SECRET

PAGE 01
STATE 030225
ORIGIN NODIS-00
INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 (NODIS) R
DRAFTED BY EA/K: AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEEN: AG
APPROVED BY S - THE SECRETARY
EA/K: RICH
E: M. ARMACOST
S/S: SILEPOKETEN
S/S: DJETAYLOR
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
DEFENSE, CIA

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMBASSARY SEOUL IMMEDIATE
INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 6230

TOP SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

1. FOLLOWING HIS INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT CHUN
ENROUTE TO BLAIR HOUSE FROM ANDREWS AFB ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON,
FEBRUARY 1, THE SECRETARY MET BRIEFLY AT BLAIR HOUSE WITH
KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER LHO SHIN YONG (M-K: NO SIN-YONG),
PRESENT WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WERE ASSISTANT MINISTER
GUNG (M-K: KONG HO-MYUNG) AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
HER (M-K: HO HWAYE-PYONG). U.S. AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEEN WAS

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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
3. FOREIGN MINISTER LHO TULO SECRETARY MAIG THAT THE DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE DATED FEBRUARY 1, 1981 WAS AGREEABLE TO HIS GOVERNMENT. THE ORIGINAL KOREAN DRAFT HAD CONTAINED A "POLITICAL" PARAGRAPH ENDORSING PRESIDENT CHUN'S VARIOUS ACTIONS TO RESTORE POLITICAL STABILITY IN KOREA, BUT HE UNDERSTOOD THE SECRETARY OBJECTED TO THIS ON GROUNDS THAT:

A) THE U.S. ACTION IN INVITING PRESIDENT CHUN SPOKE LOWER THAN WORDS, AND
B) THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WISHED TO REFRAIN FROM PUBLIC COMMENT ON KOREA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

4. THE SECRETARY WENT ON TO SAY THAT

THE KEY IN BOTH COUNTRIES WAS TO KEEP IN MIND THE STRATEGIC FACTORS WHICH WERE THE BASIS OF OUR CLOSE FRIENDSHIP. FOR OUR PART WE WOULD MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE OUR MILITARY FORCES IN KOREA, WE WOULD RETAIN OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN KOREA.
ALTHOUGH -- AS HE HAD EXPLAINED TO PRESIDENT CHUN -- IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE ROK TO CONTINUE COOPERATING WITH OUR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY. WE APPRECIATED KOREA'S CURRENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND WOULD TRY TO BE HELPFUL WITH FMS AND WEAPONS SUPPLY INCLUDING THE F-16. WE REALIZED THAT THE KOREANS MIGHT BE UNEASY ABOUT OUR TIES WITH CHINA. WE WOULD TAKE KOREAN VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT WHILE PROCEEDING WITH A RELATIONSHIP DICTATED BY OUR STRATEGIC CONCERN OVER THE POLAR BEAR.

5. THE FOREIGN MINISTER WELcomed THESE REMARKS, PREDICTING SMOOTH SAILING FOR OUR RELATIONS. SECRETARY HAIG AGREED BUT POINTED OUT THAT SOME PROBLEMS WERE INEVITABLE. THEY WOULD BE MANAGEABLE, HOWEVER, IF WE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY. HE URGED THAT THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT USE OUR AMBASSADOR IN SEOUL OR THE KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON TO LET HIM KNOW OF ANY DIFFICULTIES. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ENDORSED USE OF THESE OFFICIAL CHANNELS.

7. FINALLY THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED IF WE COULD SEND A DISTINGUISHED, AND VERY HIGH LEVEL DELEGATION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION IN SEOUL ON MARCH 3RD AS WELL AS PUBLICIZE OUR INTENTIONS SO AS TO INFLUENCE THE JAPANESE, EUROPEANS, AND OTHERS. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE NEEDED TO DISCUSS THIS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, BUT HE WOULD SEE THAT WE SENT A DISTINGUISHED DELEGATION HEADED BY A SENIOR PERSONAGE. HAIG