1. (S) BEGIN SUMMARY: PAKISTAN'S ARMY IS TOTALLY COMMITTED TO OUR SHARED GOAL OF ELIMINATING TERRORISM, B1

ASSURED S/P AMBASSADOR RICHARD
HAASS ON OCTOBER 31, BUT HAS A DIFFERENT VIEW OF THE BEST MEANS TO ACHIEVE IT. THE US TENDED TO PURSUE SHORT-TERM TACTICAL OBJECTIVES AT THE EXPENSE OF LONG-TERM STRATEGIC GOALS, WHILE THE PAKISTAN ARMY'S PREFERRED APPROACH WAS TO BUILD ACCESS AND LONG-TERM TIES TO LOCAL PEOPLE AND LEADERS.

ASSERTED THAT THERE WERE NO AL QAEDA SAFE HAVENS IN PAKISTAN AND COMPLAINED THAT OPERATIONS BASED ON BAD INFORMATION HAD PRODUCED NEGLIGIBLE RESULTS AND ALIENATED THE NWFP'S PASHTUNS. ON KASHMIR, HAASS STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ENDING INFILTRATION, BUT WARNED THE US NOT TO PUSH PAKISTAN TOO FAR ON KASHMIR. URGED THE US TO PROVIDE PAKISTAN WITH AN AERIAL SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY.

END SUMMARY

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THE LIMITS OF TOTAL SUPPORT

2. (C) ADvised AMBASSADOR HAASS THAT ARMY HQ HAD "GONE THE WHOLE HOG" TO SUPPORT THE US-LED WAR ON TERRORISM. THE ARMY HAD NO SYMPATHY FOR AL QAEDA.

UNDERLINED THAT PAKISTAN'S MILITARY WAS IN TOTAL AGREEMENT WITH THE US ON "ENDS," BUT DIFFERED WITH US IN THE "MEANS OR METHODS" TO ACHIEVE THEM. WE NEEDED TO RECONCILE THIS DIFFERENCE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE OUR SHARED GOALS, HE SAID, SPECIFYING THAT THE PAKISTAN ARMY APPROACH WAS TO ADDRESS LONG-TERM CONCERNS.

3. (S) CLAimed THAT PAKISTAN ARMY HAD RESPONDED TO ALL US REQUIREMENTS, ALTHOUGH THE ARMY HAD FACED CONSTRAINTS.

IT HAD REMAINED COMMITTED TO CT OPERATIONS.

OPERATING IN THE FATA

4. (C) US MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN CREATED A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PAKISTAN ARMY TO ENTER "NO-GO AREAS" IN THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FATA) WHERE IT COULD NOT PREVIOUSLY OPERATE. THE ARMY HAD PROACTIVELY BEGUN TO OPERATE IN THE FATA, USING DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND ROAD BUILDING AS LEVERS TO GAIN ACCESS AND WIN OVER THE INHABITANTS. DURING THE TORA BORA OPERATION, THE ARMY HAD DEPLOYED ALONG THE BORDER OPPOSITE TORA BORA WITH LOCAL LEADERS' COOPERATION.

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TRIBES WERE OVER AWAYED BY US FIREPOWER ACROSS THE BORDER AND HAD ALLOWED THE PAKISTAN ARMY TO OPERATE FREELY. THAT WINDOW HAD CLOSED, NOTED WITHOUT ELABORATION.

5. (C) THE ARMY HAD "SHOWED NO RESERVATIONS, TAKEN RISKS AND IGNORED THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE LOCAL PEOPLE," SAID THIS HAD "ALIENATED OUR OWN PEOPLE," HE STRESSED. THE ARMY NEEDED FULL COOPERATION FROM THE PEOPLE IN THE TRIBAL AREAS IN ORDER TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY. THE FUTURE NEED WAS TO \underline{\text{bring security, central government and development to the area. At present, the army needed to employ a 130mm gun to gain firepower superiority over the tribes, maintaining.}}

6. (C) THERE WAS CONFLICT BETWEEN MALIKS (TRIBAL LEADERS) AND MULLAH (RELIGIOUS LEADERS) IN THE NWFP AND PATA, SAID THE MULLAH WERE AL QAEDA SYMPATHIZERS, BUT EVEN THEY COULD

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECESTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3584
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
AMCONSUL DUBAI
AMCONSUL KARACHI
CIA WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

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NOT SHELTER AL QAEDA FOR MORE THAN A DAY OR TWO. AL QAEDA PRESENCE IN THE AREA WAS LIMITED TO TRANSIT; IT CONTROLLED NO PART OF THE FATA. IF AL QAEDA MOVED INTO PAKISTAN, HE ASSERTED, THE NWFP’S PEOPLE WOULD REPORT THEM. AL SHIBH HAD BEEN CAUGHT BASED UPON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY LOCALS.

