II. AN ANALYSIS OF WAR

War in several of its forms is analyzed in this section in a manner which emphasizes the problems of management and termination in terms of (a) the circumstances of initiation, (b) the reactions of the US and USSR at major decision points, and (c) the evaluation of terminal aims at each point.

The wars are presented in schematic fashion and are not linked to any specific year, particular force level, or combination of weapon systems. However, on the basis of the forces used and results of a series of recently completed war games, covering most of the years from 1964 to 1972, it is valid to assume that the generalized events portrayed in the following wars could occur at any time during this period.

In each of the scenarios we postulate certain conditions which lead to nuclear war, but the international framework within which these events take place is generally that existing today. The preponderance of military power is held by Washington and Moscow; there are continuing improvements in weaponry, but neither side achieves a technological break-through of such magnitude as to create an entirely different balance of power. Moscow and Peking continue their rivalry for leadership of the world Communist movements. There is no rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the US or Western Europe. And as the diffusion of power proceeds, there remain nations non-aligned with either the US or the USSR.
A. WAR INITIATED BY A SOVIET MASSIVE INTERCONTINENTAL NATION KILLING ATTACK

A war initiated under conditions of strategic surprise by a massive Soviet strike against the continental United States and against US and allied nuclear capable forces elsewhere in the world, would be one in which the least management is possible. Nevertheless, this war is included to show how even in such a war pre-war planning for the terminal phase could be of importance.

The effects of an initial Soviet missile salvo would depend on the specifics of the particular attack, for example; the total Soviet missile force available, the allocation of Soviet missiles between military and urban-industrial targets, and the reliability and accuracy of the missile systems. The degree of industrial destruction might depend upon the extent to which the US had deployed an effective ABM system. US casualties could range from 30 to 150 million and industrial destruction from 30 to 70 percent. At least for the next few years, it is probable that it would be a matter of many hours before the surviving Presidential Authority would have more than the grossest estimate of the actual damage sustained by the US.

To set the stage, it was assumed that severe external and internal reverses had plagued the Soviet government to the point where the desperate leadership was giving a serious hearing to those ideologically oriented political leaders who were arguing that the Soviet Union could only fulfill its historic role as the apostle of communism if the Western Powers and China were devastated by nuclear war. They argued that the USSR had a socio-economic base which would permit it to recuperate at a much faster rate than its competitors. Moreover, the geographical situation of the Soviet Union would permit it, with a minimum of force, to establish post-war spheres of influence in the Near East, Southeast Asia, and, hopefully, Western Europe, while the US would have to pull back to the Western Hemisphere. A younger generation of military leaders also began to side with the pro-war faction,
particularly when it became evident that economic difficulties might result in severe shortcomings in planned force postures over the next several years.

When a majority of the Presidium accepted the rationale for war, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Defense Minister saw no choice but to order a build-up for a possible all-out attack, but without setting a date. This included feverish diplomatic activity to persuade the US that a new solidarity had developed between the Soviet Union and Communist China, a move designed to provoke the US to include Communist China in any retaliatory attack. The final decision to attack came after the United States threatened to use force (1) to prevent the USSR from forcibly reversing a Polish decision to renounce membership in the Warsaw Pact, and (2) to prevent the USSR from removing from office the East German Premier and Parliament for having moved to the verge of federal union with West Germany.

1. **Initiation—The Soviet Attack.**

**Attack Against the US.** The initial phase of the Soviet attack by missiles, was to be completed by H+1 hour.\(^2\) The Soviet bomber force was assumed to penetrate the DEW line at about H-hour to avoid giving warning prematurely. These bombers could then begin to attack Alaskan and Canadian targets within minutes but would not be over CONUS for three or four hours. The Soviets might have available in approximately six to twelve hours a second salvo of those reload soft missiles surviving the US retaliatory attack. They would also have those missile-launching submarines which had not reached their launch positions before H-hour or were initially uncommitted. Some of these weapons would not be available for commitment for several days.

**Attack Against NATO Europe.** To maximize the destruction of NATO military forces, the Soviets planned to initiate the war in Europe with an IR/MRBM strike against all major NATO airfields, troop concentrations, and other prime military

\(^2\) Throughout the scenario, H-hour will be taken to mean the time of the impact of initial Soviet warheads.
targets. To minimize damage to Western Europe all weapons were to be airburst. The launch time was to coincide with the first ICBM penetrations of BMEWs to avoid giving early warning of the attack on the US.

To reduce further the possibility of warning, the Soviet ground forces in East Germany received no reinforcements prior to the missile launch. However, the Soviets considered these forces were sufficient to seize Rhine River crossings during the first several days of the war when confusion would be at its height. The ground force attack was to begin at the same time as the launching of Soviet IR/ARBM and troops in the Western USSR would be ordered to begin their move into Western Europe.

Initial Soviet Termination Plan. The Soviet leaders intended to offer to negotiate a cease-fire but not, in fact, to agree until after their bomber strike. They had hopes that the initiation of discussion could cause the US to withhold or even to recall its bombers. Their objective was maximum damage to the US even at the risk of terrible damage to the USSR. To bolster their bargaining position, they had also retained a small nuclear intercontinental reserve (primarily missile submarines) and a reserve ground force armed with tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets planned to gain a substantial advantage in post-war recuperation by establishing control of the virtually undamaged European industrial base. They believed that because of its problems at home, the US would be unwilling or unable to take effective military or political action in Europe for a prolonged period of time.

