I. Analysis

The current Guatemalan insurgency problem grew out of a 1960 political decision to overthrow the constitutional government. Today the insurgent forces remain ideologically motivated and supported in part by Cuba and international Communism. In any program we wish to advance in the security and intelligence sectors, we must take into consideration the political ramifications and, at the same time, avoid thinking of the insurgent movement in terms of civil war. Guatemala, unlike Vietnam, is not a country at war and the direct threat of the insurgents is against public security.

Therefore, the main thrust of U.S. assistance efforts must be guided toward the development of improved law enforcement, intelligence and military institutions to meet the immediate threat. Equally important is the long-range development of other governmental elements which play a part in administering justice and improving socio-economic conditions. These agencies are the instruments which can eliminate subversion's raison d'etre.

The Guatemalan Army is the only force capable of sustained field operations against guerrilla forces. For this reason, and because of its dominant political role, it must be considered in as many aspects of the development process as possible. At the same time, the civilian police force must be better prepared to meet a relatively well organized, urban-based insurgent force with a modus operandi paralleling that of organized crime.
In most respects, the U.S. effort must be regarded a long-range one, leaning heavily on the preparation of security forces to control criminal lawlessness and the politically-oriented insurgency rather than as a no-holds-barred internal war.

It is essential that all civilian and military security forces adopt effective alternatives instead of resorting to extra-legal measures so that they will not become identified in the public mind as punitive agents of the government. Insurgent terrorist acts must be dealt with rapidly and severely but within the legal framework. In order to reduce the current level of violence, the security services must reach an acceptable level of sophistication and competence or the spiral toward a higher level of terror may polarize even the most moderate elements of Guatemalan society and set the stage for eventual civil war.

II. Objectives

A. Military Intelligence

The armed forces have traditionally played a major role in internal security and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Within the armed forces, the quantity and quality of intelligence gathered by the G2 is minimal. Evaluation and analysis is nearly non-existent. The military intelligence organization should be developed as a professional organization; it needs more and better trained personnel, better utilization of those who have received training, and improved collection and utilization of intelligence. At the same time, an appreciation of the role and capabilities of the civilian services should be stressed and developed within the Army, especially at the first and second echelon levels.
The Guatemalan military intelligence organization includes all three services and is headed by the G2, Guatemalan Army General Staff, assisted by an assistant G2. There are five principal sections; Administration, Intelligence, Counterintelligence; Support and Liaison. Each of the eight major army bases has an S2, Intelligence officer with one or more assistants, and the Navy and Air Force have an N2 and A2 respectively. The G2 is responsible for obtaining, analyzing and disseminating combat intelligence, for reporting on military and civilian subversive activities, and for obtaining and analyzing information on neighboring nations' intentions and potential to conduct military action. The G2 organization has about 40 personnel, and each army base and service has three to five who work exclusively on intelligence matters. A small, 16-man Counterintelligence Detachment (MAP supported) has the mission to provide the armed forces with capabilities in the fields of counterespionage, countersabotage, countersubversion, and personal security. It will have an authorized strength of 60 when fully operative. There are also 30 to 40 confidential agents, who wear civilian clothing and operate from the G2 office or one of the bases. There is currently no professional intelligence career service in the military and the quality of personnel assigned to this function is not always high. Intelligence training for military personnel is conducted in Panama and in-country at the MAP supported Guatemalan Counterintelligence School. One of the weaknesses of the system is that frequently trained intelligence personnel are not assigned in intelligence
of intelligence-related field. The quality of intelligence produced is fair to poor. The caliber of agents is poor, the amount of money low, and the systematic intelligence collation and assessment poor. The Guatemalan G2 Division has the basic potential to become a competent military intelligence organization. Before it can realize its potential, however, it must be reorganized with specific missions for each department. There must be competent direction from higher authorities, disposition of intelligence personnel should be commensurate with their training, intelligence training needs to be carried on at all levels of command, and transportation and communications facilities must be improved.

