ITEMS SPECIFIED IN THE SPECIAL APPENDIX
FILED ON JUNE 21, 1971 WITH THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

I. Portions of Exhibits 7 and 7A the disclosure of which would present increased risks to the safety of U.S. forces

VOL IV. B. 3, Chronology, pages 1-23;
VOL IV. C. 5, Chronology, pages 11-33;
VOL IV. C. 6, Chronology, pages i-xviii -

Section I, Item 3
UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945 - 1967

IV. B. 3.

THE ADVISORY BUILD-UP, 1961-67
IV. B. 3.

THE ADVISORY BUILD-UP, 1961-67

CHRONOLOGY

21 Jul 54  Geneva Cease-fire Accord  Ended fighting between Viet Minh and French; divided Vietnam at 17th parallel; limited U.S. military personnel in RVN to current level (342).

22 Sep 54  Memo, JCS for SecDef, Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina  U.S. resources could better be used to support countries other than RVN.

11 Oct 54  Letter, J. F. Dulles (Sec State) to C. E. Wilson (SecDef)  Only small U.S. training forces to RVN to promote internal stability.


22 Oct 54  Msg, State to Saigon 1679  Set in motion "crash program" to improve RVN forces.

26 Oct 54  Memo, SecDef to JCS  JCS to prepare long-range program to improve RVN forces.

17 Nov 54  Memo, JCS for SecDef, Indochina.  Development of effective forces and prevention of communist takeover cannot be prevented without Vietnamese effort that is probably not forthcoming.


21 Jan 55  Memo, JCS for SecDef, Reconsideration of U.S. Military Program in South-east Asia  Outlines alternative U.S. courses of action in RVN: present program, advice with leverage, U.S. forces, or withdrawal.
24 Oct 55 – 31 Aug 60

9 Dec 55
Memo for SecDef, Raising U.S. Military Personnel Ceiling in MAC Vietnam

16 Dec 55
Memo, Director CIA from SecState

1959
Report, The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program

7 Jun 59
Msg, State-Defense-ICA-CAS to Saigon 28

27 Feb 60
Msg, Saigon to State 2525

10 Jun 60
U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Study on Army Aspects of the Military Assistance Program in Vietnam

1 Sep 60 – 5 Mar 62

4 Jan 61
Counter Insurgency Plan for South Vietnam (CIP), enclosure to msg, Saigon to State 276

17 Jan 61
Memo, General Lansdale for SecDef, Vietnam

Lt Gen Samuel T. Williams, Chief of MAAG to Vietnam.

MAAG needed twice the current 342 personnel to train RVNAF.

TERM also to serve as cover for intelligence gathering.

Emphasized need for promoting internal security, coined term "mirror imaging."

Forbids advisors to participate in combat.

Abolished TERM but added equal number of spaces to MAAG, Vietnam, increasing it from 342 to 685.

Prepared for Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, described Viet Cong strategy but deprecated ARVN participation in pacification.

Lt Gen Lionel C. McGarr, Chief of MAAG to Vietnam.

Blueprint for RVNAF reorganization, containing Gen McGarr’s recommendations for integrating ARVN and CG/SDC in a common chain of command to promote internal security.

Proposed extra-bureaucratic advisory effort carried out by specially selected and qualified personnel.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Memo/Report/Note</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Mar 61</td>
<td>NIE 50-61, Outlook in Mainland Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Report that VC controlled most of countryside.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Apr 61</td>
<td>Memo, Walt W. Rostow to the President</td>
<td>Suggested appointment of Presidential Agent to oversee Vietnam programs in Washington.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Apr 61</td>
<td>Memo, Gen. Lansdale to SecDef, Vietnam</td>
<td>Proposed creation of interdepartmental task force on Vietnam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Apr 61</td>
<td>Memo, SecDef for DepSecDef</td>
<td>McNamara asked Gilpatric for program to &quot;prevent communist domination&quot; of Vietnam, in response to Lansdale proposal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Apr 61</td>
<td>Memo, DepSecDef for President, Program of Action for Vietnam</td>
<td>Recommended expanded U.S. effort in Vietnam, MAAG increase of 100, MAAG takeover of CG/SDC, U.S. advisors in field operations, creation of Presidential Task Force. Foreshadowed later decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 61</td>
<td>Memo, R.L. Gilpatric for Presidential Task Force</td>
<td>Recommended augmenting MAAG by 2 training commands (1600 each) and deploy 400 Special Forces (increasing MAAG from 685 to 2285). Marked shift to conventional approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May 61</td>
<td>Memo, State Department to members of Task Force on Vietnam</td>
<td>Recommended revision of Gilpatric task force, proposed interdepartmental task force under State leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 May 61</td>
<td>NSAM 52</td>
<td>Recorded President's decision to increase U.S. forces slightly and re-emphasized U.S. commitment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May 61</td>
<td>Msg. Saigon to State 1743</td>
<td>Recorded Diem's refusal of U.S. combat troops on bilateral treaty.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18 May 61  Memo to Lansdale for DepSecDef, Vietnam

Recorded Diem's acceptance of U.S. forces for training but not for fighting.

23 May 61  Memo, Vice President Johnson for President Kennedy

Report from Johnson's trip to Vietnam that "deeds must replace words."


Set forth coordinating authority for ambassadors.

9 Jun 61  Letter, President Diem to President Kennedy

Proposed 100,000 increase in RVNAF and corresponding expansion of JNAF.

15 Sep 61  MAAG, Vietnam, Geographically Phased National Level Plan for Counterinsurgency

Suggested operational sequence of priority areas for coordinated counterinsurgency effort under single chain of command.

1 Oct 61  Msg, Saigon to State 421

Diem asked for bilateral defense treaty with U.S.

5 Oct 61  JCSM 717-61

JCS proposal to send 20,000 U.S. combat troops to central highlands.

5 Oct 61  DF, Distribution Division, OSESER, DA to Multiple Addressees, Improvement of Personnel Continuity and Effectiveness in Short Tour Overseas Areas.

OSD decision to increase tour of duty to 30 months with dependents; 18 without, instead of 24 and 12. Never put into effect.

10 Oct 61  HIE 10-3-61, Probable Communist Reactions to Certain SEATO Undertakings in South Vietnam

Examined proposal for U.S. troop intervention.
Proposed sending U.S. combat troops.

11 Oct 61  Memo for Record Roswell Gilpatric
Recorded decision to send Taylor to Vietnam and outlined alternatives to be considered.

25 Oct 61  Msg, Saigon to State
Diem's assurance that he favored deployment of U.S. troops.

25 Oct 61  Msg, Saigon 537, General Taylor to White House, State, Defense, JCS; Msg, Baguio 005, 1 Nov 61, Eyes Only for the President from General Taylor
Proposed sending 6-8000 troops under guise of "flood relief."

1 Nov 61  State Dept, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, RFE-3, 1 Nov 61, Communist Threat Mounts in South Vietnam
Reported increased VC activity in first half 1961: 500 assassinations, 1000 kidnappings, 1500 RVNAF KIA.

Discussed VC strategy and threat and the weaknesses of the Diem regime. Proposed shift in U.S. effort "from advice to limited partnership."

14 Nov 61  Msg, State to Saigon 619
Recorded U.S. expectation of sharing in GVN decision-making.

22 Nov 61  NSAM 111, First Phase of Vietnam Program
Outlines U.S. actions and expected improvements in GVR.

22 Nov 61  Msg, Saigon to State 687;
25 Nov 61  Msg, Saigon to State 708.
Ambassador Wolling reported that Diem refused to bow to U.S. pressure.

Dec 61  Msg, State to Saigon 693
Dropped insistence on explicit U.S. influence on GVN decisions, but assumed such influence as by-product of close partnership.
16 Jan 62  
Hq, CINCPAC, Record of Second Secretary of Defense Conference

Recorded decisions of Honolulu Conference: establish battalion advisory teams, province advisors, CG/SDC training.

13 Feb 62 - 1 Aug 64  

23 Jul 62  
Record of 6th Secretary of Defense Conference

McNamara plan for phased withdrawal of U.S. forces, based on optimistic 1962 expectations.

1 Aug 63 - 1 Jul 64  

Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to South Vietnam.

2 Oct 63  
White House Statement

Announcement by President. Kennedy of U.S. hopes for planned phased withdrawal of troops.

1 Nov 63  

Diem overthrown by military coup d'etat.

1 Nov 63 - 16 Aug 64  
Military Revolutionary Council

Duong Van Minh, Chief of State and Chairman, Military Revolutionary Council.

26 Nov 63  
NSAM 273

Reaffirmed and continued Kennedy administration policies in Vietnam; placed emphasis on Mekong Delta; maintained military assistance at least as great as to Diem; reiterated plans for troop withdrawal; proposed no new programs nor increased U.S. assistance; authorized operations up to 50 km. within Laos.

7 Mar 64  
Briefing Paper, Establishment of Critical District Advisory Teams (C), Briefing Book for McNaughton, Saigon /May 1964/.

MACV extended U.S. advisory effort to district level in 13 key districts around Saigon.
17 Mar 64  NSA 203, Implementation of South Vietnam Programs

The situation in Vietnam had deteriorated and was grave; VC controlled much of country; North Vietnamese support of V.C. had increased; RNWAF should be increased by 50,000; contingency plans for operations in Laos and Cambodia and overt retaliation against DRV should be developed; however, no major increase of U.S. advisory effort was called for.

17 Apr 64  Memo, DIA for SecDef, Status of the Vietnamese Hamlet Survey

Aerial photo reconnaissance revealed far fewer fortified hamlets than province officials claimed.

22 Apr 64  Memo, DepSecDef for CJCS

Secretary insisted that he personally approve every manpower space for MACV.

May 64  Briefing Book, Miscellaneous Messages, Status Reports, and Recommendations for Secretary McNamara, n.d.

Reported great instability in province governments, decline in GVN controlled population, increase in VC control; important provinces were in "critical condition."

12 May 64  Draft Memo for the Record, Lt. Col. S. B. Berry, Jr., Mil. Asst. to SecDef, n.d., U.S. Embassy Briefing, Saigon

USOM 25% understrength, half this shortage in rural affairs staff.

12-13 May 64  McNamara trip to Saigon

Situation appeared critical.

22 May 64  Msg, JCS to COMUSMACV 6448, Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps

COMUSMACV asked to study encadrement of CG/SDC with U.S. teams similar to White Star teams in Laos. JCS was examining alternative advisor expansions (1,000, 2,000, 3,000).

23 May 64  Msg, CINCPAC to JCS 230415Z, Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps

MACV opposed to "flooding" RNW with U.S. personnel; preferred build-up on selective basis, challenged "encadrement."
25 May 64  Msg, JCS to CINCPAC 6/73, Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps

JCS plan for 6 Mobile Training Teams in each province and training center, 70 advisors to each critical province, increase of 1000 personnel.

