GEN Tommy R. Franks, USA
Commander in Chief
U S Central Command

AOR Trip

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UK
19–26 April 2002
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Apr 29, 2002

Subj: CINCCENT AOR Trip 19 to 26 April 2002

(U) CINCCENT conducted an AOR trip to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. A component Commander’s meeting was held in Kuwait. The AOR trip was followed by a visit to London, England.

2. Summary of meetings:

- Egypt: 19-22 April – Cairo, Egypt. Following a country team meeting with Ambassador Welch and MG Wilson (OMC Cairo), the CINC called on LTGEN Wahiba, Chief of Staff, Egyptian Armed Forces, Field Marshall Tantawi, Minister of Defense, and President Mubarak.

- Saudi Arabia: 22/23 April – Riyadh, Prince Sultan Air Base, Jeddah. The CINC met with AMB Jordan and the Country Team in Riyadh. Visited with Troops in PSAB and met with Prince Sultan, Minister of Defense and Aviation, and GEN Muhayya, Chief of Staff, Royal Saudi Defense Forces.

- Kuwait: 24/25 April, Kuwait City, Camp Doha. Following an office call on the US Ambassador and country team briefing, the CINC attended the Hotwash exercise review for Exercise LUCKY SENTINEL and conducted an office call on LTG Ali Mohamed Al-Mumini, Chief of Staff, Kuwait Armed Forces. A Component Commander meeting and troop visit with CJTF Consequence Management followed.

- United Kingdom: The CINC met with Mr. Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence and received a series of briefings from ADM Boyce, Chief of Defence Staff.

3. Specific notes regarding the visit to Egypt.

A. The CINC met with Ambassador Welch and the Country Team. Key issues of concern:

(1) Amb. Welch noted that the visits by Sec. Powell and VP Cheney had not achieved much emphasis in the region and that the statement by President Bush that “Sharon is a man of peace” had been received very negatively. Additionally, the timeline for pullout noted by Sec. Powell had been viewed as misleading – the common view is that there would be no pullout of Israeli forces from Palestinian areas. President
(2) The CINC discussed the recent demarche* to Egypt regarding Maritime Interception Operations (MIO). The Ambassador thought the Egyptians would not agree to complete freedom to let U.S. pursue vessels in Egyptian waters but thought that some sort of cooperative method could be worked out.

(4) During a private breakfast meeting with MG Wilson, OMC Cairo, he suggested that a new focus be placed on security cooperation. CINC agreed and noted that components need to visit Cairo and meet with counterparts. Additionally, MG Wilson noted that Field Marshall Tantawi would like to come to the US to visit Washington, DC and Tampa.

**Action:** CENTCOM Components Commanders visit Egypt in the near term and meet with counterparts to discuss security cooperation. CCJ5 provide BG level focus on coordination with OMC Cairo to update and push programs.

**Action:** CINC to discuss with SECDEF invitation for visit by FM Tantawi to US.

B. CINC called on LTGEN Wahiba, Chief of Staff. Topics included progress on Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, training of the Afghan National Army (ANA), performance of Egyptian LNO in Tampa, US relationship with Egypt and how media is affecting the view in Egypt, Bright Star 03, and the Middle East crisis. CINC offered an invitation for LTGEN Wahiba to come to the US and visit Washington, DC, and Tampa.

**Action:** Coordinate visit by LTGEN Wahiba to US following FM Tantawi visit.

C. CINC called on Field Marshall Tantawi. Topics included: Middle East crisis, importance of US Egyptian Military to Military relationship, visit by Egyptian general officers to Washington in the near future, and Bright Star 2003.

**Action:** CINC to discuss invitation with SECDEF for FM Tantawi to visit the US (DC & Tampa) in the future (completed 5/2). Chief of Staff to coordinate visit to Tampa in conjunction with visit to Washington, DC.

D. Following the meeting with FM Tantawi, the CINC conducted an interview with a local Cairo Newspaper and a local TV station.

E. CINC called on President Mubarak – the meeting was friendly and constructive. Topics discussed included Operation Enduring Freedom, Middle East crisis, media impacts on the region, Multinational Force and Observers’ role in maintaining peace, Bright Star 2003 and terrorism. President Mubarak noted that the US needed to do something to give the Palestinian people and the Arab world some hope.

