DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
CRISIS RESPONSE PROCEDURES
AND THE GULF WAR

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By Brian G. Shellum

The Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) profile as a crisis and combat support organization grew dramatically during the two decades prior to the Gulf War. This growth was especially pronounced after the mid-1980s, when DIA implemented structural and doctrinal changes aimed at providing better intelligence support to the warfighter. The experience gained from these efforts prepared DIA to meet the challenges of providing accurate and timely intelligence support during the Gulf crisis. More importantly, field commanders and policymakers, more than in any previous crisis, arrived at effective decisions based on sound Defense Intelligence support. In fact, according to General Norman Schwarzkopf,

"Tactically, no commander in the history of warfare had a more comprehensive infusion of intelligence or better picture of the enemy he faced . . . . The challenge was considerable and the Intelligence Community met it head on."

The development of DIA’s role in crisis support has not been smooth over the past 20 years; and one can examine it in two intervals. The first period runs from 1975 with the end of the Vietnam era until 1985. The second period starts in 1986 with the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and continues to the present. Within this structure, the evolution of the development of various crisis response procedures and combat support organizations provided a foundation that was manifest during the Gulf War. Thus, the performance of Defense Intelligence during the Gulf War decidedly impacted the employment and utility of intelligence support for all future crises.

EARLY PERIOD

Trial and error and incremental improvements characterized the period from the mid-70’s to mid-80’s. DIA was not immune to the down-sizing turbulence that shook the military after Vietnam. Reduced resources necessitated new procedures for dealing with requirements that were increasing rather than diminishing. In spite of this environment, DIA continued to form intelligence task forces (ITFs) to handle many crises in this period. The Agency also began experimenting with strengthening ties and developing new organizational entities to better support Unified and Specified (U&S) Commands deployed throughout the world.

* This paper is based on the research done over the past 16 months in writing an official DIA history entitled Defense Intelligence in the Gulf War. This history is currently in draft form, and will be published in a classified version in the summer of 1996. An unclassified version will follow later in 1996.
DIA formed intelligence task forces to support the following national emergencies during this initial ten year period:

1975-Mayaguez seizure
1979-Revolution in Iran
1979-Chinese/Vietnamese War
1979-North/South Yemen War
1979-Sandinistas/Nicaragua
1980-Afghanistan
1980-Korean civil disturbances
1980-Iran-Iraq War
1981-Libyan aircraft downing
1982-Falkland War
1983-Grenada (URGENT FURY)
1984-US Embassy annex in Lebanon bombing
1984-Kuwaiti airliner hijacking
1984-Civil war in Chad
1984-Nicaragua
1985-TWA airliner/Achille Lauro hijacking

DIA's crisis management procedures called for activating an ITF to manage and coordinate DIA's efforts when a crisis evolved to the point where it required dedicated, 24-hour monitoring. DIA charged the ITF with the mission of providing direct intelligence support to the JCS operations and planning staffs, and serving as a clearing house for the flood of requests for information (RFI) pouring in from commands worldwide. ITF's operated out of the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) at the Pentagon. The support provided by these ITFs enabled field commanders and policymakers to arrive at effective decisions.

DIA formed other more specialized intelligence organizations in this period. In 1983, DIA established the Central American Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT) as an interagency analytical organization focused on insurgency in El Salvador. CAJIT produced all-source tailored tactical intelligence for the US Southern Command (Panama), US embassy country teams, and allies in counterinsurgency efforts in Central America. DIA later used CAJIT as a model for national-level joint intelligence centers (JICs) created to handle crisis intelligence support.

In an additional move to improve Defense Intelligence support, DIA established the Research Crisis Support Center (RCSC) at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) at Bolling Air Force Base in 1984. The RCSC provided a centralized, operationally secure, all-source crisis management in support of the NMIC at the Pentagon and the US commands. Manned during normal duty hours, DIA augmented the RCSC to operate on a 24-hour basis if necessary. The RCSC provided in-depth analytical and intelligence support to the NMIC during crisis operations.

The other critical component to DIA's crisis support strategy
was its ties with the US Commands. DIA’s links with the US Central Command (CENTCOM) dated back to 1985 when it became one of the first national agencies to assign a permanent senior civilian representative to the command. This DIA representative served as the key link in the DIA-command chain. DIA held this representative responsible for orchestrating the best possible intelligence support to the command.

