MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

JAN 9 2007

TOP SECRET

April 17, 1969

Dr. Kissinger:

Two copies of the attached memoranda are provided for your information.

[Signature]

TOP SECRET

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-2007

Declassified to Secret

Date: [Redacted]

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

05-M-0573-A1

R3
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Alternative Responses, EC-121 Shootdown

1. The attached draft memorandum for the President is forwarded in response to a request received from Dr. Kissinger.

2. It is recommended that the draft memorandum be forwarded to the President.

(Sgd) EARLE G. WHEELER

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Concept and Estimates for Retaliatory B-52 Air Strikes Against North Korean Targets

1. This memorandum forwards a concept for employment of B-52 aircraft against either one of two North Korean airfields as a response to their shootdown of the US EC-121 on 15 April 1969.

2. The recommended targets for this concept are:

   a. Wonsan AF (39-09N - 127-29E) - 6,600' concrete runways. Main structures: control, 2 hangars, 3 admin, 8 maint, 8 warehouses, 14 storages, 50 support, 120 barracks, 3 POL tanks. Jet light bomber/fighter capability. One of three major fighter bases on east coast of North Korea. Southernmost fighter base on the East Coast. 2 NM E of Wonsan.

   b. Son Dong Mi (Sondok AF) (39-44N - 127-28E) - 6,600' concrete runway. Main structures: control, 5 admin, maint, 14 barracks, 37 support, 19 POL tanks. Jet light bomber/fighter capability. Only fighter base in Hungnam area. 34 NM N of Wonsan.

3. Advantages of using B-52 versus carrier-based aircraft or land-based tactical aircraft are as follows:

   a. One B-52 delivers up to 108 bombs versus the 12 to 18 delivered by each tactical aircraft.

   b. The smaller the number of aircraft, the better the chance for surprise.
c. Introduction of the strike force from a more remote area, such as Guam, also enhances the possibility of surprise.

d. The use of B-52s, like carrier-based air, has the advantage of keeping the attack a US-NK affair, thereby reducing the risk of UNC involvement and possible NK retaliation against the ROK. It would also ameliorate the GOJ reaction.

e. The strike could be mounted more quickly by B-52s than by land or carrier-based aircraft.

f. The B-52 has a greater ECM capability than either of the other two forces.

g. The use of the B-52 as opposed to land-based tactical air permits a night, all-weather, low level attack, thus enhancing survivability.

h. Use of B-52s preserves land based tactical air in the area for defense of ROK.

4. Disadvantages of using the B-52:

a. B-52 is larger and less maneuverable than tactical aircraft and somewhat more vulnerable to barrage anti-aircraft fire.

b. Loss of a strategic bomber might have a more damaging effect on US image in this situation.

c. Use of the B-52 in relatively close proximity to the Soviet Union might elicit an adverse Soviet reaction.

5. Advantages/disadvantages of using 12 versus 24 B-52s are:

a. Attack by 12 B-52s against one airfield would be sufficient to achieve US objective.

b. The smaller attacking force would decrease the time and number of aircraft exposed and possibly reduce the risk of loss.
c. A 12 aircraft attack could be mounted slightly sooner.

d. A smaller force would have less mutual supporting capability (ECM and defense suppression).

e. Damage expectancy would be reduced using smaller force.

6. There are presently 102 B-52s deployed in the Pacific, with 52 of these at Guam. There are 85 KC-135s deployed, 35 of which are on Okinawa.

7. Concept of operations would be as follows:

   a. Launch the selected number of B-52s (up to 24) from Guam for a night low level attack.

   b. Air refueling support would be provided by an equal number of KC-135 aircraft from Kadena. Further tanker deployment into Kadena probably not required.

   c. Force could be launched 24 to 48 hours after decision to execute.

   d. Time over target would be approximately six hours after launch.

   e. Using ECM with night low level tactics should minimize losses. It is estimated that losses would not exceed one or two aircraft.

8. CINCPAC and CINCSAC have been requested to prepare operation plans for B-52 attack on each target as soon as possible, addressing both the smaller and larger strike forces (12 to 24).