Interagency Review of U.S. Government Civilian
Humanitarian & Transition Programs

SECTION II: OPTIONS

Discrete Measures

Clarifying Who is in Charge

Consolidation of State & USAID Civilian Humanitarian
Programs
SECTION II: OPTIONS

A. Discrete Measures

Rationale: There are several pragmatic, immediately actionable steps (outlined below) which may enhance the effectiveness of USG civilian humanitarian programs. They can be pursued individually or as a package. These incremental measures, reliant upon good will and trust among PRM and BHR officers, emphasize strengthening the humanitarian voice at senior foreign policy circles, the creation of new coordination mechanisms, and expanded joint operational coordination and outreach. They also emphasize clarifying interagency coordination through written protocols, including with DOD.

PROS: Through enhanced institutional cooperation, these various measures may strengthen a humanitarian culture across State and USAID and lead to more effective field operations and greater interagency policy and programmatic consultation. A joint PRM/BHR Policy and Planning Task Force, if led robustly, could help better inform senior policymakers of the humanitarian implications of political and military decisions. These measures do not foreclose more aggressive future options; indeed, their success or failure may illuminate which more ambitious options make most sense.

CONS: These measures do not address who is in charge; the structural dispersal of responsibilities across State and USAID does not change. Proposals for improved coordination and joint action highlight — and tacitly reinforce — overlapping responsibilities and redundancy of civilian programs. These measures do not result in a clean division of responsibility or institutional specialization.

1) Create a senior humanitarian policy seat.

(This is an option which the Core Group recommends under all scenarios, whether the preferred course is discrete measures, intermediate options or consolidation.)

The Secretary, following consultations with the Administrator of USAID, recommends to the NSC Adviser that there be a dedicated humanitarian seat at all future Principals’ and Deputies’ foreign policy deliberations that concern a potential or current humanitarian emergency.

The humanitarian representative will be at the Assistant Secretary/Assistant Administrator level or higher when warranted. Though ultimate authority on who fills that seat will rest with the Secretary of State, in most instances the decision will be taken at the A/S level through consultations between State and USAID, with input from the NSC.

2) Create a PRM/BHR Policy and Planning Task Force.
The Task Force will be commissioned by the A/S PRM and AA BHR. It would consciously upgrade and formalize promising coordination initiatives that heretofore have been informal, and would regularly provide input to the senior Advisory Council proposed under the intermediate options.

The Task Force will include BHR and PRM’s policy and planning staff. As warranted, it will include staff from other bureaus of State and USAID and other agencies.

Core functions will include:

- Budgetary consultations and reviews: vet proposals, forecast emergency resources requirements, assign lead responsibility on specific follow-up tasks.

- Coordinate a unified approach to the policies and programs of the UN implementing partners, especially OCHA, UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF.

- Refinement of U.S. policy on critical, emergent humanitarian issues: e.g. internally displaced persons; protection of field operations; integration of human rights and relief programs; information collection and dissemination; management of media and private donations.

- Contingency planning for priority emergent crises.

- Enhancement of State/USAID operational coordination in the field.

- Expedite procurement and logistics.

- For post-conflict transitions, build upon the Integrated Strategic Planning (ISP) process (pioneered by USAID’s Great Horn of Africa Initiative) as an interagency tool for detailed planning.

2) Intensify joint outreach activities

NGOs

- Expand upon current monthly PRM/BHR/InterAction meetings by introducing regular (perhaps quarterly) sessions that review country programs and plans, emergent policy issues, and status of funding, among other issues.

Congress

- Conduct joint Hill briefings on on-going and emergent emergencies.

- Engage Senate and House Appropriation staff jointly on important incremental legislative adjustments and emergent policy issues: e.g. options to stabilize future funding for USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives; means to better respond to internally displaced persons. (following up on some of the recommendations contained in the Kunder report.)
• Work together on Congressional and Staff delegation (CODEL, STAFFDEL) travel.

