TO: G - Mr. Johnson

FROM: G/PM - Seymour Weiss

SUBJECT: Attached Summary Memorandum

The attached is a proposed summary memorandum to the Secretary covering your Paris discussions. To it are attached a more detailed memorandum covering this subject, plus an appendix which covers the subject of CINCEUR's views on a further French withdrawal from NATO. This latter I picked up in side discussions with General Lemnitzer's staff.

Attachments
As Stated

G/PM/SWeiss/vl
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

THRU: S/S

FROM: G - U. Alexis Johnson

SUBJECT: Meetings in Paris with Bohlen, Finletter Lemnitzer and McConnell

1. **General.** The meetings went very well. They provided a useful orientation for me to the European scene, but in addition provided an insight into some of the specific problems our key civilian and military representatives are attempting to cope with. There follows a brief summary of key points of interest. Attached is a more complete report which you may wish to read if time permits. (Attachment A)

2. **Embassy-USRO.** Discussions with Chip and Tom Finletter were too short. Tom is concerned about the MLF and about the NATO Force Planning exercise.

3. **CINCEUR/SACEUR.** Six hours with Lemnitzer and McConnell covered a wide range of subjects:

   a. **Force Withdrawals.** Lemnitzer is absolutely adamant on the point that any further withdrawals (i.e., the 10,000 LOC or the 10 tac air squadrons) will have a "devastating effect" on his military capabilities. He says he will so state when and if SACEUR's military appraisal is requested by the NAC. He expressed deep appreciation and praise for your stand in September resisting withdrawals which he feels would have been and still would be politically and militarily damaging.

   b. **Tactical Nuclear Weapons.** CINCEUR has completed a study on this question which will soon be released. Lemnitzer argues that the weapons are needed for the defense of Europe (though he was somewhat more moderate in his views than McConnell) In response to my pressing him he argued that a tactical nuclear war limited to Europe was feasible. I argued that we had doubts that the Europeans would find such a prospect appealing and that their current position was based on maximum deterrence with
little regard to what would really happen when the chips were
down. I also said that we were insistent that there be suffi-
cient flexibility in the hands of the political decision-making
authorities as to when and if we go to the use of nukes and that
it would be in the interest of our military planners that mili-
tary planning not be premised on unrealistic assumptions. I had
a little bit of the feeling that we might have started him think-
ing anew about these issues.

c. MRBMs. Lem argues that these are necessary both for
deterrence and fighting purposes. He does not buy the notion
that external forces can fill the bill. He feels that the State
assessment of a lack of European political willingness to accept
MRBMs is distorted by virtue of our having failed to lay out the
full case for European consideration. I pressed him on all points
and he may have raised some doubts in his mind. In general, however,
he is firmly committed on this one and though he supports the MLF
he does not agree that it adequately meets his MRBM needs.

d. Command and Control. Lemnitzer argued that it was quite
adequate and permitted discreet use down to a single weapon if
necessary. He is satisfied with the PAL system.

e. Intelligence and Nature of the Threat. As might be
expected, CINCEUR intelligence estimates paint a pretty serious
picture of the threat. I pressed Lemnitzer on the question of
the realism of assuming that a large scale Communist attack in
Europe was likely. I referred to our concerns about East German
uprisings and trouble on the flanks. He seemed not unsympathetic
to the point.

f. Wheelus. Lem made a strong pitch for us to do every-
thing possible to retain Wheelus. Militarily, his need could
probably be met by a facility in Spain, but it was obvious that
the European Command felt strongly about the broader implications
for our Middle East position of being pushed out of Wheelus.

g. G-91 Problem and Pershings. Lemnitzer wants the G-91
(a light weight ground support aircraft) equipped with nuclear
capability. We asked how this was consistent with the DOD
pressure for substituting Pershings for existing strike aircraft.
Lemnitzer is resistant to the idea of the Pershing substitution. How well this has been thought through I could not fully ascertain.

h. NATO Aircraft Overflights of East Germany. I was surprised to learn from Lemnitzer that since the RB-66 incident there have been a number of additional overflights of East Germany.

i. European MAAGs. CINCEUR defends the continuation of a MAAG presence as needed to oversee deliveries of MAP still in the pipeline ($112 million this year to Italy) and because of excellent contacts which MAAGs have with MODs. McConnell claimed that they were reducing size of MAAGs as fast as is prudent.

j. French Problem. Lemnitzer was not much concerned about the French pull-out from the Naval commands. He indicated, however, that if this shifted to Army and Air Force the problem would be critical. CINCEUR is now in process of responding to a detailed JCS inquiry on this subject. (Appendix I, attached).