25 May 64  Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC 4/25, 27004/29.

Gen. Harkins disputed the value of U.S. conducted training for CG/SDC and of Mobile Training Teams; proposed advisors be used at district level for operations; accepted 1000 man increase.

27 May 64  Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 27080/2, Vietnamese CG and SDC

CINCPAC agreed with COMUSMACV and outlined specific advisory build-up recommended: 956 personnel by end CY 65.

27 May 64  Msg, White House to Saigon (Personal for Gen. Paul Harkins)

Gen. Harkins requested to return to U.S.

28 May 64  Msg, Saigon to State 2338

USCM desire for gradual, not rapid, build-up; need for effective local administration and security.

30 May 64  JCSM-464-64, Pilot Program for Provision of Advisory Assistance to Paramilitary Forces in Seven Provinces

One of two JCS proposals submitted to McNamara outlining pilot program for advisory build-up: teams in 49 districts over 6 month period, 300 advisors.

30 May 64  JCSM-465-64, U.S. Advisory Assistance to the Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps.

Second proposal - Broader advisory increase program: 1000 personnel for all 239 districts over 1-1 1/2 years.

30 May 64  JCSM-466-64, Provision of U.S. Advisors to Company Level Within Vietnamese Regular Ground Forces

JCS opposed extending U.S. advisors to company level, because of increased casualties, language problems, ARVN opposition.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Jun 64</td>
<td>Honolulu Conference</td>
<td>Elaborated decision of Honolulu conference to expand advisory effort to district level, and to increase battalion-level advisory groups to make company level advisory teams available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul 64 – 31 Jul 65</td>
<td></td>
<td>COMUSMACV reached 4200 personnel in addition to 926 battalion and district advisors - &quot;the straw that broke the camel's back&quot; of the overburdened support base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Jul 64</td>
<td>Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, MACJ-316180, Support Requirements for Extension of U.S. Advisory Program.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jul 64</td>
<td>Msg, COMUSMACV to JCS, MACJL 7041, Personnel Augmentation.</td>
<td>COMUSMACV requested 4200 personnel by 1 Dec 64 and remainder of 4772 total increase by 1 Feb 65.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 64</td>
<td>Hop Tac</td>
<td>Idea for Hop Tac, special combined US/GVN effort to secure critical area around Saigon, proposed by Amb. Lodge at Honolulu Conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug 64 – 30 Jun 68</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commander of MACV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Aug 64</td>
<td>Tonkin Gulf Incident</td>
<td>U.S.S. Maddox allegedly attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Aug 64</td>
<td>JCSM-665-64, Additional Support in RVN on Accelerated Basis</td>
<td>McNamara wanted additional men provided more quickly than Westmoreland's plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Aug 64</td>
<td>Tonkin Gulf Resolution</td>
<td>Congress passed joint resolution supporting &quot;all necessary action&quot; to protect U.S. forces and assist Vietnam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Aug 64</td>
<td>Memo, SecDef for CJCS, Additional Support for Republic of Vietnam on an Accelerated Basis.</td>
<td>McNamara directed that accelerated deployment be completed by end of September.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11 Aug 64  
Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, MACJ3 7736, Additional Support for RVN
Westmoreland replied that he could not absorb build-up in time requested by McNamara.

15 Aug 64  
Msg, JCS to CSA, CNO, CSAF et al, JCS 7953, Additional Support in RVN.
McNamara cancelled accelerated deployment, services instructed to deploy personnel in accordance with Westmoreland’s initial recommendations.

16 Aug 64 - 26 Oct 64  
Khanh coup.
Nguyen Khanh, President, Head of State and Chief, Revolutionary Military Council (30 Jan 64 to 26 Oct 64, 27 Jan 65 to 21 Feb 65).

12 Sep 64  
Hop Tac
Hop Tac launched with a sweep through Gia Dinh Province, Mission aborted following day by coup.

4 Nov 64 - 11 Jun 65  

Dec 64  
"Troika sign-off" for plaster abolishes
Phan Klac Sau, Chief of State

Crisis between Amb. Taylor and Gen. Khanh resulted from Taylor’s attempt to use U.S. decision to begin bombing DRV as lever to get GVN reform. Taylor abandoned further attempts at leverage.

USCM Director Killen decided to abandon joint sign-off for release of plaster funds for pacification – important leverage tool.

McNamara approved RVNAP force increase proposal for MAP support.  New strength authorizations: 275,050 Regular Forces, 137,187 RF and 185,000 EF. (Alternative 1).

23 Jan 65  
FMING DART reprisal attacks against DRV launched.
22 Feb 65  
Gen. Westmoreland recommended sending two Marine Battalion Landing Teams to DaNang for base security.

26 Feb 65  
ROLLING THUNDER, sustained bombing of DRV, initiated.

26 Feb 65  
Decision to send Marines to DaNang made in Washington.

6 Mar 65  
Marines went ashore at DaNang.

16 Mar 65  
JCS message 0936  
Gen. H. K. Johnson returned from trip to Vietnam with recommendations for deployment of U.S. combat forces and creation of joint command.

20 Mar 65  
Westmoreland requested authorization to implement Alternative 2 RVNAF strength increase (greater than alternative 1 by 15,000).

21 Mar 65  
COMUSMACV message 1566  
Westmoreland opposed any formal merging of commands, preferred informal cooperation.

26 Mar 65  
MACV "Commander's Estimate of the Situation"  
As a strategy alternative, Westmoreland rejected proposal for accelerated RVNAF build-up as insufficient to prevent VC victory.

1-2 Apr 65  

6 Apr 65  
NSAM 328  
President approved dispatch of two more battalions and an air wing and authorized their employment for active combat missions.

12 Apr 65  
MACV Command History 1965  
McNamara approved JCS recommendation for RVNAF expansion of 17,267. 150 additional U.S. advisors approved.

15 Apr 65  
Defense Department message 009164, Joint State/Defense Message  
Defense Department sought to have U.S. Army civil affairs officers introduced in provinces to improve civil administration. Amb. Taylor opposition killed proposal.
15 Apr 65 Department of State message 2332
McGeorge Bundy informed Amb. Taylor that President wanted to try "encadrement of U.S. troops with Vietnamese."

15 Apr 65 DOD message 1512338
DOD requested COMUSMACV's opinion about feasibility of encadrement of U.S. officers in ARVN divisions to improve effectiveness.

18 Apr 65 Honolulu Conference, MACV Command History
Based on study by Gen. Throckmorton, encadrement proposals were rejected because of language problem, expanded support requirement, and adverse effects on South Vietnamese morale.

Apr 65 MACV Command History 1965
Westmoreland suggested joint MACV-JGS staff. Gen. Thieu and Gen. Minh were opposed.

3 May 65 Hop Tac pacification
Corps commanders for I, II, IV Corps presented Hop Tac plans for their zones, each to extend "oil blot" pacification from its headquarters city. (By end of 1965 became scheme for National Priority Areas.)

11 May 65
Viet Cong attached and overran Song Be, capital of Phuoc Long Province, and a U.S. advisory compound in the city.

14 May 65 JCS message 122235
McNamara authorized creation of formal combined command in Vietnam and coordinating MACV-JGS staff.

21 May 65 COMUSMACV message
Westmoreland recommended against proposed combined command because of Thieu's and Ky's opposition.

21 May 65 Combined Command; JCS message 2405032

26 May 65 CINCPAC msg to JCS 3027, 2603328
CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's opposition to combined command because of fears of Vietnamese hostility.
late May 65 VC force ambushed and decimated ARVN 51st Regiment and 2 battalions near Ba Gia, west of Quang Ngai City.

Jun 65 Origin of CAP Several Marines assigned to work with local PF near Phu Bai, I Corps.

7 Jun 65 MACV message to CINCPAC and JCS 19118 Moratorium on RVNAF build-up required because trainees needed as fillers in existing units to replace heavy casualties. Westmoreland requested 44 additional U.S. battalions; reported severe ARVN deterioration.


Jun 65 Viet Cong attacked Special Forces camp at Dong Xoai with more than two regiments.

25 Jun 65 VC Central Highlands offensive began, district headquarters at Tou Morong, Kontum Province, was overrun.

26 Jun 65 MACV Military Report, 19-26 June MACV noted 5 ARVN regiments and 9 battalions combat ineffective.

Jul 65 18 US/FW combat maneuver battalions were in Vietnam.

Jul 65 MACV Command History, 1965 11 of 15 ARVN training battalions had to be disorganized to provide fillers for line units due to heavy casualties.

7 Jul 65 Six district capitals had been abandoned or overrun.
20 Jul 65  SecDef Memorandum for the President

McNamara urged U.S. to lay down terms for continuing assistance before introduction of more forces; suggested exercise leverage through control of rice policy.

25 Jul 65  Saigon message 266

Amb. Taylor did not want to appear to impose conditions for increased aid.

28 Jul 65

President announced expanded U.S. effort and increased troop commitment to Vietnam.

7 Aug 65  MACV Command History 1965.

CG III MAF designated as Senior Advisor to ARVN I CTZ Commander.

Sep 65  Lodge Ambassador


Sep 65

COMUSMACV evaluated 3-month experiment with "single manager" teams in 3 provinces, found it partially successful but scrapped the idea.


MACV created separate contingency fund for each subsector advisor for urgent projects, in attempt to overcome delays in Vietnamese pacification system.

16 Oct 65  State Dept msg 1039

USOM sought to restore troika sign-off but State Dept. opposed this idea. The attempt was abandoned.

18 Oct 65  Saigon msg 1324

21 Oct 65

Commander of HQ Field Force, Vietnam (FFORCEV) designated as II CTZ Senior Advisor. (At insistence of ARVN Corps commanders, who felt they would suffer loss of prestige if advised by less than Senior U.S. officer in corps.)
SecDef Draft Memorandum
for the President

McNamara recorded impatience
with GVN, recommended giving
larger role to advisors at
province and district level.

MACV Command History

Westmoreland recommended increased
RNMAF force levels for FY 66 and
FY 67, to limit of available
manpower.

CAP Program

Agreement between I Corps Com-
mander and CG III MAF permitting
integration of Marine squads into
PF platoons in DaNang area to form
Combined Action Platoon (CAP):
Marine Rifle Squad (14) and PF
Platoon (32-38).

McNamara trip to Saigon, approves
RNMAF force increase recommenda-
tion.

Lodge memorandum for
Gen. Lansdale; MACV
Command History

Lodge specified that GVN pacifica-
tion effort was primarily civilian,
consequently on U.S. side the
two civilian agencies, USAID and
CAS, should be generating support
agencies.