2. The US Response--Decision Point 1

The Soviet attack assumed herein poses the most difficult task to be solved by the US national command system, the most important elements of which are the survival of Presidential Authority and communications systems by which he can direct the military to carry out his decisions. While it would appear logical that the Soviets might want the President to survive so he could enter into early negotiations, US planning must be based on the worst case, namely, the inclusion of Washington in this attack. In these circumstances, the time the President might have
to consider a decision on the US response and, if deemed necessary, for moving to a secure location could vary from zero minutes, if the Soviets detonated a nuclear device placed clandestinely in their embassy, to perhaps four minutes if Washington were targeted by SLBMs, to about 15 to 20 minutes if BMEXS warning was received. It could be substantially longer if Soviet plans were implemented in less than a perfect manner, or if these plans included restraints against immediate attack of national command and control.

The Situations. For the purposes of this paper, it was assumed that BMEXS warning was received, and Washington was attacked but not until H-hour. Thus, the President had time to consider the following courses of action and to move to a secure location.

Possible Courses of Action

1. A maximum retaliatory strike against the USSR, the Satellites and Communist China

2. A counterforce strike against the USSR, the Satellites and Communist China

3. Either of the above, but withholding the attack on specific Satellite countries or Communist China.

It was assumed that the President selected the second of the above courses of action since he knew a large-scale Soviet attack was underway but did not immediately know the nature of the Soviet attack. He delayed his decision only long enough to be sure that there was no mistake about the existence of a major attack, since he was concerned by the probability that further delay would lessen the effectiveness of the US counterforce attack. Accordingly, the execution order was passed to operational units at the time the first Soviet missiles began to detonate in

3/ These courses of action are illustrative and it is recognized that other variations in response would have been possible. In order to permit consideration of subsequent situations and decision points it was necessary to assume that regardless of the course of action chosen, hostilities did continue and, thus, provided opportunities to analyze the decision-making process at various intensities of conflict.
the US. Strategic bombers and theater quick-reaction aircraft had earlier been launched on BMEMS warning.

Intercontinental Exchange. US missiles began to detonate in the USSR some 30 minutes after the President's launch order and the bulk of this salvo was completed within an hour and a half after the initial launch of Soviet missiles. Airborne alert bombers could begin arriving over the Soviet Union in about three hours, with the remainder of the bomber force arriving over the USSR in seven to seventeen hours.

War in Europe. Most of the alert aircraft in Europe, in the Far East, and on carriers in the 6th and 7th Fleets had survived, and began arriving over target areas within minutes after take-off; the attack by these aircraft, however, would continue for a number of hours depending on the distance to target. Non-alert tactical aircraft together with ground force units would have suffered heavily from the initial Soviet attack.

3. The US Response--Decision Point 2 (H to H+30 Minutes).

The Situation. Within a few minutes after he ordered a counterforce attack, the President had received a Soviet offer to halt the intercontinental exchange. It made no mention of the war in Europe. He had been receiving reports showing that the Soviet attack was clearly a composite military urban-industrial strike. He was told that the initial US retaliatory attack had been launched. He had received no reports that any of the major West European cities had been attacked.

Possible Courses of Action

1. Accept the Soviet offer to halt the exchange and negotiate armistice terms.

2. Withhold the urban-industrial attack and counter the Soviet offer with a threat that the USSR would be subjected to nuclear attack at times and places chosen by the United States unless the Soviet Union immediately recalled its bombers, ceased its attacks on the US and
Europe, withdrew all its forces to within the USSR, destroyed its major weapons systems, and agreed to meet US reparation demands.

3. Refuse the Soviet cease-fire offer and extend the retaliatory option to include an urban-industrial attack against the Soviet Union and Communist China.

The President opted for alternative three sometime between H and H+30 minutes. His decision was conditioned by the fact that US bombers were already in the air and some were on their way to military targets in the Soviet Bloc. To call back all these aircraft would degrade the US strategic position. In the meantime, there was no assurance that Soviet bombers would be recalled.

As to delaying the urban-industrial attack in the hope of using US strategic superiority to force a peace on US terms, the President rejected this alternative on the recommendation of his military advisors, who warned that: (1) the continued survivability of US forces under Soviet attack could not be assured, (2) even in the absence of enemy attack, the US could not be sure that its forces would for long remain in a war-fighting posture, in part because of the uncertainty of the human factor under the stress of nuclear devastation, and (3) it was essential to destroy the war-making base of the USSR. All of the President's advisors asserted that even if the USSR submitted to US terms, recuperation at a more rapid rate than the USSR was out of the question in a situation wherein Soviet urban-industrial centers had suffered much less damage than those in the US. Furthermore, it would be taking the greatest kind of risk to assume that the US could enforce delivery of goods and services from the USSR over a prolonged period.

