Document No. 6

Mr. Teltschik’s Memorandum for Chancellor Kohl

Bonn, December 6, 1989

Re: The Soviet Union and the “German Question”

I am forwarding the attached “official” as well as “unofficial” considerations through the confidential channel that You and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed upon beforehand.¹ The bearer told me explicitly that the “official position” contained the considerations of the “highest circles” (General Secretary Gorbachev); the “unofficial” deliberations are ideas that were discussed in the International Department of the Central Committee (Politburo member Yakovlev).

Numbers 1 through 7 show that significant considerations in your 10 Point Plan for Deutschlandpolitik go back to Soviet leadership.

The unofficial second part documents that the Soviet leadership is seriously discussing the various possibilities of the reunification issue. Your 10 Point Plan prevents the world public from facing the German question with Soviet proposals, without being aware of the Federal Government’s position.

Vote:

The points covered in Part II should be discussed as soon as possible in the Germany Circle [Deutschlandkreis] convened by Minister Seitzes. Through confidential channels General Secretary Gorbachev should be offered to speak with you. At this talk you should be in the position to discuss the addressed topics with the Soviet side.

Teltschik

Soviet Union and the “German Question”

I. “Official” Position

1. The Soviet leadership has a basically positive attitude towards the developments in the GDR.

¹ Portugalov, an analyst in the CC CPSU International Department, gave the document to Mr. Teltschik on the morning of November 21, 1989. During the conversation Teltschik initiated a meeting between Chancellor Kohl and General Secretary Gorbachev. Immediately afterward he informed Kohl. “If Gorbachev and his advisers are already discussing the possibility of reunification and the related questions” it is “high time” for Deutschlandpolitik to go “on the offensive.” Kohl was “already on the way to the next meeting” but wanted to “speak about it in detail as soon as possible.” The Chancellor also considered it “necessary to meet with Gorbachev in person soon.” (Teltschik, 329 Tage, 42-45).
2. No interference in the GDR’s affairs, but developments without the Soviet Union, let alone against it, would have been inconceivable.

From the beginning, the Soviet Union knew what consequences its own reform politics would have in the GDR.

3. In the Soviet Union, structural transformation in all areas (political, economic, the “nationalities sphere”) is still in the beginning stages. It is even more so in the GDR.

However, contrary to the USSR, the development, quality and speed of the transformation in the GDR crucially depends on the policies of the Federal Government.

4. Political slogans may sound sensible, for example the precedence of the common European order for lasting peace over the solution of the German question, or the solution of the German question exclusively under a European roof. But they could also prove to be empty formulas or, which would be worse, they could contradict realistic policies.

The Soviet Union is concerned that the development of German-German relations can go in an undesirable and dangerous direction during the deciding phase of these landmark moments—on the same grounds as always.

5. The developments in the GDR should remain in accord with the spirit and the letter of the joint German-Soviet declaration from June 12, 1989. This concerns above all things the recognition of the existing European post-war structures as the basis for new developments for the foreseeable future.

For the Soviet Union this means that the construction of a common European order for lasting peace has to have priority over the solution of the German question, i.e. before figuring out the form of the Germans’ future national and state existence. The common European order for peace has to be accepted as an indispensable condition for the solution of the German question.

6. The strict, unlimited and absolute adherence to the Moscow and Warsaw Agreements, including the Basic Treaty with the GDR, must be the matter of course until the new European peace order and stability are securely in place.

7. Today there is a new situation in the GDR. At this point it would be suitable to find a new Modus vivendi on the basis of the Basic Treaty with the GDR.

Prime Minister Modrow’s proposal of the wide-ranging co-operation treaty [Vertragsgemeinschaft] should make it possible to handle the FRG’s exclusive mandate [Alleinvertretungsanspruch] restrictively and pragmatically. Otherwise the GDR’s Existence would objectively be threatened.
II. “Unofficial” Considerations

The hour has come to free the relationship between the GDR and the FRG from relics of the past.

1. The GDR is dependent on economic co-operation. Preconditions should not lead to the renunciation and destabilization of the GDR. The Federal Government should be generous and have patience.