B. Civilian Security Services

"Effective police and public safety activities can play an important part in the prevention and handling of internal security problems. A capable and humane police force can be invaluable in coping with and controlling internal security situations at minimum cost with limited use of force and within the framework of civil law. It can be a factor in preventing dissension and dissatisfaction from growing outside the bounds of legitimate opposition and becoming subversive. In developing countries, U.S. police assistance programs can play an important role, not only in the preservation of public order, but in the building of indigenous civil security institutions which can keep pace with and assist in the nation's growth process. The effectiveness of public safety forces can be greatly enhanced if programs for their development are instituted in advance of potential crises."

1United States Police on Internal Defense in Selected Foreign Countries, Approved by the Senior Interdepartmental Group May 23, 1968.
The National Police: A mostly uniformed police of 5,500 men with general law enforcement responsibilities nationwide. Under the Ministry of Government, they maintain 3,600 men in the capital city, the remainder in the interior in 119 detachments. The Headquarters has radio communications with 18 units in Department capitals as well as some mobile and portable units in Guatemala City. Of 214 vehicles, at least half are regularly deadlined for maintenance. The force is led by three Army officers on detail who seem often to report directly to the Casa-Presidential circumventing the relatively ineffective Mingov. In the past ten years a relatively large base of U.S. trained senior police officers has been developed providing the greatest asset for development. The unit's weakness and problems are many including corruption, poor administration and management, low pay and qualifications for personnel, poor and dangerous working conditions, inadequate budget, antiquated operational concepts, techniques and procedures, inadequate facilities, poor logistic support, maintenance and many more. Moreover, recent illegal counter-terror tactics by a clandestine police group has caused a serious drop in public acceptance of police in a few places. General improvements in such areas as patrol, investigations, training, communications, records and some aspects of leadership have been recently noted. Far greater improvements across-the-board are needed.
The Judicial Police: A plain-clothes force of 500 men with criminal and subversive investigation responsibilities nationwide. Also under the Ministry of Government and entirely based in Guatemala City. It is also led by army officers who are carrying out a modest reform including the discharge of marginal personnel and improved selection procedures. Other weaknesses paralleled those described in the National Police. Like the National Police, it has powers of arrest.

The Treasury Police: A uniformed force of 1,165 men responsible for enforcing laws related to national fiscal policies and natural resources. Although recently placed under the Ministry of Government, it enjoys considerable autonomy. About 450 men are stationed in the capital and the rest are detailed in 30 interior communities, many at seaports and on the frontiers. Seventeen of these detachments have radio communications with Headquarters, but almost none have vehicles. During the Peralta regime, the Treasury Police were engaged in widespread extra-legal intelligence and anti-subversive activities. To a much lesser degree this is still true. Its three top leaders are Army officers. The current Chief is particularly competent. Although it too suffers many of the same weaknesses as the National Police, its men are better paid and led. They have powers of arrest.
All the forces suffer from some degree of institutionalized corruption and an unknown amount of infiltration. Although the current military leadership in each force is good by Guatemalan standards, history shows that the police have suffered a major problem from rapid turnover in the top spots. Thus continuity is many past developmental innovations have been lost. Moreover, a residual attitude somewhat persists that an educated policeman is harder to control and a moral policeman is insufficiently malleable to suit venal leaders.

The police, however, are accepted for the role they play in government. They are not as professionally respected as are Army officers, but their growing cadre of trained and experienced men offers a potential worth supporting.

C. Civilian Intelligence Service

The National Security Subversive Activities Group (NSSAG) became operational in 1966 and was made responsible for investigating subversive activities including Communist guerrilla operations. It has no arrest or search and seizure powers and must rely on the Judicial Police for these functions. A relatively small force of approximately 30 men, NSSAG obtains intelligence from its penetrations of the insurgent movement and from postal and telephone censorship. It maintains international teletype contact with similar groups in other Central American countries and holds the most comprehensive files on subversives. NSSAG reports directly to Col. Guillermo Mendez Montenegro, the brother of the president and the Chief of the President's Military Staff.
The majority of the NSSAG officers have been trained under U.S. programs but additional training is necessary to raise the unit's level of sophistication. The Joint Operations Center concept (explained under Section III - Targets and Activities) would provide an effective means of exploiting NSSAG-collected intelligence. The practice of detailing experienced civilian and military security officers to NSSAG would increase this agency's appreciation for the problems and capabilities of sister services and, at the same time, encourage closer coordination between the various intelligence and security services.