The President was aware that in making his choice he might be raising substantially the risk of increased damage to cities of European Allies as the Soviets tried desperately to seize control of the continent. In the end, he decided that US interests demanded maximum destruction of the USSR, despite the risk to Western Europe.

It should be noted, finally, that the decision-making process took place in haste and under unimaginable psychological stress, and that emotional factors would
have pushed the decision in the direction of a maximum retaliatory attack. It is unlikely that under such conditions the decision would be reached strictly on the basis of ad hoc gain/loss calculations.

4. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 1 (H+1 hour to H+18 hours).

The Situation. The surviving Soviet leaders were aware that the attack on the US had destroyed many of the major urban-industrial areas. But they also were receiving reports that the USSR was sustaining tremendous damage and that it appeared that Soviet military forces would not be able to seize Western Europe. Even though the Soviets retained a residual force, they estimated that remaining US nuclear-capable forces were more powerful.

Possible Courses of Action

1. Seek a cease-fire without further military action.

2. Launch an attack against European capital cities to destroy the political framework of Western Europe and then seek a cease-fire.

3. Continue the war with attacks against both the US and Europe.

The Soviet leaders decided on course two. They hoped the destruction of the European political framework would lay the groundwork for a subsequent political takeover in Europe to assist in Soviet recovery. It was reasoned that further attacks against the US would not be a useful expenditure of limited strategic resources and that further military action in Western Europe was not feasible.

Accordingly, the Soviet leaders ordered nuclear attacks against all West European capitals. They declared this to be justified by European cooperation with the US during the war. Immediately after this order was executed, the Soviet Union announced that it was willing to consider a cease-fire and that it was beginning to withdraw all its
forces to within the frontiers of the USSR. Unannounced was the fact that agents of the Soviet Union were being left behind throughout Western and Eastern Europe who would pose as patriot leaders in the reconstruction process.

5. The US Response--Decision Point 3 (H+24 hours).

The Situation. The military situation had changed very little despite the Soviet attack on West European capitals. The few surviving elements of British and French strategic nuclear forces were launched at Soviet targets. The war in Europe became even more chaotic. It was apparent, however, that Soviet forces were beginning to withdraw to the east as best they could. The Soviet SLBM fleet was known to be at sea but the location of individual submarines was unknown.

Possible Courses of Action

1. Agree to the cease-fire subject to Soviet withdrawal of forces to homeland.

2. Agree to a cease-fire only if the Soviets accepted terms which amounted to unconditional surrender.

The President decided to accept course one. More stringent terms were deemed to be unenforceable, given the condition of the US military forces. He did so on the advice of his military advisors, that the US had more to gain by negotiating from a position in which the strength of US residual forces was much greater than that of the Soviets. Accordingly, the President used every available means of communications again to get word to the Soviet leadership that the US would recognize a cease-fire provided the Soviets agreed to withdraw all land, sea, and air forces to within the frontiers of the Soviet Union. The Soviet missile submarines presented a special case—so long as they remained submerged and unlocated they were an uncontrolled threat. To counter this, the President stated that all Soviet submarines not surfaced and sailing away from the US would be subject to attack.
6. **The Soviet Response—Decision Point 2 (H+24-26 hours).**

The Situation. The military situation was essentially unchanged since the Soviet attack on West European cities and the beginning of the Soviet withdrawal from Europe. Western and Soviet forces in Europe had virtually ceased fighting.

Possible Courses of Action

1. Accept the cease-fire on US terms.

2. Reject the cease-fire so long as the US threatened to attack Soviet submarines.

The Soviet leaders decided to accept the cease-fire despite the risk of US attacks on their submarines. They felt this was a risk worth taking, especially if the US tied up a substantial part of its naval forces searching for Soviet submarines. The important thing now, in the judgement of the Soviet leadership, was to enter into negotiations while they still had residual forces in being.

7. **Immediate Tasks in Armistice Period.**

The US military would have tasks of an enormous and complex nature in the armistice period. It would be called upon to help re-establish order in CONUS and to initiate rehabilitation efforts. US forces would also have to provide immediately means to observe Soviet compliance with the terms of the agreement. The Soviet withdrawal from Western Europe would be an initial problem. Continuing surveillance of the Soviet Union would be required to determine the strength and disposition of remaining Soviet forces. US forces at sea could be used to gather up essential shipping. Residual US forces must be readied for further action as they might have to be used to threaten Nth countries which were reluctant to give full assistance to the US and its Allies. As a general proposition, it would seem probable that the more rapid the reorganization of residual units into effective forces, the greater
would be the pressure on the Soviets to comply with the armistice. Moreover, it would place the US in a better position from which to renew the war should the Soviets not live up to the agreement.
B. WAR INITIATED BY A US DISCRIMINATE PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE

To develop a second prototype war, it was assumed that as the Soviet military forces made the final preparations for their massive first strike described in the preceding War A, the US gained conclusive information of the Soviet intent through a high-ranking Soviet official who was convinced that a war would be a tragic mistake and was hoping to avert it. This information was supported by independent evidence received at 0800 Washington time, the day before the USSR had planned to attack.

1. The US Response--Decision Point 1 (0800-0900)

Possible Courses of Action

1. With no warning, launch a counterforce attack against the USSR.

2. Same as 1, but also attack urban-industrial targets in the Satellites and Communist China (or withhold attacks on specific Satellite countries and Communist China).

