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/******* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
COUNTRY: (U) GUATEMALA (GT).

SUBJ: IIR/WHY THE "TANDA" PHENOMENON DOES NOT EXIST IN THE GUATEMALAN MILITARY (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 910826.

REQS: (U) CONFIDENTIAL
SUMMARY: {C} THE GUATEMALAN ARMY DOES NOT HAVE THE
PHENOMENON OF "TANDAS", THOSE POWERFUL HORIZONTAL
LOYALTIES AMONG MILITARY OFFICER YEAR GROUPS WHICH IN
SOME OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES CAN GREATLY INFLUENCE
SUCH THINGS AS SENIOR LEADERSHIP CHANGES AND COMMAND
ASSIGNMENTS. DIVISIONS WITHIN THE GUATEMALAN OFFICER
CORPS CAUSED BY TWO EARLY 1980 COUPS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
VERTICAL COLUMNS OF LOYALTIES AMONG "OPERATORS", "INTEL"
TYPES AND SMALLER SUBGROUPS OF OFFICERS, THE MELTING OF
YEAR GROUPS IN MILITARY COURSES, AND SPLIT YEAR GROUPS
ALL CONTRIBUTE TO THE LACK OF "TANDA" DOMINATION.

TEXT: 1. {C} THE GUATEMALAN ARMY'S MILITARY ACADEMY
HAS BEEN GRADUATING CLASSES OF MILITARY OFFICERS FOR SOME
115 YEARS, AND AS SUCH, THE ACADEMY IS CONSIDERED THE
BEDROCK OF GUATEMALAN ARMY OFFICER PROFESSIONALISM AND
VALUES. YET, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT A STRONG MILITARY
ACADEMY TRADITION ALSO EXISTS IN NEIGHBORING HONDURAS AND
EL SALVADOR, THE GUATEMALAN OFFICER CORPS, UNLIKE THOSE
OF HONDURAS AND EL SALVADOR, DOES NOT EXPERIENCE THE
POWERFUL INTERNAL INFLUENCES OF THE "TANDAS". THE
PHENOMENON OF THE TANDA HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY THE
VERY STRONG IDENTIFICATION AND LOYALTY AMONG MEMBERS OF
ONE'S ACADEMY CLASS -- A HORIZONTAL LOYALTY. THIS TANDA
PHENOMENON AT TIMES IS THEN AMPLIFIED BY THE AD HOC
BANDING TOGETHER OF VARIOUS TANDAS OR YEAR GROUPS OF
ACADEMY GRADUATES IN ORDER TO ENFORCE THEIR PREFERENCES,
E.G. FOR TOP LEADERSHIP CHANGES OR TOP ASSIGNMENTS, ON
THE REST OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICER CORPS. ALLIANCES
BETWEEN CERTAIN TANDAS THEMSELVES AND ALLIANCES BETWEEN
THESE TANDAS AND ARMY CHIEFS OR MINISTERS OF DEFENSE HAVE
OFTEN RESULTED IN UNDERSTANDINGS OR AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE
OVERPOWERED THE INTERESTS OF OTHER TANDAS. THIS REPORT
ANALYZES WHY THIS PHENOMENON IS NOT NOW PRESENT IN THE
GUATEMALAN ARMY, AN ARMY WHICH IS SIMILAR IN MANY OTHER
WAYS TO ITS CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS.

2. {C} THE GUATEMALAN ARMY ONCE POSSESSED THIS "TANDA"
CHARACTERISTIC UP THROUGH THE 1970'S, ALBEIT NOT QUITE TO
THE DEGREE OF INFLUENCE AS THAT OF ITS NEIGHBORING ARMIES
OF EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS. THEN DURING THE EARLY
1980'S, A COMBINATION OF FACTORS CONVERGED TO DILUTE
GUATEMALAN TANDAS OF MUCH OF THEIR HORIZONTAL LOYALTIES
IN FAVOR OF LOYALTIES MORE VERTICAL IN NATURE THROUGHOUT
THE INSTITUTION.