Moreover, in 1985, DIA created an all-source intelligence branch at CENTCOM to facilitate DIA support to that command. DIA attached this eleven-man intelligence production element to CENTCOM headquarters. Formally called the CENTCOM Support Activity (DB-8E), it belonged to the Middle East Africa Division (DB-8) of the Directorate for Research (DB) at DIA. Congress allocated the funds and positions for this element to provide analytical intelligence support to CENTCOM. The original intent was to have this team constitute part of a CENTCOM joint intelligence center (JIC) in time of crisis.

Another intelligence support organization that had been in existence as long as DIA was the military intelligence board (MIB). The MIB was an ad hoc organization, chaired by the Director, DIA, and made up of the Service intelligence chiefs (the Director, NSA joined this membership later). The MIB served as a forum for discussing and coordinating defense positions on intelligence issues. It was strictly an advisory panel, with no real authority beyond that granted it by its members.

In the early period, the MIB met irregularly and its importance waxed and waned. It was as active as the Director wanted to make it, as he controlled the staffing, determined the frequency of the meetings, and set the agenda. But Service chiefs curtailed the usefulness of the MIB based on Military Department prerogatives and resource concerns. This did not change until Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986.

POST-GOLDWATER-NICHOLS

The real surge in DIA’s prominence as a combat support agency came after the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was the diving force behind many of the changes and improvements in Defense Intelligence support to operational commanders beginning in 1987. The lessons learned providing intelligence support during the preceding ten years, combined with the changes resulting from Goldwater-Nichols, positioned DIA to meet the challenges of the Gulf War.

Goldwater-Nichols tasked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) with developing a joint doctrine that governed the distinct but related activities of the Services and combatant commanders. Henceforth, the Military Services recruited,
organized, trained, equipped, and provided forces for assignment to the combatant commands and administered and supported these forces. Commanders of the U&S Commands exercised command authority over these assigned forces. This was a significant change in the roles of the Services and commands.

Before Goldwater-Nichols, the biggest problem in crisis operations was that decisions in the JCS were too democratic—even worse, management by consensus. There were five votes in the JCS, and a single vote could kill a project. The result was a lot of horse trading. The Services had the real power, and the U&S Commands were, at best, seen as advocates for the Service chief’s positions. After Goldwater-Nichols the advent of joint doctrine, the situation was the opposite, with less centralized authority vested in the CJCS and warfighting commanders in chief (CINCs).

These differences help explain the disparity between the success of Operation JUST CAUSE—the invasion of Panama—in 1989, and Operation URGENT FURY—the liberation of Grenada—in 1983. While both were ultimately successful, the planning and support of these operations differed greatly. During JUST CAUSE, the CJCS and combatant commander carried out the operation essentially with the forces planned. The JCS planned Operation URGENT FURY on very short notice using available forces stationed in the United States, and was the first employment of the Joint Task Force Commander operational concept.

DIA immediately began planning and implementing the intelligence component of the new joint doctrine, which involved enhancing DIA-command cooperation. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation identified DIA as a national-level intelligence and combat support agency, with the National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Central Imagery Office (CTO), and the intelligence divisions of the Department of State and the Military Services. Several DIA initiatives contributed to fostering this cooperation and strengthening the ties already forged with the U&S Commands.

The first of these initiatives was the creation of the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC), which significantly enhanced DIA’s capabilities to respond to crisis situations. DIA designed the OICC, located at the DIAC, to assemble resources quickly to surge on a problem, and then convert analysis to operationally relevant products and support. DIA set up the OICC as a fully automated intelligence center, connected by secure communications with the NMTI at the Pentagon and the U&S Commands around the world. DIA manned the OICC during normal duty hours and added personnel for 24-hour operations during crises.

As the name implies, the OICC was an integral part of DIA’s crisis response structure. It served as the focal point for DIA’s
analytical elements responding to all crisis requirements. As its primary mission, the OICC provided timely military intelligence and crisis production support for the planning efforts of the National Command Authorities, Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), JCS, and U&S Commands. The OICC could directly task and receive priority support from DIA elements.

