MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Study of Chinese Communist Vulnerability (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 18 February 1963, in which he requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide their views on the steps which might be applied in order to persuade or compel Communist China to accept the terms of a nuclear test ban or other arms control agreement.

2. The acts of persuasion, pressure, or coercion which might be applied in an effort to gain CHICOM acceptance of a nuclear test ban or arms control treaty run a wide gamut within the diplomatic, political, economic, and military spheres. The United States should seek the cooperation of other nations in any of the actions listed in paragraph 5 below. The courses of action involving direct application of force should not be resorted to until all other actions have been exhausted. If direct action is required the United States should consider the effects not only on the CHICOMs but also on the Sino-Soviet relationship.

3. Although the position of the USSR in specific cases cannot be predetermined with any degree of assurance, the Soviets might be expected to cooperate in the indirect or nonviolent actions listed in paragraph 5 below. They might not participate or intervene where mild economic and military pressures are applied but probably would intervene if the integrity of China or the general cause of Communism were threatened.

4. Although current intelligence estimates indicate that the CHICOMs are not expected to have a significant military nuclear capability until after 1970, they conceivably could detonate a nuclear device by 1963-64. The United States and the USSR have a common interest in insuring that
ChiComs does not attain a nuclear capability. It should be noted that, even if the ChiComs are forced to agree to a nuclear test ban treaty, there could be no expectation of their continued adherence to such a treaty.

5. The following actions have been considered as steps that might be taken to persuade or coerce Communist China into accepting the terms of a nuclear test ban, or other arms control agreement, but would not assure ChiCOMs adherence. The details of each are discussed in the Appendix.

a. Indirect actions could include the following:

(1) Coordinate diplomatic action on as wide a scale as possible to try to convince the ChiCOMs that it is in their national interest to accept the terms of a nuclear test ban or other arms control arrangement.

(2) Intensify propaganda and psychological warfare efforts.

(3) Encourage other countries to sever diplomatic relations with the ChiCOMs.

(4) Encourage other countries to place an embargo on all trade with the ChiCOMs including denial of the use of foreign bottoms.

b. Direct actions could include the following:

(1) Conduct overt aerial reconnaissance flights over Communist China.

(2) Support infiltration, subversion, and sabotage by Chinese Nationalists throughout Communist China, and by South Koreans against North Korea.

(3) Conduct increasingly severe maritime control measures up to and including blockade.

(4) Support a Chinese Nationalist invasion of mainland China.

(5) Support South Korean invasion of North Korea.

(6) Conduct small scale conventional air attacks against CHICOMs nuclear or other facilities.
(7) Deliver a tactical nuclear weapon on a selected CHICOM target.

Active Soviet support of these proposed actions would of course render them far more effective than unilateral US action or than multilateral action without Soviet overt participation.

6. The measure or measures selected to compel agreement would have to be determined on the basis of the circumstances at the time. Many of the actions above are obviously acts of war, should be initiated only after all other means have been exhausted, and then only after full and careful consideration of the implications of such action at the time. The advisability of the United States carrying out limited maritime control measures, full blockade, or other military actions would have to be considered in the light of its other world-wide commitments at the time.

7. The United States has sufficient naval power to impose an effective blockade against Communist China which would exert serious economic pressure on the CHICOMs. Allied and/or USSR assistance would be desirable but not mandatory. The United States also has the capability of destroying either by conventional or nuclear air attack the identified CHICOM atomic energy facilities.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the best means of effectively bringing about Chinese adherence to a nuclear test ban treaty lies in joint US/Soviet measures, since the Soviets are in the better position to exercise the leverage on Communist China. They recognize the difficulties inherent in such a cooperative approach but believe this has the major potential for success.

9. The CHICOMs are capable of responding to any actions taken against them in a variety of ways ranging from propaganda, psychological warfare, and threats up to and including overt military aggression in many geographical locations as indicated in the Appendix. Under most circumstances, the United States has the military forces and capability to counter quickly any military action which may be initiated by the CHICOMs. This assumes timely decisions by the United States and a determination to use requisite force as may be required by the situation.

