MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Contingency Plan for North Korea

1. [S] In response to your request, dated 8 May 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated a smaller (two-three aircraft) B-52 strike as a possible contingency option. An outline plan for a "quick strike" capability against a North Korean airfield using a limited number of B-52 aircraft is forwarded herewith. Additional plans utilizing other than B-52 aircraft are being investigated for possible application and will be forwarded at a later date if deemed practicable.

2. [S] The plan for a strike on a North Korean airfield using three B-52 aircraft (Appendices A and B hereto) is provided with two options which are intended to convey a political message without major provocation.

a. Option One of the plan would be executed from Kadena Air Base, Okinawa (or from Guam, if directed), using three B-52 aircraft from the ARC LIGHT force to strike Pyongyang East Airfield in North Korea. This option could be executed on short notice, on a day-to-day basis, with 10 hours from initial notification until the target is struck, or within 4 hours from a prior alert posture (from Guam it would require 13 and 7 hours, respectively). It would entail limited disruption to Southeast Asia operations and should achieve a significant element of surprise. The approximately 65 tons of ordnance expended would achieve a reasonable amount of damage to the North Korean Air Force command/control complex adjacent to the capital city of Pyongyang.

b. Option Two of this plan would be executed from Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, using three B-52 aircraft from the ARC LIGHT force to strike Saamcham Airfield, North Korea. This option could also be executed on short notice, on a day-to-day basis, with 26 hours from initial notification until the target is struck, or within 7 hours from a prior alert posture. It would entail limited disruption to Southeast Asia operations and should achieve an element of surprise. The approximately 38 tons of cluster bombs (BLU-26a) expended would achieve a reasonable amount of damage to revetted aircraft on the airfield.
c. These options would be conducted at night, and/or during adverse weather, using a low-level attack profile. The probability of an aircraft loss in either option is considered to be less than 10 percent.

3. Attacks of the type described in the foregoing contingency options provide quick response to any hostile act by the North Koreans, have little implication of third nation involvement, minimize the impact on Southeast Asia operations, and inflict an adequate level of damage with a minimum amount of physical force. The probability of major US losses is low.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that the outlined plan is feasible, and, if quickly executed in response to another North Korean hostile act, there is a reasonable chance of not provoking the North Koreans into a retaliatory action of such magnitude as to involve a major conflict. Further, this plan provides options which would convey the message that the United States will not tolerate North Korean irresponsibility.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[Signature]

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Attachments
APPENDIX A
OUTLINE PLAN FOR A STRIKE ON A NORTH KOREAN AIRFIELD USING THREE B-52 AIRCRAFT

Purpose: To provide an outline plan to attack a single airfield complex in North Korea with three B-52 aircraft.

Targets: Option One - Pyongyang East Airfield. Option Two - Saemchun Airfield. For description and significance, see Appendix B.

Task Organization
a. Strike Force: Option One - three B-52s. Option Two - three B-52s.
   b. Support Forces
      (1) Option One: Search and rescue forces available in the Republic of Korea.
      (2) Option Two: Three KC-135 tanker aircraft and search and rescue forces available in the Republic of Korea.

Concept of Operations
a. Option One: Three B-52 aircraft will launch from Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, to execute a strike against Pyongyang East Airfield, North Korea. The entire prestrike profile will be flown at low level during hours of darkness and/or adverse weather to provide maximum surprise and cover. Desired time on target (TOT) is 1800Z (0300). Egress from the target will be at low level until outside the hostile environment. Aircraft will be loaded with 117 (750 lb) bombs internal and 22 (500 lb) bombs external. The target area is 1600 feet square with the desired point of impact in the center of a triangle formed by the National Air Force Headquarters, National Air Defense Headquarters, and a Sector Air Defense Headquarters. Total target damage expectancy is considered reasonable, and the possibility of degrading command/control.