Also in 1987, DIA formed the Command Support and Plans (CSP) organization as a means to involve the commands in the Defense Intelligence planning, programming, and budgeting process. The Agency charged CSP with enhancing intelligence support to the CINCs in an environment of increasing requirements and high-risk conflict. This meant satisfying commands’ intelligence requirements, integrating master plans and architectures, and developing a joint intelligence doctrine— including joint intelligence interoperability and standardization.

One of CSP’s major missions was to promote and enhance intelligence support to operational commanders through the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (TENCAP) and the Intelligence Communications (INCA) Project. TENCAP aimed at defining interfaces between intelligence and strike planning systems, and fostered efforts to respond to command requests for expanded national system support to the tactical commander. INCA played an integral role in strengthening DIA-command relationships. In 1987, INCA completed the CENTCOM Intelligence Communications Architecture and continued to assist the command in planning for communications support.

While INCA addressed communications, other efforts addressed data bases. DIA developed several central information systems and distributed them throughout the Defense Intelligence Community to serve the CINCs’ interests and requirements. Among these systems were the Military Intelligence Integrated Data System and Integrated Data Base, designed to provide a DoD-wide architecture to integrate and relate intelligence data bases at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Additionally, DIA developed the Worldwide Warning Indicator Monitoring System and the Collection Requirements Management Program.

In an effort to enhance intelligence support to deployed commands, DIA introduced the concept of the National Military Intelligence Support Team (NMIST) in 1987. DIA activated NMISTS to augment intelligence support worldwide to the various U&S commands during crisis operations. An NMIST was a small mobile support unit (four to five people), with secure communications and intelligence equipment, that deployed to the command to provide a link to DIA’s all-source intelligence network. These teams regularly deployed on training exercises with the various commands in addition to actual operations.

In an additional move to improve command support in 1987, the
Director, DIA, announced his intention to assign one senior DIA civilian to each U&S Command (a DIA rep had been assigned to CENTCOM since 1985). This DIA representative served as the key link in the DIA-command chain. DIA held this representative responsible—backed by one military or civilian coordinator at DIA (in CSP)—for coordinating the best possible intelligence support to the command.  

DIA took steps in 1987 that contributed to coverage of the Iran-Iraq War and the tensions in the Persian Gulf. One of these was DIA’s activation of a special intelligence task force called the Persian Gulf Working Group (PGWG) in the NMIC at the Pentagon. The Agency set up the PGWG in response to specific intelligence support requirements from the CJCS. DIA charged the PGWG with tracking on a 24-hour basis the tanker war, the Iran-Iraq ground war, the air threat, the SILKWORM missile threat, and other military developments in the Gulf.  

In 1988, DIA intelligence support to US allies in the Persian Gulf Operation EARNEST WILL intensified as the Iran-Iraq War expanded in a renewed "War of the Cities," and spilled into the Gulf. The US implemented Operation EARNEST WILL to deal with the Iranian mine threat to US and allied shipping in the Gulf. On 18 July 1988, the Government of Iran accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598, leading to the 20 August cease-fire that ended the bloody eight-year war with Iraq.  

The end of the fighting between Iraq and Iran caused an immediate change in relations between Baghdad and Washington. In late 1988, Baghdad’s attitude toward the US began to harden. Iraq knew the US would not long remain silent on its employment of chemicals on the Kurds and development of biological and nuclear weapons. As US officials pondered policy towards Iraq, Defense Intelligence planners continued to refine crisis procedures while collectors and analysts struggled to track developments in the region.  

In 1988, DIA reorganized and elevated the Command Support and Plans function to directorate status. The Agency assigned Brigadier General Walter C. Hersman, USAF, the DIA Deputy Director for Command Support and Plans (CS) in early 1988, and he served in this critical position throughout the Gulf War. General Hersman immediately set about improving his new directorate’s ability to serve as a focal point for intelligence support to the CINCs.  

CS functioned as a DIA focal point for intelligence support to the U&S Commands, their components, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It was responsible for conducting intelligence management activities, to include planning, architecture development, requirements validation, program evaluation, doctrine development, interoperability measures, and functional management integration. CS acted as an advocate for the
commands within the Defense and National Intelligence communities to ensure their intelligence support needs were met.

