MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Military Reaction Options for Korea (U)

1. (FO) Reference is made to:

   a. A memorandum by the Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, dated 23 June 1969, subject as above, which requested development, on a priority basis, of a plan which would combine a strike against the Changjin Power Plant complex with a concurrent disarming strike against five or six military airfields in North Korea.

   b. Your memorandum, dated 24 June 1969, subject as above, which forwarded the request for the plan described in reference la, above, and requested the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military suitability of the plan in fulfilling its stated purposes.

2. (FO) A contingency plan, as requested in reference la, outlining a strike by B-52, tactical fighter, and carrier-based attack aircraft is contained in the Annexes hereto.

3. (FO) It is not possible to predict with confidence the reaction of North Korea to any specific US response. It is clear, however, that execution of this plan would be considered highly provocative by the North Korean Government. Inasmuch as these intermediate size, single-strike air attacks would not reduce the North Korean air order of battle to a level which would preclude a North Korean ability to retaliate, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that this plan would entail significant risk and, therefore, is not an appropriate response to future North Korean provocations.

Copy 2 of 35 copies each
4. While it is difficult to determine in advance an appropriate response to future North Korean provocations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

a. For incidents comparable to the North Korean destruction of the EC-121 on 15 April 1969, an air attack on a single military target, or other military response of similar size and scope, executed quickly and with maximum surprise, would be an appropriate response which would entail a lower risk of a major North Korean retaliatory attack on the Republic of Korea (ROK). Several outline plans for military responses of this type have been prepared and forwarded.

b. For North Korean provocations of greater magnitude, neutralization of their air order of battle by successive multiple attacks against all major North Korean military airfields with sufficient forces is militarily more appropriate than single-strike air attacks of intermediate size and scope, as are envisioned in the plan attached in the Annexes. The North Korean air order of battle is the most immediate and critical threat to ROK and US Forces in the Korean area. Due to the readiness, size, and disposition of the North Korean air forces and the defensive measures employed to protect them, single-strike US air attacks of intermediate size and scope would not neutralize the North Korean ability to carry out a damaging retaliatory attack. Such attacks would also entail a high risk of a North Korean retaliation. However, successive multiple attacks on all major airfields with sufficient forces would neutralize the North Korean capability for conducting a damaging retaliatory air attack on ROK or US Forces in the Korean area.

5. CINCPAC OPLAN FRESH STORM has been developed for the purpose of neutralizing the North Korean air order of battle. It should be recognized that execution of CINCPAC OPLAN FRESH STORM would entail some risk of initiating a major Korean conflict. In this regard, however, a generally comparable risk would be incurred by execution of the plan contained in the Annexes and without the advantages of early elimination of the enemy air threat. Accordingly, prior to conducting an attack on North Korea, US and ROK Forces should be prepared, to the extent feasible, to cope with likely enemy responses.
6. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a memorandum substantially the same as that contained in the Appendix hereto be approved and forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Declassified MAR 12 2000
Authority: EO 12856, as amended
Chief, Records & Declassification Div, WHS

Attachments
APPENDIX

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Subject: Military Reaction Options for Korea (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, dated 23 June 1969, subject as above, for the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense which requested development on a priority basis of a plan which would combine a strike against the Changjin Power Plant complex with a concurrent disarming strike against five or six military airfields in North Korea.

2. A contingency plan, as requested in the reference, is forwarded herewith. This plan, described in the Annexes, is a concept plan, the details of which would be subject to further detailed planning by operational commanders. Implementation of this plan, as described herein, would be influenced by political aspects, force readiness and disposition, and other operational considerations present at the time.

3. The plan provides for striking, with conventional munitions, the vulnerable elements of the Changjin Power Plant complex and six North Korean military airfields. A total of 55 B-52 aircraft, launched from Guam and Okinawa, are used to strike the power plant complex and one airfield. One hundred US tactical fighter aircraft based in the Republic of Korea (ROK) are used to attack three airfields. Twenty carrier-based naval attack aircraft, launched from a carrier in the Sea of Japan, are used to attack the remaining two airfields. A low-level attack commencing at last light is planned to afford an element of surprise, minimize friendly losses, and reduce the North Korean capability to launch an immediate retaliatory attack.

