Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dinitz
7/22/75; 10:50 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Mr. Ambassador.

D: Mr. Secretary, good morning.

K: How are you?

D: How are you this morning?

K: Okay. Mr. Ambassador, I have a message for you from the President.

D: Yes.

K: Which is that if we are going to work together the tone of your communication to us has to change.

D: What ______ with the tone?

K: You know, you can't just make demands on us like this. We have agreed to present your ideas as a final concept. We have never agreed to present your ideas as an ultimatum.

D: We have never said this.

K: And we cannot have everytime we express an opinion to get a nagging semi-insolent reply the way we are getting.

D: We have never said that you agreed to present it as an ultimatum. I was very carefully phrasing my words yesterday, Mr. Secretary.

K: No, no, I am talking about the communications your negotiating team --

D: Well.

K: To that we get a two-page disposition and on top of it Shalev says it was your impression we would present it as an American proposal. We never agreed to that.

D: That is not correct. All -- only with regard to the presence of the Americans. He was asking . . .
K: It was always understood we would offer the presence of the Americans on the contingency on the acceptance of the two sides. That's the reason.

D: Of course. I don't think that Shalev said that we -- he asked whether this presence of the Americans represented an American idea.

K: Well the second message -- let me get through my messages -- is that we find totally unacceptable what you are doing with respect to arms for Jordan in the Congress.

D: We are not doing it.

K: And you have to understand it is our fixed policy to deal with the moderate Arabs. We will not stand still for the radicalization of the Arab world by your actions.

D: That ...

K: And this is the whole theory of our actions. I was asked specifically to communicate this to you.

D: I understand this, Mr. Secretary, and you know that we have -- you have been supplying arms to Jordan for a long period and we have never made an issue of it. The issue that has been raised now is with regard to the quantity, quality and repetitiveness and volume of it. That was the issue which you yourself acknowledged that creates a problem.

K: Well, I have tried to create a better atmosphere but it is not exactly easy.

D: But we are ...

K: I mean if your Ministers think they have to prove their manhood to us every 24 hours by sending notes that are absolutely unacceptable to us.

D: Mr. Secretary, can I comment on this for a minute -- it will take just one second. The comments that were passed by Shalev to you were not a formal Israeli response. They were comments made by the team of Ministers and they were the framework of initial remarks in exchange -- in a friendly exchange of our views of the situation. We have not reacted to it as you know either in the Government nor publicly but just shared our views with you, which I think is a normal thing to do. There was no official reaction of Israel.
K: It is absolutely unavoidably that there be some negotiation and give and take on both sides.

D: But I...

K: It is unavoidable but that does not mean it cannot break down. But it doesn't mean that the first time there is a reaction it leads to long disquisition about first Sadat's Russian(?) option. Second, which of course he has in mind and which I may say if things keep continuing this way he's got to have increasingly in mind. Secondly, about ulterior motives -- he's got his problems. You've got your problems and we've got to try to reconcile them.

D: Yeah, but I think it is only friendly and frank that I shared with Sisco some of our thinking for the motivation of the Sadat action. I don't think...

K: I think you are right. It is partly motivated by Soviet concerns. Well, why don't you come in -- we should have an Egyptian map by when -- 6:00 - 6:30 this afternoon I would think.

D: You mean Eilts is not coming.

K: Oh, well, it won't come 'til -- then we better do it first thing in the morning.

D: No, no, I mean I can come whenever you tell me.

K: Well, it would either have to be late tonight -- if it comes in at 8:00 tonight I understand and...

D: I can come anytime tonight.

K: But I happen to have a dinner engagement tonight. But I think we may want to communicate whatever we have. Even if we don't have a formal map.

D: May I ask if Eilts is coming?

K: No, Eilts is not coming. He is sending the map.

D: I see. I can come anytime that is convenient to you.

K: I may want to see you so that you can give it orally to -- given the fact that I am leaving on Saturday that we can get a reaction and give you the map tomorrow. If I can get a clear enough description from Eilts what they have in mind.
D: Yeah. Okay. So shall I . . .

K: Put aside 6:00 to 6:30 but I may change my mind and see you tomorrow morning.

D: Fine. All right. I understand. But please understand that our reactions are only designed to be helpful.

K: You have to understand -- now, one other thing the President asked me to ask you is this: He really feels that if we don't get it done in August we just have to go to another concept(?) It now looks really very tough if Rabin goes to Austria on the 24 to the 27th. Is there any chance that he could delay this. You have Rosh Hashana on September 6. The Arabs have Ramadan starting September 6. To negotiate this during Ramadan is really testing the nervous strength of everybody.

D: When is Ramadan?

K: From September 6 to October 6. And you know that that would put an additional strain on everything.

D: So you request to see if Rabin can . . .

K: Well, I don't see that I will be ready to leave on the 10th.

D: Uh-huh.

K: Because we have to work out also how we are going to have some more exchanges.

D: Uh-huh.

K: So I would think it's more likely that I will be more ready to leave around the 20th.

D: Uh-huh. I will communicate it to Rabin and see what can be done.

K: I am just trying to be realistic about it.

D: No, I understand. I understand.

K: . . . coming back on the 1st . . . uh, and then we have the -- I don't think we will be ready to go before the 15th through the 20th, that I can see.

D: 15th to the -- you mean starting from the 15th to the 20th?

K: Yes. And it may be later.
D: Yeah.

K: Because Joe and you will have to work out these bilaterals while I am gone.

D: Right.

K: Okay, good.

D: So I will hear from you but I want again, Mr. XXXXXX Secretary, it is not in any antagonistic spirit. I spoke to Rabin today -- he personally shared with me some of his concerns and we exchanged views on it because as you know, there . . .

K: This I didn't mind as much as these other two messages we received. The American presence is the cardinal point in the whole concept and that is why he is concerned.

D: Yeah, They XXXXXX the cardinal point in the whole concept and that is why he is concerned.

K: But of course, you have to remember the Egyptians offered this an American presence which you rejected. They agreed to an American presence at the legitimate warning stations.

D: That's a different situation.

K: (Laughter)

D: You know, Mr. Secretary, you are now giving me a . . .

(Laughter)

K: That is . . .

D: By the way, I think that I was very good on the NBSC on getting out of the question and I was surprised that Anderson found it so difficult to tell the press the Ambassador has never said that there was a joint agreement. He said that naturally we have clarified the details of the negotiations after a very long period . . .

K: I didn't see what HHH Anderson said. We don't have any -- I didn't think what you said was out of order.

D: No, no, I don't think you have any problem. HHH said/that we cannot present this as an American proposal. We never did.

K: No, no, that's not in reference to what we . . .

D: But Shalev was asking only with regard to the American presence.
K: No, no, it wasn't what you said.

D: Okay.

K: Okay. Good.