MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

PARAMILITARY STUDY GROUP MEETING

AT THE PENTAGON

FOURTEENTH MEETING

12 MAY 1961

PRESENT

GENERAL TAYLOR
MR. KENNEDY
MR. DULLES
ADMIRAL BURKE

MR. LOVETT
MR. KING
COMMANDER MITCHELL
LT COLONEL TARMATER

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me that I haven't had time to count elsewhere in the CIA and overseas. There is only one counterintelligence publication in the Washington area, and for the life of me I have never been able to understand and I've never gotten an adequate answer to why in the world we don't realize that all intelligence is based on counterintelligence. We've been infiltrated until hell won't have it and yet the several military departments and Central Intelligence have a counterintelligence activity, and CIA has done some good work. They are the ones who turned up this fellow Abell.

STATEMENT: We also turned up all these spies in Britain.

MR. LOVEITT: Two questions I would like to pose to this group are: What's the use of having an intelligence organization if we're going to run it as a publicity operation with 10,000 people in Washington? I think we're licked. I think we're licked also unless we get on this counterintelligence business fast. I don't know whether you gentlemen have talked with J. Edgar Hoover, but this isn't good.

MR. LOVEITT: We should put it in an official secrets act and the first time we catch somebody with his foot off base, make an example of him. I tried that once in November, 1952, and I ran into difficulty.

STATEMENT: I was advised by the previous administration, that under our constitution, we couldn't have anything approaching the English official secrets act.

MR. LOVEITT: I think you could have something so close to it that you couldn't tell the difference. I don't see how you can have an effective intelligence service until you get it.

MR. DULLES: I'm first to recognize that I don't think that the CIA should run paramilitary operations of the type in Cuba, and possibly not of the type run in [redacted]. The Cuban operation has had a very serious effect on all our work. I believe there should be a new set-up. I think we should limit ourselves more to secret intelligence collection and operations of the non-military category except as they might be assigned to us under the control
of the kind of mechanism that we have been working on here. It's not clear in my mind, but I'm inclined to think that in this Government, we do keep our estimators entirely separate from operations. I think if you look at the [redacted] or Cuban estimates, you'll find a reasonably good appraisal of the forces in position against each other. I think you're quite right that when you get involved in a thing like [redacted], the operators, rather than the estimators, may attribute too much strength to the particular assets that are being marshalling. I think this is a fair criticism and something to be watched. I think, however, that rather than destroying everything and starting all over, we ought to take what's good in what we have, get rid of those things that are really beyond the competence of the CIA, then pull the thing together, and make it more effective. We should look over the 5412 papers and revise them in such manner that paramilitary operations are handled in some other way. It's not going to be easy to find a place to put them; it's very difficult to keep things secret. We did, however, I think have tactical surprise in Cuba when we landed. They didn't know where or when we were going to land.

MR. LOVETT: They didn't know where?

ANSWER: There's no evidence they did. They had no force there to prevent the landing on the beach.

MR. LOVETT: Weren't there some concrete pill boxes in the road section out from Bahia de Cochinos?

ANSWER: No.

MR. LOVETT: It's a tough, dirty business, but in today's world, I don't see how we can avoid going in to guerrilla type operations. I think the Communist method of operation has something we haven't acquired, and that is, the willingness to take abuse from the rest of the world, if it suits their purpose. For a long period of time, we've been primarily concerned with whether the world loves us. This is a false value. We have to acquire respect and trust, if possible, and if necessary, fear, or we're never going to beat these people.
QUESTION: I get the impression that insofar as CIA is concerned, you feel they should put their main effort in intelligence and counterintelligence?

MR. LOVETT: Yes, definitely, in coordination with the military services.

QUESTION: At the same time you recognize the inevitability of our getting into the paramilitary-type operation?

MR. LOVETT: Yes, it's more than recognizing the inevitability. I think we ought to make a national judgment that the world is a rough place to live in; that we literally can't survive under a dual standard where we are the good boys. We can't fight these fellows successfully until we are prepared to go to the same lengths that they are.