Warrenton Conference
Report

Members of Saigon Mission, Viet-
nam Coordinating Committee and
other senior officials met at
Warrenton, Virginia, to review
pacification problem. It fore-
shadowed a redirection of advisory
effort toward pacification.

MACV Analysis of
RNMAF for CY 66

At Mission Council meeting, Amb.
Lodge expressed concern that
the number of U.S. advisors not
smother the Vietnamese at all
levels.

State to Saigon 2252

U.S. requested Honolulu meeting
with Thieu, Ky to express concern
about pacification, economic prob-
lems, GVN lack of popular support.
6-8 Feb 66 Honolulu Conference

LBJ concern about the "other war," Thièu and Ky made pledges of increased pacification, promised elections. Amb. William Porter was assigned responsibility for civil support of RD.

28 Feb 66 Mission Council Minutes, Feb 28, 1966

Porter described his understanding of his duties to Mission Council: coordinating effort for all civil aspects of revolutionary development, through the Mission Liaison Group.

Feb 66

MACV subsector pacification contingency fund abandoned after 4-month trial period due to opposition of GVN RD Minister Thang; it would encourage Vietnamese dependence on U.S.

Mar 66 PROVN Study Summary Statement, Mar 66

Program for Pacification and Long Term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN) completed for internal army use. Revealed lack of coordination among U.S. agencies in pacification.

23 Apr 66 Saigon to State 4160, Apr 23, 1966; 4200, Apr 26; 4435, May 7; 5546, June 15

Lodge reviewed prospects for introduction of U.S. leverage in Buddhist "Struggle Movement"; desired to bring dissidents under GVN control, but saw no way to achieve decisive results. Recommended to Washington that a sign-off system be reinstated to reduce corruption and increase U.S. influence at lower levels.

Jul 66

Stepped-up pacification effort: Operation Ia'm Son, combined RD "Search and Seal" operations with U.S. 1st Infantry Division and ARVN 5th Division in Bình Dương. U.S. 25th Division "adopted" districts in Nam Nghia Province.
"Roles and Missions" Study Group began work for Amb. Porter. Completed in August. Recommendations for support for a reemphasis on pacification.

Sep 66

McNamara proposed that responsibility for sole management of pacification be assigned to COMUSMACV, who would have a Deputy to command all pacification activities. AID, CIA, USIA opposed such reorganization; Komer and JCS concurred.

29 Sep 66  

Komer, "Memorandum for Secretary McNamara"  

Komer stressed that unified management of pacification was needed.

23-25 Oct 66  

Manila Conference  

At Manila Conference Thieu and Ky formally accepted commitment of ARVN to support RD, and "National Reconciliation" program to attract VC back to government was announced.

Oct 66  

McNamara trip to Saigon. Ky agreed to shift in combat missions for U.S. and RVNAF forces: U.S. to conduct large-scale offensive operations, RVNAF to provide security to RD.

7 Nov 66  

MACV/JGS Combined Campaign Plan 1967 (AB 142)  

Spelled out new division of labor between U.S. and RVNAF. JGS agreed to keep 53 ARVN battalions (50% of ARVN combat units) assigned to support RD.

7 Nov 66  

Memorandum, Amb. Lodge for the Secretary of State, SecDef and Komer; message, Saigon 11225, Nov. 17.  

Lodge defined terms of reference for what was established as the Office of Civil Operations (OCO).
8 Dec 66 MACV msg 52414 to CINCPAC

Westmoreland reported to CINCPAC on poor quality and performance of ARVN. First 10 months of 1966, the number of ARVN maneuver battalions with minimally acceptable operational strength fluctuated from 31 to 78 of total of 121 organized units.

17 Dec 66 W. W. Rostow, Memorandum to Secretary of Defense and Acting Secretary of State, draft NSAM attached

Pacification listed as third strategic objective and five programs concerned with pacification were outlined, heralding reemphasis on pacification in 1967.

27 Dec 66 JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, JCSM-792-66, line-in, line-out revised draft NSAM attached.

JCS replied to Rostow's draft after consulting CINCPAC; stiffening and making more specific U.S. commitment to war, introducing term "revolutionary development," eliminated references to "national reconciliation" for ex-VC, and watered down commitment to constitutional-electoral efforts underway.

9 Jan 67 MACV msg 00949

In Dec 1966 a 12-officer team from each ARVN had undergone training on RD support so that each might instruct its division on the new duties. The division training programs began in Jan 67.

18 Jan 67 MACV msg 02149 to CINCPAC from MACVORDS

MACV described new Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) to CINCPAC.


McNaughton draft for Vietnam strategic guidelines incorporated most JCS recommendations, emphasized security, anti-infrastructure and intelligence in support of R/D, pushed "National Reconciliation."

24 Jan 67 MACV msg 02916, Westmoreland sends

Westmoreland stated that the effectiveness of RVNAF must be increased and that its image must be improved.
28 Jan 67  Deputy SecDef Cyrus Vance letter to W. H. Rostow

Feb 68  "Pacification Slowdown"
Southeast Asia Analysis Report, Feb 68, OASD(SA)
SEA Programs Directorate

18 Mar 67  MACV msg 09101, Westmoreland sends

20-21 Mar 67  Guam Conference

25 Mar 67  Embassy Saigon msg 21226, Eyes Only for the President from Lodge

Mar 67

1 Apr 67

Vance sent McNaughton version to Rostow as Defense Department reply to his memorandum. No NSAM was ever promulgated.

OASD(SA) reported that pacification effort in 1967 had failed.

Westmoreland cabled CINCPAC requesting an "optimum force" increase of 4-2/3 divisions (201,250 men) or as a "minimum essential force", 2-1/3 divisions (100,000 men). No major expansion of RVNAF called for: 6,307 more spaces for ARVN, 50,000 more RF/RF.

President Johnson met with Thieu and Ky in Guam. They presented draft constitution and agreed to a proclamation on National Reconciliation.

Johnson decided to transfer control of pacification to MACV and send Robert Komer to head new operation in Saigon.

Lodge stressed importance of RVNAF for MACV success, praised Abrams as man to oversee RVNAF improvement.

Gen. Creighton Abrams became Westmoreland deputy and assumed responsibility for U.S. advisory effort to RVNAF.

New South Vietnamese Constitution promulgated.
24 Apr 67  R. W. Komor Memorandum for the President

Komer asserted that decisive contest lay in pacification in the South, rejected Westmoreland's request for additional 200,000 troops, proposed methods to improve RVNAF and pacification, suggested increased pressure on GVN for reforms.

1 May 67

New Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, arrived in Saigon.

7 May 67  MACV msg 15064

Reported Jan. decision to make a unit by unit effectiveness evaluation and to cut off support for superfluous or below standard units. Resulted in several warnings but no suspension of support. Also reported RVNAF desertions were won for Jan-Feb 1967 from Jan-Feb 1966.

9 May 67  NSAM 362

Komer's appointment as single manager for pacification announced internally.

12 May 67  Embassy Saigon Airgram 622, Subject: Revolutionary Development

Gloomy account of progress of RD in first three months of 1967.

13 May 67  Ambassador Bunker statements to the press in Saigon, May 13, 1967

Announcement of transfer of OCO to MACV, Bunker stressed combined civil-military nature of pacification.

15 May 67  Embassy Saigon msg. 25839

First meeting of Komer with Ky. Ky declined to place GVN RD efforts under JCS.

20 May 67  State Department msg DTG 092304E; MACV Dir 10-12, 28 May 1967.

MACV issued directive with instructions on new RD organizational arrangements.

May 67  JCSM-530-67; Subject: Increase in FY 1968 RVNAF Force Level, 28 Sep 67 (a review of the year's actions).

McNamara imposed a temporary ceiling on RVNAF to prevent further inflation in Vietnam and to arrest some of the balance of payments flow of U.S. spending.
Amb. R. W. Komer, Memorandum for General W. C. Westmoreland, Subject: Organization for Attack on V.C. Infrastructure

Komer recommended consolidation, under his direction, of U.S. anti-infrastructure intelligence effort. Desired unified GVN/US, civil/military "management structure targeted on infrastructure." ICX (Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation) structure was developed.

Embassy Saigon msg 28095, For the President from Bunker

Bunker described MACV actions underway to improve RVNAF; improving leadership, better pay, improving command structure and equipment of RF/TF training, integrated US/RVNAF operations, reviews.

NACCORDS, Project Take-off, prepared by the ACOs, CORDS, Headquarters MACV

Project TAKEOFF contained analysis of reasons for past failure, appraisal of current situation, and recommendations for future emphasis in RD; suggested increased use of U.S. leverage and control.

ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven Memo for the SecDef, Subj: Improvement in RVNAF Force Effectiveness

Enthoven claimed that primary reason for RVNAF ineffectiveness was the quantity and quality of leadership and recommended that the Secretary query MACV on leadership problems.

ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven Memorandum for the Record, Subj: Fallout for SecDef Trip to South Vietnam (TSSEES-EYES ONLY for Dr. Heyman); and ASD(SA) General Purpose Forces, W.K. Brehm, Memo for the Record, Subj: SEA Deployments, Jul 14, 1967

In Saigon, McNamara gave planning authorization for U.S., augmentation up to 525,000 spaces, and civilianization of 10,000 additional spaces to fulfill Westmoreland's lower force alternative.

ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven Memo for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Subj: Southeast Asia Deployment Program #5

New U.S. force level of 525,000 promulgated as Deployment Program #5.
Amb. Komer complained that the CORUS advisory element's actual strength was seriously below authorization due to bureaucratic delays.

Study of leverage by Hans Heymann and Lt Col Volney Warner recommended increased use.

Westmoreland disagreed with Roles and Missions Study Group recommendation to remove division from chain of command below CTZ level and strengthening role of Province Chief.

JCS submitted final detailed troop list for Program #5. Contained 2,577 additional advisors and 666 Special Forces to perform advisor-like functions.

First published Review and Analysis for RVNAF appeared: long catalogue of RVNAF deficiencies.

Komer replied to recommendation for increased use of U.S. leverage that it must be done discreetly. Proposed comprehensive system of country-wide leverage was never adopted.

JCS forwarded with endorsement the MACV-CINC PAC recommendation on FY 68 RVNAF force increases: total increase of 63,586; 47,839 for RF/PF and 15,747 for regular forces. MACV requested further increase of 78,204 for FY 1969.

McNamara approved the requested FY 68 augmentations for RVNAF, against the wishes of Eisenhower, who would have authorized only half as many.
26 Oct 67  "Information on MATs (Mobile Advisory Teams) and MALTs (Mobile Advisory Logistics Teams)," 8 May 1968, working paper prepared by the ACoFS MA, MACV.