10. In summary, the foregoing list of actions is illustrative of the various actions which could be taken to bring about CHICOM adherence
TOP SECRET

to a nuclear test ban or other arms control agreement. In every case joint US/USSR action would make the measures more effective. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that it is unrealistic to use overt military force to obtain CHICOM acceptance of any agreement. As noted previously, there is no guarantee that the actions listed would assure continued CHICOM adherence to any such agreement.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

signed

CURTIS E. LEHAY
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment
APPENDIX

CHINESE COMMUNIST VULNERABILITY

(31 pages)
APPENDIX

CHINESE COMMUNIST VULNERABILITY

1. Background
   a. Negotiations with the USSR have been under way for some months in an attempt to reach an agreement on a nuclear test ban, or on some other form of international arms control. Despite an apparent lack of interest on the part of the Soviet Union in reaching an agreement, these negotiations are continuing and there is the possibility that ultimately some agreement may be reached. An important factor in Moscow's lack of interest may be preoccupation with the Chinese Communist problem. Moscow may feel that no accord (test ban, Germany/Berlin, risk of war measures, etc.) is in prospect with the West which would not aggravate its relation with the Chinese Communists.
   b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have cited the necessity for bringing the Chinese Communists into any international arms control agreement. It would be desirable to achieve this before the Chinese attain even a limited military nuclear capability. The attainment by the Chinese Communists of even a limited nuclear capability would present serious military and political problems to the United States and the Free World, and perhaps under some conditions the Soviet Union. A nuclear armed China would pose the following threats to the Free World: (1) The direct use of nuclear weapons against US bases or Asian countries; (2) the use of nuclear weapons as an umbrella for overt
nonnuclear military operations and support for insurgency; and (3) political and propaganda exploitation of its nuclear capability to capitalize upon and to create opportunities for achieving Chinese Communist objectives.

e. These objectives are contrary to US objectives in the Far East, and directly or indirectly impinge upon US interests in the area. The Chinese basic objectives are: (1) achievement of great power status and recognition of Peking as the sole voice of China in world affairs; (2) achievement of total hegemony in Asia; and (3) stimulation of the Communist movement and the enhancement of Peking's role therein. China will continue to try to draw the Communist parties of Asia, Africa, and Latin America into its sphere of influence. Despite the threat posed to US interests, China is afflicted with serious vulnerabilities which are subject to exploitation both by the United States and by the Soviet Union.

2. Assumptions. In considering the measures that might be taken to persuade or coerce Communist China into accepting a nuclear test ban or other disarmament agreement, it must be assumed that other nuclear capable countries or major powers have accepted the agreement and will respect it. In addition, two alternative assumptions have been established by the Assistant Secretary of Defense as follows:

a. The United States takes actions without active Soviet cooperation but also without Soviet intervention on behalf of the Communist Chinese.

b. The United States and the Soviet Union cooperate in a joint application of such actions.
3. CHICOM Political Vulnerabilities

a. The Sino-Soviet Dispute. The continuation of the Sino-Soviet dispute constitutes an important vulnerability to the position of Communist China. This is true especially in view of China's dependence on the USSR for certain critical supplies and for protection under the Sino-Soviet Alliance. Any appearance of common interests or possibly common action between the Soviets and the West against Communist China would be felt especially by Peiping. Within the Communist movement elsewhere in Asia, the existence or potential development of Moscow-oriented elements represents a weakness in Communist China's position.

b. Attitudes of Non-Chinese Asiatics Towards the Chinese. Many Orientals tend to dislike the Chinese people and to resent the extent of Communist China's influence in Asia. This is reflected in resentment toward the overseas Chinese and toward Peiping's policies.

c. World Reaction to Communist Chinese Aggression. China's pursuance of policy goals by military aggression (Korea, Tibet, and India) has generated opposition in world opinion. This reaction is a burden on Peiping. Although Chinese aggression causes resentment, it nevertheless also gives rise to fear of China and a tendency to yield to the "wave of the future."

d. The Existence of the Chinese Government on Taiwan. The existence of a rival Chinese regime which claims to be the true government of China weakens Communist China's claim to great power status. The Government of the Republic of
China also siphons off much of the support which could otherwise accrue to Peiping, particularly among the overseas Chinese.

e. Communist China's Aspirations to World Prominence and UN Membership. The Chinese Communist regime has aspirations not only to be the leading power in Asia, but also one of the great powers in the world. Its aspirations are blocked by the US and the USSR. For some time now they have pressured Moscow to support their admission to the UN. China appears to be sensitive to its absence from the mainstream of world affairs.

f. Effect of Internal Conditions on Communist China's Image Abroad. Exploitation of unfavorable developments within Communist China will have a corrosive effect on China's image abroad.

g. Vulnerability of Communist Parties in Non-Communist Countries. The value of Communist parties abroad as vehicles for Chinese foreign policies is limited by their need to support unpopular Chinese courses of action. This is particularly true in newer countries where nationalism is a strong force. Factionalism related to the Sino-Soviet dispute is another source of weakness in some Communist parties.

h. Nationalism in Asia. Asian nationalist governments, within the limitation imposed by size, manpower, and material resources can be important obstacles to Chinese Communist expansion. Anticomunist countries, such as Malaya and
Thailand, with Western assistance have been able to maintain their national identities and stem the tide of CHICOM expansion, and at the same time to serve as examples for other governments wishing to resist Communist inroads.