Attachments
As Stated

cc: U - Mr. Ball
    M - Mr. Harriman
    EUR - Mr. Tyler
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MEMORANDUM

1. Embassy-USRO. Time available for discussions was much too short. A working breakfast with Chip and Tom Finletter was devoted mainly to discussion of the MLF. (.... To be supplemented by Mr. Johnson as appropriate.) We then moved to USRO where Tom, Durby and I discussed the NATO Force Planning exercise. In a word, Finletter is concerned that the exercise has bogged down and seemed to be of the opinion that a June Defense Ministers Meeting would give Bob McNamara the opportunity to put some life into the undertaking. One concern which I have is that Tom continues to assume, quite understandably, that McNamara will be able to spell out the US views on NATO strategy and force capabilities in a detailed way which will be convincing to our European Allies. I am by no means satisfied that we are in any better position to do this today than we have been at any other time over the past three years. One further point I might note was Tom’s indication that the arrangements whereby Burt Klein (formerly of RAND, but now on the DOD payroll) reports to him as the US Representative on the Defense Planning Work Group (the Group which is running the NFP exercise) was less than fully satisfactory. I gather that Klein is entirely cooperative but that somehow the lines of communication from TOP SECRET
Klein back to DOD leave Finletter with a feeling that he does not control the undertaking.

In subsequent discussions at USRO, expanded to include Cecil Lyon and Jack McGuire from the Embassy, Alan James, John Burns and Phil Farley, I spent sometime discussing the French problem. In general, I gather that there was a fairly unanimous opinion that the French views on NATO strategy, with their heavy dependency on the use of nuclear weapons for defense of Europe, are reflective of a wider European feeling. (Incidentally, I was told that the French have just recently announced that they are undertaking the full reequipment of five of their divisions to make them nuclear capable. I am not clear on the details.)

Cecil Lyon says that the French clearly look upon NATO as the creature of US invention. It is not that they object to NATO as much as it is their desire to have the dominant role. When I asked whether it might not be useful to begin thinking about heavy US force withdrawals I received a somewhat mixed reaction. Lyons tossed out the notion that perhaps the time had arrived when we should begin to turn the defense problem back to the Europeans. Farley felt that the beginning of such a movement would start in motion political forces which we might not be
 able to control. He felt that lessened US force presence would result in decreased US influence over European affairs. Others echoed his view.

2. CINCEUR/SACEUR. I met for six hours with Generals Lemnitzer and McConnell. The discussions were quite free and easy and the rapport I thought quite good. Lemnitzer began with a pointed reference to the fact that he felt that the Department had been extremely helpful and appreciative of his Command's point of view on a number of issues in the past, more so than DOD. He particularly referred in this connection to the force withdrawal issue (see below). He said he felt that the State analysis on this subject (your memorandum of last September) was the best paper he had seen in his many years in Washington. He made it clear that he felt State had saved the day at the time and had saved us from making a serious mistake. In this sort of atmosphere the range of topics discussed went smoothly even where it was clear we had areas of difference of view. At the end of the meeting he and McConnell called me aside and Lem was particularly complimentary in his remarks about our POLADs John Burns and Alan James.
3. Force Withdrawals. We spent a good period of time on this subject. On the logistics side Lem claims that he is now so strapped that any significant further withdrawals (i.e., the 10,000 contemplated) would leave his force with a seriously impaired fighting ability. He has gone on record as preferring a withdrawal of a division to any more LOC personnel. Similarly, on the 10 squadrons of aircraft, his military evaluation is that withdrawal would be a serious blow to his carrying out his responsibilities. He points out that the aircraft are required to support the ground operations as well as for control of the air. In response to my direct question, he said he does not believe that the US can meet the spirit (indeed, even if it meets the letter) of its NATO commitment and still "dual base" the 10 squadrons. He said that the withdrawal would have a "devastating effect" and that when SACEUR's military judgment is solicited by NATO he will feel bound to so state. I pressed Lem very hard as to which he would prefer if he had to choose between the logistics force reductions and the 10 squadrons. He flatly refused to choose between these undesirables, finally concluding that from a military point of view a proportional reduction in both air forces and ground forces would make the
most sense.