3. Communicate with Soviet leaders in an effort to induce them to call off the attack; at the same time, take actions designed to improve US alert posture and to impress Soviets with US strategic capabilities (such as increasing airborne alert).

Based on reconnaissance which indicated that the Soviet forces were not yet fully prepared, the President decided on the third alternative. At 0900, he warned the Soviet government not to attack and, at the same time, informed the NATO allies of the situation and ordered US forces to take the necessary precautionary alert measures. While he recognized that the Soviet Union might take military advantage of this warning, the President concluded that the national interests of the US demanded that he do what he could to prevent the war.
2. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 1 (0900-1200)

The Situation. The Soviet leaders realized that surprise had been lost but, otherwise, the conditions which had impelled them to decide on attacking the United States had not changed. However, their attack in Europe might now suffer and the US top command would probably now survive.

Possible Courses of Action

1. Call off the attack permanently or until a more auspicious time.

2. Launch the attack immediately.

3. Proceed with preparations for the attack while attempting to throw the US off guard and hope to launch on schedule; if the deception efforts failed then the attack would be launched on warning of a US attack.

The Soviet government decided on the third alternative. There had been no basic change in the circumstances which had led the Soviet government to decide that a nation-killing attack against the US was in the Soviet interest. A postponement of the Soviet attack could give the advantage of initiative to the US; but on the other hand, the US forces might still be caught by surprise if the deception worked. Accordingly, the Soviet government issued public and private denials of any aggressive intent, called for a UN Security Council meeting to consider the US threat to the peace, and suggested a summit meeting to settle outstanding issues. At the same time, the Soviet government publicly called a nationwide civil and military alert "in view of the US threat."

3. The US Response--Decision Point 2 (1200-1500)

The Situation. Between 1200 and 1500 hours, reconnaissance and other intelligence information indicated that the Soviets were intensifying their attack preparations.
Possible Courses of Action

1. Withhold any US attack until a Soviet attack had been launched.

2. Launch a counterforce attack, and again call upon the Soviet Union to desist from its plans.

3. Launch a composite military and urban-industrial attack.

The President decided on course 2--at 1530 he issued orders for the execution of a counterforce attack to commence at 1600, seven hours after his first decision to communicate with the Soviet leaders.

In the face of certain knowledge that the Soviets were about to launch a massive intercontinental attack including a strike at NATO, the US objective became (1) at best, to cripple Soviet strategic capabilities so badly that such an attack would become worthless relative to Soviet aims, or (2) at worst, to blunt to a substantial degree the Soviet strategic strike capabilities so that damage on the US would be limited and that even after a Soviet retaliation the total residual strength of the US and NATO would be relatively superior.

Since it was critical that the US decision to attack be protected, it was decided not to give NATO forces notice of the attack order. The seven-hour period since NATO was first alerted permitted US forces to clear their barracks area and be en route to defensive positions. (Most US units would be clear of their barracks area in three hours.) The reaction time of other European-based Allied ground forces would depend on the alacrity with which SACEUR and the several governments could reach a decision and issue appropriate orders. In some cases the initial action might take longer than seven hours.

The US counterforce attack was launched, as ordered, at 1600. The President's message demanding the Soviet agree to desist from their plans was communicated at 1620.
4. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 2 (1600-1630)

The Situation. While not yet peaked, Soviet forces were close to being ready for launch when the Soviet leaders received agents' warnings of US missile firings.

Possible Courses of Action. Previous decisions had ruled out any course of action other than to launch the all-out attack. Having already considered the alternative of a US pre-emptive strike, a change to an attack limited to counterforce targets offered no solution. The launch of Soviet missiles against the US and military bases in Western Europe began shortly before US missiles impacted in the USSR. At the same time orders were issued to ground forces in Europe to begin rolling westward.

5. The US Response--Decision Point 3 (1630-1645)

The Situation. A few minutes after 1630 the US received BMEMS warning of Soviet missiles en route to the United States.

Possible Courses of Action

1. Immediately fire at Soviet urban-industrial targets.

2. Withhold decision until the nature of the Soviet attack was clarified.

The President decided to select course two. While there would be a risk that US forces would be degraded, nevertheless the possibility that the Soviet leadership had chosen to limit the exchange by not targeting cities, at least in the initial attack, made the risk worthwhile.

6. The US Response--Decision Point 4 (1645-1715)

The Situation. It became quickly apparent that the Soviet Union had launched a large-scale attack on US cities.
Possible Courses of Action

1. Launch an urban-industrial attack as in War A.

2. Exercise the attack option as in 1 but do so over an extended period of time.

3. Withhold any further attacks.

It was assumed that the US adopted course 1, for the same reasons cited in War A. To attempt to withhold forces to pressure the Soviets to capitulate on US terms contained too many risks, both in terms of forces survivability and long term insurance of Soviet compliance. The attack was launched at approximately 1715.