General Hersman’s Directorate administered specific programs that directly supported the CINCs. CS supervised the DIA Command Representatives throughout the world. Hersman represented the CINC’s interests during periodic meetings of the MIB. CS also trained, equipped, and deployed the NMISTs to ensure intelligence support to crisis-deployed Joint Task Forces and U&S Commands. His directorate managed the TENCAP and INCA programs discussed earlier. Finally, CS directed and coordinated DIA intelligence support to the JCS and the Commands.

At CENTCOM, Edward Valentine reported as the new DIA Command Representative in 1988. He too served with CENTCOM through the end of the Gulf War. As the DIA representative, he functioned as a special staff officer on the CENTCOM staff, with his counterparts from the State Department, CIA, and NSA. He attended CENTCOM staff meetings, assisted in providing effective intelligence support to the Command, and acted as an advocate for CENTCOM with DIA through Hersman’s directorate.

The NMISTs became fully operational in 1988 and included three deployable teams. Based in the Pentagon and the DIAC, the NMISTs gave DIA the capability to provide all-source intelligence through secure voice, data, imagery, and facsimile equipment (operating on ship or land) directly from DIA via military satellites to deployed forces during contingency or crisis operations as well as exercises. NMISTs deployed to the Persian Gulf, Panama, and elsewhere during the year and provided direct support to requesting commands. Moreover, teams deployed in support of six U&S Command exercises and four contingency operations during 1989.

To improve its ability to support the National Command Authorities, DIA upgraded the National Military Intelligence Center in 1988 and 1989 in the first major renovation of the NMIC since the 1970s. The Agency updated and renovated the NMIC, including its component Alert Center, Collection Control Facility (CCF), and intelligence task force areas, as an integrated, state-of-the-art intelligence facility. The JCS designed and built a combined intelligence/operations facility, called the Crisis Management Room (CMR), next to the Alert Center. Significantly, the NMIC’s collocation with the JCS’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) allowed for the fusion at the national level of operations and intelligence during crises.

These crisis support facilities in the Pentagon had evolved significantly since 1987 and Operation EARNEST WILL. At that time, a thick wall separated the JCS operations and intelligence crisis support spaces. Three successive DIA Deputy Directors for JCS Support (JS)—Rear Admirals Thomas A. Brooks, Edward D. Scheafer,
and J. M. McConnell—worked hard to tear down those walls, physically and psychologically. The result was valuable experience gained during routine operations and minor crises and improvements in the "jointness" of operations and intelligence support.

The DIA Deputy Director for JCS Support, or JS, was the most prominent Agency official in crisis support operations. He ran the NMIC at the Pentagon, which provided routine and crisis intelligence support to the NCA, policymakers, and the U&S Commands. The JS had two masters. As a member of the Agency, he worked for the Director, DIA. But as the primary intelligence staff officer on the JCS, he also answered to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a crisis, the JS could take advantage of the resources of DIA, and wield the hammer of the Chairman.

Between October 1989 and DESERT SHIELD, DIA responded to eight crises involving JCS alert and warning orders (Panama/JUST CAUSE, Philippines/warning of coup attempt, SOUTHCOM/counter-narcotics activity, India-Pakistan/border tensions, etc). DIA handled these without diverting resources, and uncovered problems with organization and tasking that led to improvements. One of the important lessons learned was the need for JCS operations and intelligence crisis support analysts to read each others' messages, to eliminate contention and duplication. They also found it essential to have a small, quiet room where they could brief the CJCS or the Defense Secretary without disrupting operations.

In 1989, DIA split the CAJIT so it could continue to support the El Salvador mission while the other half transferred to the counternarcotics effort in support of the President’s Andean strategy. DIA named the new structure the Joint Tactical Intelligence Center (JTIC). Through the JTIC, DIA devoted substantial analytic resources to establish a 24-hour watch, expand the basic intelligence production effort, increase imagery exploitation resources, produce high-impact studies, and dedicate current intelligence support for the Andean strategy. The lessons learned running the CAJIT and JTIC provided valuable experience for the Gulf War, and they served as models for the Department of Defense Joint Intelligence Center (DoDJIC) created by DIA during DESERT SHIELD.