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for a short period exists. Time from launch to strike is 2 hours and 40 minutes (2+40 hours). All B-52 aircraft will
recover to Kadena at approximately launch plus 4+50 hours.

b. Option Two: Three B-52 aircraft will launch from
Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, to execute a strike against
Saemch’om Airfield, North Korea. After air refueling, aircraft
will fly a low level prestrike profile during hours of darkness
and/or adverse weather to provide maximum surprise and cover.
Desired TOT is 1800Z (0300I). Egress from the target will be
at low-level until outside the hostile environment. Aircraft
will be loaded with cluster bombs (BLU-26s). The target area
is 6,000 by 2,000 feet encompassing the earthen-revetted air-
craft parking areas adjacent to the runway. BLU-26 munitions
are effective against aircraft in earthen revetments and the
damage will tend to be confined to those aircraft. Attack
axis is planned for maximum bomb string effectiveness. Time
from launch to strike is 5+46 hours. All B-52 aircraft will
recover to Andersen Air Force Base at approximately launch
plus 10+55 hours.

c. If aircraft and crews are placed on prior alert, the
targets can be struck from Kadena within 3 hours of
notification and from Guam within 7 hours.

d. If directed, Option One can be launched from Guam
with the resultant increase of approximately 3 hours
additional time from launch to strike.

Timing:

a. Option One: (All times D-Day)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>PLACE OF EVENT</th>
<th>WASHINGTON TIME (EST)</th>
<th>KOREAN TIME (I)</th>
<th>GREENWICH TIME (Z)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC LIGHT Decision 1/</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>0400</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>0800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch</td>
<td>Kadena</td>
<td>1120</td>
<td>0020</td>
<td>1520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recall Decision 2/</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>1120</td>
<td>0020</td>
<td>1520</td>
</tr>
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<td>Time on Target 3/</td>
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<td>1400</td>
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<td>1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery</td>
<td>Kadena</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>0710</td>
<td>2010</td>
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</table>

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### Option Two:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>PLACE OF EVENT</th>
<th>TIME (EDT)</th>
<th>TIME (I)</th>
<th>TIME (Z)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARC LIGHT Decision 1/</td>
<td>Washington</td>
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<td>0100 D+1</td>
<td>1400 D-Day</td>
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<tr>
<td>Launch</td>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>0815 D+1</td>
<td>2115 D+1</td>
<td>1215 D+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recall Decision 2/</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>1200 D+1</td>
<td>0100 D+2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time on Target 3/</td>
<td>Target</td>
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<td>0300 D+2</td>
<td>1800 D+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery</td>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>1910 D+1</td>
<td>0810 D+2</td>
<td>3110 D+1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ In Order to generate aircraft to meet the optimum TOT, it is necessary to discontinue an equal number of ARC LIGHT sorties from Kadena (Option One) or Guam (Option Two) at this time.

2/ Recall decision by the National Command Authorities would be required not later than the time indicated.

3/ The optimum TOT is considered to be 0300 local Korean time. One minute elapse between first and last aircraft.

#### Estimated Losses

- **Friendly Forces:** Probability of an aircraft loss is either option is considered less than 10 percent.
- **Civilian Casualties:** Minimal in either option, confined to civilians on the airfield.

**Effects on Southeast Asia Operations:** Minimal.

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

Appendix A
### SALIENT FEATURES

**SELECTED NORTH KOREAN AIRFIELD TARGETS (TWO)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TGT #</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANCE</th>
<th>STK</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>AAA DRF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>380-8002</td>
<td>Pyongyang AF E</td>
<td>5,000' concrete runway. Main structures: hangar, 6 revetted ammo storehouses, operations/control tower, admin, support, 29 soft revetments. Anti Air Defense Int. 4 NM E Pyongyang.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>380-8016</td>
<td>Hamhung AF</td>
<td>8,000' concrete runway. Main structures: UO hangar, 5 UO maint/storage, 4 maint shops, 18 storage, 6 warehouses, 2 operations/control towers, 4 admin, 29 support, 63 soft revetments. Major jet fighter base on W coast (AOB: 166 MIG 15/17/19/21). 44 nm N Pyongyang.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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