15 Dec 67  MACV conference on RF/PF, convened to study problems of RF/PF expansion and to plan for expansion of advisory effort, recommended complete reorientation of advisory concept for RF/PF, establishment of Mobile Advisory Teams to be used on a rotating basis.

31 Jan 68  Tet Offensive  Westmoreland approved new RF/PF advisory system: MATs and MALTs, to be phased in during 1968.

VC/NVA initiate massive attacks on population centers throughout Vietnam during Lunar New Year (Tet) holiday period.
UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945 - 1967

IV. c. 5.

PHASE I IN THE BUILD-UP OF U.S. FORCES

THE DEBATE

MARCH - JULY 1965
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Agency &amp; Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 Feb</td>
<td>JCSM 100-65</td>
<td>JCS recommended in conjunction with program for the 1st eight weeks of air activity against NVN the collateral action of landing one MEB at Da Nang for security of the air base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Feb</td>
<td>JCSM 121-65</td>
<td>JCS reiterated CINCPAC recommendation to land MEB at Da Nang. Presence of the Marines would serve to deter VC/DRP action against the base and would enhance readiness posture for other contingencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Feb</td>
<td>MACV 220743Z</td>
<td>Westmoreland recommended landing of 2/3 of MEB to secure base and installations at Da Nang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Feb</td>
<td>Embtel 2699</td>
<td>Taylor concurred in MACV's request to the extent of 1/3 MEB for security but warned against further foreign troop deployments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Feb</td>
<td>MACV 231230Z</td>
<td>Westmoreland backed down to 1/3 MEB with proviso that more could follow after 1st battalion was in place.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**US/FW:** U.S. and Free World Maneuver Battalions in SVN

**MAP:** Marine Amphibious Force

**MEB:** Marine Expeditionary Brigade

**MEF:** Marine Expeditionary Force

**BLT:** Battalion Landing Team

**SLF:** Special Landing Force
24 Feb  CINCPAC  
        240315Z  Sharp recommended 2/3 MEB for 
                security at Da Nang.

24 Feb  JCSM 130-65  JCS recommended 2/3 MEB for 
                security.

26 Feb  Deptel 1840  State told Ambassador 2/3 MEB 
                approved for landing contingent 
                on GVN approval. /Dep SecDef 
                approval on 25 Feb/. Remaining 
                elements of MEB deferred.

28 Feb  Embtel 2789  Taylor told State he'd get GVN 
                approval for 2 BLTs to land at 
                Da Nang. He said that should be 
                all we send and that they would 
                eventually be relieved by Viet 
                forces.

2 Mar  Deftel 6166  McNaughton told Taylor that it 
                would be desirable to substitute 
                173d Airborne for the Marines at 
                Da Nang.

2 Mar  Embtel 1954  Taylor supported Westmoreland in 
                opposing substitution of 173d.

3 Mar  CINCPAC  
        030230Z  CINCPAC opposed attempted substi- 
                tution citing seven OPLANS 
                calling for Marines into Da 
                Nang.

4 Mar  JCSM 121-65  JCS recommended deployment of 
                entire MEB to Da Nang, one 
                Army Bde to Thailand, recon- 
                stitution of MEB in WestPac, 
                and alert of III MEF (-) and 
                25 Inf Div as insurance in 
                support of deterrence deploy- 
                ments.

4 Mar  JCSM 144-65  JCS urged SecDef to reconsider 
                deferred funds for Chu Lai 
                airstrip. Facility was needed 
                to "prepare for a wide variety 
                of courses of action."

          Appr. by 
          SecDef 
          18 Mar 6
6 Mar  Press Release  DOD said U.S. at request of GVN will put 2 BFTs at Da Nang for security.

7 Mar  JCS 07C001Z  JCS ordered CINCPAC to commence landing Marines and build up to two battalions ashore.

8 Mar  3500 Marines landed at Da Nang.  2 US/FW

14 Mar  CSA Memo for SecDef & JCS  Gen Johnson recommended 21 separate measures for increased support of the GVN. Measures merely were increases in the same vein as previous steps. He also proposed deployment of up to a full U.S. division for security of various bases with the concomitant release of Viet troops from security mission for combat. The U.S. Division could go either to coastal enclaves and Saigon or into the II Corps highlands. Finally, Johnson proposed a four-division force comprised of U.S. and SEATO troops along the DMZ and into Laos to contain NVA infiltration of men and supplies.

15 Mar  JCS met w/Pres.  President urged the JCS to come up with measures to "kill more VC"; he approved most of Gen Johnson's recommendations.

17 Mar  "Strength of VC Military Forces in SVN"  Joint CIA, DIA, State Memo showing VC Order of Battle (confirmed) as follows:

37,000 Regular Forces
100,000 Irregulars and Militia

Confirmed strength up 33% over 1964.

5 Regimental Hq
50 Battalions
145 Separate Companies
35 Separate Platoons
Westmoreland recommended landing one Marine BLT at Phu Bai, near Hue, to secure airfield there and enable thereby movement of helicopters from congested area at Da Nang to Phu Bai. Recommended a 4th BLT within a month.

Taylor supported Westmoreland's Phu Bai request above and went on to discuss pro's and con's of introduction of U.S. Division without offering a recommendation.

Sharp recommended to JCS that remainder of MEB be landed within a month and one BLT at Phu Bai be landed ASAP.

JCS proposed sending 2 US and 1 ROK division to SVN for active operations against VC. Marines to I CTZ could be had quickly in concert with US/contingency plans for DRV/Chicom aggression. (A portion of this proposal could have been construed as a deterrent measure to Chicom aggression.) All forces were to engage in offensive operations with or without centralized command structure. Location for ROK Div not specified, but Army Div was to go to II CTZ highlands to release ARVN battalions for operations along the coast. The JCS proposed resupplying it by air until Rte 19 could be opened. This recommendation considered by the JCS to be an essential component of the broader program to put pressure on the DRV/VC
25 Mar JCSM 216-65

JCS reiterated CINCPAC's recommendation that 1 BLT and remaining MEB elements be landed at Da Nang and one BLT be landed at Phu Bai -- all to improve security situation.

26 Mar "Commander's Estimate of The Situation in SVN"

Westmoreland predicted that air activity would not bear fruit in the next six months, and in the interim, RVNAF needed 3d country reinforcements to enable it to offset VC/DRV build-up and enjoy favorable force ratios while permitting an "orderly" build-up of its own forces. MACV wanted the equivalent of two divisions by June '65 and possibly more thereafter if bombing failed. Westmoreland proposed deploying Marines as described in JCSM 216-65, an Army brigade in Bien Hoa, Yung Tau, and an Army division to the II CTZ highlands with a couple of battalions to protect coastal bases. The mission of these forces was to be defense of vital installations and defeat of VC efforts to control Kontum, Pleiku, Binh Dinh region.

27 Mar Embtel 3120

Taylor told State that if U.S. forces were to come in for combat, he favored offensive enclave - mobile reaction concept of employment rather than territorial clear and hold in highlands or defensive enclave.

29 Mar SecDef & JCS met with Amb Taylor

JCS three division plan presented to Taylor. The latter inclined to disfavor it because too many troops were involved, the need wasn't manifest, and the Viets would probably resent it. SecDef was inclined to favor the proposal but desired more information in reference to the Taylor qualifications.
President Johnson decided to send two more Marine battalions to Da Nang and Phu Bai and to alter the mission of U.S. combat forces "to permit their more active use" under conditions to be established by the Secy of State in consultation with SecDef. He also approved 18 to 20,000 man increase in U.S. forces to fill out existing units and provide needed logistic personnel. (All of these changes were to be contingent on GVN concurrence.) A slowly ascending tempo in response to rises in enemy rates of activity was approved for the Rolling Thunder program. The President agreed to overtures to GOA, GNE, and to ROK, seeking combat support from them.

2 Apr CIA Director Memo to SecDef & others
McConc said present level of RT not hurting DRV enough to make them quit. He warned against putting more U.S. troops into SVN for combat operations, since that would merely encourage the USSR and China to support the DRV/VC at minimum risk. He predicted covert infiltration of PAVN and the U.S. getting mired down in a war it could not win.

2 Apr JCSM 238-65
JCS asked SecDef to clear the decks of "all administrative impediments that hamper us in the prosecution of this war." Specifically, they asked for: increases in funds, a separate MAP for SEA, improved communications systems, quicker response to CINCPAC's requests, exemption of SEA from balance of payments goals, authority to extend military terms of service and to consult with Congress on the use of Reserves, relaxation of civilian
and military manpower ceilings, and a substantial increase in military air transport in and out of SVN.

4 Apr  CINCPAC
042058Z
(For Taylor)

Taylor told State that in absence of further guidance, he will tell SVN that Marine mission is now mobile counterinsurgency, plus reserve, in support of ARVN up to 50 miles of base.

5 Apr  SecDef Memo
 to CJCS

McNamara told Wheeler that he understood the JCS to be planning for the earliest practicable introduction of 2-3 Div into SVN.

8 Apr  JCSM 265-65

JCS recommended RNNAF build-up be accelerated through an additional 17,247 MAP-supported spaces plus 160 advisors.

SecDef 12 Apr

8 Apr

SecDef appr.

8 Apr

JCSM 265-65

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9-10 Apr  Planning Conference
 in Honolulu

PACOM and JCS representatives recommended deployment of 173d Airborne Brigade to Bien Hoa/Yung Tau for security of the installations there and an Army brigade to Qui Nhơn/Pha Trang to prepare for the later introduction of a division. They also recommended that the 173d be replaced by a CONUS brigade ASAP. They treated the two Marine BLT's of REGM 328 as approved and described as "in planning" the remainder of the JCS's three-division force (III MEF (-), ROK Div, and U.S. Army Div). They recommended that I MEF be deployed to WESTPAC to improve readiness posture.

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11-14 Apr

Two Marine BLT's land at Phu Bai and Da Nang.

11 Apr  MACV 110825Z

Westmoreland told CINCPAC that he still wanted a U.S. division in the highlands, even though it was apparent Washington was
not of a mind to approve it. He also reaffirmed the need for an Army brigade in the Bien Hoa/Yung Tau area for security, to strengthen the eastern flank of the Hoc Tac area, and to act as a mobile reserve in case needed in the highlands. To forestall political difficulty, Westmoreland said he'd like to see a joint staff with the RVNAF and an International Military Assistance Force under U.S. hegemony in the Da Nang area.

12 Apr  Meeting, SecDef & JCS
McNamara agreed with JCS that Marines' "Enclave" build-up plan would be adopted. Concept was to initially provide base security and then phase into combat operations from logistically supportable base areas. The logistics base extent at that juncture was recognized to be inadequate.