III Targets and Projected Activities

A. Military

1. Improve intelligence/counterintelligence training at all levels through (a) selection and training of the maximum number of personnel possible at US Army School of Americas and key officers at Holabird; (b) sending an MTT to train in the organization and functioning of a counter-intelligence unit; and (c) sending another MTT to train selected personnel in the techniques of interrogation and further technical investigative techniques. Some police officers might be included in this training.

2. Improve motivation and utilization of trained intelligence personnel. Orientation tours to the Canal Zone and to CONUS for key personnel might be arranged.

3. Improve evaluation and dissemination of intelligence collected.

4. Improve selection and training of confidential agents.
B. Civilian Security Services

1. Improve administration and management of police forces through: (a) increased technical advice; (b) increased participant training; and (c) leadership training at all levels, perhaps conducting some joint civilian/military courses.

2. Improve coordination between police units by (a) establishing direct lines of communication; (b) establishing joint training facility; (c) establishing a National Police Academy; (d) exploring possibility of certain joint logistics facilities; and (e) improving joint records and identification facilities including photo laboratory and crime analysis units.

3. Improve coordination between military and police units by: (a) establishing a JOC in Guatemala City with communications links to all department capitals; (b) appointing liaison officers in each military and police unit; (c) encouraging regular business planning sessions at all levels and promoting social get-togethers with PSD, CAS and MILGRP hosting.

4. Improve selection of police personnel through: (a) additional refinements in existing selection process; (b) increased wage and fringe benefits; (c) improved working conditions.

5. Expand patrolling in Guatemala City by (a) enlarging the precinct system to include all zones; (b) providing more vehicles, communications equipment, and better maintenance; (c) requesting Guatemala Air Force assistance to provide light aircraft or helicopter support in urban areas.

6. Establish a unified records control system in a Criminal Records Center.
7. Improve investigations technique by:
(a) establishing a small crime analysis unit in each force;
(b) increasing training of specialized units in such areas as bombing, robbery, kidnapping, etc.; (c) improving criminalistics laboratory (both mobile and at police headquarters); and
(d) revamping interrogation practices.

8. Improve communications systems and networks after a three-week survey of existing equipment.

9. Improve rural police capabilities and control of contraband and illegal travel by: (a) exploiting the Treasury Police potential; (b) improving communications and patrolling capabilities at frontiers; (c) developing collection nets using the rural-based mayors and their assistants; (d) establishing model department police systems as planned; (e) establishing a rural mobile patrol in Esquintla as planned; (f) testing the use of a Vietnam village hamlet radio network to broaden rural coverage.

10. Improve vehicle and communications maintenance by:
(a) establishing a central vehicle maintenance facility for III, IV, and V echelon (perhaps with GOG military assistance);
(b) establishing separate repair shops for I and II echelon units;
(c) establishing budget and disbursing procedural reforms.

11. Improve police/judicial relations by: (a) sponsoring seminars on security problems between appropriate police and court officials; (b) involving judges, law professors, and legislators in police investigative training; (c) preparation of a legal procedural manual which stresses sound practices in handling
evidence for operational police units; (d) encouraging appropriate revision of existing laws and procedures; and (e) co-locating police precincts with minor courts and detention centers.

12. Improve police public relations by: (a) exploiting community action programs; (b) participating with the Army in military civic action; and (c) stressing medical first aid training.

(Comment: A breakdown of the required Fiscal Year 1969 budget and an explanation of the loan funding from FY 69-73 as prepared by AID/Public Safety is attached as an annex to this portion of the Sub-group paper.)

