ATTG-ET  (350)

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Forces Command (G3), 1777 Hardee Avenue SW, Fort McPherson, GA  30330-1062

SUBJECT: After Action Review, Training and Equipping of Free Iraqi Forces (FIF)

1. Reference FORSCOM Memorandum, After Action Review, Training and Equipping of Free Iraqi Forces (FIF), received 14 May 03.

2. Enclosed are HQ TRADOC’s AAR comments for the FIF operations.

3. TRADOC personnel from Fort Jackson were attached to Task Force Warrior Headquarters at Fort Polk. Fort Jackson’s AAR comments have been compiled and sent to Task Force Warrior personnel for inclusion in their AAR.

4. Point of contact for this action is LTC Kuster, DCSOPS&T, Director IET, DSN 680-5602 or commercial (757) 788-5602.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Encl

RAYMOND D. BARRETT, JR.
Major General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Training
A. Executive Summary.

TRADOC was tasked to provide the cadre to train Free Iraqi Force (FIF) soldiers on Basic Combat Training (BCT) tasks, Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) tasks, and Officer Candidate School (OCS) tasks. The planning phase began in October 2002 with deployment in January 2003 to Taszar, Hungary. TRADOC provided 110 training cadre: 10 PLDC, 88 BCT, 10 OCS, and 2 engineer cadre. The military police training requirement was rescinded prior to departure to Hungary. One BCT battalion from Fort Jackson provided the 88 BCT cadre which resulted in TRADOC delaying the implementation of 71L OSUT. The 10 PLDC cadre were provided by Fort Knox, and backfilled by a reserve unit from Fort McCoy, WI. Fort Benning provided the OCS cadre resulting in an increase of student to instructor ratio beyond the normally accepted level.

B. Positive Actions/Successes.

ISSUE: FORSCOM G-3, Deployment Branch, was instrumental in assisting TRADOC elements in deploying from CONUS to Taszar, Hungary.

DISCUSSION: As a TDA organization, TRADOC does not have the personnel or expertise to deploy units. TRADOC relied upon FORSCOM G-3, Deployment Branch, to assist TRADOC elements in the development of deployment equipment lists (DEL), and the scheduling and coordination of strategic transportation assets. Without FORSCOM’s invaluable expertise, TRADOC would have been challenged to meet deployment timelines.

RECOMMENDATION: TRADOC continue to rely upon FORSCOM deployment expertise in future operational missions.

C. Challenges Overcome/Areas of Improvement.

ISSUE: There was confusion as to which headquarters had the authority to terminate the FIF training mission once all FIF recruits finished training at Taszar, Hungary.

DISCUSSION: When the number of FIF volunteers did not materialize as originally forecasted, and no further volunteers were forthcoming, the decision-making authority to stop the training and redeploy the TTF was not clear. It took several days to reach a decision to discontinue training and begin redeployment of the training task force.

RECOMMENDATION: Clearly delineate command responsibilities for both the supporting and the supported MACOMS.

ISSUE: Lack of initial contingency funding forced TRADOC to pull scarce funds internally to meet emerging contingency requirements.


**DISCUSSION:** Funds necessary for mission preparation, forming and deploying the TTF, and sustaining the TTF were not provided at the start of operations. TRADOC had to reallocate funding from critical training needs to support the mission. A better transition from a training posture to deployment operations can be made if the funds required are readily available at the onset of the mission.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Provide contingency funding at mission execution vice having MACOMs internally re-allocate scarce funds to meet contingency requirements.

**ISSUE:** Removal of cadre from training base.

**DISCUSSION:** The TRADOC training base is comprised of specifically identified and trained MOS personnel. These training personnel are only one deep in most situations. Removal of these personnel from the training can result in training delays. If the funds are not available initially to hire temporary contractors to backfill cadre, then the training may stop all together for unspecified periods of time.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Provide the necessary planning information far enough in advance to allow TRADOC to reassign cadre, hire temporary contractors, or activate reserve component personnel to fill positions of deploying cadre.

**ISSUE:** Lack of guidance initially as to what tasks the FIF required training on

**DISCUSSION:** There was a lack of clear guidance initially to TRADOC as to what the FIF programs of instruction (POI) should contain to meet the intent of the mission. TRADOC modified existing POIs for FIF use. Modifications included deleting reference to US specific training requirements such as Army Values, and sexual harassment training. Because instruction had to take place via translator, TRADOC POIs doubled the training hours per lesson to accommodate that translation lag. Several contractors and active duty personnel spent numerous days adjusting and modifying POIs and training support packages. Time, material, and money could have been saved.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Provide clear initial guidance outlining what subjects need to be taught, duration of training time, and number of trainees in order to allow subject matter experts the time to provide a quality product that meets the mission’s intent.

**D. Advice for Potential Future Missions.**

Future missions for training foreign personnel with U.S. Army soldiers must include more initial notice, support, and guidance. TRADOC must have the time to backfill deploying personnel either with reserve component personnel or temporary hires. It is crucial to know the requirements and timeline as soon as possible. TRADOC must also have the funding upfront. Any reallocation or unforecasted expenditures severely impact the training base. Guidance must be clear, and command relationships and responsibilities must be known from the beginning.