TELCON
Amb. Moynihan/Kissinger
11:56 a.m. 8/6/75

K: Hello.

M: Hi, Tiger.

K: Pat. You know what Joe Kraft said to me the other day?

M: What'd he say?

K: He said, "The day will come when I'll regret not having sent Bill Saxbe to the UN."

M: You told me that in Geneva. He said it to you twice?

K: He said it to me once.

M: (Laughs)

K: Now listen Pat, I know you feel strongly and I think you're totally wrong. The uncommitted at the UN are going to weep, wail, scream - but that's as far as it will go.

M: Now wait a while.

K: There is absolutely no reason - there's no reason on earth why South Vietnam which doesn't even have a government, it has nobody accredited to it, why they should be in the UN and South Korea which has been in existence for nearly 30 years should not be in. So we're on very strong moral grounds even if nobody votes with us.

M: Now just wait, Henry, wait.

K: I just want to know - I know you're carrying out instructions.

M: Sure.

K: But I want you to carry them out with conviction.

M: All right.

K: I don't want a drooping Irishman around there.

M: Now let's just be clear here. I have never got your view on this. I'm getting it now.

K: Oh, I see.
M: You invited me to say...

K: Oh no, I welcome your comments. I gave it to the President, incidentally. Actually I gave him your telegram because you didn't send another one.

M: Oh no, I sent you another one.

K: The second one I never saw. But I gave him your first one which was not exactly restrained — and your convictions. I mean I don't object to that. I thought it was well put. I gave it to him. He absolutely — I mean he is adamant against it between you and me on political grounds.

M: Right. Right.

K: So all my sophisticated arguments why I'm against it don't touch this point. He just doesn't want us to vote for North and South Vietnam on any grounds.

M: Right.

K: On that he's absolutely firm, but I really think...

M: Look, I sent you a cable to him. No, you'll make the case if you want to. Thank you very much. Here are some additional facts.

K: When did you send that?

M: Within an hour of getting your cable. Within 30 minutes.

K: To whom did you send it?

M: Through channels. As you say, you said to me "Reply in this channel."

K: Yeh. Let me find that and I'll give it to him this afternoon. But I can assure you he won't change his mind.

M: No, he's already said no. Let's speak clear. Two things. One is I asked — you suggested well, if you'd like me to take it up with the President again, I will. I say, well fine.

K: No, no, that's fine. No, no, you were right to do that.

M: But I never heard from you. You know I never heard.
K: No, I misunderstood - well, then there's been - I don't know what happened to your cable. I never saw it. The second one.

Second, we are - I mean he is absolutely determined to veto the two Vietnams.

Three, I had a long talk with Miki and Miyazawa here. They, of course, will go their own way. But I have this feeling that they understood and in that way of theirs even appreciate our position. It is easy enough for them to do in which they let us take the wrap.

M: Right.

K: But there was no argument out of them at all.

M: Let me tell you. I am saying to you here. This is a fairly important thing. Most things around here are. I was waiting for your decision to tell me "No, the decision stands. This is what I want."

K: Right. I thought that had been conveyed.

M: No, and so all day yesterday, the day before, I was saying "Well, Ok, we'll just wait because we'll get word any minute now." And it never came. That's point one.

Point two is that there are people down at the Department, and I don't like it one bit, who are acting like old Eleanor Roosevelt is in charge up here and I keep getting naughty cables saying "In no circumstances will we co-sponsor a resolution calling for an admission of the South and North Vietnam alone." Well, what in Christ is that all about. They've been sending cables for two weeks saying that would be a disastrous situation and we think we can avoid it this way or that way, you know.

K: That I don't know what that is about.

M: But they come from you.

K: No, no, let's get this straight. What my view was, I do not want to wind up in a position where having co-sponsored North and South Vietnam together with South Korea, somebody then says "since you co-sponsored them in one context why can't you co-sponsor them in another."

M: Right. We would never do that to you.

K: Who would never do it to me?
M: We. The instructions act as _________ had some idea we had here.

