press interview.
CIA officials told Committee staff the description was meant to indicate that he did not personally provide the training.\textsuperscript{251}

\textbf{(U)} In October 2002, the CIA published an assessment titled, \textit{Terrorism: Question About the Two Iraqi Defectors}. The assessment noted that the CIA and the FBI debriefed Source Four in October 2001 and found him to be "forthcoming and cooperative and assessed he was a dedicated regime opponent." The assessment outlined Source Four’s account to debriefers that media stories of his activities at [redacted] the training camp "were distorted because his statements had been mistranslated by the Iraqi National Congress (INC)."\textsuperscript{252}

\textbf{(U)} The CIA and the FBI continued discussions with Source Four until and during Operation Iraqi Freedom, particularly for assistance in contacting other former Iraqi military officers.\textsuperscript{253} The CIA stopped contact with Source Four for several months when Source Four moved in March 2002 [redacted] intending to work for the INC. Source Four returned to his original location in December 2002, saying he had become disillusioned with the INC and "its hollow promises of meaningful employment."\textsuperscript{254}

\textbf{(U)} In January 2003, Source Four told CIA and FBI debriefers that he had received menacing phone calls from an individual he believed was Iraqi intelligence requesting unspecified assistance. The individual called for a third time on February 10, 2003 and asserted that he was calling on behalf of the Iraqi government which wanted a peaceful resolution to tensions with the U.S. Source Four speculated that the Iraqi believed Source Four had a relationship with the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{251} Staff interview of CIA officials, February 6, 2006.
\item \textsuperscript{252} CIA, \textit{Terrorism: Question About the Two Iraqi Defectors}, October \underline{2002}.
\item \textsuperscript{253} CIA operational cable, [redacted], February \underline{2002}.
\item \textsuperscript{254} CIA operational cable, [redacted], December \underline{2002}.
\end{itemize}
U.S. government through which he could articulate his or Iraqi government views.\textsuperscript{255}

\textbf{1} On February 17, 2003, \textbf{[Redacted]} \textbf{[Redacted]} The same Iraqi asked for Source Four’s assessment of American views of war with Iraq and asserted that “Iraq was providing true and accurate information to the UN inspectors and noted that Iraq was ready for war.”\textsuperscript{256} A CIA domestic station requested a response from CIA headquarters regarding continued interest in gauging the Iraqi intelligence officer’s interest in meeting with U.S. government officials.

\textbf{1} CIA Headquarters \textbf{[Redacted]} responded that given several concerns referenced in a separate cable, including Source Four’s past exposure in the media and his employment with the INC, “we do not have any operational interest in further pursuing [the suspected Iraqi intelligence officer] at this time.”\textsuperscript{257}

\textit{a. Postwar Information on Salman Pak}

\textbf{(U)} A November 2003 assessment from DIA noted that postwar exploitation of the facility found it “devoid of valuable intelligence.” The assessment added that CIA exploitation “found nothing of intelligence value remained and assessed the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) cleaned it out.” The DIA assessment concluded that “we do not know whether the ex-regime trained terrorists on the aircraft at Salman Pak. Intelligence of the Salman Pak facility in late April 2003 indicated

\textsuperscript{255} CIA operational cable, \textbf{[Redacted]}, February \textbf{[Redacted]} 2003.
\textsuperscript{256} CIA operational cable, \textbf{[Redacted]}, February \textbf{[Redacted]} 2003.
\textsuperscript{257} CIA operational cables, \textbf{[Redacted]}, February \textbf{[Redacted]} 2003 and \textbf{[Redacted]} February \textbf{[Redacted]} 2003.
the plane had been dismantled. DIA and CENTCOM assess the plane was sold for scrap."\textsuperscript{258}

(U) In a June 2006 response to questions from Committee staff, DIA said it has "no credible reports that non-Iraqis were trained to conduct or support transnational terrorist operations at Salman Pak after 1991. DIA assessed that following Operation Desert Storm, Salman Pak became well known to the general public as a center for terrorist training, weapons of mass destruction storage and other sensitive activities. As a result, "fabricators and unestablished sources who reported hearsay or thirdhand information created a large volume of human intelligence reporting. This type of reporting surged after September 2001 and continued well after the capture of Salman Pak."\textsuperscript{259}

(U) In June 2006, CIA told the Committee that:

There was information developed after OIF that indicated terrorists were trained at Salman Pak; there was an apparent surge of such reporting. As with past information, however, the reporting is vague and difficult to substantiate. As was the case with the prewar reporting, however, the postwar sources provided few details, and it is difficult to conclude from their second-hand accounts whether Iraq was training al-Qa’ida members, as opposed to other foreign nationals. Postwar site exploitation of Salman Pak has yielded no indications that training of al-Qa’ida linked individuals took place there, and we have no information from detainees on this issue.\textsuperscript{260}

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\item \textsuperscript{258} Director for Intelligence (J2) Memo to DEPSECDEF, \textit{The Salman Pak Facility}, November 10, 2003.
\item \textsuperscript{259} DIA Response to SSCI Question, June 7, 2006.
\item \textsuperscript{260} CIA notes on Committee draft report, June 2006.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
(U) The Iraq Survey Group found that an Iraqi intelligence directorate, M14, which was responsible for training and special operations missions, used the Salman Pak facility to train Iraqis, Palestinians, Syrians, Yemeni, Lebanese, Egyptian, and Sudanese operatives in counterterrorism, explosives, marksmanship, and foreign operations. 261

5. Source Five

(U) Source Five was referred to the DIA by the INC through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The Assistant Secretary of Defense did not recall making this referral to DIA. According to the DIA, Source Five had been smuggled out of Iraq by the INC. The DIA debriefed the source from late September through October 2002 and produced sixteen intelligence reports based on Source Five’s debriefs on leadership atmospherics, routines, and various social activities. 262

(U) The source descriptions in the intelligence reports varied to some extent. Most described Source Five as “a naturalized Iraqi citizen with direct access to the highest levels of the Iraqi leadership. Source reliability has not yet been determined.” Some of the reports added “information may be intended to disinform.” 263

(U) Source Five had claimed publicly that Osama bin Ladin came to Baghdad.

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261 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, Regime Strategic Intent section at p. 78.
262 DIA response to questions from Committee staff, December 14, 2005.
263 DIA intelligence reports.
One DIA report described a debrief with Source Five in which the source claimed to have seen Saddam meeting with a man, who Uday Hussein identified as bin Ladin. Uday told Source Five he was there to discuss training of some of his people in Iraq. Source Five passed a DIA administered polygraph in which the source was questioned about provided reports, including the report on having seen bin Ladin meeting with Saddam.

(U) The comment section of the bin Ladin meeting report noted that it appeared to the reporting officer that Source Five may have reconsidered how the bin Ladin information was presented during the public disclosures and in the interim, had prepared for the reporting officer a careful, somewhat circumscribed, delivery of this part of the story. “Based on a preliminary examination, [Source Five’s] travel documents appear to support the basic facts of how [Source Five] left Iraq. The documents neither confirm nor deny the claim of long-term close personal access to Saddam and his inner circle. Significant further vetting of source is appropriate.”

[Redacted] evaluation in October 2002 which indicated that Source Five’ bin Ladin story appeared to be more or less cogent, but was perhaps contaminated with pockets of coached fabrications. DIA administered a polygraph of Source Five in November 2002 in which the source was assessed to

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believe what the source said to be true. Test administrators indicated that the source had emotional and psychological issues which could affect test reliability and the source’s perception of past events. DIA said that in light of the above information, DIA officers included in disseminated reporting the notification that Source Five was connected to the Iraqi opposition, was aware information was being provided to the U.S. government, and that Source Five’s comments may have been intended to influence as well as inform decision makers.\footnote{DIA, Response to questions from Committee staff, April 27, 2006.}

\textbf{(U)} The bin Ladin-Saddam meeting report was the only terrorism related report from this source. Source Five’s other reports focused on Saddam’s family and associates and identified multiple facilities associated with the senior regime leadership and security services. None of the reports related to WMD.\footnote{DIA, response to questions from Committee staff, September 30, 2005.}

\textbf{[\textit{i}] Following Source Five’s media appearance in 2002, CIA published an assessment,\textbf{\underline{\textit{[Redacted]}}} The assessment noted that Source Five’s reports of a meeting between Saddam and bin Ladin “have not been corroborated.” The assessment added that “sensitive reporting of meetings between senior Iraqi officials and al-Qa’ida members provide no indication that Saddam and Bin Ladin have met each other.”\footnote{CIA,\underline{\textit{[Redacted]}}, September 2002, p. 1.}

\textbf{(U)} CIA published another assessment after the DIA debriefed Source Five. CIA noted that the source provided documents which substantiated the basic framework of the story that Source Five lived and fled from Iraq. Source Five provided telephone numbers, some of which were determined to be accurate and showed familiarity with members of Saddam’s family. The assessment noted that Source Five’s claims to DIA about meetings between Saddam and bin Ladin
“differ from [media accounts] in terms of time, place, and number of meetings. The [DIA] team says [Source Five’s] body language in this part of the debriefing suggested [the source] was uneasy with the topic; team members assessed [the source] might have reconsidered the statements to the press and prepared a careful story for the [DIA] interview.”  

6. The Would-Be Defector

(U) In July 2001, Ahmed Chalabi told an individual in the Department of Defense\textsuperscript{272} he had information from an intermediary that a senior Iraqi diplomat in Europe\textsuperscript{273} wanted to defect to the United States. DIA officers met with Chalabi to discuss the diplomat’s possible defection. Chalabi informed the DIA that the diplomat had been directed by the Iraqi government to return to Baghdad with his family in the next few weeks or possibly days because of an ongoing dispute with the IIS station chief who was displeased with the diplomat’s refusal to do “nasty things,” and because the Iraqi government was displeased with the diplomat’s job performance.\textsuperscript{273}

(U) The CIA Iraq Operations Group informed the DIA that it had no interest in supporting resettlement of the diplomat because his academic background and limited government experience indicated that he would be of no value to the Intelligence Community. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence and the DIA concurred that the diplomat was not likely to have secrets that were of high intelligence value. The

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\textsuperscript{271} CIA. \textsuperscript{272} DIA records do not indicate which office or who specifically at DOD made this referral. \textsuperscript{273} NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program, July 10, 2002, p.4 and DIA response to questions from Committee staff, December 14, 2005.
diplomat never defected and neither CIA nor DIA officers ever met with him.\textsuperscript{274} No reporting resulted from this referral.\textsuperscript{275}

C. INC Reporting During DIA’s Management of the ICP

(U) As noted previously, the DIA officially took over management of the ICP from the Department of State in late October 2002. Between that time and before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the DIA disseminated reporting from fourteen other sources who were either members of or were associated with the INC. In addition to the fourteen individuals, the DIA also disseminated four prewar intelligence reports from a source number assigned to the INC organization itself. The reports assigned to this source number resulted from CIA and DIA meetings with several INC officials who “provided composites of what the INC ICP had on hand concerning Iraq. . . . [DIA] is unable to attribute the reporting to any single source within the INC’s ICP.”\textsuperscript{276}

(U) According to the DIA, reporting from sources provided by the ICP “covered a myriad of information and was not uniform in quality, accuracy, and utility. In some cases it provided solid intelligence leads, corroborated other information, and contributed to our knowledge base. In other cases, the information was of low or no value.”\textsuperscript{277} DIA said its “experience with INC ICP sources is similar to that with many HUMINT sources.”\textsuperscript{278}

\textsuperscript{275} CIA response to questions from Committee staff, January 18, 2006.
\textsuperscript{276} DIA response to questions from Committee staff, March 2006.
\textsuperscript{278} DIA Response to Questions for the Record, March 23, 2004.
(U) Three of the four reports sourced to the INC organization identified the reporting as from “a member of the Iraqi opposition who was aware his information would reach the U.S. government and who may have intended the comments to influence as well as inform.” One of the reports did not include this warning, but did indicate that the source had “indirect access whose reliability has yet to be determined.” This report, disseminated in November 2002, provided information about the establishment of a “crisis management committee” in Iraq which was responsible for preserving the life of Saddam and his family, protecting Baghdad and other vital locations, and the “use of weapons of mass destruction.” The report stated that Iraq possessed several thousand chemical weapons shells filled with VX and mustard, as well as 320 biological shells filled with ebola and anthrax. According to the DIA, the reference to the chemical weapons stockpile was considered credible by DIA analysts and was included in threat briefings as an example of reporting on the existence of a CW stockpile in Iraq. It was not cited in any written assessments.

(U) Two of the three reports which did note the source’s opposition affiliation, both disseminated in December 2001, provided a database and handwritten charts depicting Saddam Hussein’s genealogy and a document describing key personnel in Iraq’s intelligence and security services. The last report, which also noted the source’s opposition affiliation, was attributed to a subsource of undetermined reliability. The report said that Saddam Hussein had told his closest friends and family members to stockpile water because he was preparing to poison the water supply in Baghdad and Kurdish-controlled northern

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279 DIA intelligence reports, 2003.  
280 DIA intelligence report, November 2002, DIA, response to Committee staff request.  
281 DIA response to questions from Committee staff.  
Iraq. The exact contaminant was not identified, but “is believed to be a biological agent, possibly anthrax or a derivative of anthrax.”

(U) The fourteen other sources reported on a variety of topics including regime biographic and personality information, Saddam’s palaces, tribe loyalties, Iraqi concealment efforts, prohibited procurement, the Fedayeen Saddam, military order of battle, Iraqi intelligence, the movement of prohibited weapons, and the locations of suspect WMD facilities.

(U) According to DIA, the impact of reporting from INC-affiliated sources varied substantially by issue. The quality and impact were higher for leadership tracking, prisoners of war, and identification of medical facilities as compared to military issues and WMD. INC sources in some cases provided verified and useful information that directly supported contingency planning and operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom. In other instances, the information was vague, incorrect, or unverifiable.

(U) INC-affiliated reporting was “highly useful,” according to the DIA, in identifying important medical facilities. Reporting confirmed facility locations, identified new facilities, and providing a means for de-conflicting previously erroneous geographic coordinates provided by other sources. Most of the information was used for no-strike targeting to avoid civilian casualties.

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284 DIA, response to Committee staff request.
285 DIA response to Committee staff questions, February 2004.
286 DIA, Iraq: INC Source Pre-War Intelligence Reporting, Response to SSCI request, December 13, 2005.
287 DIA response to Committee staff questions, February 2004.
(U) Information provided by INC-affiliated sources was used to identify key leadership residences, office locations, and clubs frequented by Saddam and his sons. The information also helped analysts establish behavior patterns, in particular, for the two sons. Reporting from several sources on Iraq’s internal security apparatus was corroborated by either open or classified sources of information and contributed to the Intelligence Community’s baseline understanding of this issue. According to the DIA, information on internal security was largely accurate.\(^{288}\)

(_____ Source Six [redacted], an Iraqi-born businessman, provided twenty-three reports, almost exclusively on regime biographies and personalities. One such report, in December 2002, identified an individual said to be in charge of Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear programs. It provided no other WMD related information.\(^{289}\) Another report, in February 2003, discussed Saddam Hussein’s confidence in Faruq Hijazi for intelligence assessments. A source comment noted that if Saddam wanted to build a relationship with bin Ladin, “he would have picked Hijazi as his representative.” The report did not indicate that Saddam did want to build a relationship with bin Ladin.\(^{290}\)

(U) The only report from Source Six that did not discuss regime personalities, dated February 2003, said that some of the Iraqi population is excited about the idea of removing Saddam Hussein from power and replacing him with improved leadership. Source Six said the Iraqi people expect a U.S. operation to take about four weeks, and understand that a short U.S. presence after that will be necessary. He said if the U.S. stays too long it may be viewed as an occupation and said the U.S. should work closely with local officials to avoid that

\(^{288}\) DIA response to Committee staff questions, February 2004.
\(^{289}\) DIA intelligence report, [redacted], December [redacted], 2002.
\(^{290}\) DIA intelligence report, [redacted], February [redacted], 2003.
perception. The source said the Iraqi people will want a new government created from officials in Iraq, not from Iraqi exiles who may "be seen as spies that are not loyal to Iraq and are placed into a position by the USG as a puppet government."\textsuperscript{291} The CIA included this report in a March 13, 2003 paper, *Iraq: Diaspora Brings Tensions, Hope*, as one of many sources used to support the judgment that Iraqis would be threatened by an exile-led transitional authority. The citation said, "an Iraqi businessman with high-level contacts inside Iraq says most Iraqis prefer a new government composed of those now living in the country."\textsuperscript{292}

\textbf{Source Seven\textsuperscript{292}}, an INC member, provided thirteen prewar reports on a variety of topics including a three part report on prominent Iraqi tribes, Iraqi smuggling of prohibited materials, Iraqi intelligence assassination teams sent to kill Iraqi opposition members, infighting within the INC, and two reports on Iraq's missiles. Source Seven is described in the reporting as a Middle Eastern businessman with indirect access to the information. After the first three reports, which did not indicate Source Seven's INC affiliation, all subsequent reporting carried the comment, "the source of this report is a member of the Iraqi opposition who was aware that his/her comments would reach the U.S. government and who may have intended the comments to influence as well as inform."\textsuperscript{293}

\textbf{(U) An October 2002 report from a Source Seven subsourse said three Iraqi Scud missile systems had recently deployed to Mosul, Iraq. The subsourse reported that the Scuds were capable of delivering chemical or biological warheads and that the units were believed to have orders to fire on Turkey in the

\textsuperscript{291} DIA intelligence report, \textsuperscript{292} CIA, *Diaspora Bring Tension, Hope*, March \textsuperscript{293} October 2002. 2003 and CIA response to questions from Committee staff.
event of U.S. hostilities with Iraq. A November 2002 report, also from a
subsource, said that Qusay Hussein, Saddam’s son, had assumed control of Iraq’s
strategic rocket forces from the Iraqi army. The subsource believed Saddam made
this change because he did not trust the army to follow his orders and fire on
designated targets in neighboring countries in the event of an attack on Iraq. The
comment section of the report stated that the “source is unvetted. He is a member
of an Iraqi opposition group, and admittedly part of a faction that favors finding a
surgical means to remove Saddam Hussein and purge his close followers, instead
of achieving regime change through a large-scale attack. He therefore may have
intended his information to persuade that a military attack on Iraq could be too
risky.”

The DIA disseminated eight reports, all in late October and early
November 2002, from Source Eight, logistics specialist for
the Iraqi military production agency. All of the reports described Source Eight as
a member of the Iraqi opposition. Source Eight reported almost exclusively on
Iraqi conventional weapons production facilities and told debriefers that he had no
knowledge of chemical, biological, or missile-related production, storage or hide
sites. He reported that a business associate told him Iraq was smuggling
“sanctioned” materials to Syria, which the individuals driving the materials
believed to be chemical and biological weapons. Another report from Source
Eight, attributed to a subsourse, said that Iraqi intelligence officers provided
“bearded fundamentalist terrorists” in Kuwait with small arms and explosives in
the summer of 2002 to be used against U.S. forces in Kuwait.