Media

• Jointly develop a focused strategy for improved management of media interest during crises, including USG overall public diplomacy. This will be undertaken in close consultation with U/S Lieberman’s office.

• Initiate regular (perhaps monthly) joint background briefings for the press on on-going humanitarian emergencies and emergent issues.

4) Better integrate operations

Situation reports

• PRM and BHR collaborate to produce a single, unified classified report (for internal use) and a single external report for public affairs purposes.

Training

• Expand inclusion of PRM staff into USAID’s DART training.

• Support implementation partners (UN, IOs, and NGOs) in developing standard staff and volunteer training programs in field management, technical areas (health, water, sanitation) and security.

• Develop training for both State and USAID field officers who will be responsible for liaison with the embassy/field mission during a disaster.

Assessment

• PRM and BHR agree that wherever sensible assessment missions will be conducted jointly.

• Actively distill lessons learned from recent fruitful joint assessments (e.g. Sierra Leone, Macedonia, Kosovo) with a view to streamlining evaluation instruments, clarifying interagency division of labor and information requirements, and expediting production of joint reports.

• BHR and PRM collaborate in evaluating DART teams’ performance to date, including the trend towards more robust and diversified DART teams with direct operational responsibilities, and management of DART relations with our embassies and Washington. Findings and recommendations for future policy towards the DART will be provided to the A/S PRM and AA BHR within a brief time frame (e.g. 60 days).
• Collaborate to ensure the best possible technical means are available for assessments, and that they are effectively coordinated, including the new Global Disaster Information Network (GDIN), FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System (GiEWS), and the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS). Include intelligence assessments, where appropriate.

**Washington operations**

• Designate lead operations officers for individual crises for both PRM and BHR who will be responsible for overall coordination of programmatic activities.

• Develop ‘surge capacity’ to allow effective response to multiple, simultaneous crises. Identify and train a reserve of State and USAID officers ready and willing to serve. Identify language and area expertise.

• Develop a comprehensive roster of specialized expertise available in the NGO community and the private sector which can be mobilized quickly as part of a ‘surge capacity.’ Explore feasibility of select NGO specialization in certain technical areas such as health, water and sanitation.

**Field operations**

• Incorporate PRM personnel, as appropriate, into USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs).

• Strengthen joint overseas planning.

USAID and PRM will consult closely on scope, timing and exit strategy for DART teams.

As BHR establishes new regional field offices, or otherwise prepositions personnel in crisis-prone regions, BHR will work closely with PRM’s Regional Refugee Coordinators to devise co-location arrangements (creation of regional hubs) or alternatively, to divide coverage between PRM and BHR across regions.

The above measures could be codified into a written State-USAID protocol on coordination of emergency operations. Technical assistance should be sought from FEMA.

**Human resources**

• Develop improved career development systems in both State and USAID for Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel with humanitarian policy and program management skills.

• Change existing personnel procedures to allow USAID and State officers (Civil Service and Foreign Service) with proven humanitarian experience to compete for positions in each other’s agency on the same basis as “within agency” applicants. This would facilitate the
development of a humanitarian career path for both Civil and Foreign Service employees. It would also permit greater cross-fertilization between State and USAID humanitarian operations and help break down barriers resulting from different organizational cultures.

5) **Develop a State/USAID protocol on coordination with DOD**

- A State/USAID team, with the active backing of the Secretary and the USAID Administrator and input from the NSC, will enter discussions with DOD to put in writing mutually acceptable baseline criteria and mechanisms for use of DOD support for humanitarian assistance.

- A principal aim will be to minimize delays in accessing essential DOD support by defining more clearly what the U.S. military, under different scenarios, can be expected to contribute, what accounts will be accessed, and what prior operational planning on the civilian side is required.

6) **Develop clear procedures for managing public donations**

- Develop a public information campaign which helps inform the American people of the most useful way to contribute to international disaster relief.

- Devise a system for identifying UN and other international organizations and NGOs which are willing and able to manage sudden, large volumes of financial and other donations from the public.

