I. Portions of Exhibits 7 and 7A the disclosure of which would present increased risks to the safety of U.S. forces

VOL. V. B. 4, pages 295-311 - Reveal aspects of SEATO contingency war plans and relationships which are still in effect to a considerable extent and could destroy usefulness of SEATO as an organization, and future alliances between the countries concerned. It could reveal to the communists the limited costs of an all out effort to take all of Southeast Asia.
UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945 - 1967

V.B.4.

U.S. IN卷LEMENT IN THE WAR
- INTERNAL DOCUMENTS -

The Kennedy Administration:
January 1961 - November 1963

BOOK I
and of 4,000 in the past three months. While only 10-20% of this strength consists of cadres infiltrated from North VN, the remaining 80-90% includes remnants of the approximately 10,000 stay-behind personnel who went underground during the 1954-1955 regroupment and evacuation of Vietnamese communist army units following the Indo-China War. Though some weapons and equipment have been infiltrated into South VN, there has been no positive identification of Communist Bloc-manufactured military equipment in South VN.

31. The JCS feel the time is now past when actions short of intervention by outside forces can reverse the rapidly worsening situation in Southeast Asia. They consider the execution of ... or a suitable variation thereof, to be the military minimum commensurate with the situation. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 704-61, 5 October 1961.

32. It is the opinion of the JCS that the use of SEATO forces at the greatest possible number of entry points along the whole South VN border, i.e., over several hundred miles, is not feasible. Further, the alternative of using SEATO forces to cover solely the 17th parallel is militarily unsound. "What is needed is not the spreading out of our forces throughout SEA, but rather a consolidated effort in Laos where a firm stand can be taken..." A limited interim course of action is provided herewith in the event is considered politically unacceptable. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, JCSM 716-61, 9 October 1961.

33. "For what one man's feel is worth, mine -- based on very close touch with Indo-China in the 1954 war and civil war afterwards until Diem took hold -- is that it is really now or never if we are to arrest the gains being made by the Vietcong." Bundy suggests that an early, hard-hitting operation has a 70% chance of success. "The 30% is that we would wind up like the French in 1954; white men can't win this kind of fight. On a 70-30 basis, I would, myself, favor going in." Bundy memorandum for Secretary McNamara, 10 October 1961.

34. It is estimated that the Communist Bloc would not commit North Vietnamese or Chinese Communist forces to a large-scale military attack against South VN or Laos in response to an assumed SEATO action to patrol the GVN coast.
Subject: Planning for Southeast Asia (U)

1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 3 October 1961, subject as above.

2. Over a period of time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined various alternatives to the solution of the problems of Laos and Southeast Asia. They have recommended certain military actions short of US intervention which might have had the desired effect and could have altered the situation to our advantage. However, the time is now past when actions short of intervention by outside forces could reverse the rapidly worsening situation. They consider therefore, to be the military minimum commensurate with the situation. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, lacking an acceptable political settlement prior to the resumption of overt hostilities, there is no feasible military alternative of lesser magnitude which will prevent the loss of Laos, South Vietnam and ultimately Southeast Asia.

3. If this intervention causes escalation, additional mobilization would be required in order to maintain our strategic reserve. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their opinion that we cannot afford to be preoccupied with Berlin to the extent that we close our eyes to the situation in Southeast Asia, which is now critical from a military viewpoint.

4. Planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff has contemplated simultaneous contingencies in Berlin and Southeast Asia. In such planning the Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that implementation of ________ would provide a US initiated counter to USSR denial of access to Berlin. The
current build-up of forces will improve our military posture to support action in Southeast Asia in addition to that in Berlin. It is not a question of the desirability of having two limited war situations going at the same time. The fact of the matter is that we may be faced with such a contingency.

5. In reply to your two lesser questions:

a. Naval forces in support of operations would consist of one or two attack carrier strike groups with supporting forces. The employment of these units would not unacceptably reduce Seventh Fleet capabilities in other areas of the Western Pacific. In the event that overt Chinese Communist intervention required the deployment of additional Seventh Fleet forces to Southeast Asia, First Fleet forces and elements of a Marine Division/wing team from the Eastern Pacific could be deployed to maintain the required level of naval capabilities in the Western Pacific. These actions are in consonance with currently approved military plans.

b. The "massive deterrent US air power" referred to in the paper was designed to provide the North Vietnamese with evidence of the US intent, determination and capability. This "show of force" exercise could be conducted by Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft deployed to Southeast Asia under USAF aircraft based at Clark AB, Philippines, other PACOM aircraft using air-to-air refueling, or by SAC training flights. This type of exercise would not dilute other deployments and would serve the dual purpose of providing useful reconnaissance, both photo and visual. The basic posture for nuclear strikes would not be affected since alert aircraft would not be used for the purpose of conducting a show of force operation.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Concept of Use of SEATO Forces in South Vietnam (C)

1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 5 October 1961, subject as above. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposed concept for the use of SEATO forces in South Vietnam and the suggested two principal military possibilities for its implementation.