Finally, Lem said he could not see how the US could politically square itself arguing for increased conventional capabilities for NATO on the one hand and sponsoring a force reduction on the other. He says the Germans and our other Allies are not fooled and know full well that our conventional capabilities have already suffered from previous reductions. For example, the CINCEUR conclusion is that OSD's estimate of thirty days to reestablish the contracted French LOC is highly optimistic. McConnell thinks it would take 90 to 100 days. Because of the LOC reductions CINCEUR now estimates his capability for fighting conventionally as being limited to 14 days. He said the Europeans know full well that the US has lost its sustained combat capability as a result of the LOC squeeze. He said that US forces would require 120,000 non-combat reinforcements to fight an extended conventional combat. In this connection, Lem spoke fairly scathingly about operation BIG LIFT and its significance. He made it clear that it had far more limited military utility than DOD press agentry implied and that it did not by any means prove itself as a feasible means for reinforcing Europe in time of stress or hostilities.

4. Tactical Nuclear Weapons. CINCEUR is quite clear as
to the need for these weapons for defense of Europe. He has just finished a detailed study on this matter which, we learned from others in the CINCEUR staff, should be ready for transmittal to the JCS within the next ten days. While we did not get into the details of that study, Lam seems convinced that a tactical nuclear defense of Europe is possible. We pressed him rather hard as to whether the Europeans would really be willing to fight a tactical nuclear war limited to Europe; one which would not engage the US or USSR homelands. While he and McConnell argued that such a war was possible, they were not entirely persuasive and might have been a little bit shaken by our arguments that the Europeans seemed more devoted to the notion of deterrence than fighting and that they could hardly hope to profit from a nuclear war limited to Europe.

Lem pressed me hard on the reasons for the State refusal to agree to the DOD proposal for agreement in principle to deployment of Anti-Demolition Munitions for our Allies. I explained that we had not received a rational explanation of how the ADMs fitted into his planning or why they were so urgently required. CINCEUR argued that they were highly important to an effective forward defense and would provide important delaying
action. However, I got a little of the feeling that, though in strictly technical military terms a case might be made, the broader political significance of a reliance on nuclear weaponry, in some cases where conventional explosives might even do the job, had not really been comprehended. For example, one of Lem's staff made the point that nuclear demolitions required only a fraction of the LOC back up as compared to that required to provide an equivalent explosive force through the use of conventional demolitions.

We tried to get at the question of whether conceptually, use of ADMs would require early employment. We never received very precise answers to this one, though the implication generally seems to be that early use would be required since the weapons would be emplaced far forward.

I noted to Lem, partly in connection with the ADM problem, but in a more general sense as applying across the board to the assumption of the use of tactical nuclear weapons early in hostilities, that heavy reliance on such an assumption could lead to inflexibilities. On the one hand to the extent that early use required the President to make an affirmative decision, this tended to limit the flexibility which the
President had. Alternatively, since the decision to use nukes would be one of the most crucial ones any President could make and therefore would not in certain circumstances be likely to be made quickly or easily, planning on an early positive decision by the military commanders might lead to military inflexibility.

5. MREMS. Lem argued that European-based MREMS were essential both as an addition to the deterrent and for forward defense in the event deterrence failed. He said he had nothing to deal with the missile threat to Allied Command Europe. In response to our questions, he rejected external forces as meeting the need. He and McConnell argued that the US might well wish to have the capability for a nuclear war limited to the European theater without requiring the engagement of US external forces. Despite my pressing him very hard as to the realism of a major European engagement of this sort which would exclude the US external forces, he held to his position. He argued, for example, that most people visualized several hundreds of MREMs being exchanged in one spasm, whereas he could visualize a very limited exchange of MREM's by...both sides, an exchange which could not take place if the European Command did not have MREMs on hand.