K: No, no, no, no, no. I said - my belief in the ability of the Foreign Service to act like ambulances and lawyers is unlimited. I simply wanted to make clear when I told them yesterday that I'd agree to co-sponsoring the three that nobody would come back to me then and say "having co-sponsored the three, what's wrong with co-sponsoring the two."

M: All right.

K: We're voting for the two.

M: Will you tell the guy that drafts those cables that come up from you that please stop acting like we're idiots up here and people who were determined to lose the Vietnam war.

K: Pat, it's got nothing to do with the Vietnam war.

M: Well, I know but I mean . . .

K: It's got to do with this, Pat. It's got to do with that sometime over the next year, year and a half, we're going to get into negotiations with both North and South Vietnam. In my experience with them you're better off if you have something they want than if you don't.

M: Right.

K: And therefore, there is no possibility of keeping them out of the UN for any extended period of time. Nor any intention. It just seems that in the year in which we got run out of Indochina in total violation of the agreement. At a time when South Korea has an infinitely better case for getting in than South Vietnam. It just isn't right for us to go along with their going in. I know you have a different view.

M: No, listen . . .

K: But that's my foreign policy view on it. Now the President on top of it - just so you understand everybody's thinking - the President feels it would be a disaster to him with the right if he did this.

M: Yeh. Yeh. I see what you mean.

K: The second part of it is not my concern.

M: All right, but when you say you know I have a different view please, for God's sake make clear to me you understand that my view is what will be the rational reaction, what costs we'll pay in other places.
K: Yeh, but I don't think we'll pay them for very long.

M: Well, let's hope. Let's hope.

K: Particularly if you act with straight conviction.

M: I've spoke with conviction yesterday that I think the North Koreans and the Japanese are already telling us - you know the North Korean comes in and says "Don't veto it before . . . . because we want to join the non-aligned."

K: Yeh, I saw that.

M: (Laughs) Now, I think there's no question about the equity of it. I'll make the .

K: All I want Pat, is your oratorical effort.

M: I've taken much more of your time asking now than I would have had if somehow I had got a little more clear the decision has been made, when it was made. People are so afraid of you in your bureaucracy, Henry.

K: Oh, nonsense.

M: Listen they go through; they don't know what you think and they always think you think the worst because they think that's the safest. You know.

K: Pat, don't join that nonsense. Everybody knew what I thought about this. There was no - anybody who pretended he didn't know was really trying to support your position. There was never any question about my view that anyone could have legitimately held. There's no question of fear. I have absolutely made clear to them where I stood.

M: Well, no one made clear to me.

K: Then they're afraid of you. There's no one who talked to me who could have been under the slightest misapprehension what my view was.

M: I get you. Well they so said.

K: They said it, Pat and just so you understand the mentality - it was because they were trying to change my mind. Not because they didn't know.

M: Yeh. Yeh, well OK.

K: They damn well knew what my view was.
M: All right. Now the Japanese have collapsed on us.

K: Yeh, that's what I figured.

M: And this afternoon, although they will get a single agenda, they will call for separate votes.

K: Separate vote on what?

M: From each nation in the listing.

K: Then we'll vote "no" on the two Vietnams.

M: You want me to vote "no" and not abstain?

K: Well, I don't know - well, you better handle the tactics of it. I just don't want them to get in. Now how you keep them out...

M: Oh no, we'll have to veto them when the -- when they adopt the agenda it'll come back...

K: Then you can abstain until the South Korean thing and then you can veto the whole business.

M: All right. Now let me be specific. After - we will veto - abstain until a report comes back from the Admissions Committee that says we recommend the admission of North Vietnam and South Vietnam and then I veto.

K: Right.

M: I can abstain until then.

K: Well, now but that doesn't get them in. Now I just don't want them to get in through some parliamentary maneuver.

M: No, there's no way they can get in by parliamentary maneuver.

K: I don't care what you do to put us in the best position...