**Action:** CINC agreed to discuss MFO and present President Mubarak’s views to the SECDEF. (Completed 4/23)

4. Specific comments from visit to Saudi Arabia.
A. Country Team Briefing and meeting with Ambassador Jordan (no CINC action resulted).

(1)

1.4(a) (b)

(2) Other comments from the Country Team: the Saudis have commissioned several groups to study what kind of military they want in the future. 1.4(b)

1.4(b)

B. Call on General Muhayya, Chief of Royal Saudi Defense Forces. The topics included: US/Saudi exercise program resumption, potential risk to US pilots in Operation Southern Watch (USW), CINC request for KSA to allow OEF coalition representatives into the CAOC, CINC offer for the Saudis to send a coalition representative to the CENTCOM HQ in Tampa, and the next Joint Planning Conference (JPC).

Action: CCJ5 – Follow up with USMTM on the offer for a KSA representative at CENTCOM HQ for OEF.

Action: CCJ5 – Follow up with USMTM on the request for OEF Coalition Representatives in the CAOC.

C. Call on Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and Aviation, Prince Sultan. Topics included joint KSA and US military exercise program resumption, the next JPC, potential for visit to KSA by US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, building a backup CAOC in Qatar, and the US/KSA relationship. No action resulted from the meeting.

5. Specific comments from Kuwait.

A. CINC conducted a brief country review with Ambassador Jones. No action resulted from this review.

B. Exercise LUCKY SENTINEL hot-wash and after action review (AAR). The CINC attended the AAR at the Kuwait Defense Force Exercise facility. No CINC action resulted from the AAR.

C. Office Call on LTGEN Ali Mohammed Al-Mumin, Chief of Staff of the Kuwait Defense Force. Topics included Kuwaiti participation in Exercise LUCKY SENTINEL, the present Iraq situation,
1.4(a) recent operations in Afghanistan, and the CINC’s invitation for LTG Ali to visit the US in the future.

Action: CCJ5 – 1.4(a)

D. The CINC attended a CENTCOM Component Commander’s meeting with CENTCOM Component Commanders. Topics included selected compartmented programs, the Afghanistan National Army and Operation Enduring Freedom. Each Component Commander provided a short discussion on particular issues of concern. CINC action provided separately.

5 Visit to the United Kingdom.

A. The CINC met with Mr. Jeffreyy Hoon, the UK Secretary of State for Defense at his request. The meeting took place at Brize Norton, RAF Base.

(1
(5) Mr. Hoon asked about US plans for Iraq. 1.4(a)(c)

B The CINC met with ADM Sir Michael Boyce, Chief of Defence Staff, in a private meeting and then received briefings from the Defence Staff leadership. The briefings included: 1.4(a) a UK military operational brief, and discussions on regional issues.

1) 1.4(a)

(2) The UK Defense Staff leadership met and provided the CINC a series of briefs. Following comments and actions are provided:

- **A general discussion on the areas to the west of Afghanistan.** 1.4(a)

- **DEPCDR PJHQ provided an operations brief.** 1.4(a)

**Action:**

1.4(a)

**Action:**

1.4(a)

- The J3 from the Defence Staff provided a regional security brief. The CINC was asked about the relationship between CJTF – Afghanistan and the ISAF. 1.4(a)
should continue the "supported" and "supporting" relationship with ISAF through the CJTF similar to the way presently done with the CFLCC. The CJTF would work directly for the CINC.

DSJ3 noted they have put together a small cell of two- and three-star flag officers thinking strategically about Iraq. Some of the questions they are discussing include: what courses of action are available to handle the regime, what are regime power centers, how to exploit the no fly zones, what could be done with the Iraq army? The CINC noted that OSW and ONW are now not efficacious in that the IADS in Iraq have been reconstituted. A general discussion on approaches to the OSW/ONW problem was conducted.

DSJ3 noted that the UK does not see a long-term permanent presence in Afghanistan.

