III. WAR MANAGEMENT: POLITICAL-MILITARY OBJECTIVES

The preceding scenarios have shown that terminating a war varies radically in its connotations depending on the nature of the conflict. In the extreme case of the massive intercontinental nation-killing exchange, the war might end because one or more of the nations involved had ceased to exist as an organized society. At the other end of the spectrum, a war might never emerge from the "sub-limited" category because of political and military counter-actions below the level of actual combat. In the case of the war which began in Italy, for example, stronger internal security measures and rapid deployment of powerful US and West European forces to the area of northern Italy might have stifled the communist insurrection at the outset.

Despite the wide range of situations described in the analysis of war, the definition of national political-military objectives in every case has to consider how US objectives would be affected if the ultimate threat of large-scale nuclear war should become a reality. Section A, immediately following will, therefore, examine how some traditional war aims stand up under conditions of full-scale nuclear war, while Section B will examine political-military objectives in an escalating general war.

It is assumed that the basic US national security objective is to ensure the survival of the United States as a sovereign nation with the continued ability to develop our institutions as we see fit. To this end, with regard to the Communist world, US operational objectives include containment of international Communism through preservation of the freedom of threatened nations; the solution of international problems below the major crisis level by increased participation in international organizations designed for timely application of community pressures;
and above all the maintenance of the necessary military forces to deter the Soviet Union from a direct attack against the United States and its Allies, or, should deterrence fail, to defeat the military forces of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

The US does not have as an objective the destruction by overt military force of Communist nations or the Communist system. Nor do its policies support the initiation of military action in the support of diplomatic action, other than to avoid a forceful change in the status quo.

The Soviet basic national security objective is also survival as a nation. Thus, though the Soviet leaders will continue to seek to communize the world, the major operational objective will be to deter military attack against the USSR and other Communist countries. In their external efforts, Soviet leaders appear to intend to limit actions to subversion, support of wars of "national liberation," and political action. They appear not to have sought to design strategic intercontinental forces of sufficient strength to ensure Soviet success in a war with the US; however, the Soviets continue to maintain large conventional forces as well as extensive theater-oriented nuclear forces for commitment on the Eurasian land mass.

Despite the fact that neither the US nor the USSR contemplates resort to large-scale war to support their operational objectives, both are prepared for the contingency of war if their own national security is at stake.
A. POLITICAL-MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR

No plan could be devised which would permit an American President to decide in advance which of several contending national objectives deserved priority in a nuclear war. It is apparent that in an all-out nuclear war survival as a sovereign nation would take precedence over all other objectives. Whether the President would choose to expend national power to achieve other objectives would depend directly on his judgment of whether such actions would contribute to the attainment of the primary objective. The possible effects of selected war aims are discussed below, and suggest that the formulation of war aims is an area where continuing study during peacetime would be of considerable value.

Unconditional Surrender of the USSR and its Co-belligerents

Given the history of the Russian people and their governments it is unlikely that unconditional surrender or, indeed, surrender of any kind would be accepted by a Soviet Government without having resisted to the limit of its resources. The examples of the invasions of Russia by Napoleon and by Hitler suggest that when a Russian government and its people are reasonably at peace with one another, and when the means of resistance are at hand, surrender is no more congenial to the Russian character than it is to the American.

In particular, under the condition of a large-scale nuclear exchange it is dubious whether the US could impose terms of unconditional surrender on the USSR, unless the US, at a minimum, was prepared to seize and occupy key control centers in the USSR. There is considerable room for doubting that the United States would be physically capable of supporting the latter operation.

It is barely conceivable that in a situation where a countermilitary exchange had occurred, the prime concern of the Soviet Government might be the preservation of Soviet
cities—a concern which might lead the USSR to accept unconditional surrender. However, even in such circumstances it would be more likely that the Soviets would resist unconditional surrender by threatening to use their residual forces against US cities.

Unilateral Disarmament of the USSR

Total and unilateral disarming of the USSR as a war aim would probably require about the same degree of effort as unconditional surrender of the USSR. The Soviet leadership would have to conclude that after the Soviet Union disarmed, the United States could and probably would present demands tantamount to unconditional surrender. The conclusion one reaches is that total unilateral disarmament of the USSR as a war aim is just as unobtainable as unconditional surrender, and perhaps as a physical matter even harder to accomplish.