2. It is their opinion that the use of SEATO forces at the greatest possible number of entry points along the whole South Vietnam border, but excluding that part of the 17th parallel now held by the South Vietnamese Army itself, is not feasible for the following reasons:

   a. SEATO forces will be deployed over a border of several hundred miles and will be attacked piecemeal or by-passed at the Viet Cong’s own choice.

   b. It may reduce but cannot stop infiltration of Viet Cong personnel and material.

   c. It deploys SEATO forces in the weakest defense points should DRV or CHICOM forces intervene.

   d. It compounds the problems of communications and logistical support.
3. Further, the alternative possibility of using SEATO forces to cover solely the 17th parallel, although considered feasible to a limited extent, is militarily unsound in view of the following considerations:

   a. The 17th parallel is not a main avenue of approach being used by the Viet Cong.

   b. North Vietnam may interpret such SEATO action as preparation for aggression against them, thus promoting the possibility of communist harassment and destruction of friendly combat and logistic forces concentrated near the parallel, if not escalation.

4. As stated in your memorandum, the proposed concept set forth must be analyzed in the total context of the defense of Southeast Asia. Any concept which deals with the defense of Southeast Asia that does not include all or a substantial portion of Laos is, from a military standpoint, unsound. To concede the majority of northern and central Laos would leave three quarters of the border of Thailand exposed and thus invite an expansion of communist military action. To concede southern Laos would open the flanks of both Thailand and South Vietnam as well as expose Cambodia. Any attempt to combat insurgency in South Vietnam, while holding areas in Laos essential to the defense of Thailand and South Vietnam and, at the same time, putting troops in Thailand, would require an effort on the part of the United States alone on the order of magnitude of at least three divisions plus supporting units. This would require an additional two divisions from the United States.

5. What is needed is not the spreading out of our forces throughout Southeast Asia but rather a concentrated effort in Laos where a firm stand can be taken saving all or substantially all of Laos which would, at the same time, protect Thailand and protect the borders of South Vietnam.

6. The over-all objective could best be served by the implementation of, or a variation thereof, now. This would accomplish the objective of assisting to secure the border of South Vietnam against the infiltration of personnel and material in support of the Viet Cong thus freeing Vietnamese forces to conduct more effective offensive operations.
in South Vietnam. In addition, this action would stem further communist gains in Laos and, at the same time, give concrete evidence of US determination to stand firm against further communist advances world-wide.

If implementation or a variation thereof, is considered a politically unacceptable course of action at this time, there is provided herewith a possible limited interim course of action. This course of action, covered in the Appendices hereto, could provide a degree of assistance to the Government of South Vietnam to regain control of its own territory, and could free certain South Vietnamese forces for offensive actions against the Viet Cong. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that implementation of this limited course of action would not provide for the defense of Thailand or Laos, nor contribute substantially or permanently to solution of the over-all problem of defense of Southeast Asia, they consider the Plan preferable to either of the two military possibilities described in referenced memorandum.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L. L. Lemnitzer
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

1. To enable the Government of South Vietnam to regain full control of its own territory and to eliminate the Viet Cong threat.

2. To defend Thailand and South Vietnam, holding Laos or areas thereof to the extent required as being essential to the defense of Thailand and South Vietnam.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

1. To assist by the use of SEATO forces in securing the borders of South Vietnam to the maximum extent possible against the infiltration of personnel and material in support of the Viet Cong.

2. To assist the Government of South Vietnam to regain full control of its own territory and to eliminate the Viet Cong threat by freeing South Vietnam forces for offensive action against the Viet Cong.

3. To defend Thailand and South Vietnam, holding Laos or areas thereof essential to such defense.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. Forces available will be the British Commonwealth Brigade, Pakistan, Philippine, and US forces and a limited amount of Thai forces.

2. The United States will provide for stationing in Thailand one US Brigade Task Force Team as suggested to Foreign Minister Thanat by Deputy Undersecretary of State Johnson.

3. South Vietnamese forces released by SEATO forces will conduct effective offensive operations against the Viet Cong.
4. Maximum possible use of SEATO forces will be made to establish an effective communications network in as wide an area as possible and to serve as a means for introducing new techniques into the South Vietnamese Army.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. SEATO ground and air forces will deploy to South Vietnam to assist in protecting the South Vietnam-Laos border, exclusive of that part of the 17th parallel now held in force by I Corps of the South Vietnamese Army (I Corps Tactical IV Area), southward to the Cambodian border.