1. Possible UN Action Against Communist China. A UN resolution against the Chinese Communists could serve to exert moral pressure and also could provide a basis for international action against China.

j. Chinese Colonies Abroad. Sections of the Free World in which there are large Chinese populations (e.g., Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore) show a marked contrast to conditions in Communist China, and could be used to propagandize communist inefficiency and low living standards. They also could serve as areas of refuge and as bases for anticommunist activity projected into China.

k. Possible Differences Within the Regime. Reported differences between the Liu-shao-chi and Chou-en-lai factions within the regime and the possible decline of Mao-tse-tung offer areas of possible exploitation.

1. Albania. The Soviets and the Chinese both have used Albania as a means of philosophically attacking each other. Albania has lined itself solidly behind the Chinese Communists and against the Soviets. The fact that Communist China has committed its prestige to the support of Albania in order to gain a political foothold in the Communist world of Eastern Europe represents a CHICOM vulnerability vis-a-vis Albania. If, for any reason, the CHICOMs should not be able to continue their support of
Albania, Chinese prestige and influence in the Sino-Soviet dispute, in the international Communist movement, and in the foreign policy field would be markedly lowered.

4. CHICOM Economic Vulnerabilities

a. Agriculture. Communist China is experiencing a serious food shortage. Poor crops in successive years have resulted in widespread malnutrition and discontent among the populace. Only one-tenth of her chemical fertilizer requirements are produced locally. Communist China has been obliged to allocate scarce foreign exchange to purchase large quantities of grain, sugar, and cooking oils from the Free World, yet, for reasons of prestige, she has exported precious grain to Algeria, Yemen, Ceylon, and Albania.

b. Industry. Communist China is heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for basic plants, machinery, and industrial technicians to support her industrial production. Soviet withdrawal of support during the past few years has had serious effect on Communist China’s industrial output. Practically all segments of industry, with the possible exception of coal and iron ore, are suffering for want of machinery and raw materials. Most of China’s industry is concentrated in the Northeast.

c. Foreign Trade. With the decrease in Sino-Soviet trade ($1.7 billion in 1960 to $9 billion in 1961), Communist China has been looking to other sources, notably Japan, to fulfill her requirements for capital goods and markets. Approximately 80 per cent of Communist China’s foreign trade is carried in Free World bottoms.
d. Petroleum. China produces only about half (12,900 metric tons per day) of her petroleum requirements. She imports about 8,200 metric tons per day by rail from the Soviet Union and some 1,400 tons per day by sea. Petroleum stockpiles are concentrated in eastern ports. Three transloading points at Chining, Man-chou-li, and Sui-fen-ho on the Trans-Siberian Railroad constitute serious bottlenecks. Although the bulk of Chinese industry is geared to coal rather than oil, the war machine is highly dependent on petroleum.

e. Transportation. Aside from an extensive railroad complex in Manchuria, transportation in Communist China is quite vulnerable. Only one railroad connects Communist China with the Soviet Union, the principal logistics base. North-to-South railroads are relatively few and are vulnerable to sabotage and interdiction. Rolling stock is old and in short supply and is dependent to a large degree on foreign sources for replacement. Motor roads are generally of non-permanent construction and are subject to flooding, washouts, and landslides. The inland waterway system which carries a substantial portion of the commerce is the least vulnerable segment of the transportation system. Air transportation is dependent on foreign sources for replacements and spare parts.

5. CHICOM Military Vulnerabilities. Modernization of the armed forces has been retarded by cutbacks in heavy industry, the sudden departure of Soviet technicians and advisors, and the virtual cessation of Soviet military assistance. Maintenance and supply problems are growing as equipment deteriorates. The military budget has been cut back and military construction has been reduced by one-half.
TOP SECRET

over the past year. Inadequate PCL distribution and
shortages of other supplies have reduced flight training
for the air forces, underway training for the Navy,
and field maneuvers for the Army. The mass use of infantry
tactics so widely used by the CHICOMS makes their Army
especially vulnerable to weapons with a high-kill ratio and
to chemical, biological and radiological warfare. Without
outside logistic support, the Chinese armed forces would soon
be severely restricted. Although military personnel are
better cared for than most, there have been reports of
malnutrition even in the armed forces. Serious discontent
has been reported among armed forces personnel because of
the problems of their families at home.

