MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Korean Contingency Options (U)

Dr. Kissinger requested that Admiral McCain furnish him a list of retaliatory options being developed for possible use in the event of future North Korean provocation. The attached memorandum from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, complies with this request.

As you are aware, a number of these plans have been previously provided to me in conjunction with my duties on the Washington Special Actions Group. The balance of the options should be quite useful for our future meetings.

I recommend that you sign the attached memorandum, which forwards these options to Dr. Kissinger.

Salute

Attachment

No coordination required

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Authority: EO 12958, as amended
Chief, Declass Br, Dir. & Rec. WHS
MAR 29 2006
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Korean Contingency Options (U)

(TS) Admiral McCain has advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff of your recent request for a list of retaliatory options which could be executed in the event of further North Korean provocations. To assist in the compilation of a complete DOD response to your query, he provided a list of those options that he had summarized for you in his letter of 14 June 1969, updated to include additional options that have been considered since that date.

(TS) As you are aware, many military options for appropriate US response to any future North Korean provocation have been considered in recent months. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have identified those which they consider to be best suited and have developed plans based on these options. Summaries of most of these plans have previously been provided directly to you and resumes of all of them are available to members of the Washington Special Actions Group in their personal notebooks entitled "Military Contingency Options - Korea." You will note that several of the summaries are similar to options reflected in Admiral McCain's 14 June 1969 letter. The differences which you may note represent refinements made in the process of converting these options into plans.

(S) I have attached a summary of significant options which have been identified, including those from which plans have already been developed and others which have been or are being considered. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to evaluate existing plans, as well as old and new options, and will recommend modifications as indicated by changing conditions.

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KOREAN CONTINGENCY OPTIONS

A. OPTIONS FOR WHICH PLANS HAVE BEEN PREPARED

Initial planning has been completed on, and appropriate authorities advised of, the following options to respond to possible future North Korean provocations:

1. Noncombatant and emergency evacuation from the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the event of imminent or actual hostilities.

2. US military operations in coordination with loyal ROK Forces to preclude a communist coup in the ROK.

3. Seizure of a North Korean fish factory ship (Operation Plan FRINGE SWOOP).

4. Execution of that portion of the Pacific Mining Plan covering the waters contiguous to Korea.

5. Execution of that portion of the plan for the control of maritime traffic in the Pacific affected by the situation in Korea.

6. Execution of that portion of the plan for antisubmarine warfare and the control of shipping in the Pacific affected by the conduct of military actions in Korea.

7. Surprise destruction of North Korean military aircraft over Wonsan and/or Songdong-Ni airfields by a TALOS missile strike (Operation Plan FRACTURE PINE).

8. A two-option plan for a minimum force strike on a single North Korean airfield by three B-52 aircraft:

   a. Option One - Strike Pyongyang East Airfield and Air Defense Headquarters with aircraft launched from Okinawa or Guam.

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b. Option Two - Strike Saamcham Airfield with aircraft launched from Guam.

9. A four-option plan for an air strike on the Changjin Power Plant in North Korea.
   a. Option One - Night, low-level B-52 attack launched from Okinawa or Guam.
   b. Option Two - Last light, low-level attack by tactical aircraft based in the ROK.
   c. Option Three - Last light, low-level attack by tactical aircraft positioned in Okinawa.
   d. Option Four - Daylight or night, low-level attack by carrier-based aircraft.

10. A seven-option plan allowing a choice of air strikes on one to four North Korean Airfields or up to four North Korean military targets other than airfields.
   a. Option One - Night, low-level, Guam-based B-52 strike on Wonsan Airfield.
   b. Option Two - First light, low-level ROK-based tactical fighter strike on Wonsan Airfield.
   c. Option Three - Low-level night or daylight carrier-based aircraft strike on Wonsan Airfield.
   d. Option Four - Night, low-level strike by Guam or Okinawa-based B-52s on up to four airfields.
   e. Option Five - Daylight, low-level strike by ROK-based USAF tactical fighters on up to four airfields.
   f. Option Six - Daylight or night, low-level strike by carrier-based aircraft on up to four airfields.
   g. Option Seven - Strike on up to four military targets other than airfields by B-52, USAF tactical fighter or carrier-based attack aircraft.

11. A coordinated air strike against the Changjin power plant and six North Korean airfields, using ROK-based tactical fighters, carrier-based attack aircraft, and B-52s.
12. A five-option plan providing air strikes designed to neutralize the North Korean Air Order of Battle (Operation Plan FRESH STORM).

   a. Option ALPHA - Preemptory, first-light strike on North Korean airfields containing highest AOB by ROK-based USAF tactical fighters.

   b. Option BRAVO - Same as ALPHA except ROKAF participation added.

   c. Option COCO - Preemptory, last-light strike on North Korean airfields containing highest AOB by USAF and ROKAF tactical fighters, followed by night A-6/B-52 strikes.

   d. Option DELTA - Preemptory, night strike against designated North Korean airfields by A-6/B-52 aircraft, followed by first-light USAF/ROKAF tactical fighter strikes.

   e. Option ECHO - Retaliatory strike against North Korean airfields with all available USAF/ROKAF tactical fighters, carrier-based attack aircraft, and B-52s.

14. Execution of the plan for necessary US military action to assure the defense of the ROK in the event of a renewal of North Korean aggression.
B. OPTIONS CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION OR PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED

The following options either have been or are currently under consideration. All will be assessed periodically against projected provocations, and the required planning will be accomplished for those which changing conditions indicate should be added or further considered.

1. Increase psychological operations against North Korea in order to create opposition to the North Korean Government and increase North Korean internal security problems. Activity would involve increasing radio power and programming and leaflet drops from aircraft flying adjacent to North Korean borders.

2. Mount a show of force adjacent to Korea, utilizing naval ships in the Sea of Japan or air sorties over ROK territory adjacent to the DMZ. This option could be considered to be in effect to a degree at the present time in view of the continued presence of TF-71 in nearby waters.

3. Selected abrogations of treaty regulations for the DMZ, such as:

   a. Seize and hold a position in the DMZ, utilizing a battalion-size unit.

   b. Conduct company-size forays into the DMZ to attack North Korean guard posts and withdraw.

   c. Destroy North Korean targets in the DMZ by artillery or mortar fire or by air strike.
5. Seizure or destruction of a North Korean naval unit in either international or North Korean territorial waters. Seizure would be accomplished by surface naval units. Destruction could be effected by air strikes, surface naval unit gunfire, or submarine attack.

7. Initiation of either a Pacific or belligerent blockade against North Korea.

8. Rapid reinforcement of US Forces in Korea in order to demonstrate US resolve and allow initiation of subsequent actions. This has been accomplished previously in part with assignment of USAF units to Korea following seizure of PUEBLO. Provisions for further actions of this nature are a part of the plan for the defense of Korea, included in the WSAG book.