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Source Nine, reported almost exclusively about al-Qa’ida travel patterns, but none of the reported activities involved Iraq. The reports included a number of enclosures with. All of the reports from Source Nine described him as a member of the Iraqi opposition.298

The DIA disseminated two prewar reports from Source Ten. Both reports described him as a member of the Iraqi opposition, in one case, a senior member. The first report, dated November 2002 reported on Iraqi purchasing agents in Jordan acquiring dual-use materials for Iraq. The report said Iraq had also successfully obtained refurbished T-72 tank engines, anti-tank missiles, helicopter engines and night vision goggles.299 The second report, dated January 2003, was from a subsourse who allegedly worked on two Iraqi nuclear facilities described in the report, Tuwaitha and Ameriyah. The report said unspecified nuclear activity was rumored to have been occurring at the facility for two years, but was “definitely operating” between April and June 2002 when radiation levels were above acceptable safety standards.300

The DIA disseminated one report from Source 11 providing the alleged daily routine of Uday Hussein. The report specified that the source was “connected with the Iraqi opposition and was aware that his/her comments would reach the U.S. government. He/she may have intended the comments to influence as well as inform.”301

301 DIA intelligence report, November 2002.
The DIA disseminated twenty-eight prewar intelligence reports from Source Twelve, an INC handler. All of the reports identified Source Twelve as a member of the Iraqi opposition. Sixteen of the reports provided information from 1998 regarding Hussein family residences, security at the residences, and the activities of the Hussein family at the residences. One report identified the exact location where Saddam parked his car within the Republican Palace, while visiting Uday. Another report identified a security signature inside the Republican Palace that indicated when Saddam was in the general area. The DIA told the Committee these reports were verified through other intelligence reporting prior to the war.

Source Twelve also provided twelve reports from the translation of a 100 page Arabic document providing extensive order of battle information and Iraqi government structure information including on Iraqi border forces, Republican Guard Corps, the Special Security Organization, the General Security Directorate, and Military Intelligence Directorate. These reports also described the source as a member of the Iraqi opposition.

The DIA disseminated approximately 50 prewar reports from Source Thirteen, who conducted business with Uday Hussein and other senior Iraqi officials. About half of the reports, describe the source as a member of the Iraqi opposition. The reports largely focused on the Saddam family, in particular Uday Hussein’s lifestyle and habits, and Hussein.

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302 DIA, response to Committee staff request, reports from Source Twelve.
305 DIA response to questions from Committee staff.
306 DIA, response to Committee staff request, reports from Source Twelve.
family security, weapons procurement, and oil for food program kickbacks. The source also reported on the Iraqi regime’s practice of using certain facilities as a contingency in the event of major coalition strikes. According to the DIA, this information was corroborated, but, the use of Some of the facilities identified by these sources and corroborated with other reporting were struck by Coalition forces. Others were exploited by special operations forces or other intelligence agencies following major ground operations.

In January 2003, the DIA disseminated one report from Source Fourteen, a former Iraqi soldier. The report was attributed to a subsourse, living in Samawa, Iraq, who had direct and indirect access to the information. The report noted that neither the source nor subsourse had a prior reporting history and the reliability of the information was undetermined. The report said Source Fourteen spoke to the subsourse in January 2003. The subsourse said that earlier in January 2003 the Iraqi Republican Guard was in the process of moving chemical and biological weapons by truck into Samawa. The subsourse also said that the citizens of Samawa were being forced to hide sealed boxes in their homes, which the source believed contained chemical or biological weapons. The report did not indicate that the source was affiliated with the Iraqi opposition.

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307 DIA, response to Committee staff request, reports from Source Thirteen.
309 DIA response to questions from Committee staff.
The DIA disseminated three reports from Source Fifteen, described as an Iraqi citizen with direct access to the information. One report identified four Iraqi Intelligence Service officers serving in Iraqi embassies in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. The other two reports, dated late January and early February 2003, discussed Iraqi smuggling efforts of prohibited items including missiles, military spare parts, small arms, computer equipment and tools for the previous two years. One of the reports included enclosures of tender bids for an Iraqi company involved in the smuggling efforts.

In January 2003, the DIA disseminated two reports from two different sources containing information that was over ten years old. One report provided information from 1985 on the construction of fifteen underground arsenal facilities near Tikrit Iraq. The other report provided information from 1990 about a nuclear facility located north of Salman Pak. The source did not provide information about the type of nuclear facility he was describing. Neither report noted the sources’ opposition affiliations.

The DIA disseminated two reports from Source Sixteen, a former Iraqi army officer and U.S. citizen. The source description identified the source as a member of the Iraqi opposition and Free Iraq Force (FIF) member. The first report from Source Sixteen provided information from 1989 about a project to produce chemical protection masks and possibly suits. The report included hand drawings of the facility. The second report said

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that the leader of the a Kurdish tribe in northern Iraq was willing to support U.S. efforts to topple Saddam Hussein in return for weapons and money. The report provided background information and a description of the tribe leader, including photographs.\(^{316}\)

\(\text{[redacted]}\) The DIA disseminated one report from Source Seventeen \(\text{[redacted]}\) a U.S. green card holder and member of the Free Iraq Force (FIF). The report was attributed to a subsoure who claimed that members of the Special Republican Guard were prepared to fight to the death alongside Saddam Hussein. The report said Saddam had some units which were dressed as U.S. and British troops and were prepared to “execute chemical-biological warfare” on Iraqi citizens so the world would blame President Bush.\(^{317}\)

1. CIA Debrief of INC-walk in (Source Eighteen)

\(\text{[redacted]}\) While the DIA was officially managing the ICP program, the CIA facilitated the debriefing of one INC-affiliated source \(\text{[redacted]}\) \(\text{[redacted]}\). A DIA officer was detailed to the \(\text{[redacted]}\) team and participated in the debrief.\(^{318}\)

\(\text{[redacted]}\) In early February 2003, an INC representative brought Source Eighteen to a CIA base \(\text{[redacted]}\) for a short meeting with CIA and DIA staff that was to be followed later with a more extensive debriefing regarding his reported access to Iraq’s nuclear program. While meeting with the INC representative and Source Eighteen, the CIA case officer received a phone call

\(^{318}\) Interview with DIA officers.
from [redacted] a local source who said that on the way to the meeting he heard the INC representative tell Source Eighteen to “deliver the act of a lifetime.” The case officer said that he did not act on the information, “understanding the level of jealousy/animosity between the INC and the [local source].”

The next day, the CIA and DIA debriefed Source Eighteen. Source Eighteen was supposed to have a nuclear engineering background, but was unable to discuss advanced mathematics or physics and described types of “nuclear” reactors that do not exist. Source Eighteen used the bathroom frequently, particularly when he appeared to be flustered by a line of questioning, suddenly remembering a new piece of information upon his return. During one such incident Source Eighteen appeared to be reviewing notes.

The case officers judged that Source Eighteen was a fabricator. The Intelligence Community had no further contact with him and did not disseminate any reporting from him.

The CIA contacted DIA headquarters to inform DIA of the results of the meeting, and DIA concurred with CIA’s intent to discontinue contact.

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319 CIA operations cable, February 2003.
320 CIA operations cable, February 2003.
321 CIA operations cable, February 2003 and CIA responses to questions from Committee staff, May 25, 2006.
IV. ALLEGED INC-LINKED SOURCES

A. CURVE BALL

(U) The Senate Intelligence Committee’s July 2004 report, the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, examined the role of a foreign liaison service source, code named CURVE BALL, in the Intelligence Community’s judgments about Iraq’s biological weapons program. CURVE BALL was the source that led the Intelligence Community to judge in the 2002 NIE on Iraq’s WMD capabilities that “Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents.” 322 There were three other sources who the Intelligence Community believed corroborated CURVE BALL’s reporting, 323 but CURVE BALL was the Intelligence Community’s primary source on the BW program, providing more than 100 reports on Iraq’s alleged BW program while the other sources provided one each. As one analyst described to Committee staff, without CURVE BALL, “...you probably could only honestly say that Iraq would be motivated to have a mobile BW program and that it was attempting to procure components that would support that.” 324

(U) The Committee noted in its July 2004 report that uncertainties about CURVE BALL’s reliability had been raised in CIA operations cables but were not disseminated to analysts outside the CIA. Despite these warnings, and perhaps in part because of the limited dissemination of those warnings, the Intelligence

323 See pages 148-161 of the Committee’s July 2004 Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq for a discussion of all four sources and their role in the Intelligence Community’s judgments about a mobile biological weapons program.
Community judged CURVE BALL to be “credible” or “very credible” in its reporting. The Committee concluded that uncertainties about his reliability should have been taken into account by operations officers who provided the initial judgment of his credibility, should have made the analysts who were aware of them wary about relying so heavily on his reporting, and should have been noted in the NIE. In addition, these concerns should have been passed on to policymakers, who used CURVE BALL’s information publicly.\textsuperscript{325}

(U) Following publication of the first report, the Committee learned of additional prewar concerns about CURVE BALL’s reliability within the CIA. Those issues are discussed briefly in the accuracy section of this report and are the subject of a continuing Committee inquiry.

(U) In the summer and fall of 2003, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) investigated whether Iraq had a mobile biological weapons program as part of its overall investigation into Iraq’s WMD capabilities. The primary focus was investigating sites and individuals identified by CURVE BALL and later, CURVE BALL himself. The ISG located and debriefed over sixty individuals who could have been involved in a mobile program, were linked to suspect sites, or to CURVE BALL. Many of the individuals corroborated some of the reporting on personnel and some legitimate activities CURVE BALL claimed were cover activities, but none provided evidence to substantiate the claim of a mobile BW program.\textsuperscript{326} Inspections of the facilities CURVE BALL had described also did not support his story. A CIA assessment dated May 26, 2004 states that “investigations since the war in Iraq and debriefings of the key source indicate he lied about his access to a mobile BW production project.”\textsuperscript{327} The CIA and DIA

\textsuperscript{325} \textit{id.} at pp. 188-189.  
\textsuperscript{326} \textit{id.} at p. 74.  
\textsuperscript{327} CIA, \textit{Key Mobile BW Source Deemed Unreliable}, May 26, 2004
jointly issued a congressional notification in June 2004 noting that CURVE BALL was assessed to have fabricated his claimed access to a mobile BW production project and that his reporting had been recalled.\textsuperscript{328}

(U) During the ISG’s investigation of CURVE BALL, the group learned that CURVE BALL had a close relative who had worked for the INC since 1992, for at least some period in a senior position.\textsuperscript{329} This revelation, combined with the fact that CURVE BALL was determined to have fabricated substantial portions of his reporting, led to suspicion that CURVE BALL may have been coached on his story by the INC.\textsuperscript{330}

(U) According to a March 2004 CIA review, in the fall of 2003, CURVE BALL’s close relative, then working in INC offices in Iraq, willingly met with ISG officers. CURVE BALL’s close relative stated that he had contacted CURVE BALL in 2001 on behalf of the INC to ascertain whether CURVE BALL, in the course of his employment with Iraq’s Organization of Military Industry, had any information on secret or sensitive projects that would help boost the case against Iraq at the UN. CURVE BALL told his close relative he did not. The close relative also said that he had minimal contact with CURVE BALL since CURVE BALL defected to a European country, which the CIA says is consistent with records they have been able to locate.\textsuperscript{331}

(U) When the CIA was finally given access to CURVE BALL in March 2004, CURVE BALL refused to discuss anything about his family. In a response to questions from Committee staff, the CIA said its officers did not ask about

\textsuperscript{328} CIA and DIA Congressional Affairs Notification, June 7, 2004.
\textsuperscript{329} CIA operational cable, April 12, 2004.
\textsuperscript{330} CIA operational cables, April 10, 2004 and March 8, 2004.
\textsuperscript{331} CIA internal memorandum, March 8, 2004, and CIA operational cable, April 12, 2004.
CURVE BALL’s close relative’s INC connections, fearing that CURVE BALL would terminate discussions with the CIA. CIA never asked CURVE BALL about any affiliation with the INC, judging that he would have terminated the discussion if they had.  

(U) The CIA believes that CURVE BALL’s close relative’s connection to the INC is coincidental, and is not an explanation for his fabrications. The CIA told Committee staff in a written response to questions that CURVE BALL’s defection did not fit the pattern of the typical INC-influenced defection in that the INC did not broker his introduction to the Intelligence Community and did not put him in front of the media. In 2003, a CIA analyst told the Committee that CURVE BALL was located when he sought asylum in a European country, when officials reviewed his asylum paperwork, noticed that he was an Iraqi chemical engineer, and approached him to be interviewed. The analyst said CURVE BALL did not come forward with information himself. In explaining why she did not think CURVE BALL was affiliated with the INC she said that the INC would “shop their good sources around town, but they weren’t known for sneaking people out of countries into some asylum system. This isn’t the way they were known to operate. It would have been more blatant if the INC—at least in our estimation—had been putting him forward.

(U) A study of possible Iraqi opposition deception efforts against the U.S. noted that CIA has never formally collected against the INC and has no information on their processes and procedures for disseminating information, a key element to assess potential deception programs and tactics. However, CIA

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332 CIA response to questions from Committee staff, January 10, 2006.
333 CIA response to questions from Committee staff, January 10, 2006.
334 Interview with CIA analysts, December 4, 2003.
335 CIA internal memorandum, March 8, 2004.
officials told Committee staff that they were able to observe how the INC operated openly and that the judgments about CURVE BALL were made from those observations.\textsuperscript{336} The CIA acknowledged that there is no concrete evidence that CURVE BALL was not working at the behest of or influenced by the INC, but assessed that “CURVE BALL’s connection to the INC was coincidental.”\textsuperscript{337}

(U) Ahmed Chalabi and two other INC officials have told Committee staff that the INC had no involvement with CURVE BALL and, to this day, they do not know who CURVE BALL is. Chalabi said that the INC had done their own investigation to find out “who he was” and whether there was any truth to suggestions that he had a close relative in the INC. Chalabi said the investigation did not turn up anyone in the INC who had this close relative in the European country, where CURVE BALL resides. CIA officers told the Committee that it was hard to believe that no one Chalabi knew in the INC did not have this close relative in the European country. One officer added, “I find that a non-credible statement.” When asked if they had any examples of any INC officials who do have this close relative in the European country in question, a CIA officer said, “we didn’t follow the INC with that kind of detail so I can’t answer that.”

(U) Chalabi and two other INC officials denied ever attempting to bring any sources to the Intelligence Community, or anyone else, without openly identifying the INC’s involvement.\textsuperscript{338}

\textsuperscript{336} Interview with CIA officers, July 20, 2006.
\textsuperscript{337} CIA response to questions from Committee staff, January 10, 2006.
\textsuperscript{338} Staff interviews with INC officials.
B. Source Nineteen

On February 27, 2002, Source Nineteen an Iraqi defector walked in to a third country Embassy in the Middle East. Officers from both the CIA and the third country’s intelligence service debriefed him four times. Source Nineteen claimed to have worked as a civilian employee in the IIS from 1988 to 2001, initially as a driver. He claimed that he was aware of four trucks in Iraq that carried biological and nuclear material and that in 1995 al-Qa’ida sent some of its members to receive training at a Baghdad intelligence school. He also provided the names of individuals he said were Iraqi intelligence agents posted abroad. The July 2002 NIC Memorandum noted that he “provided somewhat sensational information on subjects to which he seemed unlikely to have access,” including Iraqi involvement in terrorist training, IIS assassination techniques, locations of biological and nuclear weapons material, subsonic bullets, and a secret weapon that fired poison darts. He was also unable to provide basic organizational information on the IIS that would show familiarity with the organization.  

(U) Operations traffic regarding Source Nineteen said that while he “has not apparently been associated with the Iraqi opposition, his purported access to the several areas of sensational information reminds us of another high-profile case that was run . . . by the INC. There may be no INC angle to this case, but subject’s claims regarding al-Qa’ida and Iraqi atrocities could easily wind up in the press.” Another operations cable noted that Source Nineteen did speak with a journalist from an unnamed Iraqi opposition newspaper while in the Middle East, but said he broke contact because the journalist refused to pay him for interviews.

(U) Following the debriefings, a separate foreign intelligence service detained and interviewed him. The foreign intelligence service told the CIA that while in the Middle East, prior to his arrival in their country, he met with four members of various Iraqi opposition groups who he thought could help him. He said that he also called Ahmed Chalabi, who told him to travel to their country and to walk in to the U.S. Embassy. Source Nineteen told the foreign government he was nervous about the large security presence at the U.S. Embassy and decided to walk in to the third country embassy instead. The CIA ceased contact with Source Nineteen after his interaction with the foreign intelligence service.

Source Nineteen’s information was included in one intelligence report disseminated to analysts. The report described the Iraqi Intelligence Service’s skill at exploiting potential refugees by recruiting them in countries when they applied for refugee status. The report provided an example of an individual Source Nineteen claimed was working for the IIS in the third country. The July 2002 NIC Memorandum, The Iraqi National Congress Defector Program, included Source Nineteen as one of five defectors referred by the INC, although there is no indication that his interaction with the CIA was facilitated by the INC other than his assertion to the foreign government service that he contacted Chalabi and that Chalabi told him to walk in to the U.S. Embassy. There is no other indication that Source Nineteen had any other contact with Chalabi or any member of the INC. Committee staff was unable to specifically ask Chalabi about Source Nineteen’s allegation because of

340 CIA intelligence report 2002,
classification restrictions, but asked Chalabi if he had suggested that anyone walk-in to a U.S. Embassy. Chalabi did not recall making that suggestion to any defectors.\footnote{Staff interview with Ahmed Chalabi, January 31, 2006.}
V. CONCLUSIONS

(U) Conclusion 1: False information from the Iraqi National Congress (INC)-affiliated sources was used to support key Intelligence Community assessments on Iraq and was widely distributed in intelligence products prior to the war. Information provided by INC-affiliated sources resulted in the production and distribution of a large body of intelligence reports and assessments on Iraq prior to the war. The DIA produced and disseminated over 250 intelligence information reports on the debriefings of INC-affiliated defector Source One alone. Information provided by these sources was used by the Intelligence Community to support key judgments about Iraq’s nuclear and biological weapons programs in the Intelligence Community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, the CIA’s 2002 and 2003 widely-distributed assessments about Iraq’s support for terrorism and alleged links to al-Qa’ida, and Secretary of State Powell’s February 2003 speech before the United Nations Security Council.

(U) Conclusion 2: The Iraqi National Congress (INC) attempted to influence United States policy on Iraq by providing false information through defectors directed at convincing the United States that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and had links to terrorists. According to INC officials interviewed by the Committee, the INC had an aggressive “publicity campaign” prior to the war to bring defectors to the attention of “anyone who would listen,” which included the media, the Congress, members of the Intelligence Community, and other U.S. government agencies. The Committee found that the INC brought six defectors to the attention of the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Community met with and debriefed five of the six individuals.

(U) A July 2004 CIA [REDACTED] review concluded the intelligence reporting of INC-affiliated defector Source One on weapons of mass destruction
facilities in Iraq "remains questionable and, on a nuclear facility, demonstrably incorrect." In February 2004, Source One appeared deceptive on questions related to his continued contact with the INC, whether the INC provided him with information to give to the U.S. government, whether the INC provided him information on the suspect facility to give to the U.S. government, and whether the suspect facility even existed.

(U) Three separate Intelligence Community assessments from April to July 2002 suggested INC-affiliated defector Source Two fabricated information he provided the Intelligence Community, which included a claim that in 1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile biological weapons laboratories to evade United Nations inspections. In two separate April 2002 assessments on Source Two's reporting, the CIA reported the concerns of the DIA debriefer that Source Two was being coached by the INC and stating that the DIA had terminated contact with Source Two because of suspicions he was a fabricator. In May 2002, the DIA issued a fabrication notice on Source Two stating that "his information is assessed as unreliable, and, in some instances, pure fabrication. We have determined that he had also been coached by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) prior to the meeting with western intelligence services." A July 2002 National Intelligence Council Memorandum also outlined the Intelligence Community's concerns about information from Source Two, and noted that a foreign intelligence service believed his information was unreliable.