6. CHICOM Psychological - Sociological Vulnerabilities

a. The Family. Communism is basically foreign and repugnant
to the traditional family unit civilization of China. Funda-
mental antipathy to absolute Communism was demonstrated in
the resistance to the communes program.

b. Peasants. Continued privation and malnutrition,
despite relaxation of some controls and institution of
various incentive measures, continues to generate bitterness.
Resentment, however, is directed more toward local party
officials and displaced urban dwellers than toward the regime.

c. Urban Populations. Unemployment or the prospect of
unemployment and evacuation to rural areas has contributed
to basic economic fears and discontent. Thus far, these
have been reflected in increased individual and family
efforts to overcome their problems rather than efforts to

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
take collective action. Among professional and intellectual classes, there is some evidence of restlessness and declining respect for authority but they remain a captive group, fearful of further loss of livelihood or more drastic punishment.

d. Youth. Drastic reductions in both educational and employment opportunities and the back-to-the-farm movement have led to a growing demoralization of students and youth.

e. Minorities. Nationalism and strong religious beliefs among the minority peoples remain a potentially explosive force, particularly in southern and western China. Efforts by the regime to achieve rapid acculturation and socialization have resulted in growing antipathy for the regime and instances of armed resistance. Followers of the Dalai Lama in India constitute a significant dissident group.

f. Cadres. Party workers in the lower and middle echelons who have borne the brunt of widespread popular resentment have also been made scapegoats for the failures of the regime by the higher party echelons. This has resulted in a growing loss of purpose and dedication to the regime's programs with a concomitant rise in administrative confusion and ineffectiveness and growing corruption among minor officials.
7. Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability

a. Although current intelligence estimates indicate that the Chinese Communists are not expected to have a significant military nuclear capability until after 1970, the CHICOMs could conceivably detonate a nuclear device by 1963-64. This assumes that the current schism with the USSR persists. If the Soviets decided to aid the CHICOMs, they could attain a nuclear capability much sooner.

b. Chinese Communist nuclear activities are located as follows:

- 2 small cyclotrons and 1 small reactor
  - Institute of Atomic Energy 20 miles Southwest of Peiping

- 1 small research reactor
  - On railroad 18 miles north on Canton

- 1 Separation Plant
  - Changsha

- 1 Missile Propulsion Vertical test stand
  - 13 miles West Southwest of Peiping

- Missile Test Range
  - Shuangcheng Tsu

- Probable gaseous diffusion plant
  - Lanxhou

No plutonium production reactor has been identified.

c. These activities are vulnerable to sabotage as well as to overt aircraft attack.

8. Courses of Action Available to Induce Chinese Communist Adherence to an Arms Control Agreement

a. There are a number of actions that the United States might take either singly or in conjunction with other countries including the USSR for the purpose of persuading or compelling the Chinese Communists to give assent to a nuclear test ban or other disarmament agreement. These actions may be divided conveniently into indirect
TOP SECRET

and direct actions. They vary greatly in their degree of effectiveness and in the amount of provocation they might be expected to produce. However, unless there is a reversal in current CHICOM policy, these actions do not provide assurance that any Chinese agreement would be honored.

b. Indirect actions include the following:

(1) Coordinate diplomatic action on as wide a scale as possible to try to convince the CHICOMs that it is in their national interest to accept the terms of a nuclear test ban or other arms control arrangement.

(2) Intensify propaganda and psychological warfare efforts.

(3) Encourage other countries to sever diplomatic relations with the CHICOMs.

(4) Encourage other countries to place an embargo on all trade with the CHICOMs including denial of the use of foreign bottoms.

c. Direct actions include the following:

(1) Conduct overt aerial reconnaissance flights over Communist China.

(2) Support infiltration, subversion, and sabotage by Chinese Nationalists throughout Communist China and by South Koreans against North Korea.

(3) Conduct increasingly severe maritime control measures up to and including blockade.

(4) Support a Chinese Nationalist invasion of mainland China.

(5) Support South Korean invasion of North Korea.

(6) Conduct small scale conventional air attacks against CHICOM nuclear or other facilities.

(7) Deliver a tactical nuclear weapon on a selected CHICOM target.
9. Diplomatic Measures to Persuade the CHICOMs that their National Interests Demand Acceptance of the Treaty. The United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the three principal powers involved in negotiating a nuclear test ban agreement) might be required to respond to a line of action designed to convince the Chinese Communists that it is in the Chinese national interest to accept the terms of a nuclear test ban. With or without Soviet cooperation, the United States and the United Kingdom might be faced with proposals to undertake courses of action that might include:

a. Introduction of a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly calling on the CHICOMs to accept the terms of the nuclear test ban, and directing a committee composed of representatives of several appropriate countries to approach the Chinese Communists with a view to obtaining their adherence to the treaty.

b. Increased trade with Japan and other countries currently reluctant to trade with Communist China.

c. Making available US agricultural surpluses to help meet China's food shortages.

d. Assisting in providing China with an international airline.

e. Reducing China's isolation by encouraging countries to establish diplomatic relations.

f. Offering China membership in international organizations.

