A Chronology of Defense Intelligence in the Gulf War: A Research Aid for Analysts
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BY
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FOREWORD

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM provided a significant challenge to the Defense Intelligence Agency and to the Defense Intelligence Community. During the early stages of DESERT SHIELD, the United States and our allies faced a significant threat with only limited infrastructure and minimal command, control, communications, and intelligence assets in the region. During DESERT STORM, Coalition forces swiftly liberated Kuwait and defeated the fifth largest army in the world without suffering significant losses.

The United States and our allies benefitted tremendously from superior national and theater intelligence during the war. Intelligence was recognized as a significant force multiplier and contributed directly to the Coalition victory and the speed with which it was achieved. In the words of General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “No combat commander has ever had as full and complete view of the adversary as did our field commander. Intelligence support to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was a success story.”

We continue to strive for better intelligence support to operational commanders and national consumers. Starting before the end of DESERT STORM, DIA conducted a thorough examination of our performance in all aspects of intelligence support. Working closely with the Defense Intelligence Community, the Military Intelligence Board, and US Central Command, DIA compiled a comprehensive list of lessons learned. In the six years since the end of the war, we have incorporated those lessons into plans, programs, products, organizations, and joint intelligence doctrine.

The US Intelligence Community has directly benefitted from many of the improvements in crisis intelligence support made by Rear Admiral James M. McConnell (J-2 during the war) and many other intelligence professionals as a result of lessons learned from the Gulf War. Our intelligence support of US, UN, and allied forces during numerous crises in the past few years has greatly improved as a result. The Intelligence Community activated Intelligence Task Forces, deployed National Intelligence Support Teams, and synchronized intelligence support for US and multi-national forces in Haiti and Bosnia.

As new generations of intelligence officers face what undoubtedly will be formidable future challenges with fewer available resources, the critical contributions of the US and allied Military Intelligence Community during the Gulf War must not be forgotten. In a fast-paced world beset with trial and uncertainty, we are often forced to react with little time to study and adapt what we have learned. We need to apply what we learned in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. It is imperative, therefore, that we docu-
ment our accomplishments while the events are fresh in our minds and the records are still in our possession.

I fully support historical documents of this kind that record the critical role of Military Intelligence in a dangerous and rapidly changing world. This extensive chronology, the first of several unclassified publications, is a guide to day-to-day support provided to the warfighter. It is for soldiers and strategists, policymakers and scholars, but most importantly, the practitioners of intelligence — our Nation's first line of defense.

Patrick Hughes
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, DIA
In 1994, the DIA Director instructed the DIA History Office to begin writing historical products not only for the DIA user, but also for consumers outside of the Agency. Beginning in 1997, therefore, many historical publications, some short and others book-length, will become available at the classified and unclassified levels in support of the DIA mission. They will serve the dual purpose of documenting historical events and informing the non-DIA reader of the significance of the Agency’s contributions to our country’s national security.

The Agency has established, as one of the highest priorities in completing these publications, a comprehensive history of DIA’s role in supporting DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The task of preparing this history involved researching over a million pages of documentation and other primary source material. In addition, it required conducting many interviews with people who were key to the effort as well as seeking additional documentation. DIA plans to publish this book-length illustrated narrative, in classified and unclassified versions in 1997.

This chronology is one of the by-products of the history and it will be included in the final publication. Pictures, drawings, charts, and maps have been added to make it more meaningful. I have also appended a DIA organizational chart and glossary to sort the unavoidable acronyms and abbreviations. This work is meant to be a chronology of Defense Intelligence support to DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, not a detailed description of those events.

As with each of the forthcoming publications, this chronology strives to meet the needs of the planner, analyst, researcher, student, and manager. With these primary users in mind, its purpose is to learn and set forth the lessons that are important to intelligence, and particularly the Defense Intelligence Agency as a Combat Support Agency. To insure a comprehensive, balanced, and accurate treatise, I solicited the assistance of individuals and source materials both inside and outside the Agency.

I completed this chronology in a six-month period while researching and writing the first five chapters of the forthcoming book. This effort would not have been possible without the help and guidance of a number of people. First and foremost on that list is Deane Allen, the DIA Historian, who first conceived this project in August 1990. He assisted and advised me throughout the early stages of my research and writing, and deserves a great deal of the credit. Over the past six years he saved many of the critical documents and records that were vital to this undertaking.
A number of other people have been especially generous in agreeing to interviews and taking the time to comment on my early drafts. These include Roy Apseloff, Jim Claxton, Mel Geiger, John Moore, Dr. William Musson, COL James Ritchey and Ed Valentine. In my own office, I have benefitted greatly from the advice of Curtis Utz and the assistance of Mirlin Toomer. This publication would not have been possible without the hard work and patience of Andrea Flowers, Monique Evans, and Barbara Smith in the Office for Publications. I would also be remiss in not mentioning the valuable support of MG John A. Leide, John T. Berbrich, John J. Sloan, James W. Lucas, Hans Pawlish, LTC Steve E. Dietrich, and Don Lenker. Special thanks go to BG David A. Armstrong in the JCS History Office for his support of this project.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword ................................................................. iii
Preface ................................................................. v
Chronology of Events ................................................ 1
  Prewar ............................................................... 1
  DESERT SHIELD .................................................. 14
  DESERT STORM .................................................. 32
  Postwar ............................................................. 38
Maps ................................................................. 41-42
DIA Organizational Chart ........................................ 43
DIA Organizations .................................................. 44
Glossary ............................................................ 46
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

PREWAR

1984  THE Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) sends a team to United States Central Command (CENTCOM) to study its intelligence support requirements and the feasibility of attaching a DIA intelligence production element to CENTCOM headquarters.

1985  DIA becomes one of the first national agencies to assign a permanent representative at CENTCOM. Also, an eleven-man DIA intelligence production element is attached to CENTCOM headquarters.