The US objective in this scenario, however, was assumed to differ from that in War A. The fact that the US had time to take preparatory actions prior to launching a pre-emptive counterforce attack contributed to the President's decision that it was feasible to expand US war aims to include the destruction of the Soviet government and empire, and the partitioning of USSR into several independent countries. To this end, all communication resources were ordered to so inform the Soviet people and to announce that the US was willing to agree to an armistice with the government of any republic or other sub-division. US military leaders were directed to draft plans to assist in securing the above war aims.

7. The Soviet Response—Decision Point 3 (1745-1900)

The Situation. Even though the Soviet attack had commenced before the US counterforce strike had landed, the Soviet force was degraded. As a result, while the Soviets had suffered as badly as in War A, the US suffered somewhat less damage and destruction. However, the Soviets had still achieved a good measure of their war aim, namely, the destruction of a large part of the US.

Possible Courses of Action

1. Ignore the US proposal, continue the war, but suggest terms for a cease-fire based on a withdrawal of Soviet and US forces to homelands.
2. Ignore the US proposal and continue the war with residual forces available.

The Soviet leaders decided on the first course of action. Acquiescing in the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a political entity was out of the question. Taking the initiative in proposing cease-fire terms would both stress continuity of Soviet central government leadership and unite internal factions behind the government. Moreover, the leadership doubted that the US was in a position to do much about any offers of surrender which it might receive from dissident elements within the Soviet Union. Finally, the Soviets were aware that it was unlikely that Soviet residual strategic forces could be destroyed by the US.

The Soviet government, therefore, announced at approximately 1900 that it would agree to a cease-fire and withdraw all its forces to within its frontiers.

8. The US Response—Decision Point 5 (1900-2400)

The Situation. It appeared that the Soviet government still maintained its authority within the USSR and that there was probably little hope of expecting a change in this situation, at least in the short run.

Possible Courses of Action

1. Continue to press the objectives initially declared.

2. Accept the Soviet cease-fire offer, but not the provisions for the withdrawal of US forces.

The President decided that US national interests would be served by a cease-fire which he expected would permit all of NATO countries to begin the urgent task of reconstitution and recuperation. Accordingly he announced that the US would agree to a cease-fire effective at 2400, by which time the US strategic attacks would have been completed. The US would not, however, agree to a permanent peace treaty unless the Soviet government was replaced by one which would accept international obligations to guarantee that the Soviet Union would never again become a threat to the peace.
9. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 4 (2400-0200)

The Situation. The military situation was essentially the same as at the end of War A.

Possible Courses of Action

1. Accept the cease-fire despite the US intention to interfere in Soviet internal affairs after the cease-fire and refusal to withdraw its own forces.

2. Reject the cease-fire and continue sporadic missile launchings in order to improve its bargaining terms.

The Soviet leaders decided to accept the cease-fire and take their chances on improving their position in the armistice and peace treaty negotiations. They counted on their residual strategic forces to give them a reasonably good position at the conference table.
C. WAR INVOLVING EscALATION

The two scenarios developed in this section provide a context for analysis of management and termination in a war begun with conventional weapons which escalates to nuclear conflict. It was assumed that the world situation in which the war occurred was generally as described above. But rather than attempting to destroy the US by direct attack, the Soviets are portrayed as exploiting a political situation with conventional military forces as a means to turn the tide in their favor.

Though in each war there are points at which either side might have agreed to end hostilities, the conflicts were carried to the point of a limited intercontinental exchange to sketch out the kinds of situations which could be expected in a prolonged escalation. Because of the much greater variety of possible courses of action available at the lower levels of intensity, alternatives to the option selected are generally not described in these scenarios.

WAR IN EUROPE

1. Initiation

The Italian Communist Party had gained sufficient political power to topple local Italian governments and had organized a para-military force in northern Italy. The Communists had infiltrated the leadership of the Army to some degree and believed they could sabotage NATO forces in Italy to such an extent that Italy could be taken with little or no fighting.

Communist Insurgency. In late March, the Italian Communist Party fomented a paralyzing national transportation strike followed by other strikes throughout the industrial plants of north and central Italy. These led to sporadic civil conflict and by the end of a month the
Italian Communists exercised full control in Milan, Venice, and Genoa.

On 1 May, the Italian Communist Party withdrew from the Parliament in Rome and proclaimed an "Italian Peoples Republic" with a provisional government located in Milan. This was immediately recognized by the USSR, European Satellites, and Communist China.

Initial Soviet Termination Plan. The Soviets supported the Italian party action with the maximum objective of establishing a Communist government in Italy and a minimum objective of forcing Italy to become neutral and withdraw from NATO and the EEC. This latter situation would prepare the way for eventual achievement of the maximum goal.

2. The US Response--Decision Point 1

On 2 May, the Italian government asked the US and West European governments for military forces to help put down this rebellion. The US response to the Italian request for military assistance was to land the 6th Fleet Marine brigade in Naples harbor and to air transport a US Army brigade from the US to the Rome-Leghorn area.

Both Italian and US-West European tactical air units engaged in the fight against the communists in the north. A number of localized air battles occurred with aircraft flown by "volunteers" from Hungarian bases, resulting in an Italian declaration of war against Hungary.

US Termination Plan. US objectives at this point included defeating the Italian communists, thus ending the threat to the legally constituted Italian government, and exploiting the diplomatic values to be gained from denouncing the aggressive Soviet support of the communist uprising in Italy.

3. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 1

The intervention of the US and West European governments as well as the Italian declaration of war against Hungary caused the Soviet leaders to conclude that the insurgents
would fail. Moreover, on the basis of "hot pursuit" US and Italian fighters had attacked Hungarian bases and destroyed Soviet aircraft and personnel, thus broadening the war further than the Soviets had intended. The apparent failure of this communist thrust had resulted in increasing unrest in the Satellites culminating in the outbreak of a revolt in Hungary. Deciding the best course was to gamble for larger stakes to overcome their current losses, the Soviets launched a conventional attack against NATO forces in Germany on 15 June.

Starting from a high state of military readiness, the USSR concentrated on a major conventional attack against Western Germany, and air/ground units were committed to seizing the Baltic exit and the Turkish straits.

Soviet Termination Plan. The primary political and military objective of the USSR now became the rapid seizure of Western Germany and the destruction of NATO forces there. In addition, they planned to continue support of the Italian communist effort to establish a new government.

4. The US Response--Decision Point 2

NATO forces had been at an alert posture from the beginning of the fighting in Italy, but the Soviets, by using low level fighter-bomber attacks, achieved tactical advantage. NATO forces were forced to withdraw, though slowly, but were able temporarily to halt the Soviet drive short of the Rhine River.

Since it did not appear possible to turn the tide of battle with conventional weapons alone, and since the USSR showed no inclination to terminate the conflict in Europe, the US, with NATO concurrence, chose to escalate by initiating the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield and against interdiction targets in the Satellites. This attack on 17 June was accompanied by a Presidential statement outlining the conditions of a cease-fire and of the West's objectives in subsequent armistice negotiations.

US Termination Plan. The Presidential decision to authorize the use of tactical nuclear weapons resulted from the belief that not only would this action reverse the local military situation but would put serious pressure on the
Soviets to close out the war. The stated objective of the Allies now became to compel the Soviets to withdraw within the borders of the USSR. This would permit the establishment of freely elected governments in the Satellites. To reduce the risk of Soviet miscalculation, the President ordered these objectives relayed to the people of Europe by all means of communication. The armistice proposal sought clearly to limit NATO objectives to the aim of permitting choice by the people of Eastern Europe and to avoid any explicit threat to the Soviet homeland. It was anticipated that in this way the Soviets would not be forced into a corner and would agree eventually to this proposal rather than escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

5. The Soviet Response—Decision Point 2

The Soviets responded to the NATO tactical nuclear attack on the afternoon of the same day (17 June) with a nuclear strike against NATO military bases carried out by MREMs, IRBMs and medium bombers.

Soviet Termination Plan. The Soviet objective was now to attempt to establish a more favorable situation in which to agree to negotiate. The Soviet attack was followed by an offer to negotiate a cease-fire. The note contained a tacit threat to destroy Europe city by city.

6. The US Response—Decision Point 3

The Situation. The Soviets, by committing the USSR based missiles and bombers, escalated the war both in terms of its geographical limits and its intensity. Continued use of the systems would seriously jeopardize the NATO military position. The US was thus faced with a critical decision.

Possible Courses of Action

1. Launch an attack with US based ICBMs to destroy the MREBM and medium bomber bases.

2. Same as one, but use Polaris missiles.

TOP SECRET
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION -24-
3. Same as one, but use theater fighter bombers.

4. Same as one, but use theater MREB forces (if available).

5. Send an ultimatum that unless the Soviets stopped using these systems the US would destroy a limited number of military targets in the Soviet Union.


If the USSR bases were attacked, there would be a risk that the next Soviet response would be an attack against CONUS. This risk would be substantially increased if the attack were by CONUS based weapons. If they were not attacked, the Soviets would be encouraged to believe that the US was so fearful of attack against CONUS that it would continue the fiction of sanctuaries, and, therefore, they could continue to employ their USSR based systems against NATO forces with impunity.

It was assumed that the President decided on course five. It was decided that the possibility of forcing the Soviets to close out the war under threat of US attack against their homeland would be of greater value than the military gain from an attempt to destroy the medium bomber and IR/MREB bases.

The US and NATO sent an ultimatum to the Soviet Union on the evening of 17 June demanding discontinuance of missile and air attacks from the USSR. The threat was made that six military targets in the USSR would be destroyed unless the Soviet attacks ceased.

US Termination Plan. The US and NATO objectives remained the same as before. The ultimatum's aim was to make clear to the Soviets their use of weapon systems from bases within the USSR had destroyed the concept of sanctuary and that their actions had substantially increased the threat of an uncontrolled nuclear war.

7. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 3

The Soviets refrained from further IR/MREB strikes, seeking to defeat NATO with tactical forces. However, this
attempt failed and the Soviets resumed nuclear strikes against Western Europe from the USSR on 19 June following several reverses suffered by their ground forces.

Soviet Termination Plan. The overall Soviet objective remained as it had earlier been. However, Soviet leadership had decided to accept the attack on six Soviet targets and respond by a return attack upon the BMEWS sites believing that this evidence of Soviet willingness to expand the battlefield would cause the US to seek quickly to close out the war, accepting a lesser goal than the total elimination of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

8. The US Response--Decision Point 4

On 19 June, in retaliation for the resumption of Soviet nuclear attacks from bases within the USSR, the US executed attacks on six Soviet military targets.

9. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 5

On the same day--19 June--the USSR declared that it would not accept the US terms, although it was prepared to call a halt to the hostilities. Any attack on the Soviet Union, however, would be met in kind. Thereafter, the Soviets retaliated by attacking BMEWS sites.

10. The US Response--Decision Point 6

Now convinced that the war could not be halted on satisfactory terms short of a large-scale nuclear exchange, the US decided to launch a limited counterforce attack against the Soviet Union. The attack was executed on 20 June and was carefully constrained to reduce urban-industrial damage. Attacks on Moscow's government control centers were withheld.

US Termination Plan. The US action was designed to increase pressure on the Soviet leaders to accept a cease-fire based on a Soviet withdrawal of all its forces in Europe to behind Soviet frontiers and the freeing of the Satellites from Soviet domination.
11. The Soviet Response--Decision Point 6

Though desperate to close out the war before an all-out exchange should take place, the Soviet leaders decided to follow their announced policy of responding in kind. The Soviet strategic forces, although badly damaged by US counterforce attack, were ordered on 20 June to fire a minimum counterforce attack against US military targets.

Soviet Termination Plan. As this attack was being executed, the Soviet Union declared that it was withdrawing to the USSR and would cease its strategic attacks on the US and Western Europe. Any further attacks on the Soviet Union would be met by Soviet attacks on US and West European cities. The objective was to end the war on the basis of US terms previously announced, but to enhance the Soviet position at post-war conference tables by virtue of having attacked the US and by possessing strong residual strategic forces.

12. The US Response--Decision Point 7

The US decided not to press the war further after realizing that the Soviet attack had done far less damage than, in fact, the Soviets were capable of inflicting. A cease-fire was thereupon agreed to on the morning of 21 June.

US Termination Plans. The withdrawal of Soviet influence from Eastern and Western Europe and the destruction of a portion of the Soviet strategic force were deemed to be acceptable outcomes of the war. Further attacks on the Soviet Union would place at risk US and West European cities without the prospect of corresponding gains.

13. War Management--Post Nuclear Attack Military Tasks

In this escalatory NATO war, major US military tasks following the counterforce exchange on 20 June would be:

a. To gain fast, accurate information on enemy residual battlefield strength and movements.

b. To be ready for immediate execution of the remaining SIOP tasks.
c. To be prepared to carry out surveillance missions to insure Soviet compliance with cease-fire terms.

WAR IN THE FAR EAST

This section broadens the war environment by adding a Far Eastern conflict in the same time period as that of the European scenario just considered. The assumed pre-war situation is modified to include a political soft spot in Thailand in addition to the situation in Italy. The Chinese Communists, together with their Allies in North Korea and North Vietnam, decided to exploit the Thai situation with the ultimate objective of seizing most of Southeast Asia. The Chinese Communists believed the planned Soviet actions in Italy would divert the US attention from the Far East. While the Chinese Communists did not explicitly coordinate their moves with the Communists in Europe, sympathizers in the Italian Communist Party kept Chinese Communist leaders fully informed of Soviet plans.

Insurgency to Chinese Communist Attack. In February and March, the North Vietnamese (DRV) leaders committed large numbers of their regular forces to guerrilla action in Laos, to open up attack routes to the south and southwest, and in South Vietnam. Toward the end of the month guerrilla action had spread to Thailand itself. All three governments, Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand, requested assistance from the US and the other SEATO powers. But as SEATO forces began landings to establish airheads in Laos and northern Thailand, and to bolster South Vietnamese forces, a "Thai" group raised the flag of a government in revolt which was immediately recognized by the three communist Far Eastern governments. Charging that SEATO was seeking to crush the local Asian governments, major units of the DRV and Chinese Communists overtly crossed the borders into the three non-communist countries.

Chinese Communist Termination Plan. The Chinese Communist objective was to establish communist governments in Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand responsive to direction from Peking.
In late March and early April, at the same time that the civil disturbance was beginning to take shape in Italy, the US was faced with the decision of how best to defend its interests in Southeast Asia. At this early stage the US had a choice of several courses of action.

1. Continue to commit sufficient of its own ground and air forces in conjunction with other SEATO forces to defeat the three-pronged conventional communist attack.

2. Commit increased tactical airpower to blunt the communist drive and, eventually, to cause the communists to return to their borders.

3. Combine both of these, plus the launching of conventional air strikes against military bases in North Vietnam and in South China.

4. Use BW/CW or radiological weapons to incapacitate the communist field forces in Southeast Asia.

5. Or finally, use tactical nuclear weapons to destroy the communist war-making potential in DRV and South China, coupled with occupation of key areas in North Vietnam.

It was assumed that the second course was chosen. The first course was eliminated on the grounds that it would call for too great a commitment of SEATO ground forces and that the courses three and five were not acceptable because they would carry too great a risk of broadening the scope of the war, especially at a time when the threat of a major war in Europe was growing. Nuclear weapons as well as BW/CW weapons in course four were ruled out because it was desired to avoid crossing either threshold unless absolutely necessary. Also the US did not want to give the appearance that it was always easy to decide to use nuclear weapons against Orientals.