(U) INC-affiliated defector Source Three told Intelligence Community officials in October 2001 that he observed non-Iraqi Arabs training in abandoned aircraft shell at the Salman Pak training facility in Iraq in 1994-1995. Haydr al Bander, the INC's Washington representative and the person who referred Source Three to the Intelligence Community, told DIA officers that the non-Iraq Arabs that Source Three observed were terrorists and that they were receiving training on aircraft
hijackings. In December 2001, a CIA intelligence report stated that Source Three "is under the influence/control of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and is not considered to be very credible." In February 2002, the CIA’s Iraq Operations Group concluded that: “Although we can verify a few elements of his story, we have determined that much of his information is inaccurate and appears aimed at influencing U.S. (and probably western) policy on Iraq.”

During his debriefings in October 2001, Source Three referred Source Four, an Iraqi [redacted] deputy to the [redacted] commander of an Iraqi training camp, to the Intelligence Community as someone who could confirm Source Three’s story about the training of non-Iraqi Arabs at the facility in 1994-1995. Later that month, Source Four was debriefed by Intelligence Community officials and said Iraqi intelligence trained Iraqi soldiers and 70-75 non-Iraqi Arabs in hijacking techniques at the [redacted] training facility. In October 2001, the CIA reported that Source Four complained that his earlier accounts to the press about terrorist training had been distorted and mistranslated by the INC translator involved in the interviews. The CIA’s Iraqi Operations Group lost operational interest in Source Four, citing, in a February 2003 cable, Source Four’s past exposure in the media and his employment with the INC.

During debriefings with the DIA during September and October 2002, INC-affiliated defector Source Five claimed that [redacted] was being smuggled out of Iraq by the INC. Source Five claimed to have seen Saddam Hussein meet with Osama bin Ladin in the early 1990’s and that Saddam Hussein’s son, Uday, told Source Five that bin Ladin was in Iraq to discuss training some of his people in Iraq. The DIA’s preliminary examination of Source Five’s travel documents appeared to support the basic facts of how the source left Iraq, but neither confirmed nor denied the source’s claim of long-term close [redacted] access to Saddam Hussein and his inner circle. Initial reports from the DIA warned that the source’s reliability had not yet been determined and that
the information Source Five was providing “may be intended to disinform.” At the DIA’s request, the CIA conducted a evaluation of Source Five in October 2002 which indicated the bin Ladin story appeared more or less cogent, but was perhaps contaminated with pockets of coached fabrications. Following the test, the DIA terminated its relationship with Source Five and included in disseminated reporting that Source Five was connected to the Iraqi opposition and that the source’s comments may have been intended to influence as well as inform U.S. government decision makers.

Conclusion 3: The Intelligence Community’s use in intelligence assessments of information provided by Iraqi National Congress (INC)- affiliated defector Source Two was a serious error. The use of the Source Two information came after three Intelligence Community assessments raised questions about his reliability as a source and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) issued a fabrication notice. Despite two April 2002 CIA assessments, the May 2002 DIA fabrication notice, and the July 2002 National Intelligence Council assessment warning that Source Two may have been coached by the INC and fabricated information to his debriefers, the Source Two reporting was cited specifically in three subsequent CIA intelligence assessments issued from July 2002 to November 2002 and the Intelligence Community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, as corroborating other source reporting about Iraq’s mobile biological weapons program. Source Two also was one of the four human intelligence sources specifically referred to in the part of Secretary of State Powell’s February 2003 speech before the United Nations Security Council that discussed mobile biological weapons production units. This use of the Source Two information constituted a serious error.

(U) The continued use of Source Two’s information was also a systemic failure. Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Intelligence Community did not have a
standard Intelligence Community-wide system in place to notify intelligence personnel of incomplete, misleading, or false information contained in intelligence reporting. The DIA’s decision to issue a fabrication notice, rather than recall the reporting, left the original Source Two reporting available for analysts to search and locate in the message handling system. Some analysts, who missed the fabrication notice but were aware of the underlying concerns about Source Two, believed that it was acceptable to continue to use the information as long as the concerns were noted in their assessments and as long as the reporting had not been recalled. The Committee believes that once a source has been identified to have fabricated information, continued use of the source’s reporting is risky. Furthermore, in this case, even if analysts believed that they could use the information, the concerns about the reporting were not included in their assessments, which included the NIE and the information provided to Secretary Powell.

(U) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has initiated an effort to provide guidance on standardization of terms and procedures and improved use of information technology to ensure that information from sources judged to be fabricators is not used in intelligence assessments in the future. The Committee encourages the ODNI to ensure that this reform is completed and fully instituted across the Community.
(U) Conclusion 5: The July 2002 decision by the National Security Council Deputies Committee directing the renewed funding of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) Intelligence Collection Program under Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) management was ill-advised given the counterintelligence concerns of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and warnings of financial mismanagement from the Department of State. At the time it assumed responsibility for funding and managing the INC’s collection effort in October 2002, the DIA cautioned that the INC was penetrated by hostile intelligence services and would use the relationship to promote its own agenda. Beginning in March 2000, the Department of State entered into an agreement with the INC, amended over time, to fund the Intelligence Collection Program (ICP), a program established to collect evidence on Saddam Hussein’s regime and promote human rights and democracy in Iraq. A September 2001 State Department of Inspector General audit of the program found financial management and internal control weaknesses. State Department officials were concerned about the lack of financial accountability and the potential of fraud in the program. In addition, State Department began to doubt the value of the information the INC was providing and was unable to judge the program’s
effectiveness due to the INC's refusal to grant State Department officials access to ICP materials. Based on these concerns, the Department of State ceased funding the program in May 2002. On July 25, 2002, the National Security Council directed that funding of the program should be continued under the Department of Defense, and on October 25, 2002, the Defense Intelligence Agency assumed formal responsibility for funding and managing the INC's collection effort. Funding of the ICP was continued in October 2002 despite warnings from both the CIA, which terminated its relationship with the INC in December 1996, and the DIA that the INC was penetrated by hostile intelligence services, including the Iranians, and that the INC would use the relationship with the Intelligence Community to promote its own agenda.

(U) Conclusion 7: The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency were inconsistent in identifying their reporting from INC-affiliated defectors and INC members as opposition-affiliated reporting. DIA collectors, who disseminated reporting on most of the INC-affiliated defectors, told the Committee that they used the "opposition group disclaimer"
only on the sources who were members of the INC. However, in some cases, the DIA neglected to describe even INC members as members of an opposition group in their reporting. In some reports the DIA would describe a defector as a member of the Iraqi opposition, while other reports about the same defector would not. This suggests that the failure to identify the defectors in some reports as members of the opposition was not the result of concerns about identifying the source, but was probably the result of carelessness. It is even more surprising that CIA collectors, who were extremely skeptical of INC sources and even resisted dealing with them due to lingering concerns from the agency’s mid-1990s relationship with the INC, failed to identify a INC-linked defector’s opposition affiliation in its disseminated reporting.

(U) The Committee believes that a source’s opposition affiliation, whether a member of an opposition group or referred by a member of an opposition group, should be characterized in a report’s source description. In its July 2004 Iraq report the Committee explained the responsibility of intelligence analysts to clearly convey to the policymaker what they know, what they do not know, what they think, and to make sure the policymaker understands the difference. Intelligence analysts will never succeed in this task if they remain uninformed about significant source information, such as the source’s affiliation with an opposition group. Such information will help analysts understand the source’s motivation for providing information. In the INC-affiliated defector cases, the failure to identify the sources as affiliated with an opposition group was largely inconsequential because extensive media reporting about the INC-affiliated defectors alerted intelligence analysts to their INC-affiliation. Nonetheless, collectors cannot rely on the media to provide information about their sources to intelligence analysts and must, therefore, ensure that they provide all pertinent information to the analysts.
Conclusion 8: There is insufficient basis to determine whether or not CURVE BALL, the Intelligence Community's primary source of intelligence about Iraq's alleged biological weapons program, provided his information at the behest of the Iraqi National Congress (INC). Beginning in 2000, CURVE BALL provided information to a foreign liaison intelligence service alleging that Iraq had a mobile biological weapons program. CURVE BALL was the key source that led the Intelligence Community to judge in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's WMD capabilities that "Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents." The Iraq Survey Group's (ISG) investigation of CURVE BALL's information in the summer and fall of 2003 revealed that CURVE BALL provided false information to the Intelligence Community prior to the war. The ISG also discovered that CURVE BALL had a close relative who had worked for the INC since 1992, for at least some period as a high-ranking official, which led to initial suspicion in the Central Intelligence Agency that CURVE BALL may have provided false information at the INC's behest.

The CIA has since concluded that CURVE BALL's close relative's connection to the INC was coincidental. The CIA based its conclusion, in part, on the fact that CURVE BALL's close relative said he maintained minimal contact with CURVE BALL but that he did call CURVE BALL in 2001 on behalf of the INC to ascertain whether CURVE BALL had any information on secret or sensitive projects in Iraq. The CIA says this account is consistent with records they have been able to locate. According to the close relative, CURVE BALL said he had no information to provide. The CIA did not ask CURVE BALL himself about this conversation or whether he had been coached or directed by the INC, believing that CURVE BALL would terminate contact if the CIA questioned him about his family. While the Committee believes the CIA should have asked him, in the end, an admission or denial in this regard would not have been dispositive.
(U) The CIA also assessed that CURVE BALL’s defection did not fit the pattern of the typical INC-influenced defection in that the INC did not broker his introduction to the Intelligence Community and did not put him in front of the media. In addition, three INC officials have told the Committee that the INC had no involvement with CURVE BALL, does not know who CURVE BALL is, and has never attempted to bring sources to the intelligence community, or anyone else, without openly acknowledging the INC’s role. However, the CIA told the Committee it never formally collected on the INC itself, and, therefore, has no information on the INC’s processes and procedures for disseminating information, a key element to assess potential deception programs or tactics.

(U) Given the fact that the Intelligence Community does not understand why CURVEBALL provided false information and only has a superficial understanding of CURVEBALL’s contacts with his close relative and other INC officials, the Committee believes the question of whether he was provided his information at the behest of the INC remains open.
COMMITTEE ACTION

Amendments to draft report, The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress.

On August 2, 2006, by a vote of 9 ayes and 6 noes, the Committee agreed to an amendment by Vice Chairman Rockefeller, with a modification, related to the conclusions of the report. The amendment (1) struck proposed Conclusion 1, inserting a substitute conclusion; (2) inserted a new Conclusion 2, Conclusion 3, Conclusion 4, Conclusion 5, Conclusion 6; (3) struck proposed Conclusion 2; (4) renumbered proposed Conclusion 3 as Conclusion 7; (5) renumbered proposed Conclusion 4 as Conclusion 8 and, as renumbered, modified the proposed text; and (6) struck proposed Conclusion 5. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Roberts – no; Senator Hatch – no; Senator DeWine – no; Senator Bond – no; Senator Lott – no; Senator Snowe – aye; Senator Hagel – aye; Senator Chambliss – no; Vice Chairman Rockefeller – aye; Senator Levin – aye; Senator Feinstein – aye; Senator Wyden – aye; Senator Bayh – aye; Senator Mikulski – aye; Senator Feingold – aye.

On August 2, 2006, by unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to an amendment proposed by Senator Wyden, as modified by a second degree amendment proposed by Chairman Roberts and adopted by unanimous consent. The amendment, as modified, inserted text on page 61 of the report concerning the production by CIA analysts of a Memorandum or PDB for the Vice President using an INC-affiliated source’s information to support the mobile BW program judgment. As modified, the amendment clarified that the PDB did not include caveats related to the source’s reporting.

On August 2, 2006, by a vote of 8 ayes and 7 noes, the Committee agreed to an amendment by Senator Wyden. The amendment struck from page 87 of the
report a press statement by Brigadier General Brooks, of the United States Central Command, regarding information purportedly discovered in April 2003 at the Salman Pak facility. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Roberts – no; Senator Hatch – no; Senator DeWine – no; Senator Bond – no; Senator Lott – no; Senator Snowe – no; Senator Hagel – aye; Senator Chambliss – no; Vice Chairman Rockefeller – aye; Senator Levin – aye; Senator Feinstein – aye; Senator Wyden – aye; Senator Bayh – aye; Senator Mikulski – aye; Senator Feingold – aye.

Adoption of findings and conclusions of the report: The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress.

On August 2, 2006, on motion by Vice Chairman Rockefeller, by a vote of 11 ayes and 4 noes, the Committee agreed to adopt the findings and conclusions of the report, The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Roberts – aye; Senator Hatch – no; Senator DeWine – aye; Senator Bond – no; Senator Lott – no; Senator Snowe – aye; Senator Hagel – aye; Senator Chambliss – no; Vice Chairman Rockefeller – aye; Senator Levin – aye; Senator Feinstein – aye; Senator Wyden – aye; Senator Bayh – aye; Senator Mikulski – aye; Senator Feingold – aye.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN ROBERTS

In a separate set of additional views, in which I was joined by Senators Hatch, DeWine, Chambliss, and Warner, I laid out my strong objections to the amended conclusions for this report which were ultimately adopted by the Committee. As I made clear in those views, I believe the adopted conclusions are not supported by the facts and contain numerous errors and omissions.

Despite my reservations about the adopted conclusions, I believe that the report’s factual findings regarding the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and the information it provided to the U.S. Intelligence Community should be declassified to the greatest extent possible and reported out by the Committee to the full Senate and the American public. This transparent process allows the public to have access to the report’s findings of fact, conclusions, and additional views and permits individual Americans to form their own judgments. It is for this reason that I voted to approve the INC Report.

Despite my concerns over the conclusions in the INC Report, I credit the Committee’s investigative staff for their patience and reasonableness during the negotiations over this report. Staff began negotiating the factual findings of the INC report when the first draft was distributed in January 2006. Negotiations over the conclusions to the INC report began in May 2006. In the course of those negotiations, members – particularly my Democrat colleagues – made well over a hundred requests for changes to both the factual findings and conclusions of the INC report. Negotiating in good faith, the investigative staff was able to accommodate the overwhelming majority of these requests.

Some of the requests for changes, however, could not be accommodated. With respect to the negotiations over the conclusions, one of the challenges the Committee faced was a flawed notion that we should be able to reach a
compromise on each conclusion. Certainly, in most negotiations there are areas for compromise. Sometimes, however, views can be so diametrically opposed that efforts at compromise are futile. In such cases, members must agree to disagree and move on. With respect to the INC conclusions, we were faced with just this scenario, and votes ensued to resolve the disagreements. That is the democratic process.

Of concern, however, is the notion that there is room for compromise when it comes to the facts. Diametrically opposed conclusions are one thing, but there is no room for compromise on the facts – they are accurate or they are not. Paraphrasing the late Daniel Patrick Moynihan, everyone is entitled to their own opinion, but not their own set of facts. I agree wholeheartedly. As Chairman, I encourage good faith negotiation and compromise when it is appropriate. However, I will continue to draw the line when it comes to amending conclusions in a way that mischaracterizes or ignores the underlying facts. I may lose some votes, but I will continue to hold to my premise that facts are stubborn things, and when it comes to the facts, there can and should be no compromise.

PAT ROBERTS.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN ROBERTS JOINED BY SENATORS HATCH, DEWINE, LOTT, CHAMBLISS, AND WARNER

If you’re trying to say that the INC is the one that pushed us to go to war because of the WMD reporting, that’s wrong.
— CIA Officer, Directorate of Operations

Over thirty years ago, the Select Committee on Intelligence was established to “oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government.” To meet our obligations to the Senate and the American people, the members of this Committee are provided with access to some of the most sensitive intelligence information possessed, and reporting produced, by the United States Government. We have a responsibility to ground our oversight in fact. Recommendations or conclusions drawn from our oversight should be based on these facts and sound intelligence policy – free from partisan political bias.

We met our obligations and responsibilities when the Committee produced the first phase of its review of prewar intelligence on Iraq. The Committee employed an exacting and thorough methodology in the first phase of our review. The hard work of members and staff culminated in the adoption of a unanimous report. That report identified significant, systemic failures in prewar intelligence on Iraq, and its conclusions contributed to needed reforms of our Intelligence Community. When we expanded the scope of our review, Committee staff were instructed to use that same approach for all five elements of “Phase II.”

Regrettably, with the adoption of the amended conclusions now contained in this report, the Committee has failed to meet its obligations and responsibilities as they relate to our review of the use by the Intelligence Community of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC). These failures are
borne out by the sharp divide between the findings and conclusions adopted by several members of the Committee, and the findings and conclusions – drawn from the fine work of Committee staff – that I, along with several of my colleagues, supported as the Committee considered this report. This failure led several members to vote against the adoption of the findings and conclusions of the report.

Despite many misgivings, the adoption of the findings and conclusions of this report allows the facts and circumstances to be presented to the entire Senate and, in unclassified form, to the public. Together with these additional views, this report represents a comprehensive understanding of the relationship of the Intelligence Community to the INC.

The Committee’s review focused on how information provided by the INC was used by the Intelligence Community. Was the information included in Intelligence Community assessments? Did the information play a role in the Intelligence Community’s judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities or its links to terrorism?

Understanding the role of INC information in Intelligence Community assessments was critical to the Committee’s efforts. As the Committee began its review, there seemed to be a growing number of individuals charging that the INC engaged in a disinformation campaign to supply erroneous information to the Intelligence Community and that such information led to the Intelligence Community’s failures in its prewar assessments on Iraq, particularly in its WMD assessments.

The facts detailed in the findings portion of this report (and outlined more briefly below) do not support this theory. Information supplied by the INC played only a minor role in the Intelligence Community’s prewar judgments concerning
Iraq’s WMD programs or links to terrorism. As it relates to prewar assessments of Iraq’s WMD programs, INC information did not significantly affect intelligence judgments. Only one key judgment in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), *Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction* contained corroborating information from an INC-affiliated source and, according to the CIA, that judgment would not have changed had the information from that source not been considered. Indeed, of the 45 human intelligence (HUMINT) sources cited in the WMD NIE, only two were affiliated with the INC – and that does not account for the vast amount of information in the WMD NIE derived from signals intelligence, imagery, and HUMINT sources not specifically cited. The INC did not supply information used to support the Intelligence Community’s key judgments about Iraq’s links to terrorism.

These facts should be sufficient to lay to rest the myth that INC information led to the intelligence failure on Iraq. Indeed, the popular misconception is likely based on past, and continued, media reporting on these INC sources. Given the level of media attention the INC sources have received, it would be quite easy for an uninformed observer to conclude that these sources formed the bulk of intelligence supporting prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq. The conclusion is seemingly buttressed by several media organizations that reported the accounts that INC sources had provided to the Intelligence Community, often with embellishments that never made their way into intelligence products. Although the media chose to highlight the information provided by these INC sources, the facts demonstrate that the Intelligence Community did not.

Unfortunately, if the public focuses only on the conclusions adopted by several members of this Committee, they will not get the full story. *The adopted conclusions are not supported by fact.* Taken as a whole, they misrepresent the INC’s relationship to the Intelligence Community, leaving the impression that the INC (with the knowledge and acquiescence of intelligence officials and policy
makers) intentionally provided the Intelligence Community with false information in an effort to push the United States to war with Iraq. These conclusions – and the misconceptions they support – are a myth. The reality – while politically unappealing for some – is quite different.

To correct these errors, these additional views set forth the most troubling and significant examples of how the adopted conclusions misrepresent the relationship of the INC to the Intelligence Community and how the Intelligence Community used the information provided by the INC in prewar assessments.

The Intelligence Community's Use of INC Information

The amended conclusions suggest that the INC intentionally provided false information to the Intelligence Community and that the Intelligence Community used that information to support key judgments about Iraq's WMD programs and links to terrorism. These conclusions not only distort the extent to which the Intelligence Community used INC information, they mischaracterize the significance of the information that was used. As with most HUMINT reporting, some of the information provided by the INC was inaccurate, some was accurate, and some remains ambiguous, even today. The Committee, however, has no evidence to suggest that the INC intentionally provided false information.