- Clarify the use of DOD space available (Denton Amendment) transportation in the case of international emergencies.
B. Clarifying who is in charge

**Rationale:** A central conclusion of the review is that clarifying who is in charge is critical to strengthening the effectiveness of U.S. civilian humanitarian programs. The three options in this middle category provide the Secretary with immediately actionable choices to test the thesis that a more unified, coherent leadership can make a substantial difference, without requiring an overhaul of current institutional arrangements.

**Common elements:** Each lead figure has a direct line of accountability to the Secretary, and the Secretary has ultimate authority to reach beyond this lead figure when circumstances require. Each lead figure, it is proposed, should chair and benefit from a Senior Humanitarian Advisory Council (outlined below) and fill a humanitarian seat at high-level policy deliberations. Each will be charged with a common set of responsibilities: e.g., provide operational and policy guidance to both BHR and PRM and resolve disputes; review and provide guidance on humanitarian resource allocations within the Function 150 accounts (while recognizing that, in the absence of legislative changes, the authorities for the different accounts will remain separate); designate a lead civilian coordinator for specific emergencies; act as the primary humanitarian representative in dealing with the Defense Department and U.S. military commands; solicit input from the State/USAID Policy and Planning Task Force; oversee media management and USG representation to donors and international organizations.

The three options include (i) substantially strengthen the USAID Administrator’s role; (ii) predetermine that lead responsibility for all natural disasters will rest with BHR and for all complex emergencies with PRM, unless the Secretary decides higher level representation is required in a particular case; and (iii) create a mechanism that allocates responsibilities for emergencies on a case-by-case basis.

Each option raises questions about the appropriate rank of the person responsible for leading USG humanitarian efforts. Each option strikes a different balance between operational responsibility and seniority.

These options would require consultations with Congress, but no legislative modification of authorities. For any of these, the President’s designation of a Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance would need to be revisited, in light of the Secretary of State’s expanded statutory authorities.

**Ambiguity:** These options are inherently ambiguous. Power is shifted to a single individual, aided by a senior Council, but existing institutional, legal and budgetary authorities remain in place. This shift may be sufficient to overcome present constraints on the effectiveness of civilian humanitarian programs such that the option itself provides a satisfactory solution and no further action is required. On the other hand, because it does not remove enduring structural constraints, this set of options may introduce unnecessary bureaucratic layers without significantly improving effectiveness.
Creation of a Senior Humanitarian Advisory Council

The Council's Chair would be determined by which option was selected, as explained below.

Council members would include the PRM Assistant Secretary, BHR Assistant Administrator, DOD Deputy Assistant Secretary for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs, the NSC Senior Director for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs and the National Intelligence Officer for Economics and Global Issues. USDA, DRL, SWC, OMB, and others would be included, as warranted.

The Advisory Council would meet monthly to discuss priority crosscutting policy issues and when necessary, to provide policy guidance to the Secretary of State, along with the USAID Administrator and the National Security Adviser. It would not have responsibility for management of ongoing or emergent crises, but would obviously be called upon to provide advisory input.

The Council would examine, inter alia, means of strengthening the resource base for humanitarian affairs; civilian/military humanitarian coordination; early crisis warning; intelligence sharing with international organizations; and policy development regarding internally displaced persons, protection of field personnel and operations, and integration of human rights and relief operations. The Council would receive regular input from the State/USAID Policy and Planning Task Force.

Option 1: Strengthen the USAID Administrator's Special Coordinator Role

Description: This option systematically strengthens the Administrator's capacity to lead on humanitarian affairs.

Rationale: The President has designated the USAID Administrator as the USG's International Disaster Relief Coordinator, with broad responsibilities. While that role has been problematic on account of State-USAID differences and competing Agency demands on the USAID Administrator, the Administrator has provided effective humanitarian leadership during select priority crises. If the Presidential designation were elaborated, so that the Administrator's office and responsibilities are realigned to give much greater weight to humanitarian affairs, a closer linkage to the Secretary of State, and broader interagency acceptance of the Administrator's role, the Administrator could become a far more authoritative and continuous leader of humanitarian affairs.