M: I made explicitly clear yesterday that we were in favor of the admission of each and all of the countries.

K: What would you do? You would abstain on the two Vietnams, vote for South Korea and then veto the whole business.

M: That's right.
K: That's all right.
M: That's OK?
K: Yeh. ...
M: All right I have my instructions.
K: Yeh, but just make sure. I don't know the parliamentary situation well enough, Pat, I have to rely on you that your abstention on those two doesn't get them in.
M: That just gets them to the Admissions Committee where they're considered. And if we start voting you see, Korea will come last.
K: Yeh, OK now then abstain, vote yes on Korea and veto the whole thing.
M: All right. Now I made clear yesterday that we are in favor of the entry and the principle of universality for admission of each and all of these countries but we cannot accept the admission of only some of them.
K: We can't accept selective universality.
M: Selective universality. Can I use that?
K: Yeh.
M: OK. OK, and I will do - now listen just one last point, because of this I want to keep abstaining on just the procedural thing so no one can ever say we were against the admission of these other two countries per se. We're only against them because we are for universality and the other side won't let in a decent country like - I mean a country like South Korea which is clearly a country, then we can't have party to this whole thing.
K: Especially when South Vietnam . . . . the impression that it's a country.
M: OK.
K: Under present circumstances.
M: OK, but I'll be sending - it may be Friday, it may be next week we will be .
K: Yeh. OK.
M: All right. I got it. Obviously I won't be at your meeting this afternoon.
M: At your meeting this afternoon, let me just make one point. I'm sending you a long note about multilateral diplomacy to point up to you what happened to your instruction to raise hell with Pakistan and Guinea and Senegal and so forth. The main point...

K: Well what happened? Did they do it?

M: At least Diem went in and saw the French Secretary who said he didn't know anything about it. You know. Senegal happened to see the Prime Minister. I have a theory for you; I'm going to put it in front of you.

K: I would be anxious to see it.

M: If it takes you an hour to read it, I think it's worth it, but the point is to tell you there are 50 countries in the world which we have listed and by a criterion we worked out this time there'll be 50 in which (the important positions are multilateral).

K: I would love to see that and it's exactly what I hoped you would do.

M: I mean in these places the most important thing they do is how they vote in things like UNCTAD.

K: Pat, I also need your help on that UN speech because I may go to the Middle East around the 20th.

M: We just got the second version. I think it's a helluva good speech and we are working on it now.

K: Yeh, but it isn't good enough yet. It needs a little more philosophy.

M: That's right.

K: It needs a much more positive tone and the specifics have to be related to some theory. Will you help me with that?

M: I will help you with it. I am helping you with it.

K: Thank you, Pat.

M: On the Israeli thing...

K: And Saxbe will be kept in New Delhi. I just have to hang a little threat over you.

M: All right. Now listen, but on these - what happens when we leave Israel?
K: Now on this Israeli thing. I think we have to be careful not to turn it into a monumental event before it has happened. Because I'm afraid we're talking so much now that it may turn into a test of manhood.

M: Well, we stopped talking.

K: I would prefer to keep this thing to see whether it actually goes forward.

M: It will almost wholly determine whether there is a second stage agreement.

K: Exactly, that's what I'm trying to get down to.

M: Right and the point here is this. The proposal which you will typically get from IO and the Department is that if something happens at the UN you don't like do something to the UN. But the United Nations is nothing more than a voting machine up here. If you don't like what happens you have to deal with the countries that did it to you.

K: I agree with you. We have to do a little bit to the UN but above all we have to get after the countries.

M: Yeh. But if you don't do it there's no consequence for those countries, nothing will ever change and the present institutional arrangement at the Department of State there is never any consequence for behaving in a multilateral way in a way that we'd like.

K: There will be as soon as you tell me how to do it. I promise you. That's what I've been eager to achieve.

M: Yeh, otherwise this is just going to be a sterile . . . .

K: I could not agree more, Pat. Come down and see me sometime soon.

M: OK.

K: Bye.