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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - Items for Evening Reading

1. Soviet Activities
   (a) Ambassador Dobrynin told Tommy Thompson that the Soviets will be turning over to us on Monday or Tuesday the documents we had requested in the Oswald case.
   (b) Gronyko, in talks with the Finns, has accused us of foot dragging in failure to wind up the civil air agreement. (Finnish Emb. source)
   (c) Ambassador Kohler recommends that we protest strongly the recent discovery of an extensive microphone system in U.S. offices and apartments in Moscow. We have so far kept the lid on these discoveries.

2. Possible Cuban Armed Shipment - CINCLANT is maintaining surveillance of a Cuban vessel suspected of planning to smuggle arms to British Guiana. The Cuban ship may be making rendezvous with a British Guiana sloop on Sunday and we have alerted the British who plan to intercept if suspicions materialize.

3. Sukarno Threatens Malaysia Again - In a May Day speech Sukarno again vowed to crush Malaysia and announced that he will give his detailed commands to volunteers in major speech on May 3.

4. Libya - The first round of discussions on Wheelus Base did not go too well. The Libyans reiterated the requirements imposed by their March 16 Parliamentary resolution calling for the abrogation of the 1954 agreement. We reiterated the US view that the discussions should be conducted in the context of the existing agreement. Attempts to refer to the peaceful purposes of Wheelus as a training facility and to its role in the security of Libya were coldly received. No date was set for next meeting.

5. Stevenson Travel - Adlai Stevenson leaves for Europe tomorrow and will return May 21. He will lecture the NATO Defense College in Paris, go to Upsala and attend the NATO Ministerial Meeting in the Hague.

6. NAC Meeting on Cyprus - Stikker has informed us that the Turks have requested a special NATO Council meeting tomorrow to consider a statement to be made by the Turkish Representative on Cyprus.

7. Khrushchev and Castro May Day Speeches - Khrushchev declared again today that "...intrusions into Cuba's airspace can have disastrous consequences". Tommy thinks this is probably the least he could have said under the circumstances. Castro's lengthy statement repeated the theme that the "flights must cease"...but essentially it is a clear indication that propaganda and resorts to international forums will be used. Both statements appear to reflect Castro's concern that improved US-USSR relations may be at Cuba's expense.

Note: I am enclosing a paper which I believe you will find of interest on the implications of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability.
April 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Implications of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability

This is a very terse summary indeed of a major planning exercise conducted over the past year on an interdepartmental basis by Robert Johnson of the Policy Planning Council.

More extensive materials on this question can be supplied, should you wish further to be briefed.

Issue 4-b -- when pre-emptive action against ChiCom nuclear facilities would be feasible and desirable in the U.S. interest -- is the subject of further intensive staffing on a particularly secure basis.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Paper - The Implications of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability

GROUP 1
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The Implications of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability

I. Summary and Key Issues

1. Timing and Character. A first nuclear test could occur any time; it is likely to be in late 1964 or later. With their one known plutonium reactor, the ChiComs could produce only one or two crude weapons per year. A substantial program would require completion of a plant started with earlier Soviet assistance. While initial nuclear delivery means may be obsolescent aircraft, the Chinese are apparently concentrating on medium-range missiles.

2. Military Effects. The ChiComs have demonstrated prudence in the use of military force. Their capability will be more important for its political-psychological than for its direct military effects - primarily because of the great disparity between U.S. and Chinese nuclear capabilities and vulnerabilities. The Chinese could eventually do significant, but not crippling, damage to U.S. forces in Asia, while the U.S. will have the ability to destroy Communist China. This makes Chinese first-use of nuclear weapons unlikely - unless the regime were already threatened with destruction - and greatly reduces the credibility of its nuclear capability as a deterrent. A limited ChiCom intercontinental capability would not eliminate this basic disparity.

3. Political-Psychological Effects. The ChiComs will hope that their nuclear capability will weaken the will of countries resisting insurgency; inhibit requests for U.S. assistance; put political pressure on the U.S. military presence in Asia; and muster support for Chinese claims to great power status. They may hope that it will deter us in situations where our interests seem only marginally threatened.

4. U.S. Counter-Actions. No major policy changes are required. Specific action proposals are developed in another paper. Policy issues include the following:

   a. Military
a. Military posture. Does the Sino-Soviet split deprive Communist China of the Soviet nuclear umbrella and make a lower U.S. nuclear threshold a desirable policy in Asia? Dependence upon nuclear weapons should not increase. Future emphasis should be upon dual-capable and seaborne forces.

b. Pre-emptive Military Action. Would military action against ChiCom nuclear facilities be desirable? Would be undesirable except possibly as part of general action against the mainland in response to major ChiCom aggression. Study of covert action should continue.

c. Nuclear Proliferation. What U.S. actions might reduce the likelihood of development of additional national nuclear capabilities (e.g., by India)? No combination of actions may be adequate; the following offer best prospects: (i) broad public declaration of willingness to provide nuclear defense; (ii) assurances to allies under existing security commitments; (iii) offers to neutrals of declaratory commitment to consult; (iv) offers to engage in bilateral planning for nuclear defense; (v) offers to deploy nuclear weapons in event of nuclear threats; (vi) exploration of possible forms of joint declarations with Soviets.

d. Additional Assurances. If the ChiComs exploit both the sense of threat and the desire for peace, what other U.S. actions might provide relevant assurance to Asian states? Such actions as deployment of mobile air defense units to advance bases in Asia; stimulation of Asian military and non-military cooperation; selective token increases in military assistance; positive statement of U.S. interest in involving Communist China in disarmament negotiations; development of Asian components of our arms control plan; etc.