Elements:

- The President and Secretary of State reaffirm and elaborate the designation of the USAID Administrator as the USG International Disaster Relief Coordinator. Accompanying statements spell out that henceforth a lead priority within the Administrator's portfolio of
responsibilities is to be fully and routinely in charge of U.S. humanitarian response, provide a continuous humanitarian leadership in policy deliberations, and report directly and routinely to the Secretary of State on humanitarian issues.

- The USAID Administrator fills a reserved chair at Principals' Meetings. A humanitarian seat is reserved at Deputies' meetings, filled by a senior USAID or State humanitarian officer designated by the USAID Administrator.

- USAID creates a new humanitarian secretariat within the Administrator's office. Its Director is the equivalent rank of a Deputy Administrator, and as necessary, that person stands in for the Administrator. The humanitarian secretariat prepares internal and external USG reports, drawing on BHR and PRM sources, for each humanitarian emergency. It leads on media relations on humanitarian emergencies.

- The USAID Administrator chairs the Senior Humanitarian Advisory Council.

**Pros:** Systematically builds on the current Presidential designation, the substantial authority and senior rank of the Administrator's office, and that office's evolving accountability to the Secretary of State. Creates a new Secretariat with a Director who can provide continuous, full-time oversight of humanitarian programs. Requires reallocation of relatively modest USAID personnel and resources. Preserves a measure of space between U.S. humanitarian objectives and U.S. political/national security interests. Could strengthen the linkage of relief, transition and development assistance.

**Cons:** The USAID Administrator might be unable to reconcile steep, continuous humanitarian demands with other pressing agency business. Separates bureaucratic responsibility for one aspect of USG response to a crisis (humanitarian) from other aspects (diplomatic, peacekeeping) which will remain part of State. Strong, continuous humanitarian leadership by the USAID Administrator might generate tensions with State Department regional Assistant Secretaries and be seen as weakening USAID's development assistance programs and State's PRM Bureau.

**Option 2: Lead pre-determined by type of crisis**

**Description:** State/PRM would be the lead agency for humanitarian response in complex emergencies and USAID/BHR would be the lead agency in natural disaster situations.

**Rationale:** It applies a decision rule that clearly assigns lead agency responsibility on the basis of functional criteria and some of the comparative advantages of State and USAID. State leads complex emergencies because of its close linkage with political and diplomatic interests. USAID leads on natural disasters since these are primarily operational and short-term, and recovery is often linked to long-term development interests.
Elements:

- The PRM Assistant Secretary or AID/BHR Assistant Administrator is assigned lead agency responsibility according to the nature of the humanitarian emergency. State/PRM would lead in situations of complex humanitarian emergencies, while AID/BHR would lead on natural disasters.

- State/PRM and AID/BHR retain existing responsibilities for other humanitarian response requirements that do not meet the criteria for designation of a lead agency (for example, refugees in non-complex emergency situations for PRM; disaster assistance and transition activities in non-complex emergency situations for AID/BHR).

- Complex humanitarian emergencies are defined as “crises caused, in whole or in part, by armed conflict and/or massive human rights abuses, leading to large-scale population displacement and/or widespread humanitarian need requiring international assistance and protection.” Natural disasters would include any humanitarian assistance situation caused primarily by natural factors, including flood, earthquakes, severe storms, drought-induced famine, and environmental degradation.

- In most cases, it would be self-evident which agency would assume the lead role under these criteria. Where there was a dispute, an Action Memorandum would be sent to the Secretary of State for his/her decision on lead agency designation.

- The Assistant Secretary/Assistant Administrator for the agency that is not designated as the lead for a particular crisis response will be responsible for ensuring that its staff are lending their expertise and full support to the crisis response, consistent with the agency’s legislative mandate. If necessary, staff will be seconded from the secondary agency to the lead agency to facilitate close coordination.