2. In the sphere of disarmament additional great possibilities are opening up for both States of the German Nation. It is now completely up to the Federal Government how quickly and comprehensively progress can be achieved on the disarmament issues in the interests of both German states.

3. It is the Soviet Union’s desire and request that the long-term solution to the German Question not be tied up in daily politics or the election campaign.

4. A purely theoretical question: if the Federal Government intends to introduce the question of the reunification and/or new unification to practical policy then it would be reasonable to openly consider the future alliance affiliation of both German states and the withdrawal clause of the Paris Treaties\(^2\) and the Rome Treaties in the case of reunification.\(^3\)

5. Theoretically, if the GDR were to be quickly integrated into the European Community, should the Soviet Union then sit at the side table and carry out their business with the GDR through Brussels, paying European taxes and renouncing their current most-

\(^2\) Through the Protocol for amending and adding to the Treaty of Brussels, signed on October 23, 1954, in Paris (with additions and correspondence in: UNTS. Vol. 211, 342-349, 350-387; BGBl. 1955 II, 258-261, 262-282), the Federal Republic and Italy entered into the Treaty (Treaty on cooperation in economic, social and cultural affairs and for collective self-defense, signed on March 17, 1948 in Brussels, in: UNTS. Vol. 19, 51-63), that would be redefined in the West European Union; according to Article XII of the Treaty of Brussels an exit is possible “after the expiration of fifteen years.” At the same time the foreign minister of NATO States decided in Paris to invite the FRG to join NATO (Protocol from October 23, 1954, ibidem Vol. 243, 308-313). According to article 12 of the North Atlantic Treaty from April 4, 1949 (as amended in the protocol from October 17, 1951: ibidem Vol. 34, 243-255 and Vol. 126, 352; BGBl. 1955 II, 289-294) each party can let the Treaty be phased out after a period of 20 years.

\(^3\) According to article 240, the Agreement to found the European Economic Community, signed on March 25, 1957 in Rome (with additions in: BGBl. 1957 II, 766-963, here 900) was valid for unlimited time. The German delegation at the intergovernmental conference for the joint market and the European Atomic Energy Community [EURATOM] stated on February 28, 1957 to a committee of delegation leaders “the acknowledgement that ‘the leadership of the GDR stems from the premise that the founding agreement of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community would be revised in case of German reunification’” (draft of a protocol from a meeting on February 28 and March 1, 2 and 3, 1957 in Brussels, Ch.Del. 406, MAE 777 d/57, Mach 9, 1957; BArch B 102/10870. Also: compilation of the displayed statements for the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community Agreement, MAE 874 d/57 and MAE 890 d/57, March 26, 1957, ibidem.)
favored-nation status with the GDR? This is also something the Federal Government should think about.

6. Together with the German question, the Soviet Union is thinking about all the possible alternatives, even, in a manner of speaking, the “unthinkable.” They knew from the beginning how to be involved in case of a reformation of the GDR. In this context, the USSR would be interested to know the Federal Republic’s attitude towards a possible peace treaty. The FRG cannot rely on its allies in this, who would not want to do away with the Occupation Statute.

7. The USSR follows with laughter and tears “some of the clever heads in Bonn” who see a solution in a future German Confederation integrated into the European Community, thereby embellishing the all-European integration. This direction does not suit the USSR. The Federal Government should consider that the Soviet Union can bait the Western Allies in Paris with the idea of two peace treaties, one with the FRG and one with the GDR. In this case you can be sure that the Western allies would call for more power in the FRG than the USSR calls for in the GDR.

8. Therefore it can be assumed that on the path of the two German states growing closer together the question of a peace treaty will arise very soon. It would be therefore reasonable to confidentially think about it together, possibly also together with the GDR.

9. It is conceivable that in the foreseeable future, in the medium term, the USSR could give the green light to a German confederation of the usual nature. This would require that there would be no more foreign nuclear presence on German soil. This would perhaps be the only Conditio sine qua non that the Soviet Union could have to uphold future good conduct in terms of German regulations.

[Source: Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit. Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/90. Translated by Anna Melyakova.]