Pros
- Would involve no risk.
- Would utilize UN action.
- Would align world opinion in support of US/UK objectives.

- Would leave the way open for other nations to accept more aggressive courses of action in the event the Chinese showed themselves unwilling to listen to reason.

- Would derogate from possible CHICOM claim that they had no free choice in the matter, and that the "world atomic club" was ganging up on China to destroy it.

Cons

- Would provide rewards to CHICOMs but would not change over-all CHICOMs aims.

- Would not insure continued adherence.

- Would provide CHICOM regime with respectability and legality.

- Would aid CHICOMs economically.

- Would perpetuate CHICOM regime.

- Would aid CHICOMs in allocation of their resources particularly in strengthening their military.


Effect of US/USSR Combined Action

- Effect would be much enhanced, especially in view of the CHICOM/USSR dispute.

10. Intensify Propaganda and Psychological Warfare Efforts

The image of Communist China as an aggressive power refusing to support an agreement which will help preserve the peace
TOP SECRET

of the world could be exploited fully. This could be effective within uncommitted countries of the world and especially those in the Far East, and would be effective particularly once China had rejected a reasonable approach.

Pros
- Would involve no risk.
- Would put CHICOMs on the defensive.
- Would be received favorably by uncommitted countries.

Cons
- Would not have any immediate effect and would not be an effective deterrent.

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action
- Would enhance the effect greatly.

11. Encourage Other Countries to Sever Diplomatic Relations
With the CHICOMs. Suspension or severance of diplomatic relations on a large scale could heighten China's isolation and complicate its relations with the outside world.

Pros
- Would heighten CHICOM isolation.
- Would involve no risk to the United States.
- Would increase CHICOM difficulties.

Cons
- Would complicate Free World communications with China.
- Would have very little effect.

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action
- Would strengthen the action greatly.
12. **Encourage Other Countries to Place an Embargo on all Trade with the CHICOMs Including Denial of the Use of Foreign Bottoms.** The effectiveness of this action would be directly dependent upon the cooperation of the countries involved. It could be significant if it were fully supported. The CHICOMs depend on Free World bottoms to carry 80 percent of their trade.

**Pros**
- Would involve no risk to the United States.
- Would have a significant effect if supported fully.

**Cons**
- Probably would not be supported fully and, therefore, be limited in effectiveness.

**Effect of Joint USSR Action**
- Would significantly increase effectiveness of the action, particularly if all USSR trade were discontinued.

13. **Overt Aerial Reconnaissance Over Communist China.** Overt aerial reconnaissance would serve to emphasize the US presence and readiness to take action. Such flights could serve to provoke the CHICOMs and probably result in some counteraction. A by-product of this action could be increased intelligence gathering.

**Pros**
- Would serve to emphasize the presence and determination of the United States.
- Would increase photographic coverage available for intelligence.
TOP SECRET

Cona

- Could provoke counter sweeps against US forces or friendly countries.
- Would expose US aircraft to attack and losses could be expected.
- Would have no significant coercive effect.

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action

- Would provide overt evidence of Soviet disapproval of CHICON attitude and emphasize that Soviets were making a significant reapproachment to West which would threaten isolation of China.

14. Support of Infiltration, Subversion, and Sabotage by Chinese Nationalists throughout Communist China and by South Koreans Against North Korea. Support of infiltration, subversion, and sabotage against both Communist China and North Korea could exert pressure on the Communists with minimum risk to the United States. These activities are now going on to a limited extent but with US encouragement and support they would be increased and made more effective. Sabotage could be channeled into the areas which would most affect the CHICON nuclear capability. Interdiction of vulnerable transportation facilities and sabotage of industrial plants could also be very effective if done on a large scale. The Chinese Nationalists are ideally suited by race and language to infiltrate along the China coast and through the countries on China's southern flank or to be airdropped into the heart of Communist China. They might be

TOP SECRET
given some support by mainland sympathizers although these
are scattered and probably not organized. The same reasoning
would apply to South Koreans infiltrating North Korea. These
actions could be made quite effective but would require a
considerable time before the impact would be felt.

Pros
- Would involve little risk to the United
  States.
- Would have an appreciable long range
effect.

Cons
- Would take a considerable length of
time to become effective
- Would accept risk of CHICOM retaliation.

Effect of US/USSR combined Action
- USSR encouragement of Chinese National-
ists would strengthen action. The USSR
would not be expected to support South
Korean action against North Korea or
Chinese Nationalists against the Chinese
Communists.

