THE MANAGEMENT AND TERMINATION OF WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION (TS)
A STUDY OF
THE MANAGEMENT AND TERMINATION
OF WAR
WITH THE SOVIET UNION (TS)

prepared by
The Staff of the
Net Evaluation Subcommittee
of the
National Security Council

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THE PROBLEM

I. Introduction ........................................ 1

II. An Analysis of War .................................... 3
   A. War Initiated by a Soviet Massive Intercontinental Nation-Killing Attack ............ 4
   B. War Initiated by a US Discriminate Pre-Emptive Strike ................................ 14
   C. War Involving Escalation ......................... 21
      War in Europe ..................................... 21
      War in the Far East ................................ 28
   D. Summary ........................................... 32

III. War Management: Political-Military Objectives ............ 35
   A. Political-Military Objectives in Large-Scale Nuclear War ......................... 37
   B. Political-Military Objectives in an Escalating General War ....................... 43
   C. Political-Military Objectives: Summary ..................................................... 47

IV. War Management: Selected Requirements for Political-Military Planning ............... 49
   A. Command and Control at the Presidential Level ........................................ 49
   B. Targeting .......................................... 54
   C. Forces for Management and Termination of War ..................................... 61

V. Conclusions and Recommendations ......................... 67
The Net Evaluation Subcommittee Staff, by direction of
the Chairman of the NESC, was to examine and report on the
problems inherent in the concept of management and termination
of war. The terms of reference given to the NESC were
as follows:

It is U.S. policy to develop a capability so
that, in the event of war with the USSR, military
force can be used in a discriminating manner, to
bring about a cessation on terms acceptable to the
United States, to deter Soviet anti-population
attacks on the USA and its allies, and to avoid
unnecessary damage in enemy countries. Terms for
cessation could be both political and military.
The U.S. war aim would not be 'unconditional
destruction.' The conduct and termination of war
should be responsive both to the circumstances of
initiation and to post-war security and political
objectives.

There would consequently be basic policy
decisions to be taken during the course of the war
and during the transition to truce and settlement.
These decisions would have to be taken on the
basis of information then available, possibly in
communication with enemy and allied commanders or
political leaders.

Detailed plans for the coordination of
military force with war objectives and negotia-
tions appear neither feasible nor desirable.
Detailed planning can help to assure that military
forces, information and communications, operat-
ional plans, decision procedures, and possibly
enemy expectations, are adapted to this concept
of war conduct. The ways in which this concept
might be carried out should be expected to vary
over time. The following planning tasks are
essential to this concept.
1. The possible stopping points in war with the USSR.
   * * *

2. The information and communications that would be available, and that can be developed, to support this concept.
   * * *

   * * *

4. The forces best suited for the terminal stage of war, for secure policing of a truce, and for post-war security and support of war aims.
   * * *

5. Decision and negotiation in war.\(^1\)
   * * *

The terms of reference were developed by an interagency panel headed by Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, and were based on the report of an interdepartmental group under Mr. Thomas C. Schelling which examined certain long-range aspects of politico-military planning.

\(^1\) The full terms of reference are appended to the report, see p. 73.
I. INTRODUCTION

Military planning for general nuclear war has focused on the application of bomber and missile delivered nuclear weapons to targets in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The prime concern has been to insure that even under the worst circumstances of a Soviet initiated nation-killing attack, US forces would be able to deal an even heavier retaliatory blow to the USSR. Within the limits set by this requirement, certain attack options have been developed to provide some flexibility in the execution of strategic force strikes. In addition, war plans to govern the commitment of conventional or tactical nuclear forces in contingent situations have been prepared. Less attention has been directed to the means of limiting and terminating war under conditions favorable to the US. These are the problem areas which have been brought to the fore by the concept of controlled response in nuclear war.

This study is intended to direct attention to those elements relating to nuclear war which would appear to warrant an increased planning effort, and to recommend the manner in which this planning might best be accomplished. The study is focused on four subjects: (a) the interaction between intra-war events and national objectives, and their probable effect on the bases for negotiation to end a war; (b) the relationships between targeting and war objectives; (c) the special requirements for military forces imposed by the possibility of successive nuclear strikes, intra-war deterrence, and policing of a cease-fire or an armistice; and (d) the complexities of decision-making at the Presidential level.

To provide a war environment for analysis, three proto-type wars between the US and the USSR were developed—(1) a massive all-out nuclear exchange, (2) a nuclear exchange initiated by a discriminate US pre-emptive attack, and (3) a war begun with conventional weapons which escalated to a limited intercontinental exchange.
The initiation of war by massive intercontinental exchange, not preceded by other forms of warfare, was included to present the worst case which the US would have to face. The discriminate pre-emptive attack permitted an evaluation, especially of the formulation of decisions as to subsequent actions and how pressures could be brought to bear on the Soviet Union to cause it to limit its actions. In the escalation scenario, the analysis focused on the several critical decision points that could emerge at varying levels of war intensity.

The events described in these stylized wars have provided points of departure for an examination of situations during and at the end of a war which might require special political or military actions, command decisions and the exercise of control at the national level relative to war management and termination, and potential bases for political negotiation during and at the close of the war.