DIA opens a US Defense Attache Office (USDAO) in Baghdad to expand access to developments in Iraq and obtain information on the Iran-Iraq War.

1987  The Defense Attache (DATT) in Baghdad gains unprecedented access to senior Iraqi military leaders in the wake of the attack on the USS STARK and sets up procedures to deconflict Iraqi and US operations in the Gulf.

DIA establishes the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC) to enhance its capability to respond to crisis situations. DIA designed the OICC to muster resources quickly to surge on a problem and then convert analysis to operationally relevant products and support.

USS STARK burns after being hit by Iraqi missiles in 1987.
DIA augments the Persian Gulf Working Group (PGWG) in the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) at the Pentagon with additional personnel to track on a 24-hour basis the tanker war, the Iran-Iraq ground war, the air threat, the SILKWORM threat, and other developments.

DIA initiates the National Military Intelligence support Team (NMIST) concept to augment intelligence support to commands during crisis operations. NMISTs are mobile support teams deployed to commands to provide analytical support and rapid dissemination of time-sensitive intelligence information and products.

DIA's all-source threat assessments provide critical intelligence for the US retaliatory strikes against the Iranian owned and occupied Rashadat oil platform.

1988

DIA intelligence support to US forces and allies in the Persian Gulf intensifies as the Iran-Iraq War expands in a renewed "War of the Cities" and spills into the Gulf. DIA provides operational elements predeployment briefings and support for retaliatory strikes against Iran.

Iraqi ground forces launch a series of five crushing offensive operations catching the Iranians ill-prepared and destroying their will to fight.

President Bush receives a briefing from DIA in the NMIC during Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) in 1989. Panama was the first major operational test of the NMIST concept. NMISTs were used extensively and with great success during the Gulf War.
Iran accepts United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 598, leading to the 20 August ceasefire that ends the bloody eight-year war with Iraq.

DIA upgrades and renovates the NMIC as an integrated, state-of-the-art intelligence facility. NMIC components include the Alert Center, Collection Coordination Facility, and intelligence tasks forces areas.

1989
April
CENTCOM assesses that Iraq will be the next likely regional threat in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War and the decline of the Soviet threat.

August
DIA military capability analysts disseminate Iraqi invasion of Kuwait scenario to CENTCOM and other commands. CENTCOM concurs with analysis by late 1989. It becomes the scenario for CENTCOM's Command Post Exercise (CPX) INTERNAL LOOK, in July 1990.

November
A Defense Intelligence Brief (DIB), *The Iraqi Threat to the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] States*, presents an assessment of Iraqi military capabilities and options to take military action against Kuwait, without dealing with the likelihood of such actions.

A Defense Intelligence Assessment, *Iraqi Military Developments Through 1992*, asserts: "Iraq is unlikely to launch military operations against any of its Arab neighbors over the next three years with the possible exception of Syria....To protect its image of moderation, Iraq is unlikely to take military action against Kuwait."

1990
February

DIA analysts participate in a war game of Iraqi invasion of the Arabien Peninsula organized by the Naval War College (NWC) Strategic Studies Group.

24 April
CENTCOM establishes Iraq Regional Warning Problem and assumes Watch Condition (WATCHCON) Level IV (defined as "potential threat" to US citizens, interests, and operating forces), and thereby increasing the intelligence collection priority against Iraq. (WATCHCON is an expression of intelligence interest and concern relative to the potential threat outlined in a Warning Problem. A Warning Problem for a country or region is a set of detectable events that might lead to a threat or crisis.)

NOTE: When a specific date is not known, a monthly entry will be indicated.
April JSW (Directorate for Indications and Warning) adds Iraq as a "regional threat" to the Indications and Warning (I&W) System based on concerns voiced by CENTCOM and DIA. DIA and US Commands formally begin monitoring Iraqi activities for indications of war preparations.

May DIA participates in CENTCOM's war game of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

11 June CENTCOM issues first status change to Warning Problem. (A status change to a Problem is made whenever detectable events arise which change the likelihood that the threat might ensue.)

July DIA analysts participate in a three-week-long NWC war game of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The war game mirrors reality as crisis approaches in Iraq and Kuwait.

17 July Saddam Hussein delivers a strongly worded speech condemning Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) oil policies.

Intelligence Community receives first unconfirmed reports of a troop buildup in southern Iraq.

Kuwait deploys forces to defend Kuwait City and puts armed forces on full alert in response to Iraqi threats.
18 July
CENTCOM issues a Worldwide Warning and Indicator Monitoring System (WWIMS) status change to the DoD intelligence warning community and its subordinate commands concerning the Iraqi propaganda and diplomatic campaign against Kuwait.

DIA receives a request from CENTCOM for additional imagery coverage of Iraq and Kuwait after an Iraqi démarche to Kuwait.

19 July
DIA receives first reports of movement of two Iraqi divisions to deployment areas near the Kuwaiti border.

Defense Intelligence Officer (DIO) for Middle East, South Asia, and Terrorism (MESAT) sends a message to the DIA Director stating that the Iraqi activity near the Kuwaiti border is "not a rehearsal." This message is forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

Iraqi claimed the disputed Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warbah.
DI-6 (Foreign Exchanges and Disclosures Division) grants authorization for CENTCOM to release data on Iraq to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

20 July

A Defense Intelligence Digest (DID) article speculates that, “Iraq is unlikely to use significant force against Kuwait, such as the occupation of Warbah and Bubiyan Islands.... Small-scale incursions are possible.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) requests DIA develop a list of targets in Iraq. OICC, located at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC), Bolling AFB, initiates targeting support for CENTCOM.

DIA analysts detect the movement of artillery and tank battalions in southeastern Iraq, 30 miles north of the Kuwaiti border. Some are loaded on heavy equipment transports (HETs).