3. {C} THE COUP AGAINST LUCAS --
THE MILITARY COUP AGAINST PRESIDENT (AND GENERAL)
FERNANDO LUCAS GARCIA IN MARCH OF 1982 WAS AN ESPECIALLY GUT-WRENCHING EXPERIENCE FOR THE OFFICER CORPS. THE COUP SUCCEEDED IN OUSTING LUCAS GARCIA IN FAVOR OF GENERAL JOSE EFRAIN RIOS MONT, BUT IT ALSO SERVED TO SPLIT APART WHAT UNTIL THEN HAD BEEN A HOMOGENEOUS OFFICER CORPS. MILITARY ACADEMY CLASSMATES AND FRIENDS FOR UP TO 20 YEARS SUDDENLY FOUND THEMSELVES ON OPPOSITE SIDES OF THIS BARRACKS COUP, WITH THOSE WHO HAD MAINTAINED LOYALTY TO LUCAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEING RELEGATED TO POSITIONS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE, POSITIONS AWAY FROM THE CAPITAL, OR WERE SENT ABROAD AS ATTACHES OR STUDENTS. THEN IN AUG 1983, RIOS MONT SUFFERED THE SAME FATE AS HIS PREDECESSOR, WITH MANY OFFICERS WHO HAD RESISTED THE PREVIOUS COUP AGAINST LUCAS NOW LEADING THE MOVE AGAINST GEN RIOS AND AGAINST THOSE SAME CLASSMATES WHO HAD SUPPORTED THE OUSTER OF LUCAS.


5. THE EFFECTS OF THE WAR -- COINCIDENTAL WITH THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE LUCAS REGIME, OR MORE LIKELY AS A RESULT OF IT, THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE RISE IN THE COMBAT POWER OF THE THREE INSURGENT GROUPS. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE AS MANY AS 8,000 FULL TIME ARMED GUERRILLAS, SOME 40,000 IRREGULAR INSURGENTS, AND A POPULAR SUPPORT BASE INSIDE GUATEMALA OF 150,000 CITIZENS. SOME OF THE GUATEMALAN ARMY'S RESPONSES TO THIS INCREASED THREAT HAD THE UNWITTING EFFECT OF ALSO REDUCING HORIZONTAL LOYALTIES OF THE ACADEMY CLASSES. THREE SUCH ACTIONS WORTHY OF DISCUSSION BELOW ARE:
- THE RISE OF VERTICAL COLUMNS OF OFFICER SPECIALISTS;
- THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADDITIONAL OFFICER SUBGROUPS;
- THE DELAY IN THE PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION OF OFFICERS;
- THE GREATER USE OF RESERVE OFFICERS.


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AND INTO TACTICAL OPERATIONS PLANNING.

7. *(go)* THE "COFRADIA" --

Under Directors of Intelligence such as the then COL. Manuel Antonio Callejas y Callejas back in the early 1980's, the Intelligence Directorate made dramatic gains in its capabilities, so much so that today it must be given much of the credit for engineering the military decline of the Guerrillas from 1982 to the present. But while doing so, the Intelligence Directorate (D-2) became an elite "club" within the officer corps, retaining the very best of officers for consecutive intelligence assignments within the D-2, or at a minimum, always bringing back into the D-2 those officers who had departed in order to become Commanders, Second Commanders, or G-2's in Battalions, military zones, and brigades. Today, officers with this type of D-2 - G-2 background who are in good standing within Army Intelligence circles are considered members of the "Cofradia".

8. *(g)h* The mere mention of the word "Cofradia" inside the institution conjures up the idea of the "Intelligence Club", the term "Cofradia" being the name given to the powerful organizations of village-church elders that exist today in the Indian highlands of Guatemala. Presently, this vertical column of Intelligence Officers, from Captains to Generals, represents the strongest internal network of loyalties within the institution. Well known members of this unofficial Cofradia include Army Chief, BG Edgar ((Godoi)), and BG Jorge ((Perussina)), as well as Colonels Luis ((Ortega)) Menaldo, Julio ((Balconi)), Marco ((Gonzalez)) Taracena, just to name a very few.

9. *(g)* The Operators --

As talent was needed and recruited for Intelligence work, other capable officers were being hand picked at all levels to serve in key operations and troop command assignments, especially positions related to planning and conducting operations against the Guerrillas. Although not as tight knit a group as the Cofradia, the "Operators" all the same developed their own vertical leader-subordinate network of recognition, relationships and loyalties, and are today considered a separate and distinct vertical column of officer loyalties, a vertical column that also exists from Generals down to Captains. The "operators" include such standouts as: General Luis ((Mendoza)), the MOD; BG Jose ((Garcia)) Samayoa, Deputy Army Chief; BG Mario ((Enriquez)); and influential Colonels Jose ((Quilo)), Carlos ((Pineda)), Carlos.
10. **THE BALANCE**

The "COFRADIA" and the "OPERATORS" continue to maintain more or less an even balance over the application of influence within the institution. This is due to the balance among top Army Leaders, and the existence of additional subgroupings of these same officers which are based on other particular affiliations. Regarding the leaders, when Gen Grajedo (an operator) was the HOD, he was counterbalanced by the Army Chief, Gen Callejas, who was known as the "Bishop" of the COFRADIA. Today, Gen Mendoza, an operator, holds the MOD position, but he is clearly balanced off by Army Chief, Gen Godoy, and the Chief of the President's Staff, Col Ortega, both of the COFRADIA.