12 Apr  Embtel 3372
Taylor told State that with the 18 to 20,000 man increase in support forces authorized by NSAM 328, "some preliminary work in anticipation of the arrival of additional U.S. forces" could be accomplished but that for "significant progress toward the establishment of a logistic base to support additional forces," about 5000 more engineers would be required. He went on to say that despite studies dealing with ambitious plans for reinforcement, he hoped that "they do not interfere with essential work in preparation for less ambitious but more probable deployments." He indicated favorable disposition toward the establishment
of brigade-sized enclaves at Qui Nhon and Bien Hoa/Vung Tau "if the Marines demonstrate effectiveness:"

13 Apr

McNamara approved deployment of 173d Airborne to Bien Hoa/Vung Tau subject to GVN concurrence (with Presidential sanction).

14 Apr JCS 140050Z

JCS asked CINCPAC to deploy the 173d to SVN as soon after GVN concurrence as possible. Their mission would be to initially secure Bien Hoa/Vung Tau and then phase into counterinsurgency operations.

14 Apr Embtel 3373

Taylor surprised at decision to deploy the 173d. He requested a hold.

Embtel 3374

Taylor & Westmoreland both embarrassed at amount of heavy equipment, not appropriate for counterinsurgency, brought ashore in Da Nang by Marines.

Embtel 3384

Taylor advised Washington to keep additional U.S. forces out of SVN, perhaps just offshore, until need for them is incontrovertible.

15 Apr JCSM 281-65

JCS replied to Taylor's traffic of the previous day. They said the 173d was needed for security of air operations and logistic bases and for subsequent phasing into counterinsurgency operations. They added that the security of existing or proposed bases at Chu Lai, Qui Nhon and Nha Trang required a battalion each. They added that to deploy the Marines without their full complement of equipment would be imprudent. They (the Marines) were now prepared to meet any contingency.
McNaughton told Saigon that "highest authority" felt situation in SVN was deteriorating, and proposed seven actions to help remedy the situation, including: (1) encadrement of U.S. troops in ARVN units either 50 U.S. to each of 10 ARVN battalions or combined operations of 3 U.S. and 3 ARVN battalions; (2) a brigade force into Bien Hoa/Vung Tau for security and subsequent combat operations; (3) battalions into coastal enclaves for further experimentation with U.S. forces in counterinsurgency role; (4) application of U.S. recruiting techniques in RVN; (5) expansion of MEDCAP; (6) pilot experimentation in 2 or 3 provinces with a team of U.S. civil affairs personnel integrated into gov't structure; and (7) provision of food directly to RVNAF troops.

Taylor told McGeorge Bundy that 7-point program plus all visiting firemen were rocking the boat and asked for respite.

Taylor sent to Washington the kind of guidance he felt he should have received in order to carry out all that Washington had proposed in the past week.

JCS proposed sending one Marine BLT to Chu Lai to secure the CB's constructing the airstrip there.

JCS described to CINCPAC the concept for U.S. combat units deploying to SFA as assistance.
in arresting the deteriorating situation against the VC and as an assurance that the U.S. would be ready to counter overt DRV or Chicom action should such occur.

McNamara, McNaughton, W. Bundy, Taylor, Wheeler, Sharp and Westmoreland reached consensus that: (1) the DRV was unlikely to quit in the next six months and probably would not give up because of VC "pain" in the South rather than bomb damage in the North; (2) RT was about right but wouldn't do the job alone; (3) best strategy would be to break the DRV/VC will by effectively denying them victory and bringing about negotiations through the enemy's impotence.

They proposed establishing four brigade-sized enclaves, in addition to Da Nang - Hue/Thu Bai, at Bien Hoa/Vung Tau (3 Army battalions plus 1 GDA battalion); Chu Lai (3 BLTs plus 3 Marine TFS); Qui Nhon (3 Army battalions); and Quang Ngai (3 ROK battalions). Added on to the 4 USMC BLTs (33,000 U.S. troops) and 2000 ROK troops already in Vietnam, the total was to be 82,000 U.S. and 7250 3d country troops.

Mentioned for possible later deployment were: a U.S. Air-mobile Division, a Corps HQ, an ROK Div (-), and the remainder of the III MEF (2 battalions). It was agreed that ARVN and U.S. units would be "brigaded" for operations, that the U.S. would try single managers of U.S. effort in 3 provinces as an experiment, that MEDCAP would be expanded, and that a study of fringe benefits for RVNAF would be undertaken.

McNamara sent the Honolulu recommendations to the President essentially as described above.
21 Apr  CIA Memo to SecDef & others
McConé said the communists still saw the tide going their way. They would see in the Honolulu expansions of U.S. involvement the acceptance by the U.S. of a greater commitment, but they would assume U.S. was reluctant to widen the war. The DHV and Chicoms might reinforce with men and equipment, but would not intervene.

21 Apr  CIA-DIA Memo "An Assessment of Present VC Military Capabilities"
The presence in Kontum Province since February 1965 of one regiment of the 325th PAVN Division confirmed. As of late 1964 the supply of repatriated southerners infiltrated back from NVN had dried up and NVN volunteers were coming down the trail.

22 Apr  Deptel 2397
Unger told Taylor that if Quat agrees to the Honolulu program, the U.S. intention was not to announce the whole thing at once "but rather to announce individual deployments at appropriate times."

23 Apr  CINCPAC 230423Z
Sharp recommended replacing the 173d, if it deployed, with a CONUS brigade.

23 Apr  Emptel 2391
Taylor told State that Quat was extremely reluctant to discuss foreign reinforcements. Taylor feared GVN reaction.

30 Apr  Deptel 1097
Saigon informed by McNaughton that the 173d and 3 BLTs to Chu Lai approved for deployment at Ambassador's call.

30 Apr  JCSM 321-65
JCS as a result of Honolulu and subsequent discussions recommended a detailed program to deploy 48,000 U.S. and 5250 Free World troops to SVN. The forces included two Army brigades, one MEB, an ROK Regt. Combat Team, and an ANZAC battalion. They were to bolster GVN forces during their current build-up, secure bases and installations, conduct combat operations in
coordinated with the RVNAF, and prepare for the later introduction of an airborne division to the central plateau, the remainder of III MEF to the Da Nang area, and the remainder of an ROK division to Quang Ngai.

5 May - ISA Memo to Dep SecDef

McNaughton informed Vance that a portion of the force package listed as "approved" by the JCS in JCSM 321-65 was in fact a part of the not-yet sanctioned three-division plan.

6 May

Main body of 173d Airborne Brigade arrived at Vung Tau.

7 May

Marines began landing at Chu Lai

7 May - CINCPAC

072130Z

Sharp reminded JCS that he wanted to reconstitute WESTPAC reserve after deployment of 173d and additional Marines.

8 May - MACV 15182

Westmoreland with Taylor concurrence forwarded concept of operations by U.S./allied ground combat forces in support of RVNAF:

Stage I - Security of base area (extended TAOR out to light artillery range).

Stage II - Deep patrolling and offensive operations (with RVNAF coordination and movement out of TAORs).

Stage III - Search and destroy plus reserve reaction operations. Westmoreland saw the U.S. role in the Vietnam war evolving through four phases:

Phase I - Securing and improving coastal enclaves

Phase II - Operations from the enclaves

23
Taylor told State that joint command structure was repugnant to Viets and should not be raised at that time. Problem of command needed to be sorted out, however, prior to input of large numbers of U.S. forces.

Westmoreland told CINCPAC that despite SecDef approval of joint planning staff, the Viets were cool to the idea.

JCS recommended approval of 2369 MAF supported spaces for RVNAF to organize a tenth division using assets of three existing regiments.

1st battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, closed RVN in early June and joined the 173d at Yung Tau.

Mission Intelligence Committee with concurrence of Taylor, Johnson, and Westmoreland told State that a series of recent ARVN defeats raised the possibility of collapse. To meet a shortage of ARVN reserves, U.S. ground troops would probably have to be committed to action.

Westmoreland told CINCPAC that a summer offensive was under way to destroy GVN forces and isolate and attack district and province towns. The enemy had yet to realize his full potential, and RVNAF's capability to cope was in grave doubt. RVNAF build-up was halted because of recent losses. No choice but to reinforce with additional US/3d country forces as rapidly as possible. Westmoreland asked that all forces then in the planning stages be approved for deployment, plus he identified more forces (9 maneuver battalions in a division (-) and one MEB)
which might be required later and for which planning should begin. He asked that the 173d be held in SVN until the Airmobile Division was operational.

7 June CINCPAC 072325Z

Sharp supported Westmoreland's request for more troops but added that he felt the airmobile division should go to Qui Nhon rather than inland and should operate in Binh Dinh instead of up in the highlands. He felt 600 to 800 tons of aerial resupply for the division if it went to the highlands was asking too much of air facilities. He also felt the ROK division should go to Quang Ngai rather than to Qui Nhon, where it would be unproductive, or to Cam Ranh as Westmoreland had suggested.

8 June Press Conference

McCloskey, State Dept Press Officer, told the press that U.S. troops would be made available to fight alongside Viet forces when and if necessary.

9 June White House Press Release

Statement released which said that there had been no recent change in mission of U.S. combat units. They would help the Viets if help was requested and COMUSMACV felt U.S. troops were required.

11 June CINCPAC 112210Z

Sharp elaborated on his earlier objections to airmobile division going into highlands and clarified his views on employment of the ROKs in either Quang Ngai, Nha Trang, or the Delta.

11 June JCSM 457-65

JCS, after discussing MACV and CINCPAC requests with Taylor, recommended that the airmobile division go to Qui Nhon, and recommended everything else that Westmoreland had requested. Total strengths recommended were: U.S. - 116,793; FW - 19,750.
11 June JCS 112347Z

JCS told Sharp that somewhat less than MACV’s 19118 was close to being approved as an alternative. Force described amounted to one additional Army brigade instead of the airmobile division. JCS wanted to know where Westmoreland would put the brigade were it to be approved.

13 June MACV 131515Z

Westmoreland objected to Taylor’s questioning of the seriousness of the situation and pointed out that to date ARVN had lost 5 battalions and the end was not in sight. He justified his request for troops by Corps area and asked for a free hand in maneuvering units. He included his concept for the employment of ROK and ARVN troops.

15 June

McNamara gave the green light for planning to deploy the airmobile division to SVN by 1 September.

16 June Press Conference

McNamara announced deployments to SVN that would bring U.S. strength there to between 70,000 and 75,000 men. 20,000 of these would be combat troops and more would be sent if necessary. He said U.S. troops were needed because the RVNAF to VC force ratio of less than 4 to 1 was too low to enable the GVN to cope with the threat. Total U.S. Ens after deployments would be 15.