20-28 July

CENTCOM conducts CPX INTERNAL LOOK 90 to examine new Operational Plan (DPLAN) 1002, Defense of the Arabian Peninsula, to validate operational and logistical support concepts.

21 July

DC-1 (Current Operations Division, Directorate for Collection) reports that Iraqi forces are moving closer to the border. Elements of two additional armored divisions join the original Iraqi armored brigade, but there are no logistics support units with these forces.

CENTCOM and DIA raise WATCH/CON to Level II (defined as “increased threat” to US citizens, interests, and operating forces).

22 July

DIA receives reports of more than 3000 military vehicles moving south on the road from Baghdad toward Kuwait and 27 free rocket over ground (FROG) transporter erector launchers (TELS) being loaded onto railroad cars.

DC-1 reports 20 FROG rocket airframes being loaded onto trucks for transport. DIA analysts report a total of 305 T-72 tanks, 167 BMP armored personnel carriers, and 198 artillery pieces present in assembly areas north of the Kuwaiti border.

DIA activates the Iraq/Kuwait Regional Working Group (IZKUWG) at the Pentagon. (A working group is activated by DIA whenever additional manpower is needed to cover a developing crisis in a region of the world).
23 July  Kuwait deploys forces to the border area while the UAE increases its combat air patrols.

DC-1 reports that more artillery and the first surface-to-air missile unit, an SA-9 battery, have deployed to the border. DC-1 also reports a logistics site is being established near the border.

DC-1 produces the first of many collection posture statements (CPS) on the Iraq-Kuwait crisis.

23-24 July  VP (Directorate for Foreign Intelligence) and DX (Directorate for Imagery Exploitation) analysts hold videolink meetings with JSJ (Directorate for JCS Intelligence Support) and JCS J-3 (Operations Directorate) to discuss targets.

24 July  KC-135 aircraft deploy to the UAE for Exercise IVORY JUSTICE which was a demonstration of US concern and support.

CENTCOM raises WATCHCON to Level II (defined as “significant threat” to US citizens, interests, and operating forces).

DIA issues WWIMS Warning Report to policy officials and the Intelligence Community assessing Iraq to have enough military force in place to achieve its goals regarding Kuwait.

25 July  A meeting called by OPEC opens to address the Iraqi claims of continued Kuwaiti over-quota oil production and to defuse the mounting crisis at the Iraq/Kuwait border area.

Defense Special Assessment (DSA) states: “Iraq is using rhetoric, diplomatic pressure, and significant military posturing to force Kuwait to comply with recent oil and economic demands. Although unlikely to use military pressure, Iraq is marshaling forces sufficient to invade Kuwait. With forces currently in place, Iraq would be able to overwhelm Kuwaiti forces and likely occupy its limited objectives within 48 hours, or all of Kuwait in 5 days.”

DIA goes to WATCHCON II and issues WWIMS Warning Report stating Iraqi military forces fully capable of military actions against Kuwait.

D-6 asks the Secretary of Defense for permission to begin providing information on Iraq to Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar.
DI-3 (Legislative Affairs Division) arranges a briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on the Gulf crisis. When asked by senior members of the SSCI about indicators of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a DIA analyst replies that the indicators have already been seen.

26 July
Kuwait adopts a partial stand down of its infantry and armor units as tensions diminish because of growing confidence in successful OPEC negotiations. Saudi Arabia states it will not tolerate an Iraqi takeover of Kuwait.

27 July
DID reports the tensions between Baghdad and Kuwait are subsiding, though military forces remain deployed. Report speculates that Kuwait will give Saddam most of what he wants to avoid military confrontation.

DIA receives reports that the logistics train to support the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) is moving south toward the Kuwaiti border.

Both DIA and CENTCOM have intelligence sources on the ground in Kuwait City who subsequently report first hand on developments there.
DIO for MESAT and analysts from DB-8 (Middle East/Africa Division, Directorate for Research) meet with the Kuwaiti Ambassador to the US at the Pentagon and tell him unequivocally that Iraq is going to invade Kuwait.

29 July
OICC personnel meet with RS (Directorate for Resources) in anticipation of crisis support to prioritize resources, including: photo lab, graphics, distribution, library, and print shop support.

30 July
DID states that, "Saddam will probably maintain Iraq’s military stance until Kuwait agrees to his demands. Some military action is likely if Kuwait is resolute."

DIO for MESAT sends E-mail message to the DIA Director warning that Iraq is not "...bluffing."

DIA begins producing operational support packages (OSP) on primary targets and basic target graphics (BTG) on primary and secondary targets in support of CENTCOM Target List.

CENTCOM sends DIA a request for additional imagery coverage on Iraq.

30-31 July
OICC recalls 17 VP analysts to work through the night to support a Commander in Chief, CENTCOM (CINCCENT) target briefing to the JCS.

31 July
CINCCENT briefs CJCS and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) on deployment options.

DSA states “Unless Kuwait’s negotiators can offer a sufficiently attractive package of economic aid, reparations, or grants, ...Baghdad may consider taking what the Kuwaitis are unwilling to offer at the negotiating table.

DIO for MESAT sends a message to DIA Director and Deputy Director for JCS Support (US) warning that Saddam is not bluffing and that his force is sufficient to conquer both Kuwait and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.

The OPEC meeting ends in failure and the participants returned home. The situation remains unsolved but tensions seem to be at a lower level.

1 August
DIA analysts confirm the movement to forward assembly areas of artillery units required for offensive operations.
CENTCOM and DIA go to WATCHCON I (defined as a "clear and immediate threat" to US citizens, interests, and operating forces). This is the first time a command or agency goes to WATCHCON I in advance of a conflict.

CENTCOM and DIA issue WWIMS Warning Reports that an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is imminent.