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I asked whether the MLF did not fill both the deterrence and the fighting needs. Lem argued that it did not: it was insufficient in numbers and I gather in other respects, such as accuracy and survivability. He wants the MLF, but only as a part of a mix. He rejects the
notion that the Europeans politically would not take land-based MRBMs. He says that the reason there has been reluctance so far is explained in large measure by the manner in which we have presented the case, i.e., an incomplete presentation combined with clear US reluctance to make the missile available. He said he thought that a full exposition of the need would lead to European acceptance of the requirement. For example, on the question of whether MRBMs wouldn't act as lightning rods, he says that they would be no more of a target than certain of his other capabilities, including the strike aircraft, which he points out are located frequently in or near cities (whereas the MRBMs would not). When we pointed up the problem of German manning, Lem denied that this need be a problem.

Comment: My general reaction is that the case militarily is probably somewhat better than OSD has heretofore argued and undoubtedly substantially less than CINCEUR believes. He is probably partially right about European receptivity to the MRBMs in the face of a full exposition as to its need, but he probably underestimates some of the concern which would exist re German manning. (For example, with regard to the Russian attitude, he argued, in effect, that we should not apologize to the Russians
for equipping Europe to defend itself against 700 Soviet MRBM's.)
The issue boils down to whether first, for reasons of deterrence, and second, for actually fighting a tactical nuclear war limited to Europe, MRBM's can be justified. On this I doubt that we had a meeting of the minds. However, on one point I do think Lem has a persuasive argument. He contends that much of our current problem with the Europeans is political and psychological in that they doubt our willingness to use nuclear weapons in their defense. They therefore need a physical evidence of a nuclear capability in Europe, which could strike the USSR and this MRBM's would supply.

6. Command and Control and PAL. I asked a number of questions concerning command, control and release of nuclear weapons. In general, Lem insisted that existing procedures were effective and provided him with full flexibility extending down to the use of one nuclear weapon at a time if necessary. (Though Lemnitzer said he could not himself conceive of the use of tactical nuclear as making sense on less than a corps basis.)

Note: Some of our people in the Johnson NESG Study Group, who recently looked into this question, have doubts that such effective and flexible control actually exists. I asked whether the problem of forward deployment of such items as Davy Crocketts on the battlefield didn't present a difficulty in the sense that an individual commander if surrounded might
wish to use the weapon. McConnell argued that the Commander's orders under such circumstances would be to destroy the weapon. Both Lem and McConnell thought that he would, although Lem went on, significantly enough, to say that their plans would not be to have the Davy Crocketts in a forward position until after the decision had been made to use nuclear weapons. Lem seemed generally satisfied with the PAL device and in particular the latest models which are just now being installed. He feels that the existence of 27 separate headquarters for release of PAL codes is generally satisfactory as a protection against having these release authorities eliminated before our weapons could be activated. He did express some thought, however, about going down the chain of command in delegating release authority in PAL codes.

7. Intelligence. I received the usual intelligence briefing which emphasized the very great threat presented by Communist capabilities. I wasn't entirely persuaded that the intelligence estimates were as realistic as they might be. For example, when I inquired as to how reliable the satellite forces were and whether in fact the Soviets might not find that they had to divert some Soviet strength to keeping an eye on the
satellites, I got an unsatisfactory response. It does seem clear, however, that the Communist force capability, especially satellite forces, is improving through being equipped with more modern items. Lem was rather pointedly critical of McNamara's Economic Club Speech concerning Soviet capabilities. He claimed that it was grossly optimistic and implied that it simply did not provide a full or candid description of the situation. He noted that there would shortly be another NATO Military Committee Meeting and he anticipated that there would be no substantial differences of opinion whatsoever regarding the size and character of the threat facing Europe, i.e., all of the NATO Military Committee representatives, presumably Lem included, will agree that the threat is grave.