GULF WAR

Through the summer of 1990, the US Defense Intelligence Community followed Iraq's dispute with Kuwait with increasing alarm. Through July, DIA tracked Iraq's military buildup along the border with Kuwait and the mediation efforts in the region. During the second half of July, US Defense Intelligence officials began to warn policy officials of the possibility of an Iraqi attack on Kuwait. DIA’s crisis support organizations and ties to the commands proved crucial in providing intelligence support to CENTCOM and policymakers during the Gulf crisis and war that
followed.

Both DIA and CENTCOM had established the Iraq regional warning problem and assumed watch condition (WATCHCON) level IV in April 1990. DIA raised its WATCHCON to level III on 21 July and to level II on 24 July based on the concentration of Iraqi troops on the Kuwaiti border and the failure of diplomatic initiatives. DIA declared WATCHCON level I on 1 August, the first time any command or agency had assumed this highest level watch condition in advance of a conflict.

Throughout the latter part of July, DIA continued to expand the OICC to handle the developing crisis. The OICC began providing targeting support to CENTCOM 12 days before the invasion of Kuwait. On 29 July OICC personnel met with DIA resource managers in anticipation of crisis support to prioritize resources. By 1 August, DIA had the OICC fully staffed in response to the crisis. On 2 August, the OICC established extended manning in response to the establishment of the Intelligence Task Force (ITF).

On 22 July, DIA had activated the Iraq/Kuwait Regional Working Group (IZKUWG) at the Pentagon. On 1 August 1990, coinciding with the release of its formal warning notice, DIA established the Iraqi Regional Intelligence Task Force (hereafter called the ITF) by expanding the IZKUWG. The expanded task force moved into the ITF spaces in the NMIC at the Pentagon. DIA also established a 24-hour all-source crisis collection team to aid the ITF. The OICC was subordinate to the ITF. The DIA Deputy Director for JCS Support (JS), Admiral McConnell, ran the ITF.

By 2 September the ITF consisted of 62 DIA personnel from the Directorate for JCS Support (JS) and Directorate for Foreign Intelligence (VP) providing order of battle, briefing maps, information for the Defense Special Assessments (DSAs), and responses to written and telephonic inquiries. The organization had an analytical cell that focused on analyzing and reporting Iraqi political-military issues, provided three DSAs and an order of battle message daily, and conducted briefings for the OSD/JCS staffs and senior DIA personnel. By this time, the OICC manning levels had increased from six to 125 people.

Crisis management procedures developed during the past 20 years functioned effectively and proved essential at the outset of the invasion of Kuwait. This previous experience had established a clear delineation of responsibility between the OICC and ITFs. However, the size of DESERT SHIELD, the scope of DIA support, and the later formation of the Department of Defense DoD Joint Intelligence Center (DoD/JIC) exceeded established procedures and necessitated changes at a later stage of the operation.

As the scope and size of its support to DESERT SHIELD grew, DIA established a DoD/JIC in the Pentagon at the request of the
CJCS. It took an additional ten days for the services to embrace the concept of a DoDJIC and commit themselves to its support. It became fully operational with DIA, Army, and Navy personnel on 2 September. The Air Force added their manning on 6 September, and NSA joined later. The CIA was invited but declined to participate formally.  

Subordinate to the ITF, DIA charged the DoDJIC’s with the mission of fusing current multi-discipline information from all national service intelligence agencies and organizations. This short suspense intelligence was tailored for both theater and Washington consumers. DIA activated the DoDJIC to compliment the in-depth research and analysis, targeting and operational support, and strategic intelligence provided by the OICC.

Composed of DIA, National Security Agency (NSA), and service intelligence personnel (Army, Navy, Air Force), the DoDJIC provided analysis on current Iraqi OB within the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO), satisfying requests for information from CENTCOM and Washington policymakers. DIA further defined the DoDJIC’s area of responsibility as air, air defense, ground, and naval OB information on Iraqi forces in the KTO south of 31 degrees North. When first established, more than 150 people manned the DoDJIC around the clock.

After DIA established the DoDJIC, the OICC picked up responsibility for Iraqi current OB outside the KTO north of 31 degrees North, in addition to information on the Coalition Forces, and in-depth research requirements previously discussed. The DoDJIC’s focus was current and short-fuse, while that of the OICC was long range and in-depth.