17 June Embtel 4220

Taylor confirmed to State the seriousness of the military situation in SVN. GVN had to either give up outlying outposts or face being ambushed trying to reinforce them.

18 June White House Memo to SecDef

McGeorge Bundy passed on to McNamara the President’s concern that “we and more dramatic and effective action in SVN..."

27
18 June  JCSM 482-65  JCS further refined recommended troop list showing the airborne division to deploy by 1 September 1965 along with its support and the brigade of the 101st airborne division to return to CONUS when the airborne division was operational. Total strength recommended was:

U.S. - 120,839; FW - 19,750

22 June  Unsigned Memo to SecDef  McNamara told that the President could wait until 10 July to approve the deployment of the airborne division if SecDef is immediately given the go-ahead for readiness preparation. The question of removal of the two Army brigades was to be reconsidered in August.

22 June  JCS 2400  JCS told CINCPAC and Westmoreland that a force of 44 battalions was being considered for deployment to Vietnam. The Chairman wished to know if that would be enough to convince the DRV/VC they could not win.

23 June  Deptels 3078 & 3079  Approval for landing of one Marine BLT at Qui Nhon for security and an additional BLT at Da Nang sent to Saigon.

24 June  MACV 3320  Westmoreland told CINCPAC and the JCS that there was no assurance the DRV/VC would change their plans regardless of what the U.S. did in the next 6 months. The 44 battalions, however, should be enough to prevent collapse and establish a favorable balance of power by year's end.

26 June  Memo, SecArmy to SecDef  Resor told McNamara that Air Cav Div must have its movement directive by 8 July at the latest in order to meet its readiness deadlines. Security would be impossible after issuing the directive.
W. Bundy told Taylor that Westmoreland could commit U.S. troops to combat "in any situation in which the use of such troops is required by an appropriate SVN commander and when, in CINCPACV's judgment, their use is necessary to strengthen the relative position of SVN forces."

On 25 June Alexis Johnson told McNaughton that in many respects the situation in SVN was no worse than the previous year. Even if it were, large numbers of foreign troops could do no more than hold a few enclaves. The Vietnamese feared massive inputs of foreign troops would degrade their control over the country.

Ball of State described the Vietnam war as one the U.S. cannot win regardless of effort. Rather than have the U.S. pour its resources down the drain in the wrong place, he recommended that U.S. force levels be held to 15 battalions and 72,000 men announced by SecDef in June. The combat role of the U.S. forces should be restricted to base security and reserve in support of ARVN. As rapidly as possible and in full realization of the diplomatic losses which might be incurred, the U.S. should exit from Vietnam and thereby cut its losses.

W. Bundy of State proposed a "middle way" to the President which would avoid the ultimatum aspects of the 44 battalions request and also the Ball withdrawal proposal, both of which were undesirable. Bundy offered further experimentation with U.S. troops from coastal enclaves.
The numbers would be held to planned deployments of 18 battalions and 85,000 men. The airmobile division and the 1st Infantry Division would be got ready but not deployed. Furious diplomatic activity concomitantly should find a gracious exit for the U.S.

1 July

One Marine BLT landed at Qui Nhon to strengthen security there.

2 July JCSM 515-65

Pursuant to their meeting with SecDef on 28 June, the JCS forwarded a program for the deployment of "such additional forces at this time as are required to insure that the VC/DNV cannot win in SVN at their present level of commitment." Concurrently, the JCS recommended expansion of the air activity against NVA as an indispensable part of the overall program. Total U.S. strength at completion of these deployments was to be 175,000.

6 July

One Marine BLT landed at Da Nang to strengthen the defenses there.

7 July Deftel 5319

McNamara informed Westmoreland that the purpose of the forthcoming visit to Saigon scheduled for 16-20 July was to "get your recommendations for forces to year's end and beyond."

10 July Deftel 5582

McNaughton told Taylor that it had been decided to deploy 10,400 logistic and support troops by 15 August to support current force levels and to receive the airmobile division, if deployed. GVN concurrence sought.
11 July  Embtel 108. Estimate of the situation prepared by the Mission Intelligence Committee reaffirmed the need for U.S./3d country forces to stem the tide then flowing against the RVNAF.

12 July  2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division arrived in Vietnam

16-20 July Conference in Saigon McNamara and Wheeler met with Westmoreland and Taylor, heard presentation of COMUSMACV's concept for operations in SVN. The 44 battalions were to be the Phase I of the build-up and were enough to prevent defeat. In order to move to Phase II and seize the initiative, Westmoreland told SecDef he'd require a further 24 battalions in 1966.

17 July  RMCC 172042Z Vance told McNamara that the President had decided to go ahead with the plan to deploy 34 U.S. battalions and that he was favorably disposed to the call-up of reserves and extension of tours of active duty personnel.

28 July  Presidential Press Conference The President told the press that he had ordered the airmobile division and other units to SVN. Strength after these deployments would be 125,000 and more would be sent if required. He also said he'd decided not to call up reserve at that juncture.

29 July  1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division arrived in Vietnam.

30 July  JCSM 590-65 Annex showed 34 battalions and 193,587 men as planned for deployment to RVN.

14-15 Aug Marine BLT's landed at Chu Lai and Da Nang. Coupled with the SLF BLT, they brought USMC maneuver strength in RVN to 12 battalions, 9 from III MAF and 3 from I MAF.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 Sept</td>
<td>1st Air Cavalry Division closed in RVN and assumed responsibility for its TAOR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Oct</td>
<td>Remainder of the 1st Infantry Division closed in RVN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Nov</td>
<td>A full division of ROK forces closed into RVN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Nov</td>
<td>JCSM 811-65 After numerous adjustments in required support for Phase I deployments, the JCS proposed a final ceiling of 219,000 on that portion of the build-up and then addressed on-going Phase II proposals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec</td>
<td>Phase I U.S. strength in RVN at year's end was 184,314.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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MARCH - JULY 1965

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<td>I. The Situation, Spring and Early Summer, 1965</td>
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<td>A. The Political Situation</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Khanh yielded to Quat and U.S. hopes went up.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Quat came to ignominious grief at a bad time.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. The military, the only stable element of the Viet body politic, took over with exaggerated confidence.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The Military Situation</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The VC lay low during March and April while the ARVN shined in their absence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mission situation reports reflected unwarranted optimism despite the occasional hardheaded assessment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Honolulu conferees on 20 April 1965 recognized the calm before the storm but were not moved by it.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. There were plenty of indications in the spring that something awful was going to happen.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. The storm.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Song Be cost both sides heavily.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Ba Gia signaled to some the signs of imminent ARVN collapse.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Westmoreland's 19118 of 7 June said the RVNAF had had it and were going under.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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33
UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945 - 1967

IV.C.6.(a)

U.S. GROUND STRATEGY AND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS
1965--1967

VOLUME I
CHRONOLOGY

13 Jun 65
Memo from McGeorge Bundy to SecDef.

Bundy passes on President's desires that "we find more dramatic and effective action in South Vietnam."

1 Jul 65
Draft Memo for the President

SecDef recommends 44 battalions (34 U.S.) to Vietnam in next few months. Says Westmoreland is not sure about requirements for 1966.

2 Jul 65
Memo for General Goodpasture from ASD(ISA)
McNaughton

Secy McNaughton suggests questions to be addressed by JCS study on assurance of winning the war.

7 Jul 65
SecDef message to Saigon
072352Z Jul 65

SecDef gives Westmoreland questions he will want answered on his trip - includes probable requirements for additional forces in 1966.

12 Jul 65
Memo for the Record,
Subj: 63 Battalion Plan

SecDef memorandum for the record calls for building up the armed forces by 63 battalions.

14 Jul 65
Intensification of the Military Operations in Vietnam - Concept and Appraisal

JCS study on concept and appraisal of assurance of winning goes to SecDef.

16-20 Jul 65

SecDef in Saigon receives Westmoreland's requirements.

17 Jul 65
Message from Secy Vance to SecDef McNamara
072042Z Jul 65

Vance informs McNamara that President has approved 34 battalion plan and will try to push through reserve call-up.

20 Jul 65
Memo for the President,
Subj: Recommendations of Additional Deployments to Vietnam

SecDef recommends 34 U.S. battalions to SVN in 1965 (Phase I) with possible need for 100,000 additional troops in 1966 (Phase II).

22 Jul 65
MACV message 220625Z Jul 65

MACV recommends 101,712 personnel and 27 battalions for Phase II.
President announces build-up in Vietnam; no reserve call-up.

JCS figures show total strength after Phase II to be 61 maneuver battalions and 253,287 personnel.

JCS recommend their concept for Vietnam. Concept envisions seizing initiative in Phase II.

SecDef recommends proceeding with Phase II (now 28 additional battalions and 125,000 personnel) in conjunction with ROLLING THUNDER in an effort to force DRV/VC toward an acceptable solution.

JCS refine concept for Vietnam, recommend Phase II force requirements and estimate probable results at the end of Phase II.

Battle of Ia Drang Valley begins.

General Westmoreland reports that PAVN infiltration has been greater than previously estimated.

General Westmoreland analyzes implications of increased infiltration for his Phase II requirements. Begins planning on Phase II TA (add-on).

SecDef outlines questions to be asked of Westmoreland during his trip to Saigon on 28-30 November.

Secretary of Defense in Saigon.

SecDef states that original Phase II increment is not enough to seize the initiative, recommends an increase of 40 US battalions during Phase II.

SecDef recommends a total of 74 U.S. battalions and 400,000 personnel by the end of 1966; warns that an additional 200,000 may be necessary in 1967.
SecDef disseminates tables showing Phase IIA deployments, bringing U.S. strength to 75 battalions and 367,800 by December 1966, 393,000 personnel by June 1967.

CINCPAC sends revised requirements for Phase IIA, desires 75 battalions and 443,000 by December 1966.

173rd Airborne Brigade begins Operation MARAUDER in Hau Nghia Province near Cambodia border.

173rd Airborne Brigade units and 1st US Infantry Division launch Operation CRUMP in Hau Nghia and Binh Thuong Provinces.

Guidelines for assumptions on availability of forces for SE Asia. Case 3 assumes availability of CONUS forces and activations only. Case 2 adds drawdowns from overseas areas. Case 1 further adds callup of selected reserve units and extension of terms of service.

1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, begins Operation VAN BUREN, in Phu Yen Province.

3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry, launches Operation MASHER/WHITE WING near Bong Son in Binh Dinh Province.

SecDef estimates U.S. strength at end of 1966 at 75 battalions and 367,800 troops.

U.S. Marine Corps units launch DOUBLE EAGLE in Quang Ngai Province.