DIA establishes Iraqi Regional Intelligence Task Force (ITF) by expanding the IZKUWG. The expanded Task Force moves into the ITF spaces in the NMIC at the Pentagon.

2 August

Iraqi forces invade Kuwait and drive to the Kuwaiti/Saudi Arabia border area.

CINCCENT presents military options to President Bush and the National Security Council (NSC).
General Schwarzkopf, Secretary Cheney, President Bush, and General Powell.

CJCS issues a Warning Order alerting military units to prepare to deploy

CENTCOM begins to develop courses of action and examine alternative force levels to respond to the crisis.

OICC establishes extended manning in response to the activation of the ITF. The OICC provides specialized targeting products, detailed and in-depth analysis, battle damage assessments for CENTCOM, ground order of battle (OB) information, special studies, and strategic estimates.

DAT-6 (Middle East/Africa Division) begins 24-hour operations at Ciarendon, tasking worldwide collection.

DAT-6 Country Officer is detailed to the J-5 (JCS Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy) Iraq Strategic Studies Group, the organization that is to draft a national policy response for senior leaders.

DI-1 (Director's Staff Group Division) starts Monday and Thursday briefings to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) principals and staff.

DC compiles a list of targets in Iraq to monitor chemical warfare (CW) sites and Iraqi reinforcements.

OSC-5 (Security Programs Division) briefs JS representatives at NMIC on Iraqi intelligence services.

FBI reinforces the DIA terrorism watch with an FBI agent.
2 August
DC-1 briefs DIA Director twice on imagery intelligence (IMINT) system options. Also briefed is the National Security Advisor's Chief of Staff.

3 August
J-5 Iraq Strategic Studies Group, with DIA representation, forwards draft strategy paper to the CJCS. He passes it to the Secretary of Defense, who delivers it to the President. The four goals set out in this paper are identical to the four objectives mentioned by the President in his 5 and 8 August policy speeches.

ITF spaces expand. VP analysts augment ITF. The ITF serves mainly as an administrative clearing house for taskings and provides numerous high-level briefings.

DX-6 (Current Imagery Division) requests coverage of Scud missile sites.

DI-3 coordinates briefing for the Defense Subcommittee and staff of the House Appropriations Committee.

4 August
The President and the NSC hear CINCCENT and Air Force Component, Central Command (CENTAF) briefings at Camp David on military options.

DM-1 (Plans, Programs, and Policy Division, Directorate for Imagery Management) receives first National Military Intelligence Support Team (NMIST) cable from CENTAF.

DI-3 coordinates briefing on the Gulf crisis for 67 senators.

5 August
President Bush states that Iraqi aggression "shall not stand" and frames US national policy objectives:

- Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
- Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government;
- Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and
- Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.

The USS INDEPENDENCE, in the North Arabian Sea, is within range to launch air strikes against Iraqi forces, if necessary.
OICC provides VP augments to form NMISTs.

DX-5 (Regional Analysis Division, Directorate for Imagery Exploitation) initiates production of an Iraqi ground forces overlay and report, providing an overview of the disposition of Iraqi forces located in southern Iraq and Kuwait.

![USN F-14 Tomcat](image)

6 August

UN Resolution 661 calls for restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and for an embargo on Iraq.

SECDEF, CINCCENT, and other CENTCOM officials travel to Jiddah, Saudi Arabia to seek King Fahd's agreement to deploy US forces. The King grants permission for the operation.

DAH (Operations Division, Directorate for Attaches and Operations) begins providing daily DESERT SHIELD DoD human intelligence (HUMINT) collection posture and situation updates to DIA leadership.
DIA maintains daily telephonic contact with its source in Kuwait City. This source details the Iraqi consolidation of the city and ongoing military operations.

DI-4 (Foreign Liaison Division) begins daily intelligence summary (INTSUM) distribution and briefings to selected foreign attaches.

**DESSERT SHIELD**

7 August Operation DESERT SHIELD begins (C-Day). The President orders the deployment of US forces to Saudi Arabia.

CJCS issues deployment orders for initial units to Southwest Asia.

Iraqi disposition of forces in Kuwait on 6 August 1990. Regular army divisions were arriving from garrisons in Iraq, freeing RGFC units for further employment.
ITF assumes a 24-hour, 7-day week analytical and support status.

NMIST personnel and equipment deploy with CENTAF to Riyadh.

SH-60 Seahawk helicopter approaches a tanker in the Persian Gulf.

Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC)/DC-1 confirms that the 3 RC-135's currently at Athens will deploy to Saudi Arabia once permission is granted.

DC-1 requests that the Air Force Staff project costs for the SR-71 reactivation.

7-10 August

DSD-3 (General Military Intelligence Support Division) develops the procedure for including the general military intelligence (GMI) air, ground, and naval order of battle daily updates into the Automated Installation Intelligence File (AIF).

8 August

President announces US deployments to "defensive positions" and reiterates four policy objectives.

First fighter aircraft of the USAF 1st Tactical Fighter Wing arrives in Saudi Arabia.
CINCCENT recommends to the JCS that operations be called PENINSULA SHIELD. That name is rejected in favor of DESERT SHIELD, recommended by the CINC's staff.

NMISTs deploy to XVIII Airborne Corps, US Marine Central Command (MARCENT), and US Navy Central Command (NAVCENT).

DIA receives a CENTCOM request for information on Iraqi reaction to arrival of XVIII Airborne Corps troops in Saudi Arabia.

9 August
UN Security Council condemns Iraq's annexation of Kuwait as illegal, null, and void.

CENTCOM headquarters advanced party arrives in Riyadh.

Lead Army elements of the 82nd Airborne Division arrive in Saudi Arabia.

DI-6 grants authority to release OLYMPIC FLARE imagery to Coalition Forces (military forces contributed by countries allied against Iraq).