11. **ADDITIONAL SUB-GROUP LOYALTIES**

Regarding additional subgroupings within the Army, there is a clique of officers (Captain to General) who had served in the elite airborne units with airborne commanders such as Grajedo, then Mendoza, and more recently, Perussina -- called the "Paracaidistas". Another sub-group of officers today are the "Kaibiles" (Guatemalan Rangers), who have become a more recent elite of the Guatemalan Army. These two subgroups actually include a mixture of both intelligence and operations oriented officers. A third sub-grouping are Air Force pilots. Subgroups like these within the institution tend to develop vertical loyalties in themselves as well as serve to bring about some melding of "COFRADIA" and operations officers out of the mutual respect gained inside a sub-group.

12. **DELAY IN MILITARY EDUCATION**

At the height of the conflict with the insurgent groups, the Army suspended the conduct of its management type officer courses in order to keep more officers in the field. Therefore, for a number of years, there were no opportunities to attend the combined arms advanced course or the command and general staff course. When these courses were finally opened again, officers were sent to these courses on a "best qualified" basis as a result of written exams. The officers with the highest scores were given courses outside Guatemala, with those next in line to attend courses at the Army's Center for Military Studies (CEM). The officer corps is still recovering from those course delays as is exemplified in the current command and staff course, which has a mix of officers to include some lieutenant colonels about to make full colonel down to mid-level majors. This melding of ranks and year groups at the CEM's courses has also served to
INTERFERE WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF HORIZONTAL YEAR GROUP LOYALTIES.

13. {G} - THE RESERVE OFFICER --
THE WAR ALSO BROUGHT ABOUT THE USE OF MANY MORE "RESERVE" OFFICERS; GRADUATES OF ONE OF THE SEVEN ARMY RUN MILITARY HIGH SCHOOLS WHO ARE COMMISSIONED AS RESERVE SECOND LIEUTENANTS AND WHO ARE ALLOWED TO COME ON ACTIVE DUTY AND SERVE A FULL 30 YEAR CAREER, BUT ARE LIMITED TO A TOP RANK OF LTC. THE INFUX OF RESERVE OFFICERS HAS DILUTED WHAT WAS PREVIOUSLY A SMALLER POOL OF ACADEMY OFFICERS, SO THAT IN THE TACTICAL UNITS, ACADEMY GRADUATES SEE PROPORTIONATELY LESS OF THEIR CLASSMATES ON A REGULAR BASIS, THUS IMPEDING THE STRENGTHENING OF THEIR OLD ACADEMY TIES.

14. {G} - THE SPLIT YEAR GROUPS --

15. {G} - ANY TANDAS IN SIGHT?
THE CLOSEST THING TO A TANDA IN RECENT HISTORY IN GUATEMALA WOULD HAVE BEEN CLASS NO. 60, WHICH GRADUATED IN JUNE 1961. OF ITS APPROXIMATELY 20 SURVIVING MEMBERS ON RETIREMENT DAY 30 YEARS LATER (30 JUN 1991), SIX HAD MADE IT TO GENERAL -- AN UNUSUALLY HIGH PERCENTAGE. BUT EVEN WITH SIX GENERALS, AND ONE OF THEM SERVING AS THE MOD, CLASS NO. 60 DID NOT SWING NOTICEABLE INFLUENCE WITHIN THE OFFICER CORPS; THE VERTICAL COLUMNS OF LOYALTIES THAT WERE ALREADY IN PLACE CLEARLY DOMINATED ANY HORIZONTAL LOYALTIES BY CLASS NO. 60. SOME "GUATEMATOLIGISTS" MAY LOOK UPON ACADEMY CLASS NUMBER 73 (GRADUATED IN 1969) AS A POSSIBLE TANDA IN THE MAKING BECAUSE OF THE HIGH NUMBER OF VERY EXCELLENT OFFICERS AMONG ITS REMAINING 17 ACTIVE DUTY MEMBERS. HOWEVER, A CLOSE STUDY OF THESE RISING STARS WILL SHOW THAT MANY OF THEM ARE ALREADY WELL INTEGRATED INTO ONE OF THOSE TWO POWERFUL VERTICAL COLUMNS -- THE INTELLIGENCE "COFRADIA" OR THE OPERATORS.

COMMENTS: {G}