Ideally, we would like to eliminate the remaining Soviet strategic forces, including MR/IRBMs, ICBMs, bombers and SLBMs. Given a US capability to re-target its residual force on the remaining Soviet missiles (and this would be difficult with respect to Soviet SLBMs), the US could more effectively demand that the Soviet force be dismantled. It would probably be safer, however, for the United States to launch another disarming attack, for the Soviet Union might well calculate that it had nothing much to lose by firing its remaining missiles instead of stripping itself of the last means of defense. This is the essence of the problem of unilateral disarmament; there comes a point where continued resistance is preferable to placing one's self at the mercy of the enemy.

For this reason, lesser measures of disarmament might be considered alternative war aims. As examples, these might include collecting weapon systems at given locations for ease of surveillance, or stationing on the spot observers at strategic force bases and launch sites. Schemes for freezing Soviet forces at the level existing after an intercontinental exchange could also be devised.

The purpose of this discussion is not to canvass all the possible disarmament arrangements which the US might seek to impose on the USSR. The kind of disarmament which
might be sought would be too heavily dependent on the relative level and quality of residual forces available to the two sides to permit recommendation of a specific formula at this time. What does seem clear is that (a) total unilateral disarmament of the USSR is so close to unconditional surrender that planners should consider these aims to be one and the same in terms of expenditure of force, (b) when we scale down our war aims to something less than total unilateral disarmament, a variety of arrangements is conceptually possible, each of which has the potential of involving us in complex and prolonged negotiations. To amplify this last statement: If the Soviets had residual forces in an amount which caused us to be concerned about their destructive potential, their bargaining position would not be so very much inferior to our own. We would, moreover, be caught between the two risks that the USSR might choose to fire its remaining weapons rather than give them up, while every day that passed would make the resumption of hostilities by US initiation increasingly improbable. In short, an effort to negotiate anything more than a very simple disarmament arrangement under something like ultimatum conditions could result in an inconclusive de facto armistice.

De-communization of the USSR

This would probably be one of the by-products of unconditional surrender. As an independent objective—and if construed to mean complete revision of the socio-economic system of the USSR—this objective would be akin to total unilateral disarmament in the level of effort required to accomplish it, both during and after the war. Yet conditions might exist which would make it feasible to demand replacement of the Soviet government by a government which would conform to accepted norms of international behavior and which would relax ideological controls over the Russian people. Even if the Soviet government apparatus had collapsed, this would be an exceedingly delicate operation, requiring an intimate knowledge of the political forces at play within the Soviet Union. Targeting Soviet government control centers to cause the maximum disruption might be helpful to an extent but we have to recognize that people who might constitute a successor government are quite likely to be located at government control centers, too.
Since we are always interested in promoting evolutionary changes in the USSR, as a matter of course we scrutinize closely those trends, cliques, and individuals whose encouragement we judge to be in our interest. Knowledge of this kind would be valuable in a war situation and we should consciously and continuously assess the information available to us from this viewpoint. In the period before a war escalated to ultimate intensities nothing would be more critical than a knowledge of how to handle our relations with the Soviet Union so as to maximize the possibilities that a "peace party" would control the levers of power within the Soviet Union. Even after a major exchange it would be essential that we do all in our power to bring to the fore those elements in the USSR who would be willing and able to guide that country down paths of peaceful cooperation. This is a role for which American diplomacy should be fully prepared and which it should play even after a US-Soviet war had begun. The American ambassador or special US emissaries in Moscow would thus have a war-time mission of unparalleled importance—realizable, however, only if plans were made for this contingency.

To sum up, de-communization in its literal sense is a war aim the achievement of which would be immensely difficult. The prospects for a change in Soviet government personnel and policies might, on the other hand, be quite good. The United States should regard this as a feasible war aim and adapt current practices to that end.

Punishment of the Aggressor

This possible war aim is mentioned because it is, in essence, the concept underlying pure deterrence. Superficially it appears to be a response rather than an objective; yet certain tasks are accomplished in the act of making good on the deterrent threat. This has been recognized in our targeting policy for many years, most explicitly and authoritatively in the annual SIOP guidance.

The tasks now set forth in guidance for the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP); it should be noted, are no mean ends in themselves. If the military and the urban-industrial attacks were executed, we would have
caused a substantial amount of disarmament of the Soviet Union and have gone a fair way towards reducing that country to a subsistence economy.

What needs to be recognized is the distinct possibility that the tasks defined in the SIOP guidance will be the principal objectives which the United States will seek through force of arms in a nuclear war. We might not wish to, or we might not be able to, use our residual military force to accomplish anything more than the objectives attained by our exercise of one of the SIOP options. In short, in drafting future SIOP guidances we should have it in mind that we may well be defining those war aims of the United States which can be accomplished through the use of military force.