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The strikes would achieve moderate to severe damage to exposed aircraft, command and control facilities located on the airfields, and the power plant complex. It is estimated that friendly losses would be less than 10 percent and that civilian casualties would average less than five per target. Without detailed planning by operational units, approximately 75 hours would be required to prepare for and execute a coordinated attack of this size. If detailed planning is accomplished and the forces required have been placed on alert, the plan could be executed 7 hours after the execution decision is received.

4. It is not possible to predict with confidence the reaction of North Korea to any specific US response. It is clear, however, that execution of this plan would be considered highly provocative by the North Korean Government. Inasmuch as these intermediate size, single-strike air attacks would not reduce the North Korean air order of battle to a level which would preclude a North Korean ability to retaliate, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that this plan would entail significant risk, and, therefore, is not an appropriate response to future North Korean provocations.

5. While it is difficult to determine in advance an appropriate response to future North Korean provocations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

a. For incidents comparable to the North Korean destruction of the EC-121 on 15 April 1969, an air attack on a single military target, or other military response of similar size and scope, executed quickly and with maximum surprise, would be an appropriate response which would entail a lower risk of a major North Korean retaliatory attack on the ROK. Several outline plans for military responses of this type have been prepared and forwarded.
b. For North Korean provocations of greater magnitude, neutralization of their air order of battle by successive, multiple attacks against all major North Korean military airfields with sufficient forces is militarily more appropriate than single-strike attacks of intermediate size and scope, as are envisioned in the plan attached in the Annexes. The North Korean air order of battle is the most immediate and critical threat to ROK and US Forces in the Korean area. Due to the readiness, size, and disposition of the North Korean air forces and the defensive measures employed to protect them, single-strike US air attacks of intermediate size and scope would not neutralize the North Korean ability to carry out a damaging retaliatory attack. Such attacks would also entail a high risk of a North Korean retaliation. However, successive multiple attacks on all major airfields with sufficient forces would neutralize the North Korean capability for conducting a damaging retaliatory air attack on ROK or US Forces in the Korean area.

5. CINC PAC OPLAN FRESH STORM has been developed for the purpose of neutralizing the North Korean air order of battle. It should be recognized that execution of CINC PAC OPLAN FRESH STORM would entail some risk of initiating a major Korean conflict. In this regard, however, a generally comparable risk would be incurred by execution of the plan contained in the Annexes and without the advantages-of-early-elimination of the enemy air threat. Accordingly, prior to conducting an attack on North Korea, US and ROK Forces should be prepared, to the extent feasible, to cope with likely enemy responses.

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ANNEX A

OUTLINE PLAN FOR A STRIKE ON THE CHANGJIN POWER PLANT COMPLEX AND SIX NORTH KOREAN MILITARY AIRFIELDS (TS)

Purpose: To provide an outline plan to attack vulnerable targets in the Changjin Power Plant complex and six of the most lucrative North Korean military airfields with B-52 aircraft, USAF tactical fighter aircraft based in the Republic of Korea, and carrier-based US naval attack aircraft.

Targets: Nangunri Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) No. 2, Oro Ri Transformer Station, Uiju Airfield, Sunan-Up Airfield, Samcheon Airfield, Woman Airfield, Songdong-ri Airfield, Sanganju Airfield.

For description and significance, see Annex B.

Task Organization

1. Strike Forces
   a. 88 F-4C/D/E tactical fighter aircraft.
   b. 12 F-105 tactical fighter aircraft.
   c. 55 B-52 aircraft.
   d. If large-deck CVA on station with Carrier Task Group:
      (1) 8 A-6 attack aircraft.
      (2) 12 A-7 attack aircraft.
   e. If small-deck CVA on station with Carrier Task Group:
      20 A-4/A-7 attack aircraft.

2. Air Defense Posture
   a. All available operational USAF and ROKAP tactical fighter/air defense aircraft in the Republic of Korea.
   b. All available operational F-4/F-8 naval aircraft for combat air patrol (CAP).

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c. All available land- and sea-based antiaircraft guns and missiles.

3. Support Forces
   a. 36 KC-135 tanker aircraft for B-52 refueling.
   b. Two EKA-3B/KA-3B tanker aircraft for naval attack aircraft refueling.
   c. Search and rescue forces in the Republic of Korea and adjacent water areas.

Concept of Operations

1. Sixteen B-52 aircraft will launch from Andersen Airbase, Guam, to execute strikes against Uiju Airfield. Twenty-two B-52 aircraft will launch from Andersen Airbase, Guam, to execute strikes against the Oro Ri Transformer Station.