INTEL AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES

7. (C) [REDACTED] SAID THAT PAKISTAN HAD NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT AL QAEDA PRESENCE IN NWFP OR FATA. IF THE US HAD OTHER INFORMATION, IT SHOULD PROVIDE "SPECIFIC INFORMATION" SO THAT THE ARMY WOULD QUICKLY ACT ON IT: GENERAL INFORMATION WAS NOT USEFUL. [REDACTED] WAS A NATIVE OF THE FATA AND HAD GONE THERE TO CHECK ON US-PROVIDED INTELLIGENCE AND MEDIA REPORTS SUGGESTING THAT THERE WAS AL QAEDA IN PARTS OF THE FATA. HE HAD FOUND NONE. [REDACTED] WHO HAD TOURD AREAS FROM MALAKAND TO CHITRAL SECRET.

DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN HAD ALSO FOUND NO TRACE OF AL QAEDA. [REDACTED] NOTED THAT US PERSONNEL WERE NOT WELCOMED IN FATA AND THE MMA WOULD EXPLOIT ANY US PRESENCE.
DESPITE THESE "MINIMAL PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCES" WE HAD EXPERIENCED TREMENDOUS JOINT SUCCESS: SEVERAL MAIN AL QAEDA LEADERS HAD BEEN KILLED; ABU ZUBAIDA AND BIN AL SHIBH HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN PAKISTAN.

12. (C) AMBASSADOR HAASS INFORMED THAT THE US WELL UNDERSTOOD FROM ITS OWN EXPERIENCE HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS TO COORDINATE EFFORTS TO FIGHT TERRORISM -- EVEN WITHIN A SINGLE GOVERNMENT. THE US AND PAKISTAN HAD THE ADDED CHALLENGE OF

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B1


B1

INDIA-Pakistan

B1

14. (C) HASS TOLD THAT HE WAS PLEASED ABOUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF TROOP PULLBACKS FROM THE BORDER AS DE-ESCALATION WOULD FREE RESOURCES TO BE DEVOTED TO SEALING THE AFGHAN BORDER AND COUNTER-TERRORISM. IT APPEARED THAT INDIA WANTED TO RENEW CONTACTS BUT CONTINUING INFILTRATION
WAS A BARRIER TO PROGRESS. THE US BELIEVED THAT INFILTRATION
WAS CONTINUING. STOPPING IT WOULD HELP PAKISTAN'S CAUSE WITH
THE US AND WITH INDIA. INFILTRATION HURTS PAKISTAN'S
FRIENDS' EFFORTS TO HELP IT.

15. (C) [___] AGREED THAT KASHMIR WAS THE "ISSUE BEDEVILING
OUR RELATIONS," BUT PAKISTAN'S KASHMIR POSITION WAS "BASED ON
JUSTICE," HE SAID, "KASHMIR SHOULD HAVE BEEN PAKISTAN." THE
PAKISTANI PEOPLE WOULD NOT AGREE TO MAKE THE LOC THE
INTERNATIONAL BORDER. KASHMIR HAD COST MUSHARRAF A LOT, AS
HAD HIS DECISION TO HELP THE CT COALITION. MUSHARRAF'S
DETRACTORS [_____] HAD HIT HIM ON BOTH KASHMIR AND
AFGHANISTAN. INDIA HAD TRIED TO EXPLOIT THE POLITICAL
ATMOSPHERE AFTER 9/11 -- [_____] DID NOT BEGRUDGE THEM THEIR
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16. (C) HAASS REPLIED THAT HE PERCEIVED AN OPPORTUNITY TO
IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN AND SURROUNDING KASHMIR. INDIA
SEEMED TO REALIZE THAT LACK OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY AND ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS CREATED SUPPORT FOR
INSURGENCY AND A BETTER CONTEXT FOR DIPLOMACY WAS NOW BEING
CREATED. HAASS SAID THAT BOTH IMPROVED GOVERNANCE AND
DIPLOMACY WERE KEY TO MOVING FORWARD ON KASHMIR.

HELP WANTED

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17. (C) [___] MADE A PLEA FOR
THE US TO PROVIDE PAKISTAN WITH AN AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
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ACTION SA-00

INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 CEA-01 COME-00 CTME-00 INL-00
DOEB-00 DOTR-00 WHA-00 PERC-00 SRPP-00 DS-00 EAP-00
ES-00 EUR-00 EXIM-01 B-00 FAAE-00 FBIE-00 VC-00
FRB-00 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 ITC-01 L-00
VCE-00 AC-01 NFA-00 DCP-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02
OMB-01 DHS-00 OPIC-01 PM-00 PRS-00 ACE-00 P-00
SCT-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 STR-00 TRE-00 USIE-00
EPAB-00 FMB-00 DSCC-00 FRM-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00
SAS-00 /012W

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CAPABILITY. PAKISTAN WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE SAME CAPABILITY BEING PROVIDED TO INDIA. PROPOSED THAT IT MIGHT BE AN EXCELLENT CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE, AS IF THE TWO SIDES COULD SEE WHAT WAS HAPPENING ACROSS THE BORDER IT WOULD REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF MISCONSTRUING WHAT THE OTHER SIDE WAS DOING. HAASS UNDERTOOK TO INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBILITIES ON SURVEILLANCE WITH OSD.

18. (U) THIS CABLE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY S/P.

POWELL

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