Territorial Demands

Under this heading might be considered: freeing of the satellites from Soviet domination; regaining independence for Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; restoring Polish, Finnish, and Japanese territory to their former sovereignties; giving independence to the ethnic republics of the USSR. The first-mentioned possibility should be regarded as a feasible war aim. The war itself might accomplish this for us by reducing the Soviet Union's ability to project its influence beyond its borders. The others mentioned might be feasible under certain conditions and probably would be items for negotiation if the war left us in a strategic position superior to that of the Soviet Union. In varying degrees, however, all of these latter possibilities strike at the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union; we would probably find a settlement on such terms very difficult to come by and the gain not worth the cost.

On the other hand, any settlement should provide that territory occupied by the Soviet Union during the course of the war would be freed of the Soviet presence. We should probably make this requirement public knowledge very early in a general war, for while seizure of territory by the USSR need not always be strategically significant, it would be vital in the case of Europe.
The Impermanence of Objectives

Implicit in this discussion has been an assumption that, while the basic consideration in a nuclear war would be national survival, the US would want something more out of a war: We would want conditions in the post-war world to be favorable to the growth of a community of free and independent nations. In other words, we would hope that the war might yield us some of the same results we are now seeking through peaceful means. The preceding discussion of bases for terminating a war with the Soviet Union has been biased in this direction. And this bias needs to be recognized for what it is, namely, a projection of present values into a vastly different future.

It is probable that a nuclear war would drastically alter the premises on which our national security policy is based and consequently would alter the basic character of our relationships with the rest of the world. Not just the fact of the war but also the enemy's war aims would be influential in altering our view of the world. The scenario of the "massive intercontinental nation-killing exchange" suggests that this kind of a war would destroy not only a good part of our physical plant but also could affect our national aspirations and scale of values. The United States might in that extremity resort to actions unimaginable to us today. Actions which we might now label as defeatism, imperialism, or even barbarism might seem quite reasonable. For example, the destruction of a nation to keep it out of enemy hands might be no more unrealistic than allowing it to fall to the enemy intact in hopes of later recovering it. Establishing American dominion throughout the world might be as reasonable an aim as dividing the world with our enemies. And the widespread use of biological and chemical weapons might seem justified in a post-nuclear attack period to guarantee the territorial integrity of US allies against further Communist incursions. In short, there may be another order of war aims which will emerge because of what has happened in a war. These aims are likely to be more "unreasonable" in terms of present values than those discussed previously in this paper.
B. POLITICAL-MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN AN ESCALATING GENERAL WAR

As is shown by the scenario on prolonged escalation, one of the more likely ways in which a nuclear war—especially in Europe—might develop is from battlefield use of tactical nuclear weapons, to interdiction attacks close to the Soviet frontier, to nuclear attacks on bases and supply lines in the USSR. It is quite conceivable that the explosions of NATO nuclear warheads on Soviet soil would result in an instantaneous all-out Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe and the United States. But this cannot be assumed. The Soviets know as well as we do what the effects of an all-out nuclear war would be. The deterrent effect of the threat of an all-out nuclear exchange would, therefore, appear to apply even after there had been an escalation to use of nuclear weapons. In such a war, the political-military objectives would vary widely, but one objective would always be to terminate the war before it escalated to a large-scale intercontinental nuclear exchange. This objective does not preclude escalation; rather is means that escalation should be managed to enhance the probability of closing out the war.

In an important sense, decisions about war aims will not be free but will rather be determined by the means of making war. The art of managing war, therefore, should include the application of force in a manner designed to create stopping points short of an all-out nuclear exchange in circumstances favorable to the US. Under ideal conditions there would be a concentration of efforts to terminate hostilities at points where weapons systems not previously introduced into the war are about to be used or where target systems not previously hit are about to be attacked. Calculations of gain or loss will be made just before and after a large quantum of force is applied.

The major stopping points in a war, as indicated by the types of forces or targets, might be as follows:

1. Transition from conventional to tactical nuclear weapons.
2. Transition from tactical use of nuclear weapons to strategic use of nuclear weapons.

3. Transition from a small and limited target system (defined by geography or type of target) to a broader target system.

4. Transition from the use of theater based to non-theater based weapon systems.

5. Transition from counterforce to urban-industrial.

6. At various points along the scale, the launch and recall or commitment of bombers could also create possible stopping points.