2. Seventeen B-52 aircraft will launch from Kadena Airbase, Okinawa, to execute strikes on the Hagaru Ri HPP. Prestrike refueling will be provided by KC-135 aircraft launched from Guam by KC-135 aircraft launched from Kadena Airbase, Okinawa, and Ching-Chuan Kang Airbase, Taiwan. A low-level overwater prestrike profile will be flown to provide maximum surprise. Self-contained ECM will be employed while exposed to the North Korean Air Defense System. Egress from the target area will be at low level until outside enemy defenses. Aircraft will recover at their respective launch bases.

2. Eighty-eight F-4 and 12 F-105 tactical fighters will be launched from Kusan, Kwangju, Osan, and Taegu Airbases in the Republic of Korea to execute strikes against Kwangju, Sunan-Up, and Saamcham Airfields. A low-level profile will be flown to and from the target to provide maximum surprise and to enhance protection of the force.
Ingress to the targets will be from the Yellow Sea, whereas egress will be over land. Aircraft will recover at their respective launch bases.

3. Twenty naval attack aircraft will be launched from a carrier in the Sea of Japan to execute strikes on Wonsan and Songdong-Ni Airfields. If a large-deck carrier is on station, eight A-6 and 12 A-7 aircraft will be employed. If a small-deck carrier is on station, 20 A-4/A-7 aircraft will be utilized. Naval aircraft will fly directly to the targets from the carrier at low level, egressing from the targets at low level until outside enemy defenses to afford maximum surprise and protection of the force.

4. B-52 aircraft will be loaded with a combination of M-117 (750 lb) bombs, Mk-62 (500 lb) bombs, and CBU-24 bomblets. F-4/F-105 aircraft will be loaded with either M-117 (750 lb) bombs or CBU-24 bomblets. A-4/A-6/A-7 aircraft will be loaded with a combination of ROCKEYE II, Mk-82, and Mk-83 (1000 lb) bombs. The ordnance load delivered by this force is expected to produce moderate to severe damage on exposed parked and revetted aircraft, command and control facilities located on the airfields, and the power plant facilities.

5. Nearly simultaneous strikes will be conducted on all targets; however, for B-52 force protection and to take advantage of darkness and the confusion caused by the initial strikes, B-52 strikes will be last. Times on target (TOT), commencing at last light, are planned to optimize target visibility during the attack while providing fading daylight to cover egress of the force from the target areas. Additionally, impending darkness is expected to reduce the effectiveness of enemy defenses, and to lessen the capability of the North Koreans to mount an
Immediate retaliatory attack. As a precautionary measure, all available US and ROK air defense resources in the Korean area will be brought to maximum readiness to cover the withdrawal of friendly forces and to be prepared to meet any North Korean retaliatory attack which may be initiated.

**Timing:** Without detailed operational planning, 75 hours would be required from receipt of a decision to execute to first TOT. With prior planning, this time could be reduced to 44 hours. With prior planning and sufficient notification to place the forces on alert, this time could be reduced further to 7 hours.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Place of Event</th>
<th>Washington Time (LDT)</th>
<th>Korean Time (1)</th>
<th>Greenwich Time (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMI LIGHT Decision¹/</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>0730 D-Day</td>
<td>2130 D-Day</td>
<td>1230 D-Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch A-52/A Andersen</td>
<td></td>
<td>2130 D+1</td>
<td>1130 D+2</td>
<td>0230 D+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recall Decision²/</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>0030 D+2</td>
<td>1430 D+2</td>
<td>0530 D+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch B-52/Badena</td>
<td></td>
<td>0010 D+2</td>
<td>1430 D+2</td>
<td>0530 D+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch F-105/A</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>0230 D+2</td>
<td>1630 D+2</td>
<td>0730 D+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch A-4/A-6/A-7/</td>
<td>Sea of Japan</td>
<td>0245 D+2</td>
<td>1645 D+2</td>
<td>0745 D+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch F-4/</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>0250 D+2</td>
<td>1650 D+2</td>
<td>0750 D+2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time on Target/</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>0310 D+2</td>
<td>1730 D+2</td>
<td>0830 D+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recover F-4/A</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>0410 D+2</td>
<td>1810 D+2</td>
<td>0910 D+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recover A-4/A-6/A-7/</td>
<td>Sea of Japan</td>
<td>0415 D+2</td>
<td>1815 D+2</td>
<td>0915 D+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recover F-105/A</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>0420 D+2</td>
<td>1820 D+2</td>
<td>0920 D+2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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MAR 12 2000

