The U.S. administration, in a number of official documents (report to Congress, brochures *Soviet Military Power*, *Program of Strategic Defense of the Soviet Union*, and others) signed by Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State, have announced more than once that the USSR has deployed a ground complex of laser weapons at the ABM testing range near Sary Shagan capable of destroying satellites, and in 1990 – warheads.

The USSR has announced more than once (colonel general N. F. Chervov at the press conference in Geneva and on various other occasions) that this is not true and that the complex is used only for satellite tracking purposes and consequently its power is thousands times less than required for destruction. However, the administration continues to actively apply the false argument to convince the Congress, the allies and public opinion that the USSR has already started to deploy elements of SDI. A number of officials – for example, the British foreign secretary – announced that this particular fact ultimately persuaded them to support their countries’ participation in the SDI program.

Composition of equipment located inside the buildings mentioned in the US documents fully corresponds with the USSR statement. Thus, there exists a complete and unique chance to demonstrate the false nature of the official American claims. At this given moment, when precisely these kind of arguments are used to justify the U.S. exit from the ABM Treaty, an exposure of a lie with one concrete example may have big political consequences, especially taking into account the general lessening of pressure on the administration.

Therefore, it is proposed, in the concluding statement of M. S. Gorbachev at the forum, to invite a small group of American scientists and journalists (5-8 people) to visit the named buildings, to familiarize themselves with the equipment and to see for themselves the false nature of the American attitude. The technological level of the actual equipment of the radar set is no secret. On my initiative, employees of the USSR State Commission for Technology, of which I am a member, have prepared the possibility and procedures of the visit.

The issue was discussed with S. F. Akhromeyev, who agrees with the above given arguments in favor of a positive decision, but notes the possibility of reciprocal propaganda steps of the Pentagon that may try to prove, using the size of the existing buildings and the purposes of the test range, that if not today, then in future the USSR has an intention to create such weapons.
Our analysis convinces us that the Pentagon has already used up all these arguments and it is unlikely to gain anything from them in future. Still, S. F. Akhromeyev’s opinion is 50 per cent in favor, 50 per cent against.

Air Defense Commander comrade A. I. Koldunov is against, because in his opinion the visit will allow the Americans to guess our future plans. As scientific director of these works, I disagree with this opinion.

Comrade F. D. Bobkov [KGB] was informed of the idea as preliminary information.

Comrade N. F. Chervov and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs – via comrade V. F. Petrovsky – support the idea.

An additional argument in favor, and a security measure, is the spontaneous nature of the invitation, a limited number of participants and its brief term (route: airfield – site – airfield is studied; the length of the trip including transportation is 4 hours).

Velikhov

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