2. SEATO ground forces of approximately one division strength (11,000) initially will deploy to the high plateau region of the Pleiku area. Securing this region with SEATO forces will free South Vietnamese forces to conduct effective offensive operations elsewhere. Further deployments to assist in interrupting the flow of personnel and material in support of the Viet Cong into South Vietnam will be at the discretion of the SEATO Field Force Commander in light of the existing tactical situation. The SEATO force will further assist South Vietnamese forces by the provision of air, communications and logistic support.

3. The additional command and control communications - electronics requirements for the support of this concept are set forth in Appendix B to Enclosure B.
**COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS**

Command arrangements for this concept would be as now provided for except that the United States would have the responsibilities of the Appointed Nation. In addition, coordination between the SEATO forces and the Government of South Vietnam would be required.

**FORCE INVOLVEMENT**

1. The forces involved in support of this concept would include those forces now committed to support less both the Thai commitment and the US commitment to the Central Reserve. This force would be composed of approximately 9600 combat forces, of which about 5000 would be US. Headquarters units, air component, logistic and other support units would total about 13,200. This would provide a total force of about 22,800.

2. SEATO forces in South Vietnam would be approximately as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Headquarters</td>
<td>700</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Ground Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Air Component</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. There are no US Navy forces assigned to the SEATO force. SEVENTH FLEET forces consisting of one or two attack carrier strike groups with supporting forces would operate in direct support of SEATO operations as required. Other units of the SEVENTH FLEET including patrol aircraft are available to assist the South Vietnamese Navy Coastal Patrol Force, as requested, in operations against Viet Cong sea infiltration.

4. The source of US forces to support this concept would be from those forces now assigned to the Pacific Command. Our military posture is such that the employment of the SEATO forces would not adversely affect our capability to conduct planned operations in Europe relating to Berlin.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. SEATO forces may take whatever action is, in the opinion of the Commander, necessary to insure the security of the force itself.

2. Offensive actions by SEATO forces against the Viet Cong will be limited normally to those necessary to destroy such Viet Cong forces as pose a threat to either:
   a. The borders of South Vietnam, or
   b. The security of the SEATO force itself. Such offensive action envisages the possibility of reasonably limited projection of SEATO air and/or ground forces beyond the borders of South Vietnam into Laos.

3. Aerial reconnaissance by the SEATO Air Component will normally be confined to Laos and South Vietnam.

4. SEATO forces will be permitted to retaliate immediately against North Vietnam overt military intervention by launching air strikes against military targets in that country.
Bloc overt aggression to counter the movement of SEATO forces into South Vietnam is considered unlikely. The most probable course of action by the communists would be continued use of insurgents and infiltration. However, if the Bloc did decide to act overtly to counter the introduction of SEATO forces into the area, this action would probably follow, in general, the pattern set forth below:

**GROUND ACTIONS**

a. Basically an infantry invasion of South Vietnam and Laos and deployed in strength and direction as follows:

1. Five divisions on the North/South Vietnam border to Saigon along the coastal route via Dong Ha - Tourane - Binh Dinh.

2. One division (light) to Vientiane via Xieng - Khouang - Paksane.

3. One division (light) to Thakhek and Savanakhet via Mugia Pass and Keo Neua Pass.

4. A follow-up force of up to six divisions moving as follows:

   a. Two divisions to Saigon or Bangkok via Lao Bao Pass - down the lower Mekong Valley along Route 13 to Saigon or across the Mekong River to Bangkok.

   b. Two divisions to Bangkok via Routes 7, 8 and 13 through Laos into Thailand and on to Bangkok.

   c. Two divisions to be held in reserve along the North/South Vietnam border to be available to put additional momentum along the coastal route, or to effect a subsidiary effort in the Kontum-Pleiku Plateau.
b. A secondary effort, or threat thereof, by about nine
Chinese Communists divisions into Burma and Northern
Thailand, which could be supported as follows:

(1) Three divisions, one lightly equipped, to
northern Thailand via northwest Burma.