Honolulu Conference with Ky and President Johnson.

CINCPAC forwards revised version of requirements for SE Asia, and deployment plans under the assumptions of Cases 1, 2, and 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 Feb</td>
<td>SecDef directs Military Departments and the JCS to study possible ways of meeting Case I deployment schedule without calling reserves or extending tours of duty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Feb</td>
<td>1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, begins Operation HARRISON, in Phu Yen Province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mar</td>
<td>JCS reply they cannot meet Case I deployment schedule without calling up reserves. Recommend stretch out of deployment into 1967.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Mar</td>
<td>1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, and 173d Airborne Division launch Operation SILVER CASH, a 17-day search and destroy operation in the Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provincial border area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Mar</td>
<td>Estimated NVA regiment overwhelms Astau Special Forces camp at Thua Thien Province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mar</td>
<td>SecDef directs planning on the basis of Case I schedule without call-up of reserves or extension of terms of service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Mar</td>
<td>GVN National Leadership Committee votes to remove Lt Gen Thi from his post as I Corps Commander. Demonstrations protesting Thi's ouster signalled the start of long political turbulence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Mar</td>
<td>USMC units launch Operation TEXAS in Quang Ngai Province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Apr</td>
<td>JCS reply to SecDef giving a program reflecting the Services &quot;current estimate of their capabilities to provide forces required...&quot; as closely as feasible the program for South Vietnam prescribed&quot; by the SecDef on 10 March.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11 Apr 66 SecDef Multi-Address Memo, Subj: SE Asia Deployment Plan

12 Apr 66 SecDef Memo for CJCS

24 Apr 66 SecDef requests an explanation of differences between JCS 218-66 and the Case 1 Deployment Plan.

10 May 66 Elements of 1st Infantry Division launch Operation BIRMINGHAM. The 24-hour search and destroy operation involving the deepest in-zone penetration in 5 years into War Zone C in Tay Ninh Province.

16 May 66 Elements of 31st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division launch Operation PAUL REVERE, an 82-day border screening area control operation in Pleiku Province.

2 Jun 66 Elements of 1st Cavalry Division launch 22-day Operation CRUZY HORSE in Binh Dinh Province.

2 Jun 66 Elements of 1st Infantry Division begin Operation 26 PASO II, 41-hour search and destroy operation in Binh Long Province.

10 Jun 66 11th Brigade, 101st Airborne Division launch Operation HAWKSEE, a 19-day search and destroy operation in Kontum Province.

13 Jun 66 ASD(SA) Memo for SecDef, Subj: Report on Deployments to SEA

13 Jun 66 ASD(SA) Memo for SecDef, Subj: Deployments to SEA

18 Jun 66 CINCPAC 3010
Ser: 000255

CINCPAC's CY 66 and CY 67 requirements based upon a concept which now emphasizes restricting access to the land borders of SVN and increased efforts in the highlands and along the western SVN border. CINCPAC envisons a rise to 90 maneuver battalions and 542,500 personnel by end of CY 67.
Requests SecDef and JCS to see if any more acceleration of deployment is possible.

Revised version of 10 April plan indicates acceleration of deployment of 2 brigades of the 9th Division to December 1966, and deployment of 196th Infantry Brigade in August 1966.

Revised 10 April Plan, now named "Program #3," is published.

USMC units launch Operation HASTINGS, a 27-day search and destroy operation against the 32nd INVA Division south of the DMZ.

JCS report that further acceleration is unlikely.

SecDef reports to the President on the acceleration achieved since the beginning of the year.

Operation DECK HOUSE in eastern Quang Tri Province is conducted in support of HASTINGS.

1st Cavalry Division units launch 25-day search and destroy operation, PAUL REVERE II in Pleiku.

Lodge quotes Westmoreland as agreeing with him on urgent desirability of hitting pacification hard while other things are going well.

JCS forwards CINCPAC's requirements for CY 66 and 67. Recommend that almost all of them be accepted.

SecDef directs JCS to evaluate CINCPAC's requirements and also Issue Papers referred for SecDef by Systems Analysis.
Lodge reports an upsurge of enemy infiltration thru the LZ and praises on Westmoreland's KAMZUS recommendation.

Westmoreland passes on his evaluation of the requirements forwarded by CINCPAC. "I cannot justify a reduction in requirements submitted."

Lodge points out the need for making a strong effort now to make sure "the smell of victory" is in the air. He reemphasizes the need for pacification.

Porter in Saigon informs Komer of anti-inflationary measures and points out possible problem areas, including US military plaster budget.

CINCPAC sends MACV its draft strategy for 1966 and 1967. The proposed strategy emphasizes pacification and nation building.

Roles and Missions Study Group report points out need for pacification. Makes several recommendations to improve pacification effort.

Westmoreland in cable to CINCPAC describes his concept of operations for the rest of the year. He describes his strategy during the period 1 May to 1 November 1966 as containing the enemy through offensive tactical operations; describes his strategy for 1 November 1966 to 1 May 1967 as increasing momentum of operations in a general offensive with maximum practical support to area and population security in further support of revolutionary development. He visualizes that significant numbers of US/FW maneuver battalions will be involved in pacification. In addition to emphasizing pacification, Westmoreland emphasizes need to fight against enemy main forces.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug 66</td>
<td>Lodge points out efforts being taken in Saigon to emphasize pacification. He begins to express reservations on need for more troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sep 66</td>
<td>SecDef asks CJCS to explore carefully all desirable tradeoffs between platoon funding of GWN and US armed forces in SVN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Sep 66</td>
<td>JCS informs CINCPAC of Jason Plan for aerial supported anti-infiltration barrier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Sep 66</td>
<td>GWN elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Sep 66</td>
<td>CINCPAC comments on anti-infiltration barrier proposed by Jason study.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Sep 66</td>
<td>Doubts practicality of scheme.</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Sep 66</td>
<td>Westmoreland discusses build-up in Quang Tri Province. Requests authority to use B-52 strikes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Sep 66</td>
<td>1st Cavalry Division launches 40-day search and destroy Operation THAYEA I in Binh Dinh Province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sep 66</td>
<td>196th Infantry Brigade begins 72-day search and destroy Operation ATHENE in Tay Ninh Province, which grows into largest operation of war to date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Sep 66</td>
<td>Other US units involved included all three brigades of the 1st Infantry Division, the 2nd Brigade of the 25th Division, the 3rd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division, and 1st battalion of the 173rd Airborne Brigade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Sep 66</td>
<td>Embassy gives their latest data on inflation in SVN; forecast a 14.1 billion piaster inflationary gap in CY 67.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Sep 66</td>
<td>Westmoreland discusses 8kem concept designed to impede enemy infiltration thru Laos.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Westmoreland conveys his concern over enemy forces in sanctuaries to Admiral Sharp.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tells SecDef that platoon costs per man of US forces are several times those of GVN forces. However, he does not see any platoon advantages from feasible exchanges.

State calls news of size of inflationary gap in Saigon's 15 September message very disturbing.

Westmoreland reviews VC/FVA's recent campaign and assesses the effectiveness of US campaigns. Does not mention pacification.

JCS forward their final evaluation of CINCPAC's 18 June submission and the results of their evaluation of the SecDef's Issue Papers, from 5 August.

Enthoven tells SecDef he is reviewing JCSM-013-66 and forwards some new deployment Issue Papers to Secretary of Defense.

Lodge, in a message to Rusk, McNamara and Komor, sets forth his proposal on platoon ceilings. Sets a platoon ceiling of $2 billion on military spending in South Vietnam.

MACV recommends to CINCPAC and JCS deployment of Caltrop for operational tests ASAP.

Westmoreland submits his remarks to Lodge's proposal for a platoon budget ceiling.

Dr. Enthoven analyzes Lodge's message of 1 Oct for SecDef. Points out differences in spending associated with different deployments small relative to other uncertainties. Terms Lodge's estimates on holding inflation down optimistic.

SecDef forwards another set of deployment Issue Papers to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Joint Chiefs of Staff forward their evaluation of world-wide military posture and the effects which deployments to SVN will have upon same.

the 3rd US Marine Division assumes control of Operation PRAIRIE in Quang Tri Province. This is the first Division-controlled operation in I CTZ.

SecDef recommends force levels stabilize at 470,000, that US stabilize ROLLING THUNDER, deploy a barrier and gird itself for a long haul.

Joint Chiefs of Staff submit their comments on SecDef's memorandum for the President: Do not agree with 470,000-man limitation. Are doubtful on feasibility of the barrier, reserve judgment until they receive detailed programs being prepared by CINCPAC.

Elements of 4th Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, launch 7th-day Operation PAUL REVERE IV, in Pleiku Province.

CINCPAC forwards results of the Honolulu Planning Conference. Recommend a build-up to 91 maneuver battalions and 493,969 personnel by end of CY 67. Total strength after filling out will be 94 battalions and 555,741 personnel.

CINCPAC forwards three alternative deployment plans and their associated manpower costs.

Manila Conference

McNaughton gives his report of conversations with Westmoreland on force levels and ROLLING THUNDER—Says Westmoreland is thinking of an end-CY 67 strength of 480,000.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Nov 66</td>
<td>JCSM 702-66; &quot;Deployment of Forces to Meet CY 67 Requirements&quot;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Nov 66</td>
<td>AB 142, Combined Campaign Plan, 1967</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Nov 66</td>
<td>ASD(SA) Memo for SecDef</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Nov 66</td>
<td>SecDef Memo for CJCS, &quot;Deployments to SEA&quot;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Nov 66</td>
<td>Draft Presidential Memo, &quot;Recommended FY 67 SEA Supplemental Appropriation&quot;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Nov 66</td>
<td>SecDef Memo for Secys of Military Departments, C/JCS, Asst Secys of Def</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Dec 66</td>
<td>JCSM 739-66, &quot;Deployments to SEA and other PACOM Areas&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Dec 66</td>
<td>Memo for CJCS from Sec Def, Subj: &quot;Deployments to SEA and other PACOM Areas&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Dec 66</td>
<td>DCFG memo for SecDef, Subj: &quot;Plan for Increased Anti-Infiltration Capability for SEA&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Jan 67</td>
<td>COMUSMACV OCC10</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Jan 67</td>
<td>MACV's year-end assessment of enemy situation and strategy.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operation CEDAR FALLS, Begins longest operation of war to date in terms of forces employed.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
21 Feb 67 Memory from DepSecDef to Under Sec State, Subj: "Military Action Programs for SEA"

22 Feb 67 JCSM 97-67, Subj: MACV Practice Nine Requirements Plan

22 Feb 67 CM-2134-67, "PRACTICE NINE Requirements Plan, dated 26 Jan 1967"

18 Mar 67 COMUSMACV message 09101

20-21 Mar 67

24 Mar 67 JCS message 59861

28 Mar 67 COMUSMACV 10311

7 Apr 67

14 Apr 67 JCSM-208-67, Subj: Marine Corps Reinforcement of I Corps Tactical Zone

20 Apr 67 JCSM-218-67

25-27 Apr 67

1 May 67 OASD(MDA) Memo for SecDef, Subj: Increase of SEA forces

Forwarded DOD input to analysis of alternative strategies prepared for the President. Incorporated various separate proposals made by JCS over past two months.