The following section addresses the myths – either expressed or implied – in the amended conclusions.

Myth: The Intelligence Community made extensive use of INC information and that information played a key role in assessments about Iraq’s WMD programs and links to terrorism.
Reality: INC information was not widely used by the Intelligence Community and played little role in the Intelligence Community’s judgments about Iraq’s WMD programs and links to terrorism.

The Intelligence Community agencies told the Committee that INC-affiliated reporting had a minimal impact on prewar judgments about Iraq. Despite evidence to the contrary, amended Conclusion 1 suggests that INC information played a significant role in the Intelligence Community’s judgments about Iraq, particularly in judgments about Iraq’s WMD capabilities and links to terrorism.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) told the Committee that INC sources and collected material were not instrumental in shaping DIA assessments of the former Iraqi regime’s terrorist connections or the terrorist threat the regime presented. The DIA said it “considered this information – as well as other information of uncertain quality – as background information which had the potential of earning more credibility as additional data was collected, though it played no direct role in forming our assessments.”

The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) told the Committee that it viewed all reporting on Iraq from HUMINT sources with skepticism. The INR said “this reporting was seldom, if ever, used as the basis for judgments unless corroborated by other sources that INR deemed credible.” With regard to the two INC-affiliated defectors whose information was included in the WMD NIE, the INR said their reports “did not influence any INR assessments relating to prohibited weapons programs.” Regarding terrorism, INR said it “did not make much use of INC reporting on terrorism issues related to Iraq in the years before Operation Iraqi Freedom.” (Emphasis in original).
The CIA told the Committee that its analysts tended not to rely on non-specific prewar opposition reporting alleging WMD or terrorism-related activities "because they were not first-hand accounts from sources with verifiable access." A CIA review of 23 INC-affiliated defector reports which contained WMD, terrorism, or other potentially significant information, said "few of the 23 reports were cited in CIA finished intelligence production or affected prewar assessments. As [the Committee] is already aware, reporting from [two sources] was used in assessments of Salman Pak, but our analytic judgments on those substantive issues did not rely solely on reports from those sources. Aside from those two sources, most of the other reports were of marginal value to the CIA finished intelligence production and had almost no impact on CIA analytic assessments." 342

The CIA comments corroborate the finding of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission). In its report, the WMD Commission wrote, "Over all, CIA’s post-war investigations revealed that INC-related sources had a minimal impact on pre-war assessments." The WMD Commission noted that two INC-affiliated defectors whose information was included in the WMD NIE "had a negligible impact on the overall assessments."

The Committee’s review supports the comments of the WMD Commission and the responses from the Intelligence Community. For example, as the findings portion of this report shows, the Committee found that only one Intelligence Community assessment used INC-affiliated reporting at all - the WMD NIE. In that NIE, the Intelligence Community used information from only one INC-affiliated source in support of only one key judgment – that Iraq had a mobile

342 The CIA initiated this review at the request of Committee staff. Committee staff did not request that the CIA review reporting from the two defectors used in the WMD NIE because at this request, Committee staff was already aware that the reporting from these two sources had been used.
biological weapons capability. According to a CIA review of this issue, "even without [that source's] reporting, the bottom-line judgment at the time on Iraq's overall mobile BW program would have remained the same." The Intelligence Community used information from only one other INC-affiliated defector in the NIE in a separate text box which described a possible suspect nuclear facility. The information about the possible suspect facility was not included anywhere in the text or key judgments of the NIE and played no role in the NIE judgment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.

Intelligence Community agencies attached even less significance to INC-affiliated sources in their terrorism assessments. The CIA included intelligence reporting from only two INC-affiliated sources in its key terrorism assessment, Iraqi Support for Terrorism. The information was used in only one paragraph of the 32-page document. Furthermore, the paragraph described one defector's information as "exaggerated," and the other's as not first-hand.

In addition to the key products described above, Intelligence Community agencies used INC-affiliated reporting in less than 20 other products about Iraq's WMD programs and links to terrorism. By comparison, the Committee's request for CIA's assessments on Iraq's WMD programs and Iraq's links to terrorism from 1997 to March 2003 yielded over 40,000 finished intelligence products. In other words, when compared to more than 40,000 finished CIA intelligence products, INC information was included in about 20 Intelligence Community reports -- a minuscule 0.05% of CIA's intelligence products on these issues and an even smaller amount of community products.

Two conclusions drafted by the Committee's investigative staff more accurately reflect the extent to which the Intelligence Community used INC information in key assessments. The conclusions accurately detail the lack of impact that this information had on prewar intelligence assessments.
Accordingly, we would have concluded the following with respect to the use of INC information concerning Iraq's WMD programs:

**Conclusion: Information from the INC and INC-affiliated defectors was not widely used in Intelligence Community products and played little role in the Intelligence Community's judgments about Iraq's WMD programs.**

The Intelligence Community used information from two INC-affiliated defectors in the NIE, but the information was not used as the primary basis for any of the key judgments about Iraq's WMD capabilities. In one case, analysts assessed reporting from an INC-affiliated defector as corroboration of other primary source reporting about Iraq's mobile biological weapons production capabilities. In the other case, a defector's information formed the basis for Intelligence Community concerns that an Iraqi facility may have had a nuclear association. Of the thousands of reports sent to the Committee as supporting documentation for the October 2002 NIE, only five were from these two sources.

With respect to the use of INC-related information concerning Iraq's links to terrorism, we would have concluded:

**Conclusion: The Intelligence Community made little use of INC-affiliated defector information in its assessments about Iraq's links to terrorism. Some of these assessments mischaracterized the content and the credibility of the reporting.** The CIA and the DIA used intelligence reporting from two INC-affiliated defectors in intelligence assessments discussing alleged special operations training of non-Iraqi Arabs at Iraq's Salman Pak Unconventional Military Training Facility. Most of the assessments describe the
defectors as not having direct access to the information and in some cases described the information they provided as “questionable” or “exaggerated.” Ironically, despite describing that reporting as exaggerated, three of the CIA assessments which used INC-affiliated information actually mischaracterized both the content and some of the concerns about the reporting, making it appear more sensational and questionable than it was. The CIA assessments said the defectors alleged that “al-Qa’ida and other non-Iraqis engaged in special operations training at Salman Pak,” but the defectors had reported the training of only non-Iraqi Arabs, not al-Qa’ida members. In addition, the assessments said that two of the defectors did not have direct access to the reporting they provided. In one case, the defector did have direct access. In the other case, the CIA was not in a position to judge the access of the defector because the CIA had never spoken to the defector and did not know his identity. The analysts used the information from a magazine article which described an unnamed defector.

Characterization of INC-related Sources and Information

As with most HUMINT reporting, information provided by INC sources to the Intelligence Community was a mixed bag – some was accurate, some inaccurate, and some, even in hindsight, remains ambiguous. What is clear, however, is that the Intelligence Community used information from only one INC-affiliated defector to support only one key assessment in prewar intelligence products. No other INC information, inaccurate or accurate, was used to support any other key assessments.
Myth: False information was used to support key assessments.

Reality: The Intelligence Community used only one claim from an INC-affiliated defector in support of one NIE key judgment. While postwar findings indicate that information from this one defector did turn out to be wrong, the Intelligence Community likely would not have altered its judgment even without his information.

As discussed previously, the only INC-affiliated defector who has been determined to be a "fabricator" was the source who reported on Iraqi efforts to establish mobile biological laboratories. The Intelligence Community used his reporting to corroborate information from another source, code-named CURVE BALL, for the Intelligence Community's key judgment that Iraq had mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents. It should also be noted that the source, contrary to the claim in amended Conclusion 2, reported on biological laboratories, not biological weapons laboratories. The postwar findings of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which included no evidence of any mobile biological programs for weapons or research, do not support the defector's prewar claim.

While information from this one defector was wrong, the CIA said the judgment that Iraq had a mobile biological weapons program would not have changed even without this source's information.

Myth: One INC-affiliated defector provided false information about a suspect nuclear facility.

Reality: Although there are several questions raised by postwar findings about one INC-affiliated defector, the source has not been labeled a fabricator and his reporting has not been recalled.
Importantly, in his reporting about the “suspect facility,” the source never claimed it was a suspect nuclear facility.

The source who provided information about an Iraqi facility, described by the Intelligence Community in the NIE as a possible suspect nuclear facility, has never been determined to be a fabricator and his reporting has not been recalled. It is also important to note that the defector never claimed that the facility was a nuclear facility. According to analysts involved in his debriefings, the source identified what he thought was a suspect facility, but he never claimed any knowledge of work at the facility related to a nuclear weapons program. Intelligence Community analysts judged that the facility was a possible suspect nuclear site, not the source.

After the war, the CIA took the defector to the facility the Intelligence Community believed he had identified as the suspect facility based on his description. While at the facility, the defector could not identify where he was. According to one CIA analyst, many of the details about the facility were exactly as the defector had described. The analysts could not explain why the defector did not recognize his surroundings. Some analysts have speculated that the defector was provided with the information about the facility by someone else. On the other hand, it is also possible that the Intelligence Community identified the wrong facility.

This defector provided information for over 250 raw intelligence reports prior to the war. Only four were related to the possible suspect facility. Although postwar information indicates that the defector had likely never been to the facility that the Intelligence Community identified based on his description, the ISG visited several other sites identified by the defector and confirmed his information pertaining to those facilities. The CIA also took the defector to another facility he had identified prior to the war, and the defector was able to quickly identify the
specific room where he said he had worked. The CIA was able to corroborate this information.

Regarding the overall authenticity of his reporting, a CIA postwar review said, "[T]here is little doubt that the subject was in fact [a contractor who worked at various Iraqi facilities]; and his reporting on Iraq’s military infrastructure and conventional facilities, areas that are commensurate with his access, has generally been corroborated."

We simply do not know, and probably will never know, the reason the source could not identify the facility to which the CIA took him. It is possible that he was provided information about the facility by someone else. In that case, the information he provided about the facility might still have been accurate – even if his direct relationship to the facility was false. It is also possible that the Intelligence Community identified the wrong facility. The Intelligence Community’s identification was based on the source’s verbal description and written diagrams. When the facility was first identified by the Intelligence Community in 2002, there were discrepancies between his reporting and the identified facility. For example, the defector reported that construction of the facility had begun in 1999, but construction on the site identified by the Intelligence Community began in the summer of 1998. In addition, the facility identified by the Intelligence Community was located on the eastern side of a specific river, but the defector told his debriefers he did not recall seeing the river adjacent to the construction site. We do not know whether these discrepancies are because the source had never been to the facility or because the Intelligence Community identified a different facility. When all of these facts are considered, it is clear that the Committee’s adopted conclusion fails to accurately describe the source and the information he provided.
Myth: Claims to the Intelligence Community from two defectors that non-Iraqi Arabs trained at Salman Pak were false.

Reality: The Iraq Survey Group found that an Iraqi intelligence directorate trained “Palestinians, Syrians, Yemeni, Lebanese, Egyptian, and Sudanese operatives in counterterrorism, explosives, marksmanship, and foreign operations at its facilities at Salman Pak.”

Information from the two sources highlighted in amended Conclusion 2, who reported on the training of non-Iraqi Arabs at the Salman Pak training facility in the mid-1990s, has not been proven false. The Committee has received no evidence that either confirms or denies whether such training of non-Iraqis took place at Salman Pak.

The Committee has been able to confirm the presence of an aircraft at the facility and that the Iraqis used the facility for special operations training, as described by the defectors. In addition, the ISG found that an Iraqi intelligence directorate, M14, which was responsible for training and special operations missions, used the Salman Pak facility to train Iraqi, Palestinian, Syrian, Yemeni, Lebanese, Egyptian, and Sudanese operatives in counterterrorism, explosives, marksmanship, and foreign operations. Thus, it is clear that amended Conclusion 2 overstates what is known about training at Salman Pak and mischaracterizes what can be concluded about the information provided by the INC-affiliated sources who reported on the facility.

Myth: These INC-affiliated defectors exaggerated claims to the Intelligence Community.
Reality: Intelligence Community officers acknowledge that press accounts were exaggerated versions of what these defectors told the Intelligence Community, but they do not know whether the defectors exaggerated their accounts themselves, whether translators exaggerated the accounts, or whether reporters did not accurately report what the defectors said.

Amended Conclusion 2 cites a CIA operations cable which said information from one of the defectors who reported about Salman Pak “is inaccurate and appears aimed at influencing U.S. (and probably Western) policy.” According to CIA officials, however, this comment related to the source’s appearances in the press and not to the information he provided during his debriefings with the Intelligence Community. In addition, these officers acknowledged that they do not know whether the defector exaggerated his account to the press, whether a translator exaggerated the story, or whether the reporters did not accurately report what the defector said. The CIA officers only know that the press story was an exaggerated version of what the defector told his Intelligence Community debriefers. A CIA assessment following the defector’s press appearances stated that the “the information [the defector] provided to debriefers was less sensational, more detailed, and more credible than depicted in [the media].”

Amended Conclusion 2 also argues that a second source who reported on Salman Pak training claimed that his press accounts had been distorted by an INC translator who participated in the press interview. The alleged “distortions” related to press claims that the defector had been a terrorist trainer at Salman Pak for eight years. In reality, the defector told the Intelligence Community that he commanded a Fedayeen Saddam unit which trained at Salman Pak for almost a year, but was not a terrorist trainer himself. The amended conclusion omits that the CIA case officer who debriefed the source told the Committee that the source did not say that he knew his remarks had been distorted. In fact, the source only
believed his remarks had been distorted because, after the source’s short responses to questions, the INC translator would speak in English for long periods.

Amended Conclusion 2 also fails to reflect that Committee staff reviewed a tape recording of the press interview with the source in which INC officials participated and an INC member translated. A U.S. government contract translator reviewed the tape recording and told Committee staff that the source was not mistranslated. In a few cases, the translator added “definitely” to the source’s responses and, in one instance, added “all over the world” to the source’s comment that the terrorist training was intended to target American interests and the American military. Neither the source, nor the translator, ever claimed that the source provided terrorist training himself. Instead, the defector only indicated that he was at the camp where such training was provided and that he was there for only a year. In several instances the translator responded to the reporter’s questions without actually asking the source, most often because the defector had already responded to the question previously. Much of the interview involved the INC officials providing information about another INC-affiliated individual.

Myth: Intelligence Community agencies debriefed only five INC-affiliated defectors prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Reality: The Defense Intelligence Agency debriefed 14 additional INC-affiliated sources. Some of the information from these defectors was wrong, but much proved to be correct and some was valuable during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In addition to the five defectors referenced in amended Conclusion 2, the DIA debriefed 14 other defectors prior to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The sources reported on a variety of topics, including regime biographic and personality information, Saddam’s palaces, tribal loyalties, Iraqi concealment
efforts, prohibited procurement, the Fedayeen Saddam, military order of battle, Iraqi intelligence, the movement of prohibited weapons, and the locations of suspect WMD facilities. None of these defectors is mentioned in the amended conclusion.

According to the DIA, its experience with INC-affiliated sources was typical of its experience with all HUMINT. Some INC-affiliated sources provided verified and useful information that directly supported contingency planning and operations for Operation Iraqi Freedom. In other instances, the information was vague, incorrect, or unverifiable. INC-affiliated reporting was “highly useful,” according to the DIA, in identifying important medical facilities. INC-affiliated reporting confirmed facility locations, identified new facilities, and provided a means for deconflicting previously erroneous geographic coordinates provided by other sources. Most of the information was used for “no-strike” targeting to avoid civilian casualties.

Reporting from several INC-affiliated sources on Iraq’s internal security apparatus was corroborated by either open or other classified sources of information and contributed to the Intelligence Community’s baseline understanding of this issue. According to the DIA, information on internal security was largely accurate.

In addition, DIA postwar memoranda from June through September 2003 noted that INC sources provided real-time intelligence that identified sensitive site locations used by CENTCOM for coalition strikes. The INC also provided sources with information on forged travel documents of known terrorists and on UN sanctions violations. The INC also identified, and supplied a picture of a senior member of al-Qa’ida who was previously unknown to the Intelligence Community.
While the Intelligence Community’s handling of the INC Information Collection Program after the start of OIF was not within the scope of this report, it is important to note that the program’s source handlers contacted, and brought in for debriefing, fourteen nuclear specialists sought by the ISG. The INC Information Collection Program led to numerous force protection leads, including credible threats against coalition forces and the arrest of two high value targets from the “top-55 blacklist.” The INC provided access to a large volume of material including Ba’ath Party military records, Baghdad police records, and thirty-one footlockers of Iraqi Intelligence Service records. The INC provided information used by CENTCOM for target lists and battle damage assessments.

**Myth:** The INC, through defectors, provided false information aimed at influencing U.S. policy.

**Reality:** The Committee has no evidence that the INC intentionally provided false information.

The INC had a clearly articulated agenda, publicly outlined in 1992: (1) the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime; (2) the establishment of democracy in Iraq; and (3) the trial of Saddam Hussein and his regime. Having evidence that the INC had an agenda is one thing. Proving that the INC intentionally provided false information to achieve that agenda – as suggested in amended Conclusion 2 – is something quite different.

Much like reporting from 45 other HUMINT sources cited in the October 2002 NIE, information from some INC-affiliated defectors proved to be wrong. The Committee has no indication, however, that the INC-affiliated sources intentionally provided false information. In fact, several officers from the CIA – some of whom were clearly not supporters of Ahmed Chalabi or his agenda – told Committee staff that they believed that INC individuals who were engaged in the
broad effort against the Saddam regime, "really did believe what they were saying about WMD."

Amended Conclusion 2 highlights a memorandum that claimed "the INC did attempt to convince US policymakers that Iraq posed a WMD threat," but the conclusion tells only half the story. The author of the memorandum told Committee staff, "[A]s an attempt to influence government policy, my judgment is that most of the people involved in that did believe in what they were saying on WMD." He continued,

[W]e found no evidence that they found some person and said you're going to make up this story and you're going to go to the public and you're going to tell them about this, even though you had no connection to it. There's no evidence of that. It was, hey, we heard of a guy who says he knows where something is; let's make sure we get him out into the public right away.

Another CIA officer said,

[I]f the answer is we're trying to find out whether the INC provided reporting that was fallacious that we then put out to influence the U.S. Government, there was very little INC reporting or INC-affiliated reporting on the WMD issue. It was mostly political and regime change.

That officer further noted, "[I]f you're trying to say that the INC is the one that pushed us to go to war because of the WMD reporting, that's wrong."

Amended Conclusion 2's assertion - that the INC provided false information through defectors directed at convincing the United States that Iraq
possessed WMD and had links to terrorists – does not make sense given the actions of the INC-affiliated defectors. If INC-affiliated defectors were directed to convince the United States that Iraq possessed WMD, certainly they would have actually reported to have seen WMD materials or efforts. If INC-affiliated defectors were directed at convincing the United States that Iraq had links to terrorists, surely they would have provided more concrete links of al-Qa’ida or terrorist connections. If INC-affiliated defectors were directed to convince the United States that Iraq possessed WMD and had links to terrorists, these issues should have made up the bulk of INC-affiliated defector reporting. In fact, the majority of the INC-affiliated defectors reported on non-WMD and non-terrorism topics and some reported on issues that were not helpful to the INC’s agenda.

The same CIA review team that said the INC did try to influence U.S. policy concluded:

We did not, however, find evidence that the INC had conducted a classic disinformation/deception campaign against the US government. We do not see classic warning markers of such a campaign, such as an unambiguous, clear, and concrete chain of evidence showing Iraq in absolute violation of UN WMD resolutions, and multiple, corroborative sources presenting consistent unambiguous information in support.