Even before the beginning of DESERT SHIELD, DIA began outfitting NMISTS to deploy with operational forces and to allied nations. NMISTS provided rapid response and the capacity for deployed forces to request time-sensitive intelligence from the national level. Through their secure voice, text, and imagery transmission capabilities, the NMISTS played a critical support role in the early phase of the Gulf War by coordinating intelligence activities.

DIA constituted and trained eight new NMISTS to extend the tree teams already in existence. Of the eleven, DIA deployed nine to corps and component level in the theater of operations. In a clear acknowledgement of their importance, CENTCOM included NMISTS as part of the first contingent of US units to arrive in the region. These self-contained teams provided the first secure-voice link to the Gulf.

The OICC provided DIA augmentees to the first NMIST on 5 August. This team deployed with the Central Air Force (CENTAF) to Riyadh on 7 August. DIA sent out additional NMISTS to the XVIII
Airborne Corps, Marine Central Command (MARCENT), and Navy Central Command (NAVCENT) on 8 August. Seven more teams deployed during DESERT SHIELD and played a critical role in the early phase by coordinating intelligence activities, passing essential intelligence, and keeping commands informed. The lack of a mature intelligence-communications architecture in theater made their presence more important.45

The Intelligence Community initially had difficulty with the volume of intelligence requirements to support the large scale of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM. During the early stages of Operation DESERT SHIELD, national agencies produced a large amount of duplicative, even contradictory, intelligence. Both the JCS and CENTCOM recognized the need for some order in a Defense Intelligence Community consisting of more than 30 producers. DIA assumed this new wartime role of military intelligence production guidance and deconfliction—addressing order of battle, targeting, imagery exploitation, estimates, and battle damage assessment (BDA) issues. The Military Intelligence Board assisted DIA in this task of sorting out intelligence support.46

The Military Intelligence Board was an advisory and decision-making body chaired by the Director, DIA, and made up of service intelligence chiefs and the Director, NSA. During its support of DESERT SHIELD, the MIB also included nonvoting representatives of the Joint Staff Directorate of Command, Control, and Communications (J-6) and the Defense Support Program Office. The MIB convened periodically to coordinate intelligence support and assign scarce resources. It addressed theater shortfalls as identified by the CENTCOM J-2 and coordinated the deployment of needed personnel, equipment, and systems to support operations in the Gulf. The MIB also played a key role during the early stages of the Gulf Crisis in coordinating UN sanctions enforcement.47

Once CENTCOM established itself in theater and its mission changed (in November) to one of preparing for offensive operations, the arrangements for providing operational and tactical intelligence changed as well. The MIB concluded that General Schwarzkopf needed an in-theater intelligence organization responsive to his warfighter needs. They felt he needed his own joint intelligence center to produce current intelligence from national and theater assets.48

Once the MIB decided CENTCOM needed its own JIC, it sent several high level teams of intelligence and communications experts to examine CENTCOM's in-theater needs and make recommendations on wartime organization. These teams had to be careful not to give CENTCOM the impression that they were telling the theater commander how to run his operation. In the end, they provided recommendations for an effective theater intelligence architecture. And the MIB designated the personnel, equipment, and systems necessary to support these recommendations.49
The value of the MIB was in coordinating actions and focusing the military intelligence community. Since all the Military Departments and NSA were voting members, once the MIB made a decision, the Services considered it binding. Not all Service intelligence chiefs gave up their personnel and other assets to the DoDJIC or CENTCOM easily or willingly. Some arm twisting was necessary to convince the military representatives to sign up for more "jointness".

Admiral McConnell, the DIA Deputy Director for JCS Support, characterized MIB before the war as generally ineffective. The Service intelligence chiefs were seen as no more than advocates of their own Services positions, and were rarely willing to give away anything. The pressure and sense of urgency during the Gulf War caused the system to get focused on what was important. Because the MIB stepped up and became a dynamic, coordinated, and demanding organization concerned with resolving problems, it secured a significant role for the future.

CONCLUSION

Defense Intelligence played a crucial role in crisis and wartime support during the Gulf War. Intelligence support procedures hammered out during previous crises and innovative technologies combined to make Defense Intelligence support to the policymaker and warfighter more important than ever. DIA, NSA, and the Services provided accurate and timely fused national intelligence to CENTCOM, confirming their role as force multipliers.