C. Intelligence Service

1. Establish a Joint Operations Center (JOC) in Guatemala City:

   a. Definition: The basic function of the JOC is to serve as the one location where all available intelligence on insurgent personalities and their activities is collected and collated. The JOC would assist the various security and intelligence services to take timely and appropriate action and would provide information designed to increase the long-range effectiveness of Guatemala's internal defense operations. The JOC will not conduct operations itself but will provide technical and material assistance to the action agency involved.

   b. Authority: The JOC should be located in the Presidential Palace where it would have ready and rapid access to the senior civilian and military leaders. The commands or requirements emanating from the JOC, especially in times of crisis, would be levied upon a particular security service
for action in a manner which would make it unmistakably clear that the command had been coordinated with other services. The JOC would have to have sufficient autonomy and authority to make rapid decisions as to which particular Guatemalan service is to take action.

c. Organization:

(1) Information Center: A small unit of intelligence analysts and report writers who would have no command function but would be responsible for the processing and storing of biographic and situation intelligence.

(2) Communication/Command Unit: A 24-hour-a-day operational command center equipped with sufficient communications to receive incoming raw intelligence, monitoring ongoing operations and issue emergency orders in crisis situations.

(3) Personnel: The unit strength of both the analysis and operational units should be limited to as few as possible. The requirements for the selection of JOC personnel should be rigid with careful attention paid to reliability and honesty, previous experience in related fields, and unquestionable loyalty to the Mendez administration. The "need to know principle" should be practiced wherever and whenever possible. The existence of the JOC should not be publicized and the salaries and administrative expenses paid from confidential funds. The JOC director would have access to both the information
and operations units and would serve as internal coordinator for all activities. He should be a person not only experienced in internal defense operations but also knowledgeable of intelligence processing procedures. Given a situation where the lines of authority can be expected to be tenuous, the success of the JOC would depend largely on the director's ability to persuade, manipulate and adapt to Guatemalan intra-service rivalries.

d. JOC Functions:

(1) Information Unit:

(a) Collect, process, disseminate and store all biographic and situation intelligence on insurgent movement.

(b) Maintain and collate incident reports and maps which detail the location and objective of insurgent actions.

(c) Record all raw intelligence received with a record of sources and reliability of fact.

(d) Prepare and distribute situation papers to appropriate GOG agencies recommending need for social, economic, security and/or political action in defined geographic areas or among particular population centers.

(e) Working with the appropriate GOG agency, the JOC will clear and coordinate public statements and other types of propaganda exposing to the public the true nature of Guatemalan subversion.
(f) Provide professionally tailored interrogation guides for captured insurgents and persons supporting insurgent activities.

(g) Provide training and briefing papers for civilian and military units engaged in penetration or infiltration operations against the insurgent movement.

(h) Analyze and disseminate reports covering contents of captured documents.

(i) Coordinate with all civilian and military intelligence collection units.

(2) Operational Center:

(a) Maintain communication facilities to receive raw intelligence and for the rapid dissemination of priority reports.

(b) In times of crisis issue orders to appropriate action agencies.

(c) Monitor and coordinate all ongoing counterinsurgency operations.

(d) Maintain up-to-date maps and charts showing both friendly and opposition movements and incidents.

(e) Intercept insurgent communications.

e. JOC In rural Guatemala: While no structured JOC units will exist as such in the departmental capitals, the success of the JOC depends upon the quality and quantity of intelligence received from both urban and rural sources. To
help insure a steady flow of intelligence from rural areas, the military or civilian force in authority will be the collection point and transmitter of the raw product. The JOC in Guatemala City must assist these reporting centers by establishing requirements so that the intelligence is not held, as it often is, only in the hands of the action unit.

D. General Recommendations:

1. Encourage improved coordination within the Country Team by establishing a limited working group for internal security matters only.

2. Investigate the possibility of establishing a military court system to try cases where a crime against the state has been committed. If a military court system does not prove feasible for Guatemala, a survey of the existing legal procedures and the judicial code itself should be done in order to advise the GOG how the legal process can be strengthened. Such a survey would provide alternative solutions to current practices of brutal interrogations and illegal executions of suspects.