As the Afghan National Army grows in capability, it is expected that the US presence can be reduced. This is a level that should allow the AIA to manage internal and border security problems.
IMMEDIATE

United States Central Command
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

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User: QCCC

SECRET

TO USCENTCINC MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
BT
SECRET SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 002213

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

FOR POLAD AMB MARTIN CRESSES FROM FM COUNSELOR MARTIN ADAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2012
TAGS: AMGT
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL: CINCCENT MEETINGS IN SAUDI ARABIA

REF RIYADH 2028

CLASSIFIED BY: FM COUNSELOR MPADAMS. REASONS 1.5 A/B/D.

1. (U) AMBASSADOR: HERE FOR YOUR APPROVAL IS THE PROPOSED TEXT OF OUR CABLE REGARDING GEN. FRANKS, CONVERSATIONS WITH SAUDI CHIEF OF STAFF GEN. MUHAYYA AND MINDEF PRINCE SULTAN.

(U) 2. (S) SUMMARY: ON APRIL 23 CINCCENT MET SAUDI CHIEF OF STAFF GEN. SALEH MUHAYYA AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND AVIATION PRINCE SULTAN. MUHAYYA ASKED WHETHER THE USG QUESTIONED SAUDI FULFILLMENT OF ITS COMMITMENTS RELATED TO SECURITY

1.4(b)

GEN. FRANKS, REQUESTS TO PERMIT LIAISON OFFICERS FROM COALITION PARTNERS INTO THE SAG'S COMBINED AIR OPERATIONS CENTER (CAOC), AND TO STATION A SAUDI OBSERVER AT CENTCOM HEADQUARTERS WOULD ALSO NEED TO BE ADDRESSED AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL.

(U) 3. (S) SUMMARY CONTD: PRINCE SULTAN CALLED THE AFGHANISTAN OPERATION A GREAT SUCCESS AND AGREED THAT ESTABLISHMENT OF STABILITY THERE WILL REQUIRE YEARS OF EFFORT AND CONSIDERABLE EXPENSE. HE WELCOMED A POSSIBLE VISIT BY SECDEF AND OTHER U.S. OFFICIALS AND REITERATED HIS INVITATION TO CJCS GEN. MYERS TO COME TO THE KINGDOM AFTER THE CROWN PRINCE'S RETURN IN ORDER TO INAUGURATE THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE (JPC). SULTAN EXPRESSED INTEREST IN VISITING THE CAOC NEXT MONTH AND PROPOSED THAT COS MUHAYYA SHOULD VISIT THE U.S. END SUMMARY.
4. (S) COMMENT: ALTHOUGH NO DECISIONS WERE MADE, GENERAL FRANK'S RAISED ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN DISCUSSED AT SENIOR

1.4(b)

THROUGHOUT BOTH MEETINGS, WE NEED TO PURSUE OPENINGS FOR SENIOR-LEVEL DIALOGUE BOTH IN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CHANNELS. END COMMENT.

MEETING WITH MUHAYYA
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5. (S) COMMITMENTS AND U.S. PRESENCE IN THE KINGDOM: GEN. MUHAYYA OPENED BY STATING THAT, WHILE HE HAD NO ISSUES TO BRING UP HIMSELF, HE WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY ITEMS

1.4(b)

6. (S) GEN. FRANKS ASSURED GEN. FRANKS

1.4(b)

ALTHOUGH THE RELATIONSHIP HAD BEEN GOOD FOR FIFTY YEARS, IT WAS NOT PERFECT. SOME ISSUES BECAME IRRITANTS BECAUSE OF MISHANDLING AT THE WORKING LEVEL. MUHAYYA RESPONDED THAT HE FELT IT IMPORTANT TO RAISE IRRITATIONS WHEN THEY OCCURRED BECAUSE, AS A SINCERE FRIEND, THE KINGDOM WISHED TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE ADVICE. GEN. FRANKS AGREED THE RELATIONSHIP HAD ALWAYS FEATURED HONEST DISCUSSION OF ISSUES.