DIA came of age as a combat support agency and in its capacity as the senior military intelligence component of the US Intelligence Community during the war. Before the Gulf War, DIA had created the future architecture to deal with crises: the Intelligence Task Force, Operational Intelligence Crisis Center, National Military Intelligence Support Team, and the Military Intelligence Board. During DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, DIA refined established crisis and wartime procedures for these, and added the essential final component of this architecture: the DoD Joint Intelligence Center.

The crisis management organizations developed by DIA before the Gulf War succeeded in providing focused defense intelligence support to CENTCOM and policymakers. The OICC, ITF, and DoDJIC all functioned effectively and were essential at the outset of the Gulf crisis and during the war that followed. These organizations, and the lessons learned operating them during the War, will serve as a paradigm for providing national intelligence support during future crises.

DIA has improved these crisis management organizations based
on experience gained during the Gulf War. Admiral McConnell institutionalized the lessons learned during the war and created the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) at the Pentagon. This formation replaced the NMIC and retained many of the positive attributes of the DoDJIC. DIA runs this organization on a 24-hour basis with Service, NSA, CIA, and State Department participation.

In November 1991, as a result of lessons learned during the war, DIA redesignated the JS as the J2 and gave it significantly wider mission. Some in the Defense Department wanted to make the J2 a three-star general officer and break it away from DIA. Admiral McConnell and DIA Director, Lieutenant General Harry E. Soyster, supported the redesignation of the J2, but opted for keeping this function under DIA. Both agreed that it would be foolish to break the J2 away from DIA, the primary source of intelligence information, analysis, and resources. General Powell agreed with this assessment, and approved the plan to redesignate the J2, expand its mission, and maintain its position within DIA.

In another initiative aimed at more efficient intelligence support to the CINCs, DIA folded the functions of CS into the J2. Admiral McConnell championed this move. CS’s programs in support of the CINCs had been very effective, but Admiral McConnell felt they could be run more efficiently by the J2. The J2 was in touch with the daily substance of intelligence support to the CINCs. It made sense to combine this with the programmatic and institutional aspects of support to the commands.

DIA has retained both the OICC and ITF as crisis support organizations. Both proved of great value and benefitted from structural improvements based on experience gained during the Gulf War. DIA has strengthened their role in intelligence support to combatant commands and policymakers. DIA recently activated a Bosnian intelligence task force at the NMJIC to support operations in the former Yugoslavia. The OICC is fully operational providing intelligence support to operations in Bosnia, Haiti, and other trouble spots in the world.

The Military Intelligence Board was effective in providing leadership and coordinating intelligence support actions during DESERT SHIELD/STORM. The MIB was an active participant in support of the CENTCOM J-2 in structuring the capabilities of the national Intelligence Community to meet theater requirements. The MIB also addressed theater shortfalls as identified by the CENTCOM J-2 and coordinated the deployment of needed personnel, equipment, and systems to support operations in the Gulf.

The MIB continues to provide leadership in coordinating intelligence support to policymakers and warfighters. Admiral McConnell institutionalized the advances made during the Gulf War in making the MIB a dynamic, problem solving body. It now meets
regularly, resolves important intelligence support issues, and continues to be a significant player.

The deployment of DIA National Military Intelligence Support Teams (NMISTS) provided essential intelligence support to CENTCOM, its component units, and Coalition forces. NMISTS provided analytical support and rapid dissemination of time-sensitive intelligence information and products. These teams were critical elements of the intra-theater and theater-to-national intelligence structure.

The NMISTS were among the unsung heroes of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. In fact they did their job too well. Their communications and intelligence information systems worked so well that CENTCOM component commanders sometimes bypassed normal channels and went right to DIA with problems and requests. DIA validated the NMIST concept during the Gulf War, and succeeded in providing commands with analytical support and rapid dissemination of time-sensitive intelligence information and products.

Experience during the Gulf War prompted DIA to improve on the NMIST concept and supersede them with National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTS). These NISTS serve the same role as they did during the Gulf War, but with participation and team members from CIA and NSA. Again, DIA deployed NISTS in support of UN and NATO forces in Bosnia.