QUESTION: Since we must have an effective paramilitary capability, where should this capability be established?

MR. LOVETT: I have a feeling that it belongs in a military type organization but not as part of the Army, Navy, Air Force or the Marines. I don't want to see our Services get into these things until there's been a declaration of war.

STATEMENT: In the Army, they have the Special Forces which are organized with the concept that they would be the cadre put into a hostile country in time of war for the purpose of utilizing and organizing guerrilla assets there. They are not supposed to do this kind of thing in times of peace but it would be a fairly easy orientation.

ADMIRAL BURKE: Technically, the Americans can train people of other nations. What you cannot control is what they do with that training. Once you've trained these people, of course, they have their own ideas as to what they want to do, and they have considerable more power so they can move in the direction that they desire to.

QUESTION: That's exactly what happened to the Nationalist Chinese guerrillas in Burma. However, while recognizing that organization will never protect us from errors, do you see any reason for thinking the military shouldn't be in this?
MR. LOVETT: No, I don't see any valid objection to it. However, realistically we should be prepared to take a certain amount of odium without going through the rather transparent devices used in the past to cover our training of other people.

STATEMENT: We train these people overtly with our MAAG's. For example, we're doing it in Vietnam right now.

MR. LOVETT: In reflecting on Cuba, one wonders if the ground in Cuba shouldn't have been prepared through guerrilla warfare. If it takes 15 organized troops to one guerrilla, we should attribute Cuba through guerrilla operations. Then at some final point, we should build up a reliable core of Cubans within Cuba. I don't think we can build up any kind of intelligence security outside of Cuba.

QUESTION: This fomenting of guerrilla activity and the building up of the central core, do you visualize these as CIA activities?

MR. LOVETT: I think they'd have a part in it, but a relatively small part.

QUESTION: Would you work in some of the soldier of fortune types?

MR. LOVETT: It wouldn't bother me a bit provided they had a fire burning somewhere.

QUESTION: Would you comment in general on whether a landing on a hostile shore was within the established purposes of the CIA?

MR. LOVETT: I believe this is an area where I doubt that CIA has authority. I have never felt that the Congress of the United States ever intended to give the United States Intelligence Agency authority to conduct operations all over the earth.

STATEMENT: That's generally our conclusion about this, that it fell outside the intended purview of 5412/2.

MR. LOVETT: But this applies to an area greater than Cuba and greater than [redacted] greater than anything we have been talking about. The only country we don't dare operate in is England.

QUESTION: In meditating on how to tighten up our procedures for cold war operations to include this extreme form of paramilitary
operations, we have come up with something tentative which we've set forth on these two pages. Would you please run through these and give us your reaction?

MR. LOVETT: I think this is the right approach. It's a very ingenious idea.

STATEMENT: You mentioned that the U.S. military would not be the actual participant in paramilitary operations, but the trainer of the participant, and that you would have this training capability in the DOD, but outside the Army, Navy, or Air Force.

MR. LOVETT: What I'm trying to point out are two things: one, I don't think that Special Service Regimental Combat Teams of the Army ought to be assigned to guerrilla work, but I do think that in the Department of Defense, made up of experts from the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force, there ought to be a group which can if necessary supply officers and noncommissioned officers in the same manner in which they were supplied to the Filipino scouts.

MR. LOVETT: There's a situation that's coming up that appears to me to demand attention and that is the 300 American citizens who have applied for and been denied exit passports out of Cuba. If the facts indicate that as a result of Communist activities in Cuba, South America is in greater danger than we have previously been prepared to admit, then it seems to me the question becomes, are we as a nation prepared to say to these people: "You release those 300 Americans by a certain date or we'll come in and get them." That's about as clear an invitation to war as you can have. Unless the country as a whole is prepared to take that kind of a stand and mean it, and tell the rest of the world to go soak their heads - none of this kind of peripheral action is going to mean a thing.

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