Comment: In general, I felt that though Lem and McConnell both viewed the threat and enemy capabilities as being very serious (as one would expect of a military commander in the field), Lem was more balanced in his view than McConnell. The latter implied that NATO forces could be easily overrun and must rely quickly and heavily on use of nuclear weapons. Lem openly disagreed saying that the NATO force was substantial and would give the
Russians pause, but that its deficiencies were serious enough so that it could not now fight a sustained conventional undertaking. It is clear, however, that if he sticks to his position on the military effect of further US force withdrawals, the adverse political impact, which is likely to be great in any event, will be magnified.

8. Nature of the Threat. In our discussions he emphasized the continued concentration of attention in most of the planning on a large Communist invasion. I said that prevailing opinion seemed to be that this was an increasingly diminishing probability. On the other hand an East European uprising, specifically an East German uprising, or trouble on the flanks, seemed quite possible. I said I was more concerned about our ability to handle such engagements in a way that would limit them from spreading geographically and into the use of nuclear weapons, than I was about the exact balance of MRBMs between East and West on the Central Front. Lem seemed in general to be sympathetic with the point, but we did not get into it very deeply. He expressed the need for improvement in UN capabilities to handle such problems as Cyprus.
9. **Wheelus**. Lem made a very strong pitch on doing everything possible to retain the Wheelus base. He referred to General Adam's recent messages on the subject. Lem was not, it seemed to me, unappreciative of the somewhat limited range of pressures and inducements we can bring to bear on the Libyans, but wanted to underline the urgency of the need from his point of view and in support of Adam's pitch. Though he made a very strong case, he was more restrained than some of his subordinates (who, quite obviously without having thought the matter through, implied that we ought to stay in Wheelus, even if by use of force, if necessary). The general reaction was that loss of our Wheelus rights was a first step in eroding the situation which would end up in eventual Communist access to Libya. We discussed briefly the possibility of substituting an area in Spain (the requirement would be for a strip approximately 20 x 20 miles), which would meet the immediate military need of SACEUR.

10. **Special Ammunitions**. It turned out that Lem had just dispatched a response to Washington on this subject which corresponded exactly with the position which State had taken with DOD. In particular, Lem strongly agreed with the Department that we could not offer this special ammunition to certain of
while the Allies/precluding others from having it. He did underline, however, the tremendous military significance and advantage which this ammunition had and the fact that it represents the one really secret weapon we have available. He did not feel, however, that we would greatly endanger security by making effects use available to our Allies. He agreed with me that the availability of this ammunition would substantially raise the nuclear threshold.

11. G-91 Problem and Pershings. Lem believes the G-91 aircraft should be permitted a nuclear capability and argued that it was the only aircraft which could be used in support of the ground operations. Lem indicated that Defense had stated that it, together with the JCS and AEC had agreed, but that State was resisting. We indicated we were not entirely familiar with the problem though we did say that one question which posed itself was whether, at a time when Defense was proposing that QRA aircraft and perhaps all strike aircraft should be phased out of their nuclear role because of their vulnerability, it made sense to go forward with the equipping of still additional aircraft for nuclear missions. Lem reacted very vigorously arguing that the "limited number of Pershings" would not
adequately substitute for strike aircraft. We pressed him a little bit as to what his views would be assuming there was a sufficient number of Pershings substituted for the strike aircraft, but I did not feel that we got a fully satisfactory response. He seemed very much wedded to the notion that the strike aircraft must be retained in his inventory. One of the reasons he cited is that the Pershings do not have the range required to hit some of the targets that the strike aircraft, at least theoretically, cover.

12. NATO Aircraft Overflights of East Germany. Lem mentioned that we had had a number of additional incidents since the RB-66 wherein NATO aircraft had overflown East Germany. This, despite the establishment of a protective zone. Recently a West German had flown a Piper Cub into East Germany and landed there. The pilot was quickly released and permitted to return home.

13. European MAAGs. In response to my questions on the justification for maintaining MAAGs in Europe, McConnell argued that the need for continuing to exercise supervision over large amounts of material still coming out of the pipeline was a major consideration. (For example, $112 million of MAP will be delivered to Italy this year.) But he also admitted that a good part of