Cons: Doesn’t create unified leadership. The distinction is often not clear between complex emergencies and natural disasters (how to deal with Sudan, North Korea, Indonesia, Nigeria?). State and USAID presently both address complex emergencies, often in separate modalities (e.g. PRM largely through multilateral channels, BHR largely through bilateral, NGO channels.) Would create new distance between response to complex emergencies and USAID’s transition and development programs. The decision rule itself could be seen as politicizing humanitarian relief.

Option 3: Case-by-Case Designation of Authority

Description: The Secretary would rely upon the Senior Humanitarian Advisory Council mechanism to recommend a designated lead for civilian humanitarian programs on a case-by-case basis. The Secretary would turn to the NSC to direct the Council in order to ensure the most effective civil-military linkages.

Rationale: Policymakers need assurance that there will be a single, civilian agency accountable for managing the overall USG humanitarian response to crises. They also need flexibility to permit the agency with the most experience in a particular area to play the lead role.

Elements:

• The Advisory Council would recommend designation of a single humanitarian coordinator, from State or USAID, to manage the USG response to individual humanitarian crises on a case by case basis. The Chairman would make the recommendation, with counsel from the other core members of the Advisory Council. Whenever possible, the lead will be designated in advance of the actual crisis to facilitate better planning and preparation. The Advisory Council may also recommend that the pre-designation of a particular category of humanitarian crisis to a particular agency (e.g. natural disaster to USAID.)

• In most cases, the Advisory Council will recommend the designation of either the PRM A/S or the BHR AA, who are members of the committee, to serve as the Humanitarian Coordinator. However, this would not preclude either the White House or the State Department from determining that an Under Secretary-equivalent or higher level U.S. official should lead high profile humanitarian responses.

• The designated Humanitarian Coordinator will provide the USG humanitarian voice at deputy-level deliberations.

• The Assistant Secretary/Assistant Administrator for the agency that is not designated as the lead for an individual crisis will be responsible for ensuring that its staff fully support the crisis response. The Chairman will reinforce this imperative. As needed, staff will be seconded from the secondary agency to the lead agency.

Pros: Designates lead while systematically guaranteeing flexibility, based on agencies’ experience in given areas; provides exceptional voice and authority for the Advisory Council and broadens its reach to encompass military humanitarian efforts; specifies priority focus by Humanitarian Coordinator on select crises.

Cons: Does not create predictable or unified leadership. If lead responsibility shifts regularly, there is reduced accumulated institutional learning and increased confusion in dealing with other donors. Rotation of chair at Deputies’ meetings might degrade the chair’s authority; disputes over lead responsibility, particularly in joint refugee/IDP operations, might deadlock the
Advisory Council. Interjects the NSC into State-USAID relationship. A case-by-case approach has been attempted by the UN over the past decade, with poor results.
C. Consolidation of State and USAID Humanitarian Programs

Rationale: Consolidation of U.S. civilian humanitarian functions into one agency provides the best opportunity for ensuring unified humanitarian leadership and coordinated planning and operations among U.S. civilian humanitarian actors. Consolidation presents, however, major legislative, bureaucratic and financial challenges and would require the active, sustained commitment of the President and the Secretary of State. It might also encounter resistance from NGOs and others who favor the existing decentralized system and oppose centralization in principle.

The paper presents three options – consolidation of U.S. humanitarian functions into State, consolidation into USAID and creation of a new humanitarian agency that would incorporate the humanitarian functions of both State and USAID. Consolidation into either State or USAID would also require substantial internal changes, in organization and sense of mission, in both the agency that sheds functions and the agency that gains functions. Each option includes the movement of all entities that support humanitarian programming, planning and operations (financial management, contracting, logistics, personnel, etc.), including those functions that reside outside the functional bureaus managing humanitarian assistance in both USAID and State, to the recipient agency to ensure continued operations. Creation of a new U.S. humanitarian agency, while providing the clearest break with the past, would be the most costly option, in terms of both financial and prior political investment.