JCS forwards comments on MACV manpower and logistics requirements to implement barrier plan. Recommends plan not be approved.

JCS forwards his dissent to JCSM 97-67. Recommends implementation of plan.

MACV analysis of current force requirements submitted to CINCPAC. "Optimum force" of 4-2/3 divisions; "minimum essential force" of 2-1/3 divisions.

Guam Conference. Bunker, Locke, Komer introduced to Vietnamese leaders.

Requested CINCPAC/MACV detailed analysis and justification for additional forces.

Forwarded MACV detailed justification and planning calculations to JCS.

Task Force OREGON formed, posted to Quang Ngai Province.

Proposed 2 brigades from 9th MAB be stationed off Vietnamese coast to be committed when required by COMUSMACV, remainder of MAB placed on 15-day call in Okinawa.

Formally reported to SecDef the MACV force requirements.

General Westmoreland returns to US, consults with President.

Detailed analysis of MACV force request. Recommended against adding more US combat forces.
All pacification efforts placed under MACV. Korean-named Deputy for Pacification to COMUSMACV.

ASD(ISA) reviews situation in Vietnam, analyzes alternative military courses of action, argues against force level increases, proposes strategy of "slow progress."

JCS seriously concerned at the prospective introduction by the USSR into NVH of new weapons. Proposed neutralization of Hanoi-Haiphong complex by attacking all elements of the import system of NVH, "shouldering out" foreign shipping, mining port.

JCS recommend selective call-up of reserves so US could more effectively fulfill worldwide commitments.

SecDef requested JCS to prepare detailed study analyzing in depth CSS staffing levels in SVN.

JCS reply to 26 April memo by DepSecDef. Concluded that (a) force levels recommended in JCS 218-67 should be deployed; (b) a more effective air/ naval campaign against NVH should be conducted as recommended in JCS 218-67.

Identifies certain factual corrections and annotations in COMUSMACV 18 March "minimum essential force" request.

JCS reply to 19 May DPM, expressed strong objections to basic orientation as well as specific recommendations and objectives. Saw "alarming pattern" which suggested a major realignment of US objectives and intentions in SEA, recommended that DPM "not be considered further."

JCS response to SecDef memo of 20 May. Concluded that original recommendation of 20 May represented the most effective way to prosecute air/ naval campaign against NVH.
2 June 1967

Note, Wm. P. Bundy to Mr. McNaughton

Comments on 19 May DPM. Expressed general agreement with basic objectives as stated in DPM, but agreed with JCS that DPM displayed a negative turn to our strategy and commitment in SVN.

8 June 1967

Memorandum for Under SecDef (sic) Vance from UnderSecState Katzenbach, Subject: Preliminary Comments on DOD Draft of 19 May.

Comments on 19 May DPM. Recommended increase of 30,000 men in small increments over 18 months, get SVN more fully involved and effective, concentrate bombing LOCs in the north.

12 June 1967

ASD(ISA) Draft Memorandum for the President, Subject: Alternative Military Actions Against NVN

Revised DPM incorporated views of JCS, CIA, State. Opposed JCS program, recommended concentrating bulk of bombing on infiltration routes south of 20th parallel, skirted question of ground force increase.

13 June 1967

Memo for CJCS from SecDef, Subj: Increased Use of Civilians for US Troop Support (C)

Requested JCS to determine which logistical requirements could be met by increased use of SVN civilians for US troop support.

5 July 1967

Memo for SecDef from ASD(SA), subject: Current Estimate of Additional Deployment Capability

Update of original estimate of what Army could provide. Approx. 3-2/3 IE could be provided to MACV by 31 Dec 65 without calling reserves.

SecDef in SVN receives MACV justification.

7-8 July 1967

ASD(ISA) memo for the record indicates decision in Saigon to increase forces to 525,000 limit.

13 July 1967

Memo for SecDef from Richard C. Steadman, DASD, Subject: Additional Third Country Forces for Vietnam

Provided series of letters to Manila countries making clear the need for additional forces.

14 July 1967

Memo for Record, Subj: SBA Deployments

ASD(SA) outlined the decisions made in Saigon and directed work priorities and assignments for OASD(SA) to flesh out the 525,000 troop limit.
20 July 1967
JCS 286-67, Subject: US Force Deployments - Vietnam

26 July 1967
Memo from DepSecDef to CJCS, Subj: Operations Against NVN

22 Jul - 5 Aug 1967

14 Aug 1967
ASD(SA) Memo for Secys of Mil Depts, CJCS, ASDs, Subject: SEA Deployment Program #5

9 Sept 1967
DJCS: 1112-67, Subj: Examination of Speed-Up in Program 5 Deployments

12 Sept 1967
CM 2540-67

15 Sept 1967
JCSI-505-67

16 Sept 1967
SecArmy Memo for SecDef, Subject: Deployment Schedule for 101st Airborne Division (-)

22 Sept 1967
SecDef Memo for SecArmy, Subj: Deployment of 101st Airborne Division (-).

28 Sept 1967
MACV message 31998

4 Oct 1967
SecDef Memo for the President

5 Oct 1967
SecDef memo for Secys of Mil Depts, CJCS, ASDs, Subject: FY 68 U.S. Force Deployments, Vietnam

JCS provide detailed troop list within 525,000 ceiling. Reaffirmed force requirements as set forth in JCSM 286-67.

Comments on JCSM 286-67.

General Taylor, Mr. Clifford tour troop contributing countries, seek additional third-country forces.

Formally approved forces for deployment in Program 5. Established civilianization schedule, approved additional 5 destroyers for gunfire support.

Joint Staff examined possible actions to speed up Program 5 deployments.

Joint Staff requested by President to indicate actions which would increase pressure on NVN.

JCS forward refined troop list for Program 5.

Div(-) could be deployed to close in W prior to Christmas.

Approves accelerated deployment of 101st Airborne Div(-).

MACV plan for reorienting in-country forces.

SecDef indicated actions taken on MACV recommendations contained in message 31998.

SecDef approves force deployments listed in JCSM 505-67.
16 Oct 1967  SecArmy memo for SecDef,  
  Subj: Deployment of 101st  
  Airborne Division (-)  
  SecArmy indicates that remainder  
  of 101st Airborne Division can be  
  accelerated to close in Vietnam  
  by 20 December 1967.

17 Oct 1967  JCSM-555-67  
  JCS forward to President through  
  SecDef their reply to questions  
  raised on 12 September.

21 Oct 1967  SecDef memo for Sec-  
  Army, Subject: Deploy-  
  ment of the 101st  
  Division (-)  
  SecDef approves accelerated deploy-  
  ment of remainder of 101st Airborne  
  Division.

31 Oct 1967  SecArmy memo for Sec-  
  Def, Subject: Deploy-  
  ment of 11th Infantry Brigade.  
  SecArmy indicates that Brigade could  
  be deployed on or about 10 December.

6 Nov 1967  SecDef memo for SecArmy,  
  Subject: Deployment of  
  the 11th Infantry Brigade.  
  SecDef approves early deployment of  
  the 11th Infantry Brigade.

7 Nov 1967  CM-2743-67  
  CJCS directs Joint Staff to explore  
  what further foreshortening of deploy-  
  ment dates could be accomplished.

10 Nov 1967  CM-2752-67  
  CJCS directs Joint Staff to recom-  
  mend military operations in SEA for  
  next four months.

21 Nov 1967  DJSN-1409-71  
  Joint Staff reply to CJCS request  
  of 7 Nov to explore foreshortening  
  of deployment dates.

27 Nov 1967  JCSM-663-67  
  JCS provide SecDef their recomme-  
  dations for conduct of military opera-  
  tions in SEA over next four months.

22 Dec 1967  ASD(ISA) memo to  
  CJCS.  
  Forwards SecDef and SecState comments  
  on JCSM 663-67.

26 Jan 1968  MACV message 61742  
  COMUSMACV year-end assessment.

31 Jan 1968  TET offensive begins.

12 Feb 1968  JCSM-91-68  
  JCS examine plans for emergency aug-  
  mentation of MACV, recommended deploy-  
  ment of reinforcements be deferred.
13 Feb 1968  JCS Message 9926  Directs deployment of brigade task force of 82nd Airborne Division to SVN.
            JCS Message 9929  Directs deployment of one Marine regimental landing team to SVN.
13 Feb 1968  JCSM-96-68  JCS forward to SecDef recommendations for actions to be taken relative to callup of reserves.
23-26 Feb 68  CJCS visit to SVN.
27 Feb 1968  Report of CJCS on Situation in SVN and MACV Force Requirements  CJCS reports on his trip to SVN and furnishes MACV Program 6 force requirements.
1 Mar 1968  Clark Clifford sworn in as Secretary of Defense.
4 Mar 1968  Draft Memorandum for the President  Forwards recommendations of SecDef Working Group to the President.
8 Mar 1968  CM-3098-68  JCS forward CCMJSMACV comments on DFM.
11-12 Mar 68  SecState testifies before Senate Foreign Relations Committee
14 Mar 1968  DepSecDef memo for CJCS; Subject: SEA Deployments  DepSecDef informs CJCS of Presidential decision to deploy 30,000 additional troops.
14 Mar 1968  SecArmy memo to SecDef  SecArmy indicated requirement for 13,500 additional men to support emergency reinforcement.
16 Mar 1968  ASD(SA) Memo for Record  Summarizes decision to deploy 43,500 additional troops and plans for reserve call-up.
22 Mar 1968  Gen. Westmoreland to be new Chief of Staff of the Army.
23 Mar 1968  OASD(SA) Memo for SecDef, Subj: Program #6 Summary Tables (Tentative)  Forwarded to SecDef for approval Program 6, based on manpower ceiling of 579,000.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 1968</td>
<td>Remarks of President to the Nation. Announces Presidential decision to US Ambassadors in troop contributing countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Apr 1968</td>
<td>White House Press Release. President announces partial bombing halt, deployment of 13,500 additional troops.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Apr 1968</td>
<td>DepSecDef memo for Secys of Mil Depts, CJCS, ASD’s, Subj: SEA Deployment Program #6. DepSecDef establishes Program #6, placed new ceiling of 549,500 on U.S. forces in SVN.</td>
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