15. Conduct Increasingly Severe Maritime Control Measures
up to and Including Blockade

a. General
(1) The United States, together with its Allies (and
possibly under some circumstances with the help of the
USSR), is capable of applying serious economic pressure
against Communist China, should that nation refuse
to accept the terms of a nuclear test ban agreement or other arms control arrangements. There are various measures which can be applied, either singly or in concert, to sharply restrict the flow of surface traffic in and out of Chinese Communist ports. Once (a) a UN resolution has been approved calling on Peiping to accept the test ban agreement or other arms control arrangements; (b) once the United Nations has approved an approach to Peiping designed to persuade the Chinese Communists to accept the treaty; and (c) once the Chinese have definitively rejected this approach, then the way will have been paved for joint diplomatic/military action to restrict and/or control trans-ocean shipping into Chinese ports.

(2) All measures that comprise action at sea against commerce, communication, and military movements can be classed as maritime control measures. These range widely from the one extreme of the classic blockade, which has developed legal standing and specifications but which is historically an act of war, to the other end of the spectrum whereby minor harassing actions are conducted. All maritime control measures are to some degree unfriendly acts. Most of these measures have no acknowledged legal precedent or accepted standing. But many can be justified to a degree legally, as a limited response to a specific situation. The degree of belligerency of action can be adjusted to the needs of the situation, but it should be anticipated that limited actions will probably produce limited effects.
b. Limited Maritime Measures

(1) The first step would be to reach an agreement on an embargo of all trade with China with those nations seeking to gain China's acceptance of the terms of a nuclear test ban agreement or other arms control agreements. The USSR and its Eastern European satellites might agree to cut off trade with Peiping, but might not state their intentions to do so publicly. If agreement were reached by the overwhelming majority of UN members to restrict or to sever trade relations with China, the area of police action required by units of the US fleet in Chinese or nearby waters would be sharply reduced. If Japan and the Philippines were sympathetic and cooperated in the action the naval task would be rendered that much easier, since it is obvious the greater the perimeter the more ships and aircraft would be needed.

(2) Although it is within the capability of the US Navy to carry out the type of action envisaged here, care would have to be taken to insure that such operations would not prevent the Navy's carrying out its commitments elsewhere in the world. In this connection, the use of Naval forces of Allies would not only provide additional resources but additional psychological impact as well.

(3) Along the Chinese coast there is a considerable flow of coastwise junk traffic. This traffic would be most difficult to control since it would require a great many ships and aircraft to operate within easy range of the Chinese mainland, thus exposing them to
Chinese counteraction. In such circumstances the risk of escalation would be great since the obvious answer to this hazard is to bomb out the enemy's airfields. To move the policing forces beyond the CHICOM air umbrella would weaken the effectiveness of the forces employed.

(4) It is likely that during the period that would be required to make these measures effective some form of direct Chinese retaliation will take place. In the light of the vociferous CHICOM criticism of the Soviet failure to act aggressively in the instance of the Cuban quarantine, it is most reasonable to expect that the imposition of restrictions to maritime movements in support of Chinese Government requirements will evoke retaliation in some form by the Chinese. This retaliation may take the form of submarine and/or aircraft attacks against US ships, and possibly shelling of US ships by coastal artillery.

(5) The Republic of China might take advantage of the presence of US warships in the area to create incidents leading to an invasion attempt on the mainland. However, such action would require full military support from the United States with land, sea, and air forces being committed from CONUS.

(6) It is estimated that this proposed action would have a most serious effect ultimately on the economy of Communist China. It would also have a seriously adverse impact on China's foreign exchange balance. A considerable period of time, however, would be required
before Peiping would feel the full effects of such action. Soviet cooperation would be required in the matter of halting the shipment of POL and other important items by rail. Soviet agreement on this point might not be difficult to obtain since the USSR is already severely restricting, or in some instances cutting off completely, trade in strategic goods to China. However, it is most unlikely that the USSR would collaborate openly with its naval forces in controlling shipping into Chinese ports. If it were to do so, depending on the extent of cooperation, the task of the US naval units in this action would be correspondingly reduced.

**Pros**

- Would provide, in the long run, means for considerable pressure against China, complicating seriously its agricultural, industrial, and military problems.

- Probably would provide, depending on the degree of Soviet cooperation or non-interference, a degree of dissidence or outright sympathy for Communist China within the Soviet Bloc which might exacerbate Sino-Soviet differences.

**Cons**

- Would not have an immediate effect on Chinese Communist viability.

- Would involve the risk of retaliation and, possibly, escalation.
- Probably would produce a counter-productive reaction among the Chinese people who might blame the West for worsening their already serious plight.

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action

- It is highly unlikely that the USSR would use its own forces to assist in controlling ship traffic into Chinese ports. It might, however, cooperate to the extent of taking action to curtail sea and rail traffic from the Bloc, and possibly also to the extent of supplying intelligence on the movements of ships suspected of being headed for Chinese ports.

c. Full Blockade of the Coast of China

(1) A sea blockade of Communist China offers another means of coercive action.