Central to deciding among the three possibilities is what priority is attached to competing policy goals: to integrate humanitarian affairs into foreign policy; to create an empowered single-focus humanitarian entity; and to integrate relief, transition and development assistance. It is clear that the reorganization of State to take on bilateral humanitarian and transition assistance and operations would provide the most systematic assurance that humanitarian assistance will be closely linked with broader foreign policy considerations. Similarly, the reorganization of USAID to take on multilateral and refugee assistance components would provide the best structural opportunities for linking humanitarian assistance and transition with development. It should be noted, however, that under the current divisions of responsibility, neither State nor USAID have excelled in ensuring these linkages with the programs that they respectively manage, nor has either agency given adequate profile to its humanitarian assistance components. Finally, a new humanitarian agency would have the highest profile and chance of becoming an empowered single-focus international emergency agency.

Common Elements: The State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration and USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Response would form the core of any consolidation option. Consideration should be given to all of the below listed elements that might logically be placed within a consolidated civilian humanitarian structure. Also, adequate funding and staffing arrangements would be required to ensure that the functions within each agency that form the necessary “tail” to support humanitarian programs are replicated or accommodated within the recipient agency.
State offices that would logically form part of a unified civilian humanitarian structure include: State/PRM, except population activities; State/I/O components related to voluntary funding of all UN humanitarian agencies, including UNICEF, WFP and OCHA; State/I/O functions related to relief information management, such as Global Disaster Information Network (GDIN) and Reliefweb; State Global Demining Policy Coordination; and humanitarian components of SEED and the Freedom and Support Act.

USAID offices that would logically form part of a unified civilian humanitarian structure include: USAID/BHR’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Office of Food for Peace and Office of Transition Initiatives; USAID/Global Bureau’s War Victims Fund.

The head of the unified humanitarian structure would provide senior leadership within the USG on issues of humanitarian response and transitions, including participation in appropriate senior interagency fora, and would ensure that humanitarian activities were effectively linked with broader foreign policy considerations and sustainable development efforts. He or she would also ensure effective coordination of relevant programs and activities within the USG, working closely with State, USAID, the White House, NSC, OMB, DOD, USDA, FEMA, DOJ, the intelligence community and other departments and agencies. Such coordination might require the establishment of formal councils within the USG, which would be chaired by the lead appointee or his or her designee. Also, he or she would provide senior leadership on humanitarian response and transition issues with other bilateral donors, the EU, the UN and other international organizations and with PVOS/NCOs. He or she would ensure consistent, dynamic U.S. leadership in the Executive Board meetings of UN organizations and, where appropriate, World Bank forums.

Structure: The precise structure of the consolidated humanitarian entity should be determined through interagency task forces. Notionally, the consolidated humanitarian entity would include: the head of the unified humanitarian structure (State U/S, USAID Deputy or USAHR Administrator) and an appropriate number of Assistant Secretary-level deputies. Offices in the structure would be organized around functional and regional specialization. Functional areas would include: crisis response; refugee and displaced persons protection, assistance and resettlement; policy planning; budget and financial management; outreach to the media, congress, multilateral and non-governmental organizations; and technical expertise in health, water, sanitation, shelter and food aid issues.

1) Consolidation of Civilian Humanitarian Programs into the Department of State

Elements:

- Create at State a new Under Secretary for Humanitarian Response and Human Rights to directly manage humanitarian, transition and human rights policy and operations. An appropriate number of Assistant Secretary-rank deputies would assist the U/S.

- Designate the Under Secretary as the President and the Secretary’s Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance.
Pros: Enhances the reach and force of the State Department in leading U.S. foreign policy. Results in the greatest incorporation of humanitarian affairs and human rights into U.S. foreign policy: through senior leadership within State itself and the close interface with State’s geographic bureaus. Provides consistent Under-Secretary level humanitarian and human rights representation at Deputies Committees, and direct, high-level, informed guidance to the Secretary on humanitarian and human rights issues.