Annex A
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Place of Event</th>
<th>Time (EDT)</th>
<th>Time (1)</th>
<th>Time (2)</th>
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<td>Radan</td>
<td>0500 D+2</td>
<td>2000 D+2</td>
<td>1100 D+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recover</td>
<td>Andersen</td>
<td>0850 D+2</td>
<td>2250 D+2</td>
<td>1350 D+2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ In order to generate aircraft to meet optimum TOT, it is necessary to discontinue an equal number of ARC LIGHT sorties from Radan and Guam at this time.

2/ Recall decision by National Command Authorities would be required not later than this time.

3/ Nominal TOT only. The optimum TOT is considered to be at last light for tactical aircraft and darkness for B-52s and would vary depending on the time of year. Time between first and last aircraft on target varies by target. Maximum time is 29 minutes.

Estimated Friendly Losses: Less than 10 percent.

Estimated Civilian Casualties: Less than five per target.

Effect on Southeast Asia Operations: Major reduction in ARC LIGHT operations for 4 days.
## ANNEX B

### SALIENT FEATURES

#### NORTH KOREAN TARGETS (8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TVT#</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANCE</th>
<th>STK</th>
<th>AAA Der</th>
<th>CIV</th>
<th>CAS</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>290-0211</td>
<td>Hageru R1 HPP No. 2</td>
<td>112,000 KW, 6% national capacity. Main structures: generator hall, 2 transformer yards, support. Thrust NK power net, serves key mi/industries in Hambang, 24 NM N of Hungnam.</td>
<td>228-52</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290-2142</td>
<td>Oro Ro Transformer Station</td>
<td>220/110 KV transformer/switching station. Main structures: transformer yard, switching house, control/support buildings. Main junction point for 334,000 KW Chongjin power system serving key mi/industries in Hambang, Hungnam, and Chongjin. 14 NM N of Hungnam.</td>
<td>175-52</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290-8459</td>
<td>Uiju AF</td>
<td>8,000 concrete runway. Main structures: hangar, adm, 22 support, 18 acf revetments. Sustains jet light bomber ops. AO: 60 IL-28. 6 NM ENE of Sinuiju.</td>
<td>16B-52</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>290-8439</td>
<td>Susan Up AF</td>
<td>8,200 concrete runway. Main structures: hangar, 4 maint shops, adm, 10 support, 37 acf revetments. Sustains jet light bomber/fighter ops. AO: 2011-28, 15 MIG-15/17. 12 NM NW of Pyongyang.</td>
<td>40P-4</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>380-8016</td>
<td>Saemchon AF</td>
<td>8,200 concrete runway. Main structures: 12 P-105 1-2% hangar (UG), 9 maint shops (5K), 18 storage, 6 warehouses, 2 opns/control towers, 4 adm, 29 support, 65 acf revetments. Sustains jet fighter ops. AO: 106 MIG-15/17/19. 44 NM N of Pyongyang.</td>
<td>12P-4</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>380-8004</td>
<td>Wonsan AF</td>
<td>6,500 concrete runway. Main structures: A-6/A-7 3% 2 hangars, 8 maint shops, 3 POL tanks, 14 storage, 8 warehouses, 20 radar, 2 opns/control tower, 3 admin, 50 support, 21 acf revetments. Sustains jet fighter ops. AO: 75 MIG-15/17/21. 2 NM ENE of Wonsan.</td>
<td>10A-4/</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>380-8005</td>
<td>Songdang R1 AF</td>
<td>6,000 concrete runway. Main structures: A-6/A-7 1-2% hangar, 3 maint shops, 2 POL tanks, storehouse, 5 storage, 2 opns/control tower, 2 admin, 14 acf revetments. Sustains jet fighter ops. AO: 29 MIG-17. 34NM N of Wonsan.</td>
<td>10A-4/</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>TotW</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>STK</td>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>DER</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>360-434</td>
<td>Hwangju AF</td>
<td>6,250' concrete runway. Main structures: 5 Maint shops, 5 storage, 7 admin, 12 support, 27 a/cft revetments. Sustains jet fighter ops. AOB: 78 MIG-15/17/19/21. 05 NM S of Pyongyang.</td>
<td>36P-4</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>1-2%</td>
<td>0</td>
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