_When all these facts are viewed together and in context, it is clear that there is no support for the implication of amended Conclusion 2 – that the INC intentionally provided false information to the U.S. government._
"Warnings" from U.S. Government Agencies about the INC

Myth: The National Security Council Deputies Committee ignored "warnings" from several agencies about counterintelligence and financial problems with the INC.

Reality: The Committee has no information that the Deputies Committee received any warnings about continuing the government's relationship with the INC.

Amended Conclusion 5 suggests that the Deputies Committee had specific "warnings" prior to its decision to move the INC Information Collection Program
to the Department of Defense. The conclusion asserts that the State Department “warned” of INC financial mismanagement and that the DIA “cautioned” that the INC was penetrated by hostile intelligence services. The Committee has no information that the Deputies Committee was warned or cautioned at all.

A State Department Inspector General (OIG) audit in September 2001 did find financial management and internal control weaknesses related to the INC grant. The audit found, however, that these problems occurred due to a lack of understanding of, or lack of familiarity with, cumbersome laws and regulations related to federal assistance awards, such as the requirement to use U.S. flag carriers for overseas travel. In a mid-2002 follow-up audit, OIG found that the INC had taken “significant steps to implement OIG’s recommendations.” The Committee has no information that the State Department “warned” the Deputies Committee about this issue.

The State Department told the Committee that it believed the INC Information Collection Program contained a clandestine collection capability and, “therefore, should be managed by other agencies more experienced in managing covert intelligence collection.” Rather than ignoring an alleged State Department “warning,” the Deputies Committee appears to have done exactly what the State Department wanted – it transferred responsibility for the program to the Department of Defense, which had the DIA manage and operate the program.

DIA officials told the Committee that they did not have advanced notice of the Deputies Committee decision. The DIA, therefore, was not in a position to “caution” the Deputies Committee about its decision. Regardless, the Committee has no information that the DIA “cautioned” anyone at any time about INC counterintelligence issues. The DIA was aware that the INC may have been penetrated by foreign intelligence services and was aware that the INC had an agenda. The DIA did include this information in its own “assumptions” about the
group and, accordingly, increased its counterintelligence efforts against the group. The DIA included the assumptions in briefings to Congress – including briefings to the staff of this Committee – but did not characterize the assumptions as cautionary.

The CIA told the Committee that it had notified the Clinton Administration that it terminated its relationship with the INC because the INC had lost its ability to serve as a unifying force in northern Iraq and that it had limited effectiveness as an umbrella opposition organization. The CIA also said that between 1997 and July 2002 it had “several exchanges of views on the subject of the end of the CIA’s relationship with Chalabi and the INC,” but the CIA did not say specifically what views it expressed and to whom the CIA expressed those views. The CIA did not describe its views as “warnings.” The CIA said it expressed “concerns” to the Department of Defense in December 2002, but this was six months after the Deputies Committee decision.

In September 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz informed this Committee and other Congressional committees about the program, noting that it would “debrief Iraqi citizens presented by the Iraqi National Congress” as having information on key military and intelligence questions. The letter added:

The Iraqi National Congress will continue to provide access to Iraqi citizens who have fled Iraq and are believed to have pertinent knowledge. This is a continuation of a program under which the Department of Defense, specifically the Defense Intelligence Agency, has already debriefed certain individuals. The program is of special Congressional interest.

If the supporters of this amended conclusion, many of whom were members of this Committee at the time of this notification, believed the Deputies Committee
decision was "ill-advised," perhaps they should have written to Mr. Wolfowitz or the DIA Director, or taken some other action, to express their concerns.

We believed then, as we do today, that the Intelligence Community should not disregard potential sources of information simply because they have an agenda, or because of counterintelligence concerns. Intelligence is a tough business, especially when dealing with HUMINT sources. They all have agendas; they all raise counterintelligence concerns. Accordingly, we would have concluded the following:

**Conclusion:** The Committee believes that intelligence collectors should seek to exploit all potential sources of human intelligence (HUMINT) regardless of their agenda. Furthermore, the Committee rejects the idea that opposition sources are inherently more unreliable than other HUMINT sources. While opposition sources usually have a clearly articulated agenda – removal of the regime to which they are opposed – all HUMINT sources should be presumed to have an agenda. The Intelligence Community often tells the Committee that HUMINT sources take great risks when they cooperate with U.S. intelligence officers. They are motivated to do this for a reason, whether to make money, be relocated, or undermine a government. It is the responsibility of intelligence officers to determine and understand that motivation, exploit it if possible, and accurately report what the source says with appropriate warnings or caveats about the source’s agenda. It is the responsibility of analysts to assess the information, take account of the warnings, and convey the information and their judgments to policymakers accordingly.

The CIA’s resistance to dealing with the INC because of the group’s agenda may have caused the agency to miss potential collection
opportunities. For example, an INC-affiliated defector told the CIA in February 2003 that an Iraqi intelligence officer told him that “Iraq was providing true and accurate information to the UN inspectors and noted that Iraq was ready for war.” The CIA headquarters told the CIA Station involved that given several concerns, including the defector’s past exposure in the media and his employment with the INC, “we do not have any operational interest in further pursuing [the Iraqi] at this time.” The information was never disseminated in intelligence reporting to analysts or policymakers.

CURVE BALL and the INC

Myth: There is an insufficient basis to determine whether CURVE BALL, the key source of intelligence about Iraq’s alleged mobile biological weapons program, provided his information at the behest of the INC.

Reality: While we cannot rule out that CURVE BALL provided his information at the behest of the INC, we have enough information to judge that it is unlikely.

While we certainly cannot rule out that CURVE BALL provided his information at the behest of the INC, the INC’s modus operandi leads to the conclusion that it is unlikely. Several of the facts related to this issue were omitted in amended Conclusion 8. This is unfortunate. While we can understand that reasonable people may come to different opinions based on the same evidence, the decision to distort the facts, by eliminating some of them from the final conclusion, is not in keeping with this Committee’s record of forthrightness.
Amended Conclusion 8 kept the portion of the Committee staff’s drafted conclusion which said, “CIA also assessed that CURVE BALL did not fit the pattern of the typical INC-influenced defection in that the INC did not broker his introduction to the Intelligence Community and did not put him in front of the media.” But, the amended conclusion struck the next portion of explanation:

Throughout its history with the Intelligence Community, until October 2002 when the INC agreed to refrain from media exposure for its defectors, the INC actively and persistently courted the media with its defector information. Almost immediately upon locating a defector with information deemed pertinent, the INC brought the defector to the media to tell his or her story and ensure that the INC’s role in finding the defector was acknowledged. The INC was even more adamant about maintaining an intermediary role when it brought defectors to the Intelligence Community. CURVE BALL’s case, in which a foreign intelligence service approached him, does not fit this pattern.

This is significant because the amended conclusion omits the explanation that CURVE BALL was not paraded before the media nor did he have his relationship brokered with the Intelligence Community, as was the case with all of the other INC-affiliated defectors. CURVE BALL was not even a walk-in source who offered up a story about Iraq’s mobile biological weapons program. CURVE BALL was identified by a foreign government service when he applied for asylum. During a standard screening process, the foreign government service reviewed the paperwork he submitted as part of his asylum application and noticed that he had previously been a civil engineer in Iraq.

To conclude that the INC played a role in CURVE BALL’s introduction to the Intelligence Community, one must ignore all of the facts regarding the INC’s
standard methods of introducing potential sources to the Intelligence Community and their record of taking credit for those introductions in the media. More significantly, one must also embrace the notion that the INC encouraged CURVE BALL to apply for asylum in the hope that the foreign government would spot him, question him, and find his information so valuable that they would pass it to the U.S. Intelligence Community. *This tortured scenario does not pass the common-sense test, particularly when the INC was having no difficulty introducing sources directly to the U.S. Intelligence Community.*

The only connection of any kind between CURVE BALL and the INC is that the ISG determined that CURVE BALL’s relative was an INC member. The ISG learned that the relative had contacted CURVE BALL in 2001, on behalf of the INC, to ascertain whether CURVE BALL had any information on secret or sensitive Iraqi projects that would have helped boost the case against Iraq at the UN. CURVE BALL told his relative he did not. The relative also said that he had minimal contact with CURVE BALL since CURVE BALL defected, which the CIA says is consistent with phone records they have been able to locate. By the time the relative called CURVE BALL in 2001, CURVE BALL had already provided extensive information about the alleged mobile biological weapons program to debriefers.

We are left to conclude that the CIA’s assessment is correct – that CURVE BALL did not fit the pattern of the typical INC-influenced defection and that the INC probably played no role in CURVE BALL’s fabrication.

We understand the desire to blame someone else for CURVE BALL, and we understand the intent in the amended conclusion – to leave the door open to the possibility that our own Intelligence Community was not responsible for this intelligence failure. It would be somewhat of a relief if there was evidence that the INC tricked the Intelligence Community into believing CURVE BALL’s story.
But, the Committee has uncovered no such evidence. Just as there is no evidence that INC information was the basis for the Intelligence Community’s judgments about Iraq’s WMD programs.

Accordingly, we would have concluded the following with respect to CURVE BALL’s relationship with the INC:

**Conclusion:** It is unlikely that the HUMINT source CURVE BALL, the Intelligence Community’s primary source of intelligence about Iraq’s alleged biological weapons program, provided his information at the behest of the INC. Beginning in 2000, CURVE BALL provided information to a foreign liaison intelligence service alleging that Iraq had a mobile biological weapons program. CURVE BALL was the key source that led the Intelligence Community to judge in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s WMD capabilities that “Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents.” The Iraq Survey Group’s (ISG) investigation of CURVE BALL’s information in the summer and fall of 2003 revealed that CURVE BALL provided false information to the Intelligence Community prior to the war. The ISG also discovered that CURVE BALL had a relative who had worked for the INC since 1992, which led to initial suspicion in the Central Intelligence Agency that CURVE BALL may have provided false information at the INC’s behest.

The CIA has since concluded that CURVE BALL’s relative’s connection to the INC was coincidental. The CIA based its conclusion, in part, on the fact that CURVE BALL’s relative said he maintained minimal contact with CURVE BALL but that he did call CURVE BALL in 2001 on behalf of the INC to ascertain whether...
CURVE BALL had any information on secret or sensitive projects in Iraq. The CIA says this account is consistent with phone records they have been able to locate. According to the relative, CURVE BALL said he had no information to provide. The CIA did not ask CURVE BALL himself about this conversation or whether he had been coached or directed by the INC, believing that CURVE BALL would terminate contact if the CIA questioned him about his family. While the Committee believes the CIA should have asked him, in the end, an admission or denial in this regard would not have been dispositive.

The CIA also assessed that CURVE BALL did not fit the pattern of the typical INC-influenced defection in that the INC did not broker his introduction to the Intelligence Community and did not put him in front of the media. Throughout its history with the Intelligence Community, until October 2002 when the INC agreed to refrain media exposure for its defectors, the INC actively and persistently courted the media with its defector information. Almost immediately upon locating a defector with information deemed pertinent, the INC brought the defector to the media to tell his or her story and ensure that the INC’s role in finding the defector was acknowledged. The INC was even more adamant about maintaining an intermediary role when it brought defectors to the Intelligence Community. CURVE BALL’s case, in which a foreign intelligence service approached him based on their review of his asylum paperwork which indicated that he had been an Iraqi civil engineer, does not fit this pattern. In addition, three INC officials have told the Committee that the INC had no involvement with CURVE BALL, does not know who CURVE BALL is, and has never attempted to bring sources to the Intelligence Community, or anyone else, without openly acknowledging the INC’s role.
The Intelligence Community does not fully understand why CURVE BALL provided false information, and may never know. While the Committee cannot rule out that CURVE BALL was influenced by the INC, the available information supports CIA’s conclusion that the INC probably played no role in CURVE BALL’s fabrication.

Conclusion

The findings contained in this report are, for the most part, an accurate depiction of the results of the Committee’s inquiry. The findings tell the actual story of the Intelligence Community’s use of information obtained from the INC. It is our hope that the American people will read the factual findings contained in the body of the report and reach their own conclusions. They should not rely on the adopted conclusions attached to this report. These conclusions are replete with inaccuracies and omissions; they are not consistent with the facts found by the Committee’s inquiry. These conclusions do not meet the Committee’s obligations to the Senate and to the American people.

We are concerned that members of the Committee have perpetrated the very offense for which they so often charge the Intelligence Community and the Administration. Whether these actions were based on politics, a lack of objectivity, or the desire to meet theoretical public expectations, a majority of the Committee chose to support amended conclusions that rely upon “cherry-picked” facts to validate preconceived notions concerning the INC’s relationship with the Intelligence Community.

We find this action alarming. When the Select Committee on Intelligence knowingly approves facts and conclusions that contain the inaccuracies, omissions and mischaracterizations outlined above, it begins to diminish its own credibility. Once diminished, that credibility will be difficult to regain.
These distorted facts and conclusions are enough to call into question the utility of the INC report, but we also believe these facts demonstrate that Phase II has devolved to an exercise with no oversight value. It does nothing to advance the Senate’s oversight of the intelligence activities of the U.S. Government.

Make no mistake, the Intelligence Community needs oversight. Rather than perpetuating an ongoing effort to rewrite history, the Committee should be focusing all its resources on a host of troubling issues: monitoring Intelligence Community reforms, balancing acquisition requirements with budgetary constraints, correcting the flawed tradecraft which led to the Iraq intelligence failure, and assessing collection and analysis of intelligence on Iran, North Korea, and al-Qa’ida. If anything, the recently revealed terrorist plot in Britain underscores the continuing threat facing the nation. Our enemies are focused. They continue to develop innovative and insidious methods to kill Americans and attack our way of life. The terrorist threat should be the primary focus of all the members of the Committee – Democrat and Republican alike.

The facts are clear – the prewar assessments of Iraq’s WMD programs were a tragic intelligence failure. However, the real causes of that failure, explained in detail in the Committee’s exhaustive 2004 report on prewar assessments on Iraq, had nothing to do with Ahmed Chalabi and the INC. Instead of focusing on the
implementation of reform and on current and future threats, the Intelligence Committee continues to expend resources looking backwards at statements and actions that occurred over four years ago. It is our hope that the Committee will soon extricate itself from this time-consuming exercise and initiate forward looking oversight.

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MIKE DEWINE,
TRENT LOTT,
SAXBY CHAMBLISS,
JOHN WARNER.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, SENATORS CARL LEVIN, DIANNE FEINSTEIN, RON WYDEN, EVAN BAYH, BARBARA MIKULSKI, AND RUSS FEINGOLD

In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration embarked on a public campaign to use the war against al-Qa’ida as a justification for overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. In January 2002, President George W. Bush portrayed Iraq as a “grave and growing danger” to the United States in his State of the Union Address and promised the 50 million Americans watching “I will not wait on events while dangers gather.” In the weeks and months that followed, the President, Vice President Dick Cheney and senior Administration officials advocated the overthrow of the Baghdad regime in statements that asserted the United States knew with certainty that Iraq possessed and was increasing its stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, that Iraq was aggressively pursuing the production of nuclear weapons, and, most threatening of all, that Saddam Hussein was linked to the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks and would transfer weapons of mass destruction to al-Qa’ida or other terrorist groups for use against the United States. The Administration built the case for military action by characterizing the threat posed by Iraq as imminent in significant part because of Iraq’s alleged alliance with terrorists. This nexus between Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and al-Qa’ida was effectively exploited by the Bush Administration in increasingly urgent and ominous pronouncements prior to the war.

The Committee’s investigation into prewar intelligence on Iraq has revealed that the Administration’s case for war in Iraq was fundamentally misleading. Administration officials repeatedly characterized Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs in more conclusive and threatening terms than were substantiated by the underlying intelligence assessments. Analytical judgments of the intelligence community that were not in line with the more strident
Administration view on alleged Iraqi links to al-Qa’ida and the 9/11 plot were ignored and denigrated by senior policymakers. Most disturbingly, the Administration, in its zeal to promote public opinion in the United States for toppling Saddam Hussein, pursued a deceptive strategy prior to the war of using intelligence reporting that the U.S. intelligence community warned was uncorroborated, unreliable, and, in critical instances, fabricated.

Some of the false information used to support the invasion of Iraq was provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an organization which our intelligence agencies had cautioned was penetrated by hostile intelligence services and would use its relationship with the U.S. government to promote its own agenda to overthrow Saddam Hussein. During its investigation, the Committee received a July 2006 report from the Department of Defense Inspector General entitled “Review of the U.S. Government’s Relationship with the Iraqi National Congress: Phase One – Compromises of Information, Sources, and Methods.” The Committee’s investigation concluded that the INC attempted to influence United States policy on Iraq by providing false information through Iraqi defectors directed at convincing the United States that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and had links to terrorists. The Committee majority refused to request from the Administration documents and information provided through separate channels established by the INC that circumvented the intelligence community’s vetting process altogether and provided purported “raw intelligence” on Iraq directly to the Office of the Vice President and the Office of the Secretary of Defense prior to the war. When asked by the press in February 2004 about charges that the INC had deliberately misled the intelligence community, Ahmad Chalabi, leader of the INC, replied “We are heroes in error. As far as we’re concerned we’ve been entirely successful. That tyrant Saddam is gone and the Americans are in Baghdad. What was said before is not important.”
The Committee has uncovered information in its investigation that shows that the Administration ignored warnings prior to the war about the veracity of the intelligence it trumpeted publicly to support its case that Iraq was an imminent threat to the security of the United States. Key justifications used by the Administration to strengthen the case for military action against Iraq – i.e., (1) reconstitution of its nuclear weapons program, (2) construction of mobile biological weapons laboratories, (3) support for al-Qa’ida and links to the 9/11 plot – relied at least in part on information known at the time to be suspect or outright false.

1. Reconstitution of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program

- “[Saddam] is a dangerous man who possesses the world’s most dangerous weapons.” – President Bush, March 22, 2002

- “Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.” – Vice President Cheney, August 26, 2002

- “We do know that there have been shipments going... into Iraq... of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to – high-quality aluminum tubes that are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs.” – National Security Advisor Rice, September 8, 2002

- “...he [Saddam] has been seeking to acquire ...the kinds of tubes that are necessary to build a centrifuge.... But we do know, with absolute certainty, that he is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon.” – Vice President Cheney, September 8, 2002

- “Very likely all they need to complete a weapon is fissile material – and they are, at this moment, seeking that material – both from foreign sources and the capability to produce it indigenously.” – Secretary Rumsfeld, September 19, 2002
• “But we now have irrefutable evidence that he has once again set up and reconstituted his program, to take uranium, to enrich it to sufficiently high grade, so that it will function as the base material as a nuclear weapon.” – Vice President Cheney, September 20, 2002

• “Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.” – President Bush, October 7, 2002

• “Saddam Hussein was close to having a nuclear weapon. We don’t know whether or not he has a nuclear weapon.” – President Bush, December 31, 2002

• “…the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” – President Bush, January 28, 2003

• “…Iraq must be disarmed of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, weapons productions capabilities, and the means to deliver these weapons.” Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, February 12, 2003

• “And we believe [Saddam] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.” Vice President Cheney, March 16, 2003

These prewar statements were misleading given the underlying intelligence community assessments at the time about Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. The intelligence community assessed that Iraq did not possess a nuclear weapon and that it would most likely take five to seven years, with foreign assistance, for Iraq to produce enough weapons-grade fissile material for a nuclear weapon. No intelligence reporting asserted that Iraq had made attempts to acquire nuclear weapons from another country.