US conventional air strikes caused serious casualties among the communist forces. However, they were not sufficient to stop the forward movement of Chinese Communist reinforcements.
US Termination Plan. The US objective was to defeat the communist forces and support the legally constituted governments, while minimizing the extent of commitment of ground forces.

2. Chinese Communist Response--Decision Point 1

The Chinese Communists interpreted the US action as giving sanctuary to their air bases and committed fighter bombers to attacks against US bases in Southeast Asia and US carrier forces in the South China Sea. In addition, they pressed forward their attack in Southeast Asia.

3. War Management--Decision Point 3

US Response. During May, as a result of fighting in both the European and Far Eastern theaters, demands for conventional equipments began to exceed supply; yet the SEATO campaign had not succeeded in forcing the Chinese Communists and DRV to withdraw. In fact, their guerrilla elements were still infiltrating deeper into Thailand. Arguments in the US government to use tactical nuclear weapons in the Far East were gaining ground; the decision in their favor was reached, however, only after the Soviet attack in Germany on 15 June, when it became imperative to close out the war in the Far East.

It was decided to destroy all major elements of the Chinese Communist military forces to prevent air and, possibly, missile attacks against US bases on Taiwan, Okinawa, and South Korea, or the initiation of a ground attack against South Korea. The US attack was to be carried out with a minimum of civilian casualties.

The attacks against Chinese Communist targets were carried out by US strategic forces. Theater forces had suffered considerable attrition and the balance of these forces were to be held in reserve to mop up surviving Chinese Communist forces, to be prepared to retaliate if the Soviets should attempt any action, and to be available to reinforce US forces in the Mediterranean. Chinese Nationalist forces were transported to landing areas on the mainland and given US air support.
US Termination Plan. The objective was to force a Chinese Communist withdrawal from Southeast Asia and to prevent their forces from attacking elsewhere. It was also intended that this action would convey to the Soviet Union the seriousness with which the US viewed its strategic objectives and that the US would take whatever action was necessary to support them, even though it involved the risks inherent in the use of nuclear weapons. Finally, it was hoped that the eventual destruction of the Chinese Communist regime could be achieved by a successful war waged by the Chinese Nationalists.

It was assumed that the US attack effectively destroyed the capability of the Chinese Communists to wage large-scale modern war.
D. SUMMARY

We have discussed three war situations against which the concept of management and termination can be examined. In the massive, all-out nuclear exchange, most of the damage would have occurred within 24 hours. The concept of a sophisticated response capability, war management to limit the total effects of the war, and a negotiated termination of the war, would have very limited meaning in such a war. Vital to US interests in such a situation would be a mix of weapon systems which gave high assurance of the survivability of a force sufficient to destroy the Soviet Union in a retaliatory attack, no matter what the degree of surprise. In addition, there must be a command and control system which would permit Presidential Authority to order the attack and to initiate actions of reconstitution.

There is not much that can be said about the bases for ending this kind of war, except that the objectives of both sides will rest on the issue of survival. The focus of surviving resources, military and civilian, would be on the immediate task of assisting surviving populations, reestablishing a national political fabric, initiating a program of rehabilitation, and preventing any Soviet attempt to establish control over undamaged areas beyond its borders.

A post-nuclear exchange environment in which both the US and the USSR lie shattered would certainly encourage other countries to exploit the prevailing world-wide instability to promote their particular interests. These efforts could be inimical to US interests, and together with predictable Soviet efforts at reconstitution, constitute an added post-war task with which US forces must be prepared to cope.

At the other end of the scale, we have discussed a war situation in which a prolonged escalation takes place. At the lesser levels of intensity which do not threaten national survival, the deterrent effect of strategic nuclear forces on both sides will act to keep the war limited. The management of such a war is exceedingly complex; it is
influenced heavily by political considerations which are difficult to foresee. Nevertheless, an analysis of this kind of war shows that there will be many points at which it can be terminated—especially if the war develops in a manner which permits the governments to find acceptable settlements which are less than total victory for either side. And basic to this is the ability of all parties to the conflict to control their strategic nuclear forces under periods of prolonged and intense crises, and to make explicit the intent of their actions.

The dynamics of such conflicts in terms of intensity, objectives and locale, suggests that pre-war as well as intra-war planning should include continuous evaluation of military actions relative to political aims. Contingency planning which takes into account only the application of military forces to achieve a single objective would be inadequate for decision-makers, who require an integrated analysis of the military-political alternatives in assessing the probable outcome of any available course of action.

The other war situation we have described is the case where general nuclear war takes place with at least one side following the doctrine of "controlled response." Questions of management and termination relate initially to the response to a discriminate attack. It must be noted that unless there is a considerable change in US targeting philosophy, weapons characteristics, and force application, it is problematical whether Soviet civilian and military leaders could be made to believe that US targeting was confined to military targets only. The blurring of the attack outlines resulting from the varying times on target of the different weapon systems, together with the proximity of numerous military targets to urban-industrial centers, might well cause the Soviets to deduce otherwise.