September 2, 1964

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MEMORANDUM

TO: S/P - Mr. Owen

FROM: S/P - Robert H. Johnson

SUBJECT: Thursday Planning Group Discussion of "Communist China and Nuclear Proliferation"

As requested, the following is a list of issues on which you might like to focus discussion in the Thursday Planning Group:

1. Should the U.S. take direct action to destroy Chinese Communist nuclear facilities on a pre-emptive basis?

   Discussion: Might be done overtly or covertly, with no special justification, on the basis of a justification developed through disarmament agreements (non-proliferation, etc.) or in response to ChiCom aggression. If successful, action would temporarily eliminate an important source of a possible chain reaction of proliferation and temporarily deprive the ChiComs of the political-psychological advantages of a nuclear capability. However, even if attack is successful effects will be temporary; political costs (except where we were responding to major ChiCom aggression) would be very great and long-lasting; such action might provoke a serious ChiCom military response.

2. If pre-emptive

GROUP 1
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2. If pre-emptive action is ruled out what other actions might be taken to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation in response to a ChiCom nuclear test?

Discussion: In addition to a non-proliferation, non-acquisition agreement, following are possibilities: unilateral U.S. guarantees of nuclear defense; joint U.S.-Soviet guarantees; U.S.-Soviet declarations not to assist third powers that use nuclear weapons; offers to "consult" with countries placed under nuclear threat; offers of advance bilateral planning for nuclear defense; deployment of nuclear weapons systems under dual control to countries concerned; deployments of U.S. forces to the area including planned POLARIS deployments, advance offers to deploy to or near a country in event of emergency and more sustained deployment of "Concord Squadron" in Indian Ocean. (Indian case is being examined by Thompson committee.)

3. If pre-emptive action is ruled out what can the U.S. do to reduce the adverse political-psychological effects of a ChiCom nuclear test and development of a nuclear capability?

Discussion: Measures under par 2 above are all relevant. Following additional possibilities are included in draft program of action: psychological program for preparation of Asian opinion (going forward); command post and other exercises designed to make clear that we distinguish problem of nuclear deterrence of Communist China from that of USSR; designation of a mobile air defense force; particular emphasis in CINCPAC weapons demonstrations to limited military implications of a ChiCom capability; expansion on longer-term basis of sense of mutuality of interest and outlook through such means as expanded use of third-country training technique to support intra-regional military training and development of a Pacific Defense College; encourage development of technological capabilities in space and peaceful uses by other Asian countries; development and provision on selective basis of materials on vulnerabilities of mainland China to nuclear attack and on weaknesses in its conventional military capabilities; demonstration of U.S. rapid reaction capabilities through military exercises.

4. What
4. What kind of U.S. military posture will be politically most sustainable in Asia over the long term as the ChiComs gradually develop a nuclear capability?

Discussion: While it is very difficult to predict with confidence the character of the problems we will face, it seems likely that ChiCom nuclear capability will increase fear that future wars in Asia will be nuclear and that for this and other reasons there will be increasing pressure on U.S. land bases in the area. Seaborne and dual-capable systems seem likely to be least vulnerable politically. (From a military as well as a political point of view the aircraft carrier seems likely to have a much longer future in Asia than elsewhere; it is relatively invulnerable given ChiCom detection and naval and air capabilities.)

5. What are prospects for joint U.S.-Soviet action to deal with problems created by a ChiCom capability?

Discussion: While U.S. and Soviet interests coincide in important general respects, we have no evidence that the Russians are interested in discussion with us and some evidence that they are not. Nonetheless, draft program of action suggests broad exploration of the question in future discussions with the Soviets. (Proposed joint U.S.-Soviet statements of nuclear defense mentioned above might be one form of possible action.)

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