On September 8, 2002, Vice President Cheney referred to Iraqi attempts to purchase aluminum tubes and stated that “we do know, with absolute certainty, that (Saddam Hussein) is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon.” That same day,
National Security Advisor Rice stated that there were shipments to Iraq of aluminum tubes that were “only really suited for nuclear weapons programs.” Twelve days later, the Vice President referred to the aluminum tubes as “irrefutable evidence” that Saddam had reconstituted his nuclear weapons program. At the time of those statements, there were significant differences of opinion in the intelligence community about the purpose of the tubes. In fact, both the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) assessed that the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq were probably not intended for a nuclear program. Those DOE and INR assessments were discussed both in the October 2002 NIE and in the President’s one-page summary of that NIE. The President’s summary stated that “State/INR and DOE believe that the tubes more likely are intended for conventional weapons uses.”

Despite the fact that clear differences of opinion on the purpose for the tubes were included in both the NIE and the President’s summary, Dr. Rice stated on July 11, 2003 that “If there were any doubts about the underlying intelligence to the NIE, those doubts were not communicated to the President, to the Vice President, or to me.”

Just weeks later, on July 30th, Dr. Rice stated that it had been the “consensus view” that the tubes were suitable for use in an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Dr. Rice’s statement, like those made nearly a year earlier, was not consistent with underlying intelligence.

Postwar findings support the assessment of the Departments of Energy and State that the aluminum tubes were probably not intended for a nuclear program.

The intelligence community was so skeptical of the claim that Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger that Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George
Tenet personally interceded by calling Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and having a reference to the alleged attempts removed from President’s Cincinnati speech in October 2002, warning that the “President should not be a fact witness on this issue” because CIA analysts found the “reporting to be weak.” Nevertheless, White House officials included the disputed claim in the President’s State of the Union Address three months later, this time assigning the assessment to the British government, but packaging it as fact.

On March 7, 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported publicly that “documents which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded.” Four days later, the CIA issued a classified assessment which stated that “we do not dispute the IAEA Director General’s conclusion”, noting that the U.S. government “on several occasions has cautioned IAEA inspectors that available information on this issue was fragmentary and unconfirmed.” There was, however, no public correction of the President’s speech following that classified assessment.

On September 12, 2002, the White House disseminated a background paper entitled *Decade of Deception and Defiance* to support President Bush’s address to the United Nations. The paper was not produced or cleared by the intelligence community and it used the *New York Times* as a source. It purported to provide “specific examples” of Iraqi violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions. One source of reporting on Iraq’s nuclear program in the background paper was an INC-affiliated defector Adnan Said Haideri. In the paper’s section on weapons of mass destruction, the first item was a reference to claims by Haideri of having “visited twenty secret facilities for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.” Haideri, according to the White House paper, “supported his claims with stacks of Iraqi government contracts, complete with technical specifications” and that he “said Iraq used companies to purchase equipment with the blessing of
the United Nations – and then secretly used the equipment for their weapons programs.” The paper clearly left the impression that Haideri had specific knowledge of the location of Iraqi WMD.

[The intelligence community’s decision to classify the information in the above paragraph is not consistent with its decision to declassify similar information described elsewhere in the report. Based on this inconsistency and the inability of the intelligence community to demonstrate that sensitive sources and methods would be revealed if the information was disclosed, we have concluded the redaction to be without justification.]

However, INC Source #1’s reporting on a suspect nuclear facility at [REDACTED] was included in the intelligence community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq as well. A text box in the NIE outlined several points from INC Source #1's reporting that drove the intelligence community’s concerns that activity at [REDACTED] was nuclear related. [REDACTED]
in February 2004, INC Source #1 showed deception on questions related to his continued contact with the INC, whether the INC provided him with information to give to the U.S. government, whether the INC provided him information on the suspect nuclear facility at [redacted] to give to the U.S. government, and whether the [redacted] facility even existed. In July 2004, the CIA concluded the intelligence reporting of INC Source #1 on weapons of mass destruction facilities in Iraq “remains questionable and, on a nuclear facility at [redacted], demonstrably incorrect.”

The Committee’s investigation concluded that postwar findings do not support the October 2002 NIE judgment that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. The Committee concluded further that the intelligence community failed to reconsider its assessment on the suspect nuclear facility at [redacted] based on the findings of the IAEA inspectors. This also is an example of information from an INC defector that purported to show evidence of Iraq weapons of mass destruction but was subsequently determined to be false.

2. Iraq’s mobile biological weapons laboratories

- “From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late 1990’s, had several mobile biological weapons labs. These are designed to produce germ warfare agents, and can be moved from place to place to evade inspectors.” – President Bush, January 28, 2003

- “One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq’s biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents. Let me take you inside that intelligence file and share with you what we know from eyewitnesses....His [the source codenamed Curveball] eyewitness account
of these mobile production facilities has been corroborated by other sources...We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile, biological agent factories...these are sophisticated facilities. For example, they can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin. In fact, they can produce enough dry, biological agent in a single month to kill thousands upon thousands of people.” – Secretary Powell, February 5, 2003

- “Firsthand witnesses have informed us that Iraq has at least seven mobile factories for the production of biological agents, equipment mounted on trucks and rails to evade discovery. Using these factories, Iraq could produce within just months hundreds of pounds of biological poisons.” – President Bush, February 6, 2003

- “Biological Weapons – In 2001, an Iraqi defector...al-Haideri, said he had visited twenty secret facilities for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.” – White House paper, Decade of Deception and Defiance, September 12, 2002.

[Certain information redacted in the above paragraph is unclassified and drawn from a prewar document prepared by the White House but not cleared by the intelligence community before its release to the public. We find the intelligence community’s decision to classify this information to be without justification.]

In its July 2004 report, the Committee concluded that the judgment in the intelligence community’s October 2002 NIE that “Baghdad has biological weapons” overstated what was known about Iraq’s biological weapons holdings, did not explain the uncertainties underlying the statement, and did not explain that
the conclusion that Iraq had a mobile biological weapons program was largely based on the report of a single source, codenamed “Curveball.”

During his February 5, 2003, speech, Secretary of State Colin Powell assured the United Nations (UN) Security Council — and the world at large — that “every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving you are fact and conclusion based on solid intelligence.” The Curveball reporting in the UN speech did not meet that standard, despite several days of extensive discussions between Secretary Powell and the intelligence community during the preparation of the speech. In fact, by the time President Bush, Secretary Powell and other senior Administration officials began touting publicly Curveball’s claims about Iraq possessing mobile biological weapons labs, repeated warnings had already been raised within the intelligence community about the source’s reliability and credibility.

The Committee investigation found that in March 2002 the foreign intelligence service handling Curveball had informed the CIA that Curveball had changed some of his stories. In April 2002, another foreign service conveyed to the CIA doubts about Curveball’s reliability, saying it was “inclined to believe a significant part of his reporting is true. Even so, we are not at this point convinced that he is a wholly reliable source.” The foreign service noted inconsistencies in his reporting and that his behavior seemed “typical of individuals who we would normally assess to be fabricators.” On December 20, 2002, the chief of the relevant CIA station cabled CIA headquarters regarding a discussion with the head of the foreign intelligence service handling Curveball and provided a summary of a letter to DCI Tenet from that service head. The cable noted that, according to the head of the foreign intelligence service, Curveball’s reporting on mobile facilities “has not been verified.” The CIA station sent the actual letter from the head of the foreign service to CIA headquarters in February 2003. In January 2003, the same chief of station cautioned CIA headquarters in another cable to “take the most
serious consideration” before using Curveball’s information publicly.” Despite these concerns, Curveball’s reporting was included, without caveat, in Secretary Powell’s UN speech. On May 26, 2004, the CIA officially issued a fabrication notice and recalled Curveball’s reporting.

One source used by the intelligence community to corroborate Curveball’s reporting about Iraq’s mobile biologicals weapons program was INC Source #2. The Committee investigation found three separate intelligence community assessments from April to July 2002 that suggested INC Source #2 fabricated information he provided the intelligence community, which included a claim that in 1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile biological laboratories to evade UN inspections. In two separate April 2002 assessments on INC Source #2’s reporting, the CIA reported the concerns of the DIA debriefer that INC Source #2 was being coached by the INC and stated that the DIA had terminated contact with INC Source #2 because of suspicions he was a fabricator.

[The Committee was told that the decision to classify the information in the above paragraph explaining the existence of an Intelligence Community document about the claims made by INC Source #2 was made by the Office of the Vice President. We have concluded that there is no justifiable basis for classifying this information.]

In May 2002, the DIA issued a formal fabrication notice on INC Source #2 stating that “his information is assessed as unreliable, and, in some instances, pure fabrication. We have determined that he had also been coached by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) prior to the meeting with western intelligence services.”
A July 2002 National Intelligence Council Memorandum also outlined the intelligence community's concerns about information from INC Source #2, and noted that a foreign government intelligence service believed his information was unreliable.

Despite these repeated warnings, the INC Source #2 reporting was cited specifically in three subsequent CIA intelligence assessments issued from July 2002 to November 2002 and the intelligence community’s October 2002 NIE, as corroborating other source reporting about Iraq’s mobile biological weapons program. INC Source #2 also was one of the four human intelligence sources specifically referred to in the part of Secretary of State Powell’s February 2003 speech before the UN that claimed Iraq had mobile biological weapons laboratories weapons that had produced biological agents.

The Committee concluded that the intelligence community’s use in assessments of information provided by INC Source #2 was a serious error. The Committee also concluded that postwar findings do not support the assessment that Iraq possessed, or ever developed, mobile facilities for producing biological warfare agents. This is another example of an INC defector providing false information to the intelligence community.

3. Iraqi links to the 9/11 plot and support of al-Qa’ida

MR. RUSSERT: The Washington Post asked the American people about Saddam Hussein, and this is what they said: 69 percent said he was involved in the September 11 attacks. Are you surprised by that?

VICE PRESIDENT CHENEY: No. I think it’s not surprising that people make that connection. – Meet the Press, September 14, 2003
Repeated prewar statements by Administration officials sought to connect Iraq and al-Qa’ida in ways that the underlying intelligence did not support. The Administration’s repeated allegations of a past, present and future relationship between al-Qa’ida and Iraq exploited the deep sense of insecurity among Americans in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks, leading a large majority of Americans to believe, contrary to the intelligence assessments at the time, that Iraq had a role in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Using exaggeration and hyperbole, the Administration sought and succeeded in creating the impression that al-Qa’ida and Iraq worked in concert and presented a single unified threat to the United States. The Committee’s investigation revealed something completely different. The Committee found that there was no credible information that Iraq was complicit in or had foreknowledge of the September 11 attacks or any other al-Qa’ida strike. The Committee also found that Iraq did not provide chemical or biological weapons or any material or operational support to al-Qa’ida prior to the war. No evidence was found of any meeting between al-Qa’ida and the Iraq regime before the war other than a single meeting that took place years earlier in 1995 in the Sudan, and that meeting did not lead to any operational cooperation. Key pieces of evidence asserting links between Iraq and al-Qa’ida were a report of a meeting in Prague between a 9/11 hijacker and an Iraqi intelligence officer and a claim that Iraq provided biological and chemical weapons training to al-Qaida in the late 1990’s. This claim of training came from a single source who, according to an intelligence assessment at the time, may have been intentionally misleading his debriefers. The source recanted his claims soon after the war and was determined by the CIA to be a fabricator.

a. Link to the 9/11 plot – Atta meeting in Prague

• “...it’s been pretty well confirmed that he [9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta] did go to Prague and he did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service in
Czechoslovakia last April, several months before the attack.” – Vice President Cheney, December 9, 2001

- “We discovered, and it’s since been public, the allegation that one of the lead hijackers, Mohammed Atta, had, in fact, met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague...” Vice President Cheney, March 24, 2002

- “And on at least one occasion, we have reporting that places him [Atta] in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official a few months before the attack on the World Trade Center. The debates about, you know, was he there or wasn’t he there, again, it’s the intelligence business.” Question: “What does the CIA say about that? Is it credible?” “It’s credible.” – Vice President Cheney, September 8, 2002

- “The strongest link of – of Saddam Hussein to al-Qa’ida – we’ve never said that he somehow masterminded 9/11 or was even involved in 9/11. But the strongest – although there are a lot of tantalizing meetings that – with people who were involved in 9/11.” – National Security Advisor Rice, March 9, 2003

The Committee’s report demonstrates that the prewar statements of the Vice President that the Prague meeting had been “pretty well confirmed” and that 9/11 hijacker Muhammad Atta had “in fact” met with Iraqi Intelligence Services Chief in 2001 were not substantiated by the intelligence assessment at the time the statements were made. Likewise, the statement by National Security Advisor Rice that “there are a lot of tantalizing meetings” between Iraq and “people who were involved in 9/11” was clearly false based on what was known prior to the war.

Czech intelligence reporting in the fall of 2001 alleged a meeting in Prague between September 11th hijacker Muhammad Atta and the Iraqi Intelligence Services Chief in Prague, Ahmed al-Ani in 2001. Prewar assessments described reporting on the Atta lead as “contradictory” and “not verified.” In September 2002, the CIA assessed that some evidence asserted that the two met, and some cast doubt on the possibility. By January 2003, CIA assessed that “the most
reliable reporting casts doubt on this possibility” and said they were “increasingly skeptical that Atta traveled to Prague in 2001 or met with IIS officer al-Ani.” The CIA reports were widely disseminated inside the government and are reported to have been reviewed by the staff of the National Security Council and the Office of the Vice President.

In testimony before the Senate Democratic Policy Committee on June 26, 2006, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson (Ret.), Secretary of State Powell’s Chief of Staff from 2001-2005, and the person responsible for coordinating the drafting of the Secretary’s historic February 5, 2003, speech to the UN Security Council, described how the White House persistently tried to include the alleged Atta-al-Ani meeting in public statements over the objections of senior intelligence officials:

“[The alleged Prague meeting] was one of the matters that kept working its way back into his [Secretary Powell’s] presentation and one of the dramatic moments at the DCI’s conference room at Langley when we were doing, as I recall, the last rehearsal with the Secretary before we went to New York. And the Secretary was stopped in mid-presentation, and [Deputy National Security Advisor] Mr. Hadley asked what had happened to the Mohammed Atta story. And the Secretary fixed him and essentially said: “We took it out and it’s staying out.” And it was just an example of the tenacity with which certain people tried to get information into the script, repeatedly, that either the DCI [Tenet] or the DDCI [McLaughlin] or Secretary Powell himself simply didn’t find credible and left out.”
[We have concluded that the intelligence community's decision to classify the CIA document about the alleged Atta-al-Ani meeting in Prague discussed in the three paragraphs above and the underlying Committee report to be without justification. The intelligence community is unable to demonstrate to the Committee that disclosing the information would reveal sources and methods or otherwise harm national security. We believe the decision to keep from the public this revealing information about the use of intelligence information prior to the war represents an improper use of classification authority by the intelligence community to shield the White House.]

This is reminiscent of the Niger uranium story a month and a half earlier. While intelligence officials set aside objections and bowed to White House pressure to include the uranium claim in the President's January 28, 2003, State of the Union Address, there is no indication that the intelligence community backed down from its belief that the Atta meeting did not occur. The Committee has no knowledge that the President made reference to the alleged Atta meeting in a public speech on or after March 14, 2003, [redacted]. However, the Vice President made repeated public statements after this date asserting that the meeting may have occurred and that no information had been obtained to discredit the original report.
[During the declassification review of these additional views, the intelligence community determined that the paragraph above was entirely unclassified. On the day the Committee met to release the report, the intelligence community reversed itself and made the indicated redactions. We believe this last-minute decision is without merit and represents an improper use of classification authority, the effect of which is to shield the White House.]

The Committee Chairman declined a request of the Vice Chairman for the Committee to interview White House officials, including speechwriters, to fully understand how and why intelligence assessments were included in major prewar speeches, such as President’s State of the Union Address and Secretary Powell speech to the UN Security Council.

Postwar debriefings of al-Ani indicate that he had never seen or heard of Atta until after September 11, 2001, when Atta’s face appeared on the news.

[The intelligence community's decision to classify the information in the above paragraph is not consistent with its decision to declassify similar information described elsewhere in the report. Based on this inconsistency and the inability of the intelligence community to demonstrate that sensitive sources or methods would be revealed if the information was disclosed, we have concluded the redaction to be without justification.]

b. Iraq providing al-Qa’ida with training
“We know too that several of the detainees, in particular some high ranking detainees, have said that Iraq provided some training to al-Qa’ida in chemical weapons development.” – National Security Advisor Rice, September 25, 2002

Question: “Do you have more than one source that indicate this [chemical weapons training of al-Qa’ida]? “On that particular matter – yes.” Secretary Rumsfeld, September 26, 2002

“We’ve learned that Iraq has trained al-Qa’ida members in bomb making and poisons and deadly gases.” – President Bush, October 7, 2002

“The support that this detainee describes included Iraq offering chemical or biological weapons training for two al-Qa’ida associates beginning in December 2000.” – Secretary Powell, February 5, 2003

“Iraq has also provided al-Qa’ida with chemical and biological weapons training.” – President Bush, February 6, 2003

“And secondly, a very strong link to training al-Qa’ida in chemical and biological weapons techniques, we know from a detainee that – the head of training for al-Qaida, that they sought help in developing chemical and biological weapons because they weren’t doing very well on their own. They sought it in Iraq. They received the help.” – National Security Advisor Rice, March 9, 2003

Intelligence community analysts based assessments about possible Iraqi provision of chemical and biological weapons training to al-Qa’ida largely on reporting from a single source, the al-Qa’ida detainee who was referred to by National Security Advisor Rice, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. DIA assessments in February 2002, soon after debriefings of al-Libi began, questioned al-Libi’s inability to provide details about Iraq’s involvement. An assessment noted that it was possible that al-Libi did not know any further details, but assessed “it is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers.” In a July 2002 assessment the DIA called reports from al-Libi “plausible,” but noted, however,
that al-Libi’s information lacked details concerning the individual Iraqis involved, the specific chemical and biological materials associated with the assistance, and the location where the alleged training occurred. The DIA also assessed that the information was second hand and not derived from al-Libi’s personal experience. An internal Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy communication indicates that office was aware of the DIA assessment that al-Libi was likely misleading his debriefers.

The CIA’s January 2003 version of *Iraqi Support for Terrorism* described al-Libi’s reporting of chemical and biological weapons ties as “credible,” but stated that al-Libi was not in a position to know if the training had taken place.

The Committee’s investigation concluded that the DIA’s assessment that al-Libi was likely misleading debriefers was correct. In January 2004, al-Libi recanted his allegations about chemical and biological weapons training and many of his other claims about Iraq’s links to al-Qaida. He told debriefers that, to the best of his knowledge, al-Qa’ida never sent any individuals into Iraq for any kind of support in chemical or biological weapons. Al-Libi told debriefers that he fabricated information while in U.S. custody to receive better treatment and in response to threats of being transferred to a foreign intelligence service which he believed would torture him. He said that “once he began to fabricate information, he experienced no further physical pressure by [ ].” He also said that later, while he was [ ] of the foreign government, he fabricated more information in response to physical abuse and threats of torture. The foreign government service denies using any pressure during al-Libi’s interrogation. In February 2004, the CIA reissued the debriefing reports from al-Libi to note that he had recanted information. No postwar information has been found indicating that Iraq provided any weapons training to al-Qa’ida.
Two INC-affiliated defectors also made claims that Iraq provided terrorist training prior to the war. INC Source #3 told intelligence community officials in October 2001 that he observed non-Iraqi Arabs training in an abandoned aircraft shell at the Salman Pak training facility in Iraq in 1994-1995. Haydr al Bander, the INC’s Washington representative and the person who referred INC Source #3 to the Intelligence Community, told DIA officers that the non-Iraq Arabs that INC Source #3 observed were terrorists and that they were receiving training on aircraft hijackings. In December 2001, a CIA intelligence report stated that INC Source #3 “is under the influence/control of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and is not considered to be very credible.” In February 2002, the CIA’s Iraq Operations Group concluded that: “Although we can verify a few elements of his story, we have determined that much of his information is inaccurate and appears aimed at influencing U.S. (and probably western) policy on Iraq.”