10 August
DIA issues HUMINT tasking to provide the location and description of key Iraqi government facilities.

DC receives request from Navy for coverage of the port of Umm Qasr to monitor Iraq's mining operations.

12 August
DIA issues worldwide HUMINT tasking to begin tracking merchant ships to monitor support of the UN embargo against Iraq.

13 August
DI-6 completes guidance for intelligence sharing with Coalition Forces.

15 August
DIA sends team to CENTCOM (Rear) at McDill AFB to discuss foreign disclosure, development of an all-source fusion center, production coordination, and targeting/operational issues.

DAT-6 provides personnel for HUMINT representation on the ITF.
DAH begins providing daily DoD HUMINT collection activity summary to ITF/CCF (Collection Coordination Facility).

OSC-2 (Physical/Tempest Security Division, Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence) provides security recommendations for the multinational environment of the CENTCOM Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF).

DX-5 begins production of OSPs on the top 43 primary targets on CENTCOM's target list.

DX-6 expands its reporting in both the Significant Imagery Highlights Book and daily briefings to the JS, to include the status of Iraqi shipping after enactment of the UN embargo.

16 August
DoD designates DIA as Executive Agent for DESERT SHIELD imagery collection.

The Clarendon Operations Support Center begins a 24-hour watch.

DM-1 consolidates instructions for use and distribution of NARROW SANDS F-14 Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS) information.

17 August
DAT-6 receives information indicating Iraq plans to use Western "detainees" as human shields.

DIA begins publication of the Military Situation Summary (MSS) at the OICC.

DIA begins analysis of Iran/Iraq POW history, to include POW camp locations, treatment of POW's, and procedures.

DIA Director orders that all Scud sites be placed in active collection.

DC reports that a CCF Imagery Officer is required at the following daily meetings:

0400 - Teleconference room with the OICC (to accept proposed targets for the next day)

0600 - JS update
SCUD/AL HUSAYN
TRANSPORTER ERECTOR LAUNCHER (TEL)

Drawing of the Iraqi version of the Scud missile prepared by DIA Public Affairs (DIA-PA) for public and media release.

0730 - DC morning brief

1145 - JS (for JS's emphasis requirements)

1400 - DIA discussion on requirements

1500 - Community imagery meeting

1730 - Task Force evening wrap-up meeting

2000 - OICC

19 August  NMIST deploys to UK Strike Command in High Wycombe, UK.

DIA publishes first DESERT SHIELD Bulletin.
20 August
DIA orders the establishment of a Department of Defense Joint Intelligence Center (DoDJIC) at the Pentagon at the request of the CJCS to fuse the efforts of DIA and the Military Services.

DIA Deputy Director asks DR-BT to develop and maintain a brief on DIA intelligence support to DESERT SHIELD.

DD-1 makes initial distribution of OLYMPIC FLARE airborne imagery highlights.

DICC meets with RS to establish prioritization of RS support to DESERT SHIELD activities (photo lab, graphics, distribution, library, and print shop).

DAT-6 attends tri-service collection manager meeting to discuss DoD/CENTCOM HUMINT tasking in support of DESERT SHIELD. A worldwide HUMINT tasking update message is dispatched as a result.

21 August
DIA lifts ban on release of chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW) data. This is done so DIA can provide CW/BW information to CENTCOM which can then pass it on to the Coalition Forces.

22 August
DIA Representative to CENTCOM deploys with the headquarters element to Riyadh, one of only two civilians that General Schwarzkopf allows to deploy permanently forward with him.

DI-6 requests amended release authority to Coalition Forces (granted 19 Sep).

23 August
DIA forms provisional DoDJIC with three teams of Agency personnel. (The DoDJIC produced daily situation summaries and assessments as well as short suspense reporting and analysis. It also had several special production elements added during the course of its existence). DoDJIC operates with 299 personnel at its peak.
DI-6 grants approval for British, Canadian, and Australian officers to work in the OICC.

DIA initiates action to obtain access to Iraqi defectors in Saudi Arabia.

![Map of Iraq and neighboring countries with annotations](image)

**Iraq avenues of approach for a followup invasion of Saudi Arabia.**

24 August  
DC receives State Department request for imagery of the Jordanian/Iraq border to gauge refugee congestion (for embassy evacuation convoy route planning).

25 August  
DIA forwards draft concept of operations (CONOPS) for Defense Intelligence support to CENTCOM.

DIA participates in wargaming of US options against Iraq. Results lead to major changes to CENTCOM warplan.

VP arranges for three Multimedia Information Network Exchange (MINX) terminals to be installed in the OICC for connectivity to ITF.

26 August  
DC assigns priority to locating Iraqi Republican Guard units.
DC-1 prepares a background paper on reactivation of SR-71.

28 August  

DC assigns high priority collection to monitor Republican Guard and UN embargo enforcement.

29 August  

DS (Directorate for Information Systems) provides proposal to CENTCOM and CENTCOM (Rear) through the DIA Representative for DIA intelligence automation communications support for DESERT SHIELD.

DIA assumes management responsibility for target material (TM) production.

DAT-6 sends collection guidance message worldwide to reinforce the need to report any attempts to circumvent the quarantine against Iraq.

30 August  

Military Services commit to the DoDJIC. The mission of the DoDJIC is to provide short suspense intelligence tailored to both theater and Washington consumers.

DSD-3 begins daily update processing of air order of battle (AOB), ground order of battle (GOB), naval order of battle (NOB), and AIF information into the Integrated Data Base (IDE).

DIA Deputy Director tasks DIA Historian with writing a history of Defense Intelligence support to DESERT SHIELD. Historian begins collecting documents and identifies requirement to key DIA officials.

31 August  

OICC ships first of 14 OSPs to CENTCOM.

ITF modifies manning structure to four teams working 12-hour shifts, seven days a week.