There were both intelligence successes and failures during the Gulf War, providing many insights for future conflicts. Future conflicts are likely to be smaller and shorter, and Defense Intelligence will have to be adaptable to cope with them. Rapid assessment of intelligence, innovative use of information systems, and appropriate use of new technology will be the keys to success.

DIA’s role as a crisis and combat support agency has expanded significantly in the past twenty years. The crisis response procedures and command support organizations refined during these years enabled DIA to meet the challenges of the Gulf War. DIA has incorporated the lessons learned during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and further refined its crisis planning and structure. Thus, Defense Intelligence performance during the Gulf War will guide intelligence support for all future crises.
ENDNOTES

1. DIA took a 35% personnel cut in the downsizing after the Vietnam War.

2. Classified internal DIA material.

3. Classified internal DIA material.

4. Until the DIAC opened in 1984, DIA operated in offices and buildings scattered throughout the Washington, DC area, creating obvious management, coordination, and logistics problems. Uniting most of DIA's functions under one roof improved efficiency and provided a more technologically advanced environment from which to provide crisis support. The consolidation also provided other elements of the Intelligence Community with a physical identification for the Agency.

5. Classified internal DIA material.


7. Classified internal DIA material.

8. The MIB was activated in 1961 as an ad hoc organization to assist in the development of the DIA "Activation Plan." The board, made up of the Service intelligence chiefs, provided advice to the DIA Director-designate and the DIA planning staff. Because the MIB demonstrated its usefulness as a forum for discussion and advice, it remained in existence as a mechanism for coordinating Defense positions on intelligence issues.


10. Classified internal DIA material.

11. Classified internal DIA material.


13. The concept of an OICC-type organization was not entirely new. The OICC was a refinement and follow-on to the Research Crisis Support Center (RCSC) established in 1984.

14. Classified internal DIA material.

15. (U) In support of crises, the OICC provided expertise in military capabilities; in-depth, strategic-level intelligence; economic sanctions monitoring; logistics; nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) capabilities; scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) issues; terrain analysis; escape and evasion; energy and military production; terrorism; intelligence data bases; targeting; and operational support requirements for national, theater, and tactical units.

16. Classified internal DIA material.
17. Classified internal DIA material.
18. Classified internal DIA material.
19. Classified internal DIA material.
20. Classified internal DIA material.
21. Classified internal DIA material.
22. Classified internal DIA material.
23. Classified internal DIA material.
24. Classified internal DIA material.
27. Classified internal DIA material.
28. Classified internal DIA material.
29. Classified internal DIA material.
30. Classified internal DIA material.
31. The Defense Intelligence Agency: A 21-Year Organizational Review, Working Papers, by Deane Allen, p. 60. The position and duties of the JS had changed over the years. Subsequent to the creation of DIA in 1961, the J-2 staff section in the JCS was disestablished and reassigned to DIA on 28 June 1963. In the years between 1963 and 1990, this staff section went through many reorganizations and name changes. But at the beginning of the Gulf War, this position was designated the JS.
32. Classified internal DIA material.
33. Classified internal DIA material.
34. Classified internal DIA material.
35. (U) WATCHCON is an expression of intelligence interest and concern relative to the potential outlined in a warning problem. A warning problem for a country or region is a set of detectable events that might lead to a crisis and threaten US citizens, interests and operating forces. WATCHCON IV is defined as a "potential threat", WATCHCON III is "increased threat", WATCHCON II is "significant threat", and WATCHCON I is "clear immediate threat".

36. Classified internal DIA material.


38. Classified internal DIA material.

39. Classified internal DIA material.

40. Classified internal DIA material. The CIA finally relented in December and sent a liaison officer, but not a representative.

41. Classified internal DIA material.

42. Classified internal DIA material.

43. Classified internal DIA material.


45. Classified internal DIA material. The other NMISTS deployed to Strike Command at High Wycomb, UK on 19 August, US European Command on 10 September, CENTCOM in Riyadh on 17 September, Special Operations Central Command (SOCCENT) on 6 December, Army Central Command (ARCENT) on 17 December, VII Corps on 10 January, and SOCCENT (Forward) on 29 February.


47. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp. C-4-C-5.


50. Classified internal DIA material.