During his debriefings in October 2001, INC Source #3 referred INC Source #4, an Iraqi walk-in and former deputy of the [REDACTED] training camp’s commander, to the Intelligence Community as someone who could confirm his, INC Source #3’s, story about the training of non-Iraqi Arabs at the facility in 1994-1995. Later that month, INC Source #4 was debriefed by Intelligence Community officials and said Iraqi intelligence trained Iraqi soldiers and 70-75 non-Iraqi Arabs in hijacking techniques at the Salman Pak facility. In October 2001, the CIA reported that INC Source #4 complained that his earlier accounts to the press about terrorist training had been distorted and mistranslated by the INC translator involved in the interviews. The CIA’s Iraqi Operations Group lost operational interest in INC Source #4, citing, in a February 2003 cable, INC Source #4’s past exposure in the media and his employment with the INC.

In April 2002, the DIA assessed that “there was no credible reporting on al-Qa’ida training at Salman Pak or anywhere else in Iraq.” In January 2003, the CIA noted that additional information was needed before validating the claim of
training, because of difficulties with the sources and the fact that, at the time, al-Qa’ida could have offered such training at its own camps in Afghanistan. The DIA reported in November 2003 that postwar exploitation of the facility found it “devoid of valuable intelligence.” The assessment added that CIA exploitation “found nothing of intelligence value remained and assessed the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) cleaned it out.” The DIA assessment concluded that “we do not know whether the ex-regime trained terrorists on the aircraft at Salman Pak.” Intelligence reporting on the Salman Pak facility in late April 2003 indicated the plane had been dismantled. The CIA and the DIA told the Committee in 2006 that postwar site exploitation of Salman Pak has yielded no indications that training of al-Qa’ida linked individuals took place there. In June 2006, the DIA told the Committee that is has no “credible reports that non-Iraqis were trained to conduct or support transnational terrorist operations at Salman Pak after 1991. The Committee’s investigation supports the DIA assessment that there was no credible reporting on al-Qa’ida training at Salman Pak or anywhere else in Iraq.

c. Operational alliance of Iraq and al-Qa’ida against the United States

• “There is certainly clear evidence that Saddam Hussein cavorts with terrorists. I think that if you asked, do we know that he had a role in 9/11, no, we don’t know that he had a role in 9/11. But I think this is a test that sets a bar that is far too high.” – National Security Advisor Rice, September 8, 2002

• “Al-Qa’ida hides. Saddam doesn’t, but the danger is, is that they work in concert. The danger is, is that al-Qa’ida becomes an extension of Saddam’s madness and his hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the world...[Y]ou can’t distinguish between al-Qa’ida and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror.” – President Bush, September 25, 2002.

• “We know that al-Qa’ida is operating in Iraq today, and that little happens in Iraq without the knowledge of the Saddam Hussein regime...Moreover, if he decided it was in his interest to conceal his responsibility for an attack on the U.S., providing WMD to
terrorists would be an effective way of doing so.” – Secretary Rumsfeld, September 19, 2002

• “We have what we consider to be credible evidence that al-Qa’ida leaders have sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire weapon of – weapons of mass destruction capabilities.” – Secretary Rumsfeld, September 26, 2002

• “After September the 11th, we’ve entered into a new era and a new war. This is a man that we know has had connection with al-Qa’ida. This is a man who, in my judgment, would like to use al-Qa’ida as a forward army.” – President Bush, October 14, 2002

• “And as the President has said, ‘Iraq could decide in any given day to provide biological or chemical weapons to a terrorist group or to individual terrorists’ – which is why the war on terror will not be won till Iraq is completely and verifiably deprived of weapons of mass destruction.” – Vice President Cheney December 2, 2002

• “Iraq’s weapons of mass terror and the terror networks to which the Iraqi regime are linked are not two separate themes – not two separate threats. They are part of the same threat.” – Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, January 23, 2003

• “The more we wait, the more chance there is for this dictator with clear ties to terrorist groups, including al-Qa’ida, more time for him to pass a weapon, share a technology, or use these weapons again.” – Secretary Powell, January 26, 2003

• “His [Saddam] regime aids and protects terrorists, including members of al-Qa’ida. He could decide secretly to provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists for use against us. And as the President said on Tuesday night, it would take just one vial, one canister, one crate to bring a day of horror to our nation unlike any we have ever known.” – Vice President Cheney, January 30, 2003

• “One of the great dangers we face is that weapons of mass destruction might be passed to terrorists, who would not hesitate to use these weapons. Saddam Hussein has longstanding, direct and continuing ties to terrorist networks.” – President Bush, February 6, 2003
• “And, worst of all, his connections with terrorists, which go back decades, and which started some 10 years ago with al-Qa’ida, are growing every day.” Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, February 6, 2003

• “He provides funding and training and safe haven to terrorists, terrorists who would willingly use weapons of mass destruction against America and other peace-loving countries.” – President Bush, March 6, 2003

Prior to the war, the intelligence community assessed that it would be “an extreme step” for Iraq to assist Islamist terrorists in conducting a chemical or biological weapon attack against the United States. The key judgements of the October 2002 NIE stated that Saddam had no current intentions of conducting terrorist attacks against the U.S. The Committee’s investigation revealed no postwar information indicating that Iraq considered using al-Qa’ida or any other terrorist group to attack the United States.

The Committee investigation concluded that, in fact, Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al-Qa’ida and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, refusing all requests from al-Qa’ida to provide material or operational support. Debriefings of key leaders of the former Iraqi regime indicate that Saddam distrusted Islamic radicals in general, and al-Qa’ida in particular. Postwar findings indicate that Saddam Hussein refused all al-Qa’ida overtures for material or operational support and issued a general order that Iraq should not deal with al-Qa’ida. In addition, Iraq was unaware that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was in Baghdad (under an assumed identity) until the regime was alerted to his presence by a foreign intelligence service in spring 2002. Saddam viewed al-Zarqawi as an outlaw and attempted, unsuccessfully, to locate and capture him. Similarly, Saddam Hussein viewed the al-Qa’ida affiliate group Ansar al-Islam operating in Kurdish-controlled northeastern Iraq as a threat to his regime. A May 2002 Iraqi intelligence document indicates that the Iraqi regime was concerned that the United States would use the presence of Ansar al-Islam, operating in an area that
Baghdad had not controlled since 1991, to support claims of links between the regime and al-Qa’ida.

Many of the Administration’s statements in support of the Administration’s policy of regime change were made in advance of the production of the intelligence community’s October 2002 NIE on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and the CIA’s September 2002 and January 2003 *Iraqi Support for Terrorism* documents. The drumbeat of statements throughout 2002 that characterized the threat posed by Iraq in the starkest of terms created pressure on the intelligence community to conform to the certainty contained in these statements. It is no coincidence that the analytical errors and omissions in the NIE all broke in one direction. The NIE and related analytical papers assessing Iraqi links to terrorism were produced by the intelligence community in a highly-pressurized climate wherein senior Administration officials were making the case for military action against Iraq through public and often definitive pronouncements.

During the build-up to war, the intelligence community was placed under pressure to support the Administration’s position that there was a link between Iraq and al-Qa’ida. This pressure took the form of policymakers repetitively tasking analysts to review, reconsider, and revise their analytical judgments. The CIA’s July 2003 independent review on U.S. intelligence on Iraq reported: “Requests for reporting and analysis of [Iraq’s link to al-Qa’ida] were steady and heavy in the period leading up to the war, creating significant pressure on the Intelligence Community to find evidence that supported a connection.” General Michael Hayden, during testimony for his confirmation as Director of the CIA, told the committee that, as Director of the National Security Agency, he had experienced similar repeated requests for information about a potential connection. This finding of pressure was confirmed by the CIA’s Ombudsman, an individual who is chartered to serve as an “independent, informal, and confidential
counselor for those who have complaints about politicization, biased reporting or the lack of objective analysis. After interviewing about two dozen analysts and managers involved in the CIA’s June 2002 analytical paper entitled *Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship*, the CIA Ombudsman told the Committee that he felt the “hammering” by the Bush Administration on Iraq intelligence was harder than he had previously witnessed in his 32-year career with the agency. Director Tenet confirmed to the Committee that some agency officials raised with him personally the matter of the repetitive tasking and the pressure it created during this time. The Director’s counsel to those who raised the issue was to “relieve the pressure” by refusing to respond to repeated questions where no additional information existed. He confirmed to the Committee that: “The issue where there was intense focus and questioning where analysts felt pressure was Iraq and al-Qa’ida.”

In Congressional testimony in June 2006, Paul Pillar, the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000-2005 and a key participant in analytical judgments on Iraq before the war, described how this pressure was brought to bear:

“Unfortunately, this issue [of pressure] has been reduced in some post-mortem inquiries to a question of whether policy-makers twisted analysts’ arms. That question is insufficient. Such blatant attempts at politicization are relatively rare, and when they do occur are almost never successful. It is more important to ask about the overall environment in which intelligence analysts worked.

“It is one thing to work in an environment in which policy-makers are known to want the most objective analysis, wherever the evidence may lead. It is quite another thing to work in an environment in which the policy-maker has already set his course, is using intelligence to publicly justify the
course, will welcome analysis that supports the policy, and will spurn analysis that does not support it. The latter environment was what prevailed on Iraq in the year before the war.

"Intelligence analysis being human, such an environment has subtle but significant effects on the shape of the intelligence product. With analysts throughout the community feeling a policy wind always blowing in one direction, there is a bias in the way countless calls about ambiguous evidence are made. Caveats are strengthened or weakened. And judgments are worded.

"As the Silberman-Robb Commission observed about work on the Iraqi weapons program, draft assessments that conformed with the Administration’s picture of Iraq had an easier time making it through the process of coordination and review than draft assessments that did not. And just through sheer repetition of the demands and requests the Administration placed on the intelligence community to support certain lines of argument, such as the one about alleged links between Iraq and al-Qa’ida, a further bias is introduced into the direction of the community’s work.”

Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson (Ret.), Secretary of State Powell’s Chief of Staff from 2001-2005, described this selective use of intelligence to support policy goals in the context of the Secretary’s February 5, 2003 speech to the UN as “perpetration of a hoax” and “what I would call...cherry-picking, or shaping the intelligence in new and unique ways in order to support political objectives.” Wilkerson added: “...I was dismayed to see, that, unquestionably in my mind – and I’m a Republican, so this is difficult for me to say – our national leaders were using intelligence in a way that was not as discriminating as it should be.”

The decision to go to war
It has been widely reported that the President and his advisors had placed Iraq in the cross-hairs for military invasion in the days and weeks following the September 11th attacks. Many participants involved with the preparation of prewar intelligence felt at the time that the decision had been made to go to war by Administration early on, many months before Congress was asked to authorize the use of force. According to the July 23, 2002 Downing Street memo, the British assessed that President Bush had made up his mind to take military action against Iraq, even if the timing had not been decided. Former National Intelligence Officer Pillar stated that he and analysts he worked with felt the decision to go to war had been made by April 2002. Pillar stated that the Administration’s aggressive use of intelligence to build support for war presented a major problem: “The textbook model of intelligence - policy relations was turned upside down. Instead of intelligence being used to inform policy decisions, it was used primarily to justify a decision already made. The Administration’s public case sometimes included the use of raw reporting, without reference to and, in some cases, in contradiction with intelligence community judgments about the reporting.” It is notable that in his July 2006 testimony, former DCI Tenet told the Committee he believed the decision to go to war had been reached by the Administration later in the fall of 2002. These compelling accounts fly in the face of repeated statements by the President and his senior advisors that the decision to go to war was not made until March 2003.

The Committee investigation revealed evidence that this prewar pressure to conform to Administration’s policy demands may have led to the co-option of the intelligence community. On October 7, 2002, the CIA declassified a question and answer exchange between Senator Carl Levin and Deputy DCI John McLaughlin from a closed hearing of the Committee five days earlier on the just-received Iraq weapons of mass destruction NIE. The letter declassified the CIA’s assessment that it would be an “extreme step” for Saddam Hussein to assist Islamist terrorists in conducting a weapons of mass destruction attack against the United States. The
letter also declassified DDCI McLaughlin’s testimony that the likelihood of Saddam Hussein using weapons of mass destruction, if he did not feel threatened by an attack, was “low.”

The same day, October 7th, at a speech in Cincinnati, the President said that “Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorist.” The next day, DCI Tenet issued a statement that “There is no inconsistency between our view of Saddam’s growing threat and the view as expressed by the President in his speech.” In his testimony before the Committee on July 26, 2006, former DCI Tenet stated that “there was some concern about the letter, and they [policymakers] wanted me to say something about [the declassified October 7th letter] not being inconsistent with what the President had said, and I did. And it was the wrong thing to do.” Former DCI Tenet also said he spoke with the New York Times on the matter and stated to the Committee his belief that the newspaper was “directed to talk to me.” We concur with former DCI Tenet’s recent acknowledgment that issuing the statement was the wrong thing for him to do and we find the Administration’s use of our nation’s senior intelligence official to undermine CIA assessments that were inconsistent with the President’s public statements to be deeply troubling, particularly given the fact that the Tenet statement was issued on the eve of the congressional debate on the question of authorizing military force against Iraq.

*   *   *

The Committee’s Phase II investigation has been significantly limited by the majority’s refusal to examine issues and documents relevant to our inquiry when the issues and documents come close to the White House. While a quarter of the Committee’s INC report is devoted to a lengthy examination of the CIA’s relationship with the INC in the early and mid-1990’s, the Committee majority voted down requests to investigate the flow of intelligence information from the
INC that circumvented the intelligence community and went to directly to White House and Pentagon policy officials in the lead-up to the war. According to a June 26, 2002, memorandum from the Director of the INC’s Washington office to the Senate Appropriations Committee:

“Defectors, reports, and raw intelligence are cultivated and analyzed and the results are reported through the INC newspaper (Al Mutamar), the arabic and western media and to appropriate governmental, non-governmental and international agencies. US Governmental recipients include the Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, (Deputy Assistant Secretary William Luti....principal point of contact) and the Office of the Vice President (Special Assistant for National Security John Hannah...principal point of contact).”

Requests to interview Mr. Luti, Mr. Hannah and others who may have received the INC intelligence were also denied. These decisions inhibited the Committee’s ability to pursue legitimate lines of inquiry. Our request to interview Secretary Powell and his Chief of Staff Colonel Wilkerson (Ret.) so as to better understand how the February 2003 UN speech was prepared was rejected. Colonel Wilkerson has stated that the initial 48 page draft for the UN speech came from the White House and that he believed much of what was in the document came from officials in the Office of the Vice President and the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Attempts to obtain this initial draft were denied. Similarly, the Committee has been denied access to the intelligence assessments on Iraq contained in prewar President’s Daily Briefs (PDBs), though PDBs have been shared with private citizens serving on the both the 9/11 Commission and the Silberman-Robb Commission.
Finally, the Committee’s inquiry has been hampered by the decision to deal with the five Phase II tasks as separate inquiries and complete the reports on a piecemeal basis rather than a unified whole.

The Chairman’s unilateral decision in November 2005 to relegate the Committee’s inquiry into the prewar intelligence activities of Pentagon policy officials to the Department of the Defense Inspector General (IG) was a mistake and has prevented the Committee from completing its work. The IG’s investigation is not a substitute for the Committee authorized inquiry and should be undertaken concurrent with the Committee’s investigation. The Chairman suspended the Committee investigation into the Pentagon policy office over two years ago, despite evidence, presented in the Committee’s Phase I report, that the office attempted to shape the CIA’s terrorism analysis and, when it failed, prepared an alternative intelligence analysis for policy officials designed to denigrate the CIA’s analysis for not embracing a link between Iraq and al-Qa’ida and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In the view of former National Intelligence Officer Pillar, “...the driving force here, quite clear, was an attempt – not by the military, but in this case an arm of the Office of the Secretary of Defense – at the policy level to link the whole Iraq war to the idea of terrorism and the mood of the public after 9/11.”
It is our expectation that the Committee can complete its remaining work on Phase II of its Iraq inquiry in a manner that is complete, objective, and expeditious. It should not have taken nearly three years to reach this point.

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
CARL LEVIN,
DIANNE FEINSTEIN,
RON WyDEN,
EVAN BAYH,
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI,
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD.
MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR HATCH JOINED BY CHAIRMAN ROBERTS

(U) The Committee’s work on this subject adds much needed granularity to a complex story that has been the subject of much speculation and, in some quarters, denunciation. The responsibility of the Committee was to examine, in documents and interviews, the use of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) to the U.S. Intelligence Community. Such a review required an examination of the INC’s contribution to our collection efforts and the role such collection played in our analysis. This examination needed, as well, to examine questions of counterintelligence procedures and the possibility of failures. Finally, the question of the INC’s role with our Intelligence Community involves the use of influence activities and actions to change the Iraqi leadership. In examining all of these aspects, the Committee’s investigation sheds light on strengths and weaknesses of past Intelligence Community actions.

(U) Beyond this scope, however, lies the question of the interaction of intelligence and policy. While intelligence founders when disconnected from policy, policy success or failure rarely weighs solely on intelligence. The intelligence process has been fraught enough with weaknesses and failures without bearing this burden. For an exposition of those weaknesses and failures, the reader is directed to the Committee’s first report, U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessment on Iraq, July, 2004. This report, while contributing specificity on the question of the use of INC information by the Intelligence Community, provides additional examples to support the conclusions of the previous report, without, in my opinion, revealing new failures or weaknesses as a result of our relations with an emigre group.

(U) While the findings of this report are well-founded, I cannot support the Conclusions, as amended. It is my own assessment that these conclusions
extrapolate from the substance of the findings. (I direct the reader to the detailed “Additional Views” of Chairman Roberts, which I endorse.) Whether by varying but unsubstantiated analysis, or a “group think” that has developed that perceives the INC as nefarious in motives or practices, or the mere commission of extrapolation from a small sample of contradicted examples, I believe the Committee’s conclusions come dangerously close to committing the errors in analysis we have previously exposed in the first phase of investigation concluded in July, 2004. To commit these errors, in my opinion, seriously undermines the role of the Committee in conducting constructive oversight that will have long-term positive support for the Intelligence Community.

(U) In reviewing the use of INC-provided information, it is useful to read the findings in the context of the four traditional practices of intelligence:

(U) *Collection:* It is difficult to conclude that the INC did not make a positive, but limited, contribution to our collection efforts. While keeping in mind that intelligence collected is rarely pure, and rarely does a source – or, in the case of the INC, a compilation of sources over an extended period of time – give clear or complete or even uncontradicted information, it is hard to imagine, however, that the INC should have been ignored as a source of intelligence, given established requirements related to actions directed to changing the Iraqi leadership. It is well-known that, at the time, our sources in Iraq and the region were slight, at best. The INC, an organization of disparate representatives from across Iraq’s sectarian, cultural and generational lines that shared our opposition to the Saddam Hussein regime, provided a natural opportunity to exploit sources at a time when we suffered a dearth of such access. To not have collected from the INC would have been an unacceptable failure.

(U) As the report reveals, the quality of intelligence gathered through the INC was of a wide variety in subject and quality. Throughout the relationship
between the CIA and the INC, there are reports to the lack of value gained from INC sources. However, in other instances, both CIA and DIA report, at various times during their relationships, to the value of intelligence gathered. DIA perhaps best summarizes when indicating that "its experience with the INC ICP (Information Collection Program) sources is similar to that with many HUMINT sources." While it appears that the most valuable information appears to be related to tactical military issues, this information cannot be discounted when considering that such information was used, for example, to attempt to track movements by key members of the regime in the days before Operation Iraqi Freedom, or perhaps more importantly, to avoid civilian casualties by identifying important medical facilities during our planning of air strikes.