DIA delivers first escape and evasion (E&E) study to CENTCOM.

DAT-6 tasks HUMINT sources to report Kuwaiti resistance efforts.

August-September  

Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) provides six air defense analysts to DIA/OICC to assist in providing 24-hour intelligence support on Iraqi air defense operations.
Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC) provides three chemical warfare analysts to assist DIA's CW/BW analytical cell at the OICC.

1-30 September  DI-6 sends sanitized Defense Intelligence Memoranda (DIM) and orders of battle to CENTCOM.

1 September  DIA asset obtains an Iraqi sea mine and arranges to have it flown to the US for exploitation.

2 September  DoDJIC becomes fully operational with DIA and Service (Army and Navy) manning.

VP establishes Order of Battle Scrub Team in Building 213, Washington Navy Yard.

5 September  JS directs DX-6 and DX-7 (Systems, Technology, and Resources Division, Directorate for Imagery Exploitation) to develop a Scud strategy.

DX and DB (Directorate for Research) begin work on a scrub of the AIF in an effort to ensure the accuracy of the warfighting data base.

6 September  Air Force adds manning to DoDJIC.

7 September  DoDJIC produces first (published twice daily) Defense Special Assessment (DSA).

General Schwarzkopf with a Saudi official during DESERT SHIELD.
8 September  DIA sends Assistant DIC for Middle East/South Asia to Riyadh to serve as CINCCENT interpreter.

9 September  DX assigns 11 imagery analysts to the DoDJIC and transfers production of map overlay responsibility for Iraqi forces south of 31 degrees latitude. DX-5 then initiates production of overlay reporting on Iraqi forces north of 31 degrees.

10 September  NMIST deploys to United States European Command (EUCOM).

  DoDJIC produces first daily MSS after responsibility is transferred from OICC.

  DM-1 consolidates instructions for use and distribution of EAGER LIGHT imagery information.

  DSO (Directorate for Systems Operations) installs Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System (AIRES) in the DoDJIC.


11 September  DIA initiates a 24-hour border watch to report sanctions violations of goods moving into Iraq.

14 September  CENTCOM requests that DIA readout DESERT SHIELD Battle Damage Assessments (BDA) imagery.

15 September  Initially situated in the CCF, DIA collection management element relocates to the DoDJIC.

  Collection and imagery representatives begin 24-hour duty in OICC management cell.

17 September  NMIST deploys to CENTCOM.

18 September  DS ATF briefs D/A-CS (Directorate for Command Support and Plans) on recommendations/findings from 10-13 September visit to CENTCOM.

20 September  DS begins to look at actions required to pass data base information between DIA and CENTCOM. Specific requirement is to pass daily Iraqi OB information to CENTCOM in a timely manner.
The USS WISCONSIN deployed to the Gulf and provided naval gunfire support during the Gulf War.

First reservist reports for duty in VP.

21 September DX delivers first gridded reference graphics (GRG) to CENTCOM.

25 September CENTCOM requests the CCF pass any "hot" news directly via secure phone to keep them "in the loop." CENTCOM is currently eight days behind Washington, DC in imagery reporting.

DIA and the Defense Courier Service (DCS) establish the "Desert Line" courier system to expedite OSP and TM delivery to CENTCOM and its warfighting components.

26 September DIA arranges for Kuwaiti officials' visit to DIA.

27 September Last of USDAO Baghdad personnel evacuate with other members of the US Embassy staff.
30 September  DoDJIC I&W Cell, established in early September, operates around the clock with five analysts.

CENTCOM J2 (CENTCOM Chief of Intelligence) agrees with a DIA recommendation to reduce coverage of Scud sites.

September  DX begins work on three dimensional models and a Hostage Intelligence Support Package (HISP) covering some thirty locations in Iraq.

DX-5 begins providing daily imagery derived reports on targets identified as possible American citizen detention areas.

DX begins to develop a BDA concept of operations, having been charged with the responsibility for all phases of imagery exploitation in support of BDA.
DX develops a BDA workbook containing gridded target graphics, maps, and reporting EEIs on some 309 primary and secondary targets.

DX establishes Central Tasking Cell (CTC) in the Pentagon to facilitate tasking coordination with the ITF and DoDJIC.

September - January 1991
DIA BDA elements and CENTCOM/CENTAF conduct 18 BDA exercises in an effort to ensure the efficiency and accuracy of BDA reporting and dissemination.

2 October
DAT-6 levies further taskings to acquire specific details, as a result of earlier reporting, describing the Iraqi rigging of the Kuwaiti oil fields for demolition.

DC begins acquiring baseline imagery coverage for BDA targets.

DIA sets into motion an imagery “blitz” to determine ground order of battle.

3 October
DAT-6 tasks assets worldwide to provide comprehensive Iraqi OB information for the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO — See maps on pages 41 and 42).

5 October
DIA implements crisis local area network (LAN), providing connectivity between all VP Task Force cells.

10 October
DSD-3 prepares an IDB-II crisis data base (Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen) for the OICC to support ad hoc queries and printing reports. IDB-II replaces older IDB-I data base.

13 October
CCF IMINT desk conducts BDA exercise.

18 October
DS ATF chairs meeting with CENTCOM representatives to discuss BDA support, DODIIS (DoD Intelligence Information System), IDB-II support, and CENTCOM requirements.

DAT-6 sends tasking to regional assets requesting information on the type of warheads for the CCS-2 missile.

20 October
OICC begins to transfer priority intelligence information electronically (via e-mail) to CENTCOM.

CENTCOM puts imagery blitz on hold until further evaluation by CENTCOM J2.
21 October CENTCOM approves and begins imagery blitz.

22 October DIA Director begins to host Military Intelligence Board (MIB) weekly meetings.

24 October JS informs CCF that the SECDIF wants coverage of the 28 Scud short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) launchers at least every other day.