(2) The United States would have sufficient naval power to impose an effective blockade against Communist China. However, Allied assistance would be highly desirable.

Pros

- Would retard China's timetable as far as attainment of status as a world power is concerned.

- Would have an important but still limited effect on the Chinese economy, since the Chinese probably would expand into other areas in Asia.
TOP SECRET

Cons

- Would be an act of war with retaliation likely.  
- Would be costly in the expenditure of resources.  
- Would have an unfavorable world impact, particularly if foodstuffs, medicine, and other essentials were precluded from entry into China.  
- Might have an undesirable effect on our Allies.

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action

- Soviet cooperation or non-interference in a blockade of China is most unlikely.  
  In fact, since a blockade is an act of war, the action may have counterproductive effect on Soviet/CHICOM relations. If the USSR did assist, the blockade would be more effective and fewer US forces would be involved.


a. It has long been a policy of the United States not to support a Chinese Nationalist invasion of mainland China. In the face of CHICOM refusal to respect a nuclear test ban or cooperate in a disarmament agreement to which the rest of the world was adhering, a reversal of this policy might be justified.

b. This action could quickly result in either the CHICOMs accepting the agreement or in the start of a major war.
The United States would have to be prepared to support the CHINATs fully in launching an amphibious assault and sustaining their operations on the mainland. It would probably become necessary to resort to the use of nuclear weapons to insure an outcome on terms favorable to the United States.

Pros
- Would have great coercive and diversionary effect.
- Would result in elimination of CHICOM regime if followed to a successful conclusion.

Cons
- Would risk starting a major war.
- Would probably make the use of nuclear weapons necessary.
- Would require major US military commitments.
- Would expose United States to world criticism.
- Would risk antagonizing US Allies.

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action
- Would greatly increase coercive effect but Soviet support is unlikely. CHICOMs would be much more likely to acquiesce and avoid a war which could only result in certain defeat.

17. Support of South Korean Invasion of North Korea
   a. This action would be an immediate challenge to the CHICOMs since they would be faced with a threat to their own territory. The presence of US ground forces in South Korea makes this course of action particularly risky since the United States would be immediately involved. This
Course could be justified as a United Nations action to enforce a previous UN resolution involving the peace and security of the world.

b. The CHICOMs would be faced with a quick decision either to acquiesce or actively fight again in Korea. The United States would have to be prepared to support fully the war which might result. The use of nuclear weapons probably would be required to prevent defeat.

**Pros**
- Would probably be under UN auspices.
- Would exert great pressures on CHICOMs.
- Would possibly result in the overthrow of the Communist regime in North Korea.

**Cons**
- Would involve risk of escalation.
- Would immediately involve US militarily.
- Would possibly require the use of nuclear weapons.

**Effect of US/USSR Combined Action**
- Joint Action by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is most improbable.

18. **Small Scale Conventional Air Attacks Against CHICOM**

**Nuclear or other Facilities**

a. US forces are capable of conducting air attacks against all areas of mainland China. The nuclear facilities in Communist China are vulnerable to air attacks. It would be possible to eliminate any CHICOM nuclear capability by such attacks, provided target locations are known. It also would be possible to curtail their aircraft or other armament production by such means.
b. There would be risk not only of retaliation but also of escalation if such raids were conducted. The US aircraft involved would be subject to attack and US bases in the Far East might also be attacked in retaliation. The United States would also be subject to criticism for such action even though it might be justified as necessary to preserve a nuclear test ban or other disarmament agreement.

**Pros**
- Would be convincing proof of US determination.
- Would permit flexible action to reduce the CHICOM capability exactly as desired.

**Cons**
- Would invite retaliation and escalation.
- Would be difficult to justify to world opinion.

**Effect of US/USSR Combined Action**
- Would greatly increase the coercive effect and could well be the difference between escalation and quick acquiescence by the CHICOMs.
- USSR cooperation or participation is highly unlikely.

19. **Delivery of a Tactical Nuclear Weapon on a Selected CHICOM Target**

a. US forces can deliver a tactical nuclear weapon to any designated target in China. Any CHICOM nuclear facility could be effectively demolished.
TOP SECRET

b. This is a most drastic action. It introduces use of nuclear weapons for the first time since 1945. The risk of escalation would be severe. On the other hand, the effect would certainly be dramatic and might well result in quick CHICOM capitulation. World opinion holds a revulsion toward nuclear weapons and the United States would be heavily criticized.

Pros
- Would reduce CHICOM capability.
- Would be dramatic proof of US determination.
- Would have immediate positive effect in forcing quick acquiescence.

Cons
- Would invite retaliation and escalation.
- Would expose United States to strong criticism from world opinion.