(U) Analysis: The question should be: How was the information collected by the INC used by our own analysts? As a point of departure on this question, a sense of proportion should be applied: Between 1997 and the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Intelligence Community provided tens of thousands of assessments on the key questions of Iraq’s WMD programs and Iraq’s ties to terrorism. For this period, the Committee has reviewed over 40,000 finished intelligence products from the CIA alone. As revealed in the findings of this report, INC-affiliated reporting contributed to less than 20 products of finished intelligence. As the report reveals, CIA, DIA and Department of State all reported to the Committee that INC-affiliated intelligence contributed minimally to finished intelligence. The amended conclusion to this report, therefore, that information from INC-affiliated sources was "widely distributed" appears to exaggerate the truth. It is worthwhile noting that the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (the so-called WMD Commission) similarly concluded: "Over all, CIA’s post-war investigations revealed that INC-related sources had a minimal impact on pre-war assessments."
The Committee report reveals failures by the Community in establishing consistent source descriptions identifying sources as INC-affiliated. Further, on the critical question of Iraq’s ties to terrorism, CIA analytical assessments that “defectors claimed that al-Qaida and other non-Iraqis” trained at Salman Pak appears to have been the result of extrapolation by CIA analysts of defectors’ reports, not false reporting by INC-affiliated sources. The underlying reporting, however, that non-Iraqi Arabs trained at Salman Pak, was reiterated by the post-war reporting of the Iraqi Survey Group.

A sense of proportion need not deny failures in assessing INC-affiliated sources for inclusion in the specific cases where they contributed to finished analysis. The Committee report details these failures in substantial detail. The report’s findings reveal the role of two INC-affiliated defectors’ reporting in the critical October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction. In one case, the reporting was used as corroboration on the question of mobile biological weapons production capabilities, and in the other, on reporting regarding ongoing questions regarding a potential nuclear facility. In the latter case, subsequent reviews by the Committee of a CIA memorandum of the source’s reporting revealed, according to the Committee report, “that the source did not provide claims on Iraqi WMD programs, but did provide reporting on military-industrial facilities.” The CIA memorandum itself states that the source “never claimed any knowledge of nuclear weapons program-related work at [a suspected nuclear facility].” The CIA admits itself to having made assessment errors based on “extrapolations” by its analysts and officers.

The most significant error, however, regards the other INC source, whose information was used to corroborate reporting of biological weapons production from another source. (Our report reveals that the INC source provided reporting on biological facilities – not weapons production facilities.) This source
was deemed to be a fabricator by DIA in May, 2002, after DIA had identified problems with the source, and following warnings from CIA. While fabrication notices were sent in internal message handling systems, these notices were not attached to all reports including this source’s information, resulting in the failure to inform Secretary Powell of the weakness in the intelligence supporting this aspect of his public charges in his February 5, 2003 speech before the United Nations.

(U) These were failures in analytic processes of our Intelligence Community, not failures whose responsibility ought to be ascribed to the INC.

(U) Counterintelligence: For INC culpability, we would have to discover attempts by that organization to deliberately deceive, separate from the Intelligence Community’s counterintelligence capabilities to detect and neutralize this deception. What is apparent from the beginning of the U.S. Intelligence Community’s relationship with the INC is that the organization had an agenda and was seeking to use its resources to advance that agenda by influencing target audiences around the world. The INC should be seen in this context, and numerous examples of source reporting properly include the caveat that, when dealing with INC-affiliated sources, some sources may be seeking to influence.

(U) However, the Committee, in its comprehensive review of documents and in all its interviews, was not able to conclude that the INC actively sought to deceive the Intelligence Community. The Committee could find no evidence that the INC intentionally provided false information to the Intelligence Community. An amended conclusion implying that the INC did so is unsubstantiated by the underlying report.

(1) The report provides some information on the question of the INC’s relationship to Iran, and whether this in fact created counterintelligence
challenges. Certainly, as the report reveals, elements in the Intelligence Community voiced concerns about this, demonstrating the proper awareness to counterintelligence issues.

(U) It is also necessary to recall, however, that the INC is comprised of numerous Iraqi parties, interests and individuals who all co-existed in close proximity to Iran. Two key elements within the INC, the Kurdish parties of the KDP and PUK, had both fought and made accommodations with Iran. Ahmed Chalabi and numerous other individuals of the INC were open with our Intelligence Community about their interactions with Iran.

(U) That such interactions should raise counterintelligence concerns is proper; that the Intelligence Community should hold concerns about Iranian penetration is similarly understandable and to be expected. This should remind us, however, of one of the most common failures in the practice of counterintelligence – that it is essentially practiced defensively, rather than offensively. Counterintelligence must be used not only to preserve our secrets and intelligence practices, but it can also be used to find opportunities to penetrate, manipulate or exploit our adversaries. Today we need to be more focused on the threat we face from Iran than ever before. It is my opinion that we should be seeking opportunities for intelligence access exploitation of that regime, and that this should have been a goal since at least 1979.

(U) In this area, I am particularly disturbed by the report’s amended conclusion criticizing the National Security Council’s July 2002 decision to direct renewed funding for the INC to DIA management as “ill-advised given the counterintelligence concerns of the CIA.” Not only is this conclusion an extrapolation beyond the facts of counterintelligence assessments at the time, not
only does this conclusion blur the critical distinction between policy
determinations and the role of intelligence, but this conclusion appears to suggest
that counterintelligence threats must be dealt with only defensively, enforcing a
serious misconception about a useful tool in intelligence activities.

(U) The Committee report reveals, from our interviews, the original CIA
concerns about “controlling” the INC, as well as the clear view of INC leadership
that the organization did not see itself as an asset of U.S. intelligence. This is a
historic tension in Intelligence Community relations with emigre groups. While
fully controlling a group may have some advantages in short-term perspective, it is
not hard to recognize that a group’s effectiveness – in reputation and reach – could
also be hampered in such an oversimplified relationship. The history of
intelligence operations certainly bears this out. It would be tragic if this
Committee communicated to the broader Intelligence Community that we looked
askance at such future opportunities to aid carefully selected emigre groups that
we could not control or that did not necessarily share all our policies, even if they
would serve to critically advance specific foreign policy goals we share.
(U) In conclusion, the Iraqi National Congress did not seek to deceive the U.S. Intelligence Community, nor were they primary sources of the majority of our intelligence assessments – accurate and inaccurate – leading up to the Iraq war. The quality of the information they provided to the Intelligence Community at a time when we had limited intelligence access to Iraq varied – from important tactical information, to mostly incidental information, to occasions of inaccurate and incorrect reporting. In that sense their record is indistinguishable from the historical record of intelligence relationships with emigre groups. Certain analytical mistakes were made by our Intelligence Community analysts – along the lines the Committee has previously exposed in our July, 2004 report.

(U) My concern is that, with the amended conclusions, which I and others argue in additional remarks here extend beyond the findings of the report, we signal to the Intelligence Community an unfounded caution against working with emigre groups in the future. Emigre groups have agendas, about which we certainly must be aware. As a result, reporting from emigre groups poses analytic challenges, to which our analysts must be trained to scrutinize. Emigre groups pose counterintelligence challenges – and opportunities – that our Intelligence Community must be trained to detect – and exploit. And emigre groups are rarely easy to control, even were it desirable to do so. But these cautions should not be
converted to passivity and a reluctance to exploit future opportunities. This misinterpretation of some of the flawed conclusions of this report would serve to undermine future intelligence opportunities, without which we could be unnecessarily disarmed.

Orrin G. Hatch,
Pat Roberts.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR DEWINE

Introduction

I offer these additional views because with the adoption of most of the conclusions to this report, I think the Committee missed an opportunity here to perform real oversight over how our Intelligence Community operates. Unfortunately, despite the work the Committee put into this, it could not produce a report providing more meaningful guidance to our intelligence agencies in how they conduct their business.

Use of HUMINT Sources with Possible Agendas

The duty of HUMINT intelligence collectors is to exploit all potential sources of intelligence regardless of agendas. I reject the notion that sources from opposition groups are somehow inherently more unreliable than other HUMINT sources. We look to our intelligence professionals to use their best judgments in handling HUMINT sources, including reporting possible agendas and then identifying those bias in intelligence reports with caveats. We expect our analysts, in turn, to carefully weigh the information they receive, including caveats, when crafting their assessments. I am concerned, however, that the Committee’s final message in this report is a warning to intelligence agencies against recruiting HUMINT sources with opposition or other agendas, or face criticism from Congress.

I want to be clear, though, that I agree with the substance of the conclusion that it was a mistake for the National Security Council to order the Intelligence Community to continue working with the Iraqi National Congress after 2002. The bad experience of the CIA in trying to work with the Iraqi National Congress in the 1990s, followed by the State Department in the period 1998-2002, and the
resources that were allocated to support the Iraqi National Congress with relatively little pay-off, should have been taken into more account by the National Security Council. This was a failure of policy in determining the appropriate allocation of intelligence resources, however, and not of the Intelligence Community in carrying out its mission to collect against the Iraqi target.

**Impact on Policymakers of Intelligence Obtained from the Iraqi National Congress**

While the first three conclusions of the report find that information provided by defectors affiliated with the Iraqi National Congress had a great impact on our intelligence estimates produced prior to the War, I do not believe that the Committee’s report actually has made a convincing case for those conclusions.

The Committee was able to identify only two sources with ties to the Iraqi National Congress who provided information that arguably had an impact on pre-war U.S. intelligence, Source 1 and Source 2. Information from both Source 1 and Source 2 was used in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate titled *Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction*, and Source 2’s information was used in Secretary of State Powell’s February 2003 UN Speech.

Source 1 provided information on a facility that the Intelligence Community alleged to be a suspect Iraqi nuclear facility. Regarding the National Intelligence Estimate, however, Source 1’s information on the alleged suspect nuclear facility was only included in a text box that advised readers that a new nuclear facility may have been identified. The information provided by Source 1 was not in fact used in the key judgments or full text of the NIE.

Source 2 was one of four sources for the now discredited assessment that Iraq had a biological program based on mobile labs. Source 2, however, was not a
primary source. The mobile lab assessment rested in large part on CURVE BALL reporting and the Committee’s own conclusion on CURVE BALL admits that there is an insufficient basis to determine if CURVE BALL had an Iraqi National Congress affiliation.

The Source 1 and Source 2 information, of course, did have an impact on policy. The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq and the Powell Speech were meant to demonstrate that we had a solid basis for our concerns about Iraq and its WMD programs. Information from neither Source 1 nor Source 2, however, was critical to the National Intelligence Estimate or the Powell UN Speech. The Source 2 story is even more revealing of process failures in our Intelligence Community, which are not really addressed by the conclusions to the Committee’s report.

I agree that it was a serious mistake that Source 2’s information about alleged mobile biological labs in Iraq was used in Powell’s February 2003 UN Speech. DIA, afterall, had issued a fabrication notice in May 2002 about Source 2 and his information. What the Committee’s report misses in its conclusion on this issue, though, is that, despite the fabrication determination, DIA did not recall its reporting from Source 2. Additionally, the fabrication notices were not electronically attached to the actual reports so that when the reports were called up from the databases, analysts would also get the fabrication notices. This was a serious breakdown in how the Intelligence Community processed and disseminated information. I understand that the Director of National Intelligence has recognized how important this problem is and is trying to address these issues. Unfortunately, apart from urging the DNI to do more, the Committee did not really address these underlying technology and process problems that continue to haunt us. It is beholden on the Committee to ensure that these new procedures be quickly implemented across the Community.
Final Remarks

This report and its conclusions represent to me a missed opportunity for the Committee. There are some important and useful judgments in this report that hopefully will be of value to our intelligence agencies, but I believe that the Committee could have better used this effort to frame the issues that our intelligence agencies are facing now, such as establishing clearer guidance regarding how they should handle information obtained from problematical groups like the Iraqi National Congress, and highlighting the need for the Director of National Intelligence to even more aggressively address the process and technological problems revealed in the Committee’s report. In the long run, I doubt the Committee’s report has advanced very much the cause of Congressional oversight, of better performance by our intelligence agencies, or in the final result, our national security.

MIKE DEWINE.
MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS BOND, LOTT, AND CHAMBLISS

(U) Any investigation that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Committee or SSCI) undertakes should ultimately improve the Intelligence Community (IC) and enhance our national security. Unlike independent commissions, panels, and boards, the oversight committees of Congress have the power to effect change. The fifteen members of this Committee along with our counterparts in the House of Representatives and our Committee staffs comprise the only oversight bodies outside of the Executive Branch with the authority to execute difficult, and much needed, intelligence transformation. This first report in a series of reports coming from a second round investigation into Iraq prewar intelligence comes at a critical juncture. Yet, rather than attempt to improve our efforts to combat terrorism and make our country safer, the results of this investigation were calculated to promote a partisan agenda. Thus, sadly, the Committee’s two-year-long, second investigation of Iraq pre-war intelligence has failed to heed a higher call.

(U) Immediately following September 11 as well as after our invasion into Iraq, a number of outstanding investigations were conducted that produced actionable findings and recommendations in seminal documents such as: the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, reports by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, the Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction known as the Robb-Silberman Report, the British Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction known as the Bulter Report, the Report of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, the Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq by the Senate Intelligence Committee.
These hallmark reports were appropriate, well-written, and deserved our foremost attention. Yet, for the past two years, rather than pursue our oversight role to ensure that some of the key findings and recommendations of these reports and others were enacted, this Committee’s usefulness as an oversight body and as a key element in our national security apparatus has been consumed by a rear-view mirror investigation pursued for political ends. If this second-round investigation had offered the Congress and the American people additional insights that the plethora of previous reports had overlooked, then we would have stood together in full support of it. The truth is, however, that it does not. Consequently, we are at this juncture – five years since 9/11 and months since terrorists in the United Kingdom attempted a potentially even more devastating and horrible attack on this nation and our British allies – wasting valuable time that could be used to conduct intensive oversight of our new intelligence structure. The cement is still wet on intelligence reform, and it should be the primary business of the Committee to oversee it aggressively.

(U) The report the Committee produced in July 2004 resulted in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which reorganized the Intelligence Community and created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. All 15 members of the Committee signed on to this bipartisan effort. That report highlighted areas for follow-up that the Executive Branch and the Congress could use to improve our national security. We applauded the Committee for its collaborative efforts in producing that report and looked to get to work overseeing the Intelligence Community, instead we found ourselves bogged down with yet another investigation.

(U) Simply stated, this second series of reports is designed to point fingers in Washington and at the Administration. The conclusions in the reports were crafted with more partisan bias than we have witnessed in a long time in Congress. The “Phase II” investigation has turned the Senate Intelligence Committee, a
committee initially designed to be the most bipartisan committee in the Senate, into a political playground stripped of its bipartisan power, and this fact has not gone unnoticed in the Intelligence Community. The Committee will only return to proper and aggressive intelligence oversight once its membership determines to get back to its primary function for the betterment of our national security. Although the structure of the Committee provides for effective bipartisan oversight, the recent agenda of its membership has not fallen in line with the Committee’s primary purpose.

(U) The Chairman’s additional views in this first report lay out the factual discrepancies, false impressions, and inaccurate emphases impregnating its partisan conclusions; we support these views. Regrettably, the conclusions reached in this report do not constitute, in our view, a useful guide for the Intelligence Community in its ongoing efforts to improve our intelligence capabilities. Misleading conclusions not only misrepresent the facts, but fail to address, for example, how inaccurate intelligence assessments might be avoided in the future. This Committee must conduct forward-looking oversight, even when addressing matters of the past. In the current threat environment, amidst a struggle against international terrorists and their state sponsors, we cannot afford to sacrifice opportunities to improve our intelligence capability for the sake of rehashing history to build a case for partisan politics.

(U) While the INC provided information that proved inaccurate, there is no evidence to suggest the INC knowingly provided fictitious information. Even despite allegations of dubious motivations of INC leader Ahmed Chalabi, there is no evidence that the INC engaged in a systematic deception campaign against the U.S. Government.

(U) The July 2002 decision by the National Security Council Deputies Committee to continue the INC’s intelligence collection program (ICP) under the
auspices of DIA was a prudent effort to more fully evaluate the INC information. As noted in the preceding report, the Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), “believed it was unable to determine, without a professional assessment by the Intelligence Community, the value of the information the ICP did share. NEA believed, therefore, that the program should be managed by other agencies more experienced in managing intelligence collection.” The recognition that the Intelligence Community provided a mechanism to allow for more in-depth assessment of the ICP information was correct; however, the Community’s lack of management controls and adherence to its own procedures resulted in critical errors. These mistakes point to the urgent need for increased attention to asset validation procedures and the strengthening of those procedures throughout the Intelligence Community.

(U) Concerns raised by the CIA and the State Department prior to DIA assuming control of the ICP should have alerted DIA that dealing with the INC and reporting any information they offered would require the most stringent attention to asset validation procedures to ensure the correct source descriptions and proper caveats were placed on all information derived from the INC. Although it is apparent that the Intelligence Community did undertake some attempts at asset validation, it is clear that these efforts were uneven. For example, DIA provided an adequate source description in some of its reports, but inexplicably failed to do so in others. The Committee found that DIA and CIA “were inconsistent in identifying their reporting from INC-affiliated defectors and INC members as opposition-affiliated reporting.” This demonstrates the lack of attention in the field and oversight by managers to proper asset validation and reporting procedures.

(U) It is the responsibility of organizations charged with collecting and reporting information from human sources to employ rigorous validation procedures and to ensure sources are thoroughly vetted before incorporating their
information into finished intelligence publications for decision makers. However, it is also an analyst’s responsibility to continue the validation process by continuously reviewing information against new intelligence and comparing, for example, source descriptions and any cautionary warnings. The asset validation process must be a continuous vetting tool used throughout the life of an operation to describe, evaluate, and utilize human sources more effectively. The process makes better use of limited resources, reduces uncertainty, and provides decision-makers the confidence that the Intelligence Community has exercised due diligence in assessing the reliability of its information. Therefore, the Director of National Intelligence must establish common asset validation standards and descriptions across the Intelligence Community and ensure that intelligence reporting used in the most important intelligence documents affecting policymaking at the highest levels of the U.S. Government be subjected to a thorough validation process.

(U) We joined the Senate Intelligence Committee to conduct oversight, not to perform witch hunts; we serve on the Senate Intelligence Committee to make our intelligence community better, not to use it for partisan politics; we travel overseas to speak with our operators on the ground in order to gain insights in how to support them and make them successful. We have written this additional view because we believe it is important to unmask the partisan nature of this report’s much negotiated “conclusions.” We understand the decision of some of our colleagues to vote for this report in an effort to finish this interminable investigation, and for the sake of putting this investigation to rest that has kept us from exercising meaningful oversight of the Intelligence Community. We too, have endeavored to accommodate as many concerns as possible in order to vote out these second-round investigation reports. In cases such as in this report, however, where the conclusions are obviously inaccurate, misleading and incomplete, we cannot in good conscience vote in favor.
(U) The easiest way for Congress to give the impression that it is conducting oversight without doing so is to conduct another investigation. Investigations are important, yet it is only when steps are taken to act on valid issues that surface during an investigation that Congress performs the job that the American people elected members to do; namely, oversight. This is why we joined the Committee several years ago, to conduct effective oversight. It is our sincere desire that the Committee will return its full effort to such oversight sooner than later. As the foiled terrorist plot in Britain in August 2006 reminded us, the terrorists won’t wait; neither should we.

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