Perhaps one of the most difficult situations to analyze would be the probable outcome of an attempt to limit strategic war. The management of such a war would be heavily concentrated on doing the least amount of civil damage in the enemy's homeland, on making the target list clearly relevant to specific objectives, on demonstrating an intent not to escalate without restraint, but at the same time raising the level of coercion to a point which would promote the attainment of national objectives. A prime purpose of the limited strategic war would be to convince the enemy that continuation of the war at the existing level was not profitable, that it would continue unless US demands were met, and that escalation would be even more unrewarding.

It can be seen from the scenario on prolonged escalation that US political objectives in an escalating situation would not be the same as those possibly obtaining in a general war situation. War aims in an escalating war would arise out of conflicts generated at specific pressure points and the principal war objective of both sides would presumably be to relieve the pressure in a manner satisfactory to both parties. If one party had a more radical war aim to begin with or its war aims escalated, the conflict could quickly depart from the limited category.

The scenario on the escalating war in Europe indicates that the immediate objective of the USSR was seizure of NATO territory, while the US objective was to hold on to this territory. This did produce an imbalance in the situation which tended to make limitation difficult since
the Soviet Union was evidently prepared to risk nuclear war to gain an advantage at the expense of US vital interests. As the European scenario states, the US was then faced with the problem of defining the limits of the objectives and military actions which it might take. The US chose to escalate to tactical use of nuclear weapons and then to limited strategic use of nuclear weapons; its objectives were also raised from the restoration of the status quo ante to the freeing of East as well as West Europe of Soviet forces.

This introduces the problem of managing changes in objectives—a problem which is as important to the termination of a war as managing military escalation.

In the scenario on prolonged escalation in Europe, it is probable that the war could have been ended quite early if the Italian government, concerned by the failure of its NATO partners to declare war on the Soviet Union, had withdrawn from NATO and declared itself to be neutral. Alternatively, the US might have more promptly escalated its objective from status quo to neutralizing or making an ally of one or more of the satellites since, as the scenario notes, there was considerable unrest in the area at the time. Possibility this would have had a deterrent effect on the subsequent Soviet decision to broaden its own objectives. In short, when one party to a conflict is unwilling to modify its objectives in the interests of closing out the war the other party may be obliged to escalate not only its military actions but also its political objectives.

Somewhere at the boundary between limited and general war, US objectives would begin to shift from local and limited aims to those discussed in the section on political objectives in a large-scale nuclear war. National command would become more alert to the possibilities of securing these broader objectives. And this is where a political hazard in the limited strategic war would come to the fore. The transition from local and limited objectives to more sweeping ones is quite likely to be made earlier than it should be. Both success and discouragement are apt to have their effect on the national commands of the two sides, with the result that one side would proclaim sweeping objectives in the flush of victory or the other would enlarge the war with the abandon of despair.
The principal point to be recognized is that in a war involving possible escalation there are no political aims which should be regarded as immutable, and military planning which does not go forward side-by-side with planning for management of changing political aims will lack an essential dimension.
C. POLITICAL-MILITARY OBJECTIVES: SUMMARY

The prospects are that in an all-out nuclear war with the USSR, US efforts would be focused on securing the basic US objective of survival as a sovereign nation. Some war aims, e.g., elimination of a large percentage of Soviet strategic forces, would, of course, be achieved by the destructive processes of the war itself, and we should bear in mind that the guidance for strategic target planning in a very real sense defines war aims. Additional aims which might be attainable in an all-out war and which might be the bases for terminating such a war could be: the liberation of any territory seized by the Soviet Union during the course of a nuclear war, especially in Western Europe; the withdrawal to their homeland of any Soviet forces deployed abroad at war's end; the end of Soviet political domination of Eastern Europe. The institution of inspection procedures might be regarded as essential to the securing of the foregoing war aims and to provide warning of any Soviet intent to resume hostilities. Our chief political task, for which we should be well prepared in advance, would be to exert all the influence and skill we possess to bring to power those elements in the Soviet Union who would be disposed to cooperate with us in restoring world order. However, it should be recognized that nuclear war is likely to bring with it changes in the domestic and international fabric which are so radical that pre-war objectives established by pre-war values will be altered or discarded in favor of new war aims.

In an escalating situation, additional war aims would arise out of conflicts generated at specific pressure points. If the war were limited, the war aims of the aggressor would be less than to seek a major shift in the power equilibrium between the US and USSR. Hazards are encountered when objectives begin to shift from local and limited aims to broader objectives. Thus, management of changing objectives and management of forces should proceed hand in hand.