29 October DSO-1 installs AIRES TELNET (Telecommunications Network) throughout DX offices in Bldg 213, Washington Navy Yard.

30 October DS ATF demonstrates to ITF the procedures to pass daily/weekly OB messages directly to CENTCOM using e-mail and DSN3 (Defense Integrated Secure Network 3 — TS/SCI level).

October DIA sends the former DATT Baghdad to CENTCOM to be Chief of the Combat Analysis Cell after the CENTCOM J2 requests him by name.

DoD/JC, DX-5, and DX-6 establish imagery analytical expertise focused to monitor and report on all SRBM equipment and activity in Iraq.

DX-6 initiates daily reporting on Iraqi merchant ship, SRBM, CW and air activities in support of DoD/JC, CENTCOM and JS.

DX, DB, and JSJ begin meeting with USAF (CHECKMATE) personnel in the Pentagon to facilitate DSP target development and to broaden its insight on BDA.

DIA sends its Chief of All-Source Collection Requirements Division (OC-4), a Navy captain, to be the CENTCOM JIC collection manager in Riyadh.

DM-1 formulates plan for Joint Imagery Processing Center (JIPC) concept of photo-processing in Saudi Arabia.

1 November DAT-6 tasks assets worldwide for information on Iraqi forces in the KTC with emphasis on the RGFC, special forces, Navy, logistics, and equipment.

6 November ITF sends first of daily and weekly OB update messages via e-mail/DSN3 to CENTCOM.
7 November  DAT-6 tasks assets to confirm or deny the presence of SS-12/21 missiles in Iraq. Subsequent collection determines they are not present.

President Bush visiting US troop positions in Saudi Arabia during a November 1990 visit.

12 November  DIA sponsored MIB team conducts assessment visit to CENTCOM.

15 November  DIA develops draft concept of operations to integrate the entire Intelligence Community in support of DESERT SHIELD BDA.

DIA requests release authority for five more Coalition allies (granted 10 Dec).

22 November  CENTCOM establishes JIC Forward.

25 November  DIA sponsored MIB team releases report on CENTCOM visit.

30 November  DIA establishes DODIIS e-mail link between DIA and CENTCOM.

DC-1 prepares a point paper for the Director, DIA on the diversion of reconnaissance assets from counternarcotics to DESERT SHIELD.
November

DX joins the ad hoc Command, Control, and Communications (C3) Fusion Cell in an effort to assist the DoDJIC in identifying the Iraqi C3 network in the KTO.


JS sends his deputy (an Army colonel) to be the CENTCOM JIC Commander, after the CENTCOM J2 requests him by name.

6 December

NMIST deploys to US Special Operations Central Command (SOCCENT).

7 December

Special DIA ad hoc group meets to determine Iraqi BW threat and intelligence gaps.

9-12 December

DM-1 team travels to Beale AFB, CA to review progress of deployable photo processing/data base preparations.

10 December

DIA establishes BDA Cell to provide third-phase BDA assessment.

DIA and CIA establish Iraqi Interagency Biological Warfare Working Group (IIBWWG).

DC-1 passes tasking to CENTCOM asking them to look for SA-2s in southern Kuwait.
Defense Intelligence College (DIC) hosts a "Conference on the Gulf Crisis" at the request of VP and the JCS. Analysts working in support of DESERT SHIELD attend the in-depth discussions by experts and academicians.

12 December  OSC-CI (Directorate for Counterintelligence) hosts a conference at Clarendon for counterintelligence experts supporting Operation DESERT SHIELD. Twenty-six specialists attend from DIA, CENTCOM, and the Services.

13 December  DAT-6 publishes message guidance to collectors on IIR releasability to the Coalition members.

17 December  NMIST deploys to US Army Central Command (CENTCOM).

IIWWG submits interim report to Deputy Director, DIA.

18 December  DM-1 briefs MIB on imagery capabilities.

21 December  DAT-6 sends out a worldwide tasking message that provides detailed EEIs and solicits operational information in the event of a terrorist attack.

DX and DB complete AIF scrub after completing the update of approximately 142,000 order of battle and facility transactions.

26 December  DIA deploys personnel to CENTCOM JIC in Riyadh. DIA eventually deploys a total of 100 personnel to the JIC Forward.

USDAOs in Yemen and Jordan reduce the size of their staffs because of increased regional tensions. For the same reason, USDAO Khartoum, Sudan later temporarily closes.

28 December  OB Scrub Cell from DB and DX completes input of new records, updates AIF, and stands down.

29 December  DIA establishes Joint Intelligence Production Center, or "Desert JIPC" in Riyadh. DIA sends an Army colonel from DX to set up and run this organization.
1991

2-5 January  DIA prepares scenario for Exercise DESERT LIGHTNING.

3 January  Military Intelligence Detachments (MIDs) arrive at DIA for DESERT SHIELD duty. One hundred thirty-seven reservists are incorporated into the Task Force.

5 January  DM-1 begins coordination of imagery movement from Riyadh to Washington via DCS, reproduction at DIA, and dissemination to non-theater commands.

8 January  USDAOs in Bangladesh and Pakistan reduce the size of their staffs at each embassy because of an increase in regional tensions.

9 January  JIPC integrates UK/CA/JAS analysts.

10 January  NMIST deploys to VII Corps.

11 January  OICC ships last of 14 Operational Support Packages to CENTCOM.

DSD-3 prepares IDB-II software and database for CENTCOM. Daily updates provided via e-mail/DSNET3.

12 January  American Embassy Baghdad closes as the last six US officials, other Western diplomats, and private citizens depart Iraq for Frankfurt aboard a chartered Iraqi Airlines Boeing 727.

ITF modifies rotation back to three teams, six days on, three days off, 12-hour shifts.

15 January  UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait passes.

DIA augments J2 BDA briefing team with analysts and intelligence technicians.