7. (S) EXERCISES: GEN. FRANKS REMARKED THAT THE LOSS OF THE EXERCISE PROGRAM HAD BEEN AN IRRITANT, AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT EXERCISES WOULD NOW RESUME. GEN. MUHAYYA COUNTERED THAT SUSPENSION OF EXERCISES WAS NOT INTENDED AS A NEGATIVE SIGNAL, BUT REFLECTED THAT THE SITUATION AT THAT TIME DID NOT FAVOR CONTINUATION OF THE PROGRAM. THE INTENTION HAD ALWAYS BEEN TO RESUME THE PROGRAM. THE SAUDI COSS EXPLAINED THAT COMPARED TO OTHER NATIONALITIES, HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD THE MOST FAVORABLE IMPRESSION OF
AMERICANS, BUT HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT CERTAIN POLITICAL
ISSUES (READ THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT).

(U) 8. (S) SOUTHERN WATCH OPERATIONS: GEN. FRANKS NOTED THAT,
WHILE SOME REQUESTS MAY APPEAR TO BE INVASIVE OF SAUDI
SOVEREIGNTY, SUCH WAS NEVER THE INTENTION. TO THE CONTRARY,
WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SAG WILL NOT IN ALL CASES PERMIT
OPERATIONS TO GO FORWARD. 1.4(a)

(U) 9. (S) S-E-R-E-T SECTION 02 OF 03 RIYADH 002213
OFFICIAL INFORMAL
FOR POTAD AMB MARTIN CHESESES FROM PM COUNSELOR MARTIN ADAMS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2012
TAGS: AMGT
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL INFORMAL: CINCCENT MEETINGS IN SAUDI
ARABIA

(U) 9. (S) SAUDI AIR FORCE COMMANDER GEN. HENAYDI REMARKED THAT
THE U.S. HAD OTHER ASSETS besides THOSE IN SAUDI ARABIA FOR
ENFORCING THE NO-FLY ZONE. GEN. FRANKS COUNTERED THAT IT WAS
OF COURSE POSSIBLE TO ENFORCE THE NO-FLY ZONE WITH OTHER
ASSETS, BUT IT WAS NOT CONVENIENT TO DO SO. THAT SAID, WHEN
EITHER SIDE PUSHES TOO HARD ON AN ISSUE, FRICTION RESULTS.
FOR THAT REASON, HE ACCEPTED THE RESTRICTIONS THE SAG HAD
LEVIED. 1.4(d)

(U) 10. (S) LIAISON OFFICERS: RESPONDING TO GEN. HENAYDI'S
REMARK THAT COOPERATION AT THE CACC APPEARS TO BE GOING WELL,
CINCCENT ASKED FOR PERMISSION TO BRING PLANNERS FROM OTHER
STATES IN THE COALITION TO WORK IN THAT FACILITY. HE NOTED
IMMEDIATE

THAT 31 NATIONS ARE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN THE WAR AGAINST TERROR
1.4(a)
1.4(a) GEN. MURAYYA RESPONDED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD TURNED DOWN SEVERAL REQUESTS FROM THESE STATES. PERMISSION FOR THE PRESENCE OF COALITION FORCES IN THE KINGDOM WAS LIMITED TO ENFORCEMENT OF SOUTHERN WATCH. USE OF THE CAOC FOR OTHER PURPOSES BY NATIONS NOT ALREADY REPRESENTED THERE WOULD REQUIRE APPROVAL AT POLICY LEVELS.

11. {S} GEN. FRANKS COUNTERED THAT SAUDI ARABIA DOES NOT GET SUFFICIENT CREDIT FOR ITS ASSISTANCE TO OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) AND THE WAR AGAINST TERROR. INASMUCH AS THE SAG WAS ALREADY A MEMBER OF THE OEF COALITION, IT SHOULD CONSIDER PERMITTING USE OF ITS CAOC FOR COALITION ACTIVITIES
1.4(a)