Cons: Could raise concerns by NGOs and others that USG humanitarian interests would be compromised by other foreign policy interests. The direct link between humanitarian/short-term transition assistance and longer-term transition assistance/development would not be structurally assured. Would require considerable effort and perhaps additional costs to incorporate the USAID “tail” into State: e.g., procurement and financial management support services, and field operations management. Removal of humanitarian assistance from USAID could result in decreased public and congressional support for long-term development.

(2) Consolidation into USAID:

Elements:

- The Administration would work with Congress to change the name and redefine the mandate of USAID to render development and humanitarian components co-equal.

- Create a second Deputy Administrator for Humanitarian Response and Transitions, who would directly manage all humanitarian and transition policy and operations. An appropriate number of Assistant Administrators would assist the Deputy Administrator.

- Re-designate the Administrator of USAID as Special Coordinator for the President and the Secretary of State for International Disaster Assistance thus strengthening the direct reporting line from USAID to the Secretary on humanitarian and transition issues. In most cases, the Deputy Administrator for Humanitarian Response and Transition would serve as the Administrators implementing agent for fulfilling this coordination function, though the Administrator may choose to play the role for select high-profile crisis responses.

Pros: Facilitates close linkages between humanitarian assistance and transition and longer-term development. Brings USAID much more directly into U.S. foreign policy process: strengthens the linkage between USAID and the Secretary of State while retaining continuity in USAID’s lead responsibility on foreign aid programs. Consolidation becomes a reinvention of USAID, which puts USAID into a much more favorable position vis-à-vis future debates on U.S. foreign aid and the utility of USAID. Would be preferred by NGOs who do both relief and development work and their supporters.

Cons: Link between humanitarian and transition assistance and foreign policy would not be structurally assured. Would be perceived as a shift away from State’s currently specialized focus on refugees, raising opposition from refugee policy and resettlement groups and their supporters. Heightened role for humanitarian and transitional assistance would be viewed within USAID and
to external actors as a shift away from long-term development programming, raising resistance within USAID and among development assistance advocates and their supporters on the Hill. A second Deputy Administrator might complicate USAID's internal management structure. Consolidation into USAID could invite greater political interference from Congress.

(3) **Consolidation into a new agency:**

**Elements:**

- Create a new U.S. Agency for Humanitarian Response (USAHR), under the authority of the Secretary of State and headed by an Administrator co-equal to the current USAID Administrator. An appropriate number of Assistant Secretary rank officials would assist the Administrator.

- Establish an interagency council, under the overall management of the USAHR Administrator, to ensure foreign policy integration and effective interagency coordination on crisis response, transition and refugee policy issues.

- Incorporate a robust operational mechanism within USAHR, modeled on FEMA, to permit large-scale U.S. civilian direct implementation capacity when traditional response mechanisms (funding through PVOs/NGOs/multilateral organizations) are insufficient or inadequate.

- Designate the USAHR Administrator as the President and the Secretary's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance.

**Pros:** Would represent the cleanest break from the past, providing the best opportunity for articulating a bold commitment to humanitarianism and a clear, integrated vision for civilian humanitarian response distinct from the existing bureaucratic and institutional biases. The only option that provides for an agency head who is devoted full-time to humanitarian and transition policy and programs, thus best meeting the need for improved humanitarian advocacy. Incorporates new, robust civilian operational capacity, modeled on FEMA that is missing from our current structures.

**Cons:** Requires the most substantial legislative and organizational changes of any of the options under consideration, requiring a substantial investment of time, human resources and political capital (including Presidential leadership) to implement. Runs counter to the direction of recent legislation on foreign affairs reorganization, which has sought to reduce the number of foreign affairs agencies through consolidation into State. Does not structurally assure links with either broader foreign policy or long-term development. The most expensive option. Removal of humanitarian assistance from USAID could result in decreased public and congressional support for long-term development.