(2) Six divisions toward Rangoon along the Burma Road
and via Myitkyina to Kandalay, then south in the internal
transport system of Burma.

c. There would probably be a build-up in North Vietnam and
possibly a build-up along the China-Burma border before any
invasion was initiated. The invasion would probably be on the
broadest possible front employing lightly equipped troops to
infiltrate between defending forces and thereby minimizing
the effects of nuclear weapons against deployed ground troops.
These infiltrating forces would be supported by columns advancing
quickly down main routes. Battalion-size or smaller airborne
units might be used, chiefly to seize and hold key features
such as bridges, airfields, critical road junctions. The
communists would exploit to the fullest their ability to
infiltrate through the most difficult country and would not
necessarily be tied to the highways and roads. Large numbers
of porters and pack animals would be available and jungle
trails would be used to a great extent, though this would
restrict the speed of attack and the weight of equipment
that could be used.
AIR ACTIONS

a. The Chinese Communists maintain, on a routine basis, approximately 250 jet fighters in South China. These and other aircraft, including jet light bombers, could be rapidly deployed to bases in North Vietnam and South China to conduct air operations in support of the Communist objective. In the event of a ground invasion of the magnitude suggested above, it is well within the CHICOM's capability to neutralize the air bases and port facilities in Thailand and South Vietnam in an attempt to deny their use by SEATO forces. Such an operation could precede or accompany the invasion of ground forces.

REACTION TO CONTINGENCIES

1. If North Vietnamese forces overtly intervened, the SEATO force would have to be increased from the equivalent of approximately one division at the initiation of the SEATO Plan to twelve divisions, seven Regimental Combat Teams and five battalions. In addition, the SEATO force would have air and naval superiority. Such a force is considered adequate to defeat the North Vietnamese forces.

2. US force contribution to the enlarged SEATO force required to combat such DRV action would include two Army divisions, one Marine division/wing team and five USAF tactical squadrons deployed in Thailand and South Vietnam. The US forces would be increased from 14,000 to a total of approximately 129,000, not including Navy forces. One division for this force must come from the continental United States. This could require the call up of one division plus other appropriate forces to maintain the US strategic reserve.
3. The mission of the enlarged SEATO force would be to defend Laos and South Vietnam against attack by forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and to inflict a quick and decisive defeat on the military forces of the DRV. The general concept is to hold the enemy as far forward as possible, destroy his forces, his lines of communication, and those installations directly supporting his war making capability. When appropriate, SEATO forces would mount a general offensive against the enemy. They would have a capability of conducting amphibious assault operations in North Vietnam in case the military situation so dictated.

4. If the Chinese Communists intervene, whether by regular or "volunteer" forces, political authorization for essential military actions must be anticipated since prompt counteractions would be required. There would be issues whether to attack selected targets in South China with conventional weapons and whether to initiate use of nuclear weapons against targets in direct support of Chinese operations in Laos.

5. In this event the SEATO force would be increased to fifteen divisions and eight RCTs (278,000) deployed in the defense of Southeast Asia.
6. The US contribution to this force would be three ground divisions deployed in Thailand and South Vietnam and one Marine Division/Wing Team, prepared for amphibious assault operations against North Vietnam as the military situation dictated. Two divisions and additional air forces would have to come from the continental United States. This could require the call up of two additional divisions plus other appropriate forces to maintain the US strategic reserve.

7. The mission of the SEATO force would be expanded to defend Southeast Asia against attack by Chinese Communist forces and those of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The general concept of operation would be to launch air and naval attacks, to delay the enemy's advance with local forces and interdict his lines of communications with air and naval forces, while conducting an unremitting air and naval offensive to destroy the enemy's war-making capacity.
COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPORT OF SEATO FORCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM (C)

1. Long Haul Gateway Communications.
   a. Long haul gateway communications now supporting the Southeast Asia area will require expansion and augmentation as follows:
      (1) Establish Saigon-Okinawa voice and record communications system.
      (2) Establish Saigon-SEATO Force Headquarters voice and record communications.
      (3) Expand Saigon-Bangkok system to provide voice and record channels.
   b. Provision of the above communications will involve the following actions:
      (1) Saigon-Okinawa Sideband System - Expedite completion of the sideband equipment now in the process of installation at Saigon. Okinawa installation has been completed. To fulfill this requirement pending completion of the present installation now in progress at Saigon, it would be necessary to move by air one mobile AN/TSC-16 radio equipment (contingency package) with operating personnel from Clark Air Base to Saigon. Operating personnel would be furnished initially from DCS STARCOM Station Clark AB.
(2) Saigon-SOUTH FORCE Headquarters - Move by air two complete mobile radio relay equipments (4 terminals, 4 relays with associated carrier, channel derivation switching and terminal equipments) with operating personnel from the US to Saigon. Mission will be to establish voice and record communications between DCS station Saigon and SOUTH Force Headquarters.

(3) Saigon-Bangkok Expansion - Move by air two mobile AN/TSC-20 radio equipments (contingency packages) with operating teams from the US, one to Saigon and one to Bangkok.

2. SOUTH Force Communications-Electronics to component Forces Headquarters, Subordinate Field Forces and National Forces Headquarters will be provided by CINCPAC, and National Forces initially, utilizing resources currently available augmented by three mobile AN/TSC-20 equipments with operating teams air lifted from the US to locations designated by CINCPAC.