12. {S} GEN. FRANKS POINTED OUT THAT IRAQ HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH OEF, WHEREAS AFGHANISTAN, YEMEN AND SOMALIA WERE ALL OF CONCERN TO THE COALITION. HE THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE SAG SEND A LIAISON OFFICER TO CENTCOM. SUCH AN OFFICER WOULD RECEIVE DAILY BRIEFINGS ON COALITION ACTIVITIES AND COULD FUNCTION AS A CONDUIT FOR INFORMATION BETWEEN CENTCOM AND THE SAUDI MILITARY. MOREOVER, SAUDI PRESENCE AT CENTCOM COULD BE AS HIGH OR LOW PROFILE AS THE SAG WISHED. GEN. MUHAYYA SUGGESTED THAT THIS ALSO WAS A MATTER FOR POLITICAL AUTHORITIES. (CINCWEST ALSO PROVIDED A WRITTEN INVITATION ON THIS ISSUE TO BE FORWARD TO PRINCE SULTAN.)

13. {S} JPC/MILITARY VS. POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS: GEN. MUHAYYA DEMURRED AT CINCWEST'S REMARK THAT HE HOPED FOR POLICY DISCUSSIONS AS PART OF THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE. THE MILITARY ARE NOT SUPPOSED TO DISCUSS THINGS OF A POLITICAL NATURE. THESE WERE NOT OUR BUSINESS, AND EMBARRASSMENT COULD RESULT.
1.4(d)

POLITICAL ISSUES AND NEEDED DISCUSSION AT THE POLICY LEVEL.
CHARGE D.AFFAIRES SECONDED GENERAL FRANKS, REMARKS,
EXPLAINING THAT HIGH LEVEL USG CIVILIANS MADE THE MAJOR DECISIONS ABOUT NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY POLICY.

MEETING WITH PRINCE SULTAN

(U) 14. {S} PRINCE SULTAN STATED THAT GEN. MUHAYYA HAD BRIEFED
HIM FULLY ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH GENERAL FRANKS. THE MINDEF
HOPED THAT BOTH SIDES COULD AGREE SOON TO RESTART MILITARY
AND NAVAL EXERCISES, AND GEN. FRANKS ASSURED HIM THAT THEY
WOULD. SULTAN PRAISED THE RESULT IN AFGHANISTAN AS A GREAT
SUCCESS BUT AGREED WITH CINCCENT THAT ESTABLISHING STABILITY
WILL TAKE YEARS. SULTAN EMPHASIZED THE PRESSURE ON CROWN
PRINCE ABDULLAH TO ABANDON HIS VISIT TO THE U.S. HE WELCOMED
A POSSIBLE VISIT BY SECDEF AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS AND
REITERATED (REFTEL) HIS INVITATION TO CJCS GEN. MYERS TO COME
TO THE KINGDOM AFTER THE CROWN PRINCE'S RETURN IN ORDER TO
INAUGURATE THE JPC. SULTAN ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN

(U) 9-8-6-2-3-3 SECTION 03 OF 03 RIYADH 002213

OFFICIAL INFORMAL

FOR POLAD AMB MARTIN CHESNES FROM FM COUNSELOR MARTIN ADAMS

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ARABIA

VISITING THE CROC NEXT MONTH AND PROPOSED THAT COS MUHAYYA
SHOULD VISIT THE U.S.

(U) 15. (S) COMMENT: GENERAL FRANKS HAS SET THE STAGE FOR
FOLLOW-ON DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE US-SAUDI SECURITY
PARTNERSHIP. AS GENERAL MUHAYYA REPEATEDLY NOTED, HE IS NOT
THE INTERLOCUTOR FOR SUCH DISCUSSIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, PRINCE
KHALID BIN SULTAN, ASSISTANT MINISTER OF DEFENSE, WAS NOT IN
COUNTRY DURING GENERAL FRANKS, VISIT. HE IS THE ONLY SAUDI
OFFICIAL BELOW PRINCE SULTAN WHO WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO
DISCUSS ISSUES WITH A POLITICAL CONTENT. HE IS NOT A
DECISION MAKER HIMSELF, BUT IS CONFIDENT ENOUGH TO ENGAGE IN
DIALOGUE, TO REFLECT HIS FATHER'S VIEWS, AND TO PREPARE THE
GROUND FOR FUTURE SENIOR DISCUSSIONS WITH PRINCE SULTAN
HIMSELF.

SCOBEY

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#2213