Effect of US/USSR Combined Action
- Would exclude nuclear retaliation against the United States or its Allies. However, USSR cooperation is most unlikely.

20. Cooperation Between US and USSR

a. In all the actions which have been discussed in preceding paragraphs it has been assumed that the USSR would not intervene on the part of Communist China. It is unlikely that the USSR would maintain such a policy of non-interference in the face of the more provocative overt actions. This would certainly have to be considered fully before any such actions were implemented.
b. In every action contemplated, Soviet positive support would make the action more effective toward the ultimate goal of forcing the CHICOMs to respect any agreement reached. Active Soviet support, particularly in the overt military actions, would place the CHICOMs in the position of having to oppose militarily both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Even the aggressive CHICOMs would take a second look at this prospect and the chances for a peaceful, quick settlement would be greatly enhanced. The degree of Soviet participation would not have to be more than a token contribution to accomplish this. If the Soviet were unwilling to commit forces to assist actively their outspoken support of the actions and condemnation of the CHICOMs would lend powerful and effective support. On the other hand, Soviet withdrawal of all military and economic support would seriously affect CHICOM capability for any sustained military operations.

c. Soviet suspension of all trade with the CHICOMs would be necessary to enforce an effective blockade. If done on a voluntary basis it would be even more effective. Another Soviet action that would provide over-all support would be for the USSR to break diplomatic relations with the CHICOMs.

21. Possible Chinese Communist Retaliatory Measures

a. Against Indirect Actions. In response to indirect US actions it is most likely that Communist China would respond indirectly limiting its actions to the fields of propaganda and vilification of the United States and other measures. Peiping would accuse the United States of using smaller and weaker nations for her own ends. Certainly
the United States would be branded as a meddler in the
internal affairs of those nations having diplomatic
relations with Peking as well as those involved in trade
with the Chinese Communists.

b. Against Direct Actions. The Chinese Communists have
a broad field from which to choose action in response
to direct US moves. These actions range from propaganda,
psychological warfare and threats up to and including
overt military aggression taken singly or in a variety
of conjunctions in many geographical locations. The
following are well within Chinese Communist capabilities:

(1) Interfere with fishing fleets of nations such as Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of China, South Vietnam, and the Philippines.

(2) Eliminate Hong Kong as a British holding. This action could be accomplished by several means, e.g., Fifth Column takeover, uncontrollable disorders, or outright military operations. It is relevant that some of Hong Kong's municipal water supply comes from inside Red China and could be cut at will.

(3) Step up insurgency and subversion in Southeast Asia.

(4) Renew the Offshore Island artillery bombardment.

(5) Military operations including air offensive against US overflights, blockading forces and invasion efforts.

(6) Although the Chinese Communist Navy has not demonstrated combat capability against modern forces, the PT and submarine fleet would be problems with which a blockade effort would have to contend.
(7) Initiate overt military aggression against Mainland countries allied to the West or supporting US efforts.

c. The above actions could be applied in a number of different areas. Among these are the following:

(1) **South Korea.** The Chinese Communists could, using the North Koreans, exert pressure on South Korea by creating border incidents. They could also instigate another invasion and participate actively as they did before.

(2) **Taiwan.** The Offshore Islands are always an objective for renewed Chinese Communist action. If provoked far enough they could also mount raids on Taiwan proper and the Pescadores and force US participation in defense of the area.

(3) **India.** Tension on the Sino-Indian border could be heightened and could result ultimately in a CHICOM invasion of India. Even if China did not invade India, sabre rattling, seizure of more strategic high ground, invasion of Sikkim, Bhutan, and/or Nepal could do enormous damage to India economically and militarily. The United States probably would be forced to contribute vast quantities of material to support India and even to participate actively with forces.

(4) **South Vietnam.** The insurgency situation in South Vietnam could be used by the CHICOMs to their advantage. The present military actions could be increased and expanded, which would require major increases in US support, including commitment of large numbers of US forces.
(5) Cambodia and Laos. These "neutral" countries are fertile areas for the CHICOMs to increase infiltration and subversive activities. They could take over these countries by military action without difficulty if they desired.

(5) Burma and Thailand. These two countries are also exposed and could be targets for CHICOM aggression from the north. They would be in a difficult position if Laos and Cambodia were taken over by the CHICOMs. The United States would be put in the position of having to prevent a CHICOM take-over of these countries.

22. US Capability to Counter Chinese Communist Military Retaliatory Measures. Under most circumstances, the United States has the military forces and the capability to quickly counter any military action which may be initiated by the Chinese Communists. This assumes timely decisions by US authorities and a determination to use requisite force as may be required by the situation. This would probably include use of tactical nuclear weapons. Deployment of augmentation forces to locations in the Pacific on a timely basis could have a deterring effect on CHICOM retaliatory measures.