V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The concept of war management and termination is not new; it has been attempted with varying degrees of success in previous wars. What is new is the possibility that any war may now turn into a nuclear war and that the intensity of a nuclear war can rise quickly to unprecedented heights. Never have the stakes been so enormous, and never has it been necessary to make decisions of such irrevocable character in minutes rather than weeks and months.

It is the conclusion of this study that full consideration must be given to the problems of war management and termination in all planning for war. It is further concluded that such efforts will increase the likelihood of a successful application of political actions and military forces to deter the Soviet Union from intensifying a war should one occur, and to cause Soviet leaders to seek to end the war under conditions acceptable to the US.

The acceptance of the above conclusions would require that the interaction of anticipated war events on war aims and on the bases for war termination be analyzed and the analysis kept current with changing world situations. US planning must also take into account the probability that nuclear war would bring with it changes in the domestic and international fabric which are so radical that pre-war objectives established by pre-war values would be altered or discarded in favor of new war aims. Consideration would have to be given in these analyses to the role of strategic force targeting, the requirement for intra-war deterrence, the role of military forces in the terminal phase of war and to procedures to strengthen command and control at the Presidential level. And perhaps of most importance, political guidance to the planners would have to be more comprehensive.

Nothing in these proposed actions should be interpreted as suggesting that war plans should be formulated on other
than sound military doctrine. What is sought is war planning which is more effective because national objectives and war aims are more precisely defined. What is also sought is a common understanding by political and military planners of the possible effects of alternative courses of action once war has begun. The latter process could be of most importance since it could be a means whereby the President and his principal advisors, in reviewing such plans, could be made aware of the nature of decisions which would confront them should contingency plans be implemented.

In the paragraphs which follow, certain conclusions are presented with regard to the applicability of the concept of war management and termination to the several most probable types of war. Consideration is given to certain major factors influencing the bases for termination. Finally, there are specific recommendations to enhance the functioning of command and control at the Presidential level and the comprehensiveness and compatibility of political-military planning.

The Role of War Management and Termination in a War Initiated by a Massive Nation-Killing Nuclear Attack

In the consideration of the various general forms which war might take, one basic factor remained quite clear. The US must always be prepared for the worst case, namely, that of a Soviet initiated nation-killing attack. Vital to such a situation would be a high assurance of being able to deliver the necessary weapons to destroy the USSR no matter what degree of surprise the Soviets might achieve. Because of the uncertainties which would always exist as to the precise capability of the enemy, such assurance could be achieved only with a mix of weapon systems. There must also exist a command and control system which would ensure the capability of Presidential Authority to launch a retaliatory attack.

In the event of a nation-killing attack, the implementation of a sophisticated response capability, attempts at war management in order to limit the total effects of the war, or attempts to negotiate the termination of the war would have little chance of success. Any implementation of these concepts under such circumstances, therefore, must not be permitted to risk the degradation of our capability to
destroy the Soviet Union. The above notwithstanding, the military must be prepared to accomplish important tasks at the end of a nuclear exchange. These would include assisting in the initial national rehabilitation efforts, destroying residual enemy military capabilities, if required, and bringing strength to bear against Nth countries should this be deemed necessary.

The Relationship between the Capability to Use Strategic Nuclear Forces in a Discriminating Manner and Management and Termination

The US should continue efforts to develop selected nuclear weapon systems which have an improved capability for use in a discriminate manner should war occur. This would provide a better deterrence at all levels of war intensity. At the same time the increased flexibility in the use of military force would enable the US to act boldly should national interests dictate an intensification of the war. Such weapons would be available should a circumstance occur which required a US pre-emptive attack—the degree of discrimination in a military strike might contribute to a Soviet decision to desist. The hope would be that the Soviets would come to their senses and, being practical men, opt to close out the war short of a nation-killing exchange. In the public enunciation of the policy of controlled response, care should be taken to impress the Soviet and Allied leaders that the US is not seeking to make war acceptable. On the other hand, there must be nothing said which might cause Soviet leaders to doubt that the US will use whatever force is required to defeat the Soviet Union should war occur.

It would appear that in a controlled exchange with the Soviet Union the US would have as its objective something less than unconditional surrender or destruction of the Communist regime. Especially if the US escalated a war to a limited strategic exchange to force the Soviet leadership to accept a cease-fire; it would seem apparent that Soviet leaders would find this more acceptable if the terms, though favorable to the US, did not call for an unconditional surrender or jeopardize their continued rule in the Soviet Union.
The Role of Management and Termination in a War Involving Escalation

In an escalating war situation, there are inherent stopping points which could be exploited to US advantage by deliberate war management practices. However, the problem of deciding between alternative courses of action at these important turning points would be complex. To be effective, they would have to be supported by an evaluation of military actions relative to political aims. Since the most critical of these decisions would involve consideration of changing the level or intensity of warfare they would require Presidential action.

Both actions and words influence the enemy, but direct contact with the enemy top command is essential to minimize the possibility of confusion. In contrast with past wars, continuous direct communication with enemy authorities will be important and an unprecedented absence of ambiguity will be necessary.

The Requirement for a National or Presidential Command Center

In all the situations examined it was clear that the President must exercise his role as Commander-in-Chief in a manner not previously required. The President must be supported by a mechanism which can bring to rapid focus those political and military factors which relate to the existing situation as well as to provide previously considered judgements of the possible consequences of the courses of action being considered. In particular, he must have available his chief political and military advisors who can be supported at the command center by staff and a continuing flow of information. Such an organization should not be assembled on an ad hoc basis, but rather must have existed prior to the need arising and have been operating in an integrated political-military environment.

Suggested Modifications in Process of National Planning for War

Increased sophistication in the control and management of wars involving the threat of nuclear escalation will require
an extraordinary degree of anticipatory planning in order to ensure that the President is provided with the means to make timely, considered decisions and the assurance that a wide range of possible decisions can be properly carried out.

Such anticipatory planning would encompass specific actions such as the following:

a. Analysis of the application of US military power to the widest possible range of alternative national objectives from the foreign policy viewpoint in order to develop full appreciation of all of the political-military aspects of situations resulting from adoption of various courses of action.

b. Development at national level of sufficiently detailed guidance to ensure that planning for the employment of US military capabilities is responsive to the full range of selected alternative national objectives.

c. Adaptation, as necessary, of military forces and techniques to support the full range of political-military concepts of foreign policy implementation.

d. Adoption of procedures to acquaint the President with examples of the types of decisions he may be called upon to make under conditions of extreme urgency and adoption of means to ensure that his principal advisors are continuously able to provide the most accurate and timely joint evaluation of the military, political and economic consequences of alternative courses of action.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Specific recommendations given below are directed to the problem of integration of military and political factors in the formulation and review of war plans, to the creation of a National Command Center, and to the problem of reconnaissance requirements at the national level.
Recommendation 1

That a subcommittee of the National Security Council be formed which would have the overall responsibility for the integration of political and military factors in the provision of guidance for war planning at the national level. This subcommittee, which would be composed of senior members of agencies represented on the NSC, would operate on a permanent basis to the end that the President is provided with the means to make timely considered decisions on the basis of a full appreciation of all of the political-military aspects which may result from adoption of alternative courses of action.

Recommendation 2

Adopt the concept of a National Command Center organized, staffed, and equipped wherein the President and his key advisors, both civilian and military, assemble for managing a war.

Recommendation 3

Analyze reconnaissance tasks facing this country in the pre-war, intra-war and post-war environment to determine the optimum mix of systems required. Such an analysis must be made at the national level considering the needs of the military, other agencies of the government, and, especially, those of the National Command Center.