DAT-8 tasks assets worldwide to seek host nation reaction to the possible initiation of hostilities by the Coalition forces.

16 January  DIA establishes a Scud Cell at the DoDJIC in the Pentagon.
17 January

Operation DESERT STORM begins (D-Day). Coalition air campaign commences.

DIA sends out the first of over 3,200 verbal BDA/I&W reports via the DoDJIC "hot ring" to CENTCOM/CENTAF.

Backing up verbal BDA reports, DX inputs first of over 2,000 AIREIS imagery analysis reports and over 222 first and second phase BDA summaries during the course of the war.

DI-6 approves BDA release to UK/CA/AS.

OSC-2 counterintelligence analysts begin I&W watch for terrorist threats to US Forces.

18 January

Iraq fires first Scud missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia.

DI-3 coordinates DESERT STORM briefings to the full House and Senate.
BDA 24-hour and 12-hour message initiated.

VP establishes net assessment and BDA teams.

DAT-6 tasks assets for information on Scud strikes against Israel.

DC-1 receives report from CENTCOM JRC that reconnaissance over Western Iraq located 10 Scud launchers. All 10 launchers are reported destroyed.

20 January CENTCOM JIC begins daily production of first-phase BDA reporting via e-mail. OICC downloads reporting and passes to various cells for analysis/comparison.

DAT-6 tasks assets to acquire BDA data on targets in Kuwait through the use of sources in the Kuwaiti resistance.

21 January DIA establishes a POW/MIA Operations Center to track Coalition POW/MIA and captured journalists, and to provide information to US rescue forces.

DIA publishes first glossy BDA daily publication.

DC-1 receives request from JRC Forward to clarify the architecture and connectivity between theater surveillance systems.

22 January DIA expands BDA Cell. ITF I&W Cell displaces Counternarcotics Facility.

DIA dedicates additional assets to the Scud problem as Iraqi Scud attacks on Israel continue.

23 January DSD produces IDB II five-country data base for CENTCOM.

DC-1 reports that the President and CJCS have ordered airborne reconnaissance platform JSTARS to perform dedicated reconnaissance on Scud launch areas in western Iraq.

24 January DI-4 arranges weekly briefing for attaches in Washington, DC.
DAT disseminates guidelines to worldwide collectors on forwarding IIRs and HUMINT operational traffic as a result of JCS-imposed restrictions on routine messages.

25 January  DIA sends requirement through DC-1 to CENTCOM for coverage over western Iraq.

26 January  DIA receives details from the Kuwaiti military resistance on the facilities that control the oil flow to the sea terminals (after Iraq released millions of barrels of oil into the Gulf). Using this information, two F-111 aircraft attack the Al Ahmadi oil manifolds the next day and stop the flow of oil into the Gulf.

27 January  DAT-6 tasks collectors to acquire information on all underground facilities in Iraq, plus information on Iran's role in the conflict given the Iraqi air force flights to Iran.

28 January  CENTCOM requests an SA-2 OB from DC-1.

29 January  DIA begins baseline MSS production every night.

31 January  DAT-6 tasks regional assets to report on the extent of the Persian Gulf oil spill.

1-28 February  DIA elements visit Turkey.

5 February  DC-1 replies to CENTCOM request for information about MTI (moving target indicator) and JSTARS.

5-12 February  DSD-3 prepares IDE-II software and data base for CENTCOM (replaced 11 January copy due to problems with updates).

6 February  DI-1 establishes Monday and Friday J2 briefs for senior OSD principals.

7 February  DC-1 keeps JCS/URC informed of SNAPSHOT platform via verbal mission assessment briefing.

10 February  BDA footage begins to arrive daily from the Joint Camera Shop at the Pentagon. In-house distribution made for DB-6 and BDA Cells.
12 February  DIA forwards studies on breaching the Iraqi defensive barriers in southern Kuwait to CENTCOM.

DIA establishes a formal C3 Cell in the DoDJIC with CIA participation in an effort to improve targeting of Iraqi C3.

DAT-6 tasks regional assets to report the attitudes of their host countries concerning the US bombing of Iraq.

13 February  DIA BDA analysts determine that Iraq is dispersing aircraft to historical sites to reduce likelihood of destruction by air attacks.

14 February  DIA establishes Multispectral Imagery Fusion Cell to support the Scud Cell in the DoDJIC.

15 February  DC-1 responds to JS tasker with information brief on various imagery platforms.

19 February  DAT-6 tasks worldwide collectors to provide information on any Iraqi terrorist action against the Coalition forces.

DS produces IDB II data base for CENTCOM to replace corrupted 23 January version.

Historical monuments, like the ancient temple depicted in this DIA Public Affairs drawing, were not targeted despite the placement of military equipment nearby.
20 February  DC-1 reports on airborne reconnaissance surge capability for the ground war.

21 February  DIA ground forces assessment production begins.

DIA moves MSS production to NMIC.

DIA Document Exploitation (DOCEX) personnel depart for Saudi Arabia.

22 February  DAT-6 tasks assets in Western Europe, Middle East, Far East, and the Soviet Union, requesting their views and national interests in the Iraqi post-war period.

24 February  Operation DESERT SABRE (G-Day), the Coalition ground campaign begins.

DIA begins production of two MSSs per day.

26 February  DIA Director curtails MIB meetings to biweekly.

DIA sends a reserve augmentee who is a trained interrogator and Arab linguist to Turkey to assist the Turkish Government in debriefing Iraqi military defectors.

Destroyed Iraqi armored vehicles.
27 February  
DCCEX team deploys to Kuwait.

28 February  
Coalition forces/Iraqi cease-fire.

At cessation of hostilities, ITF consists of 634 personnel, with 394 working in the Pentagon and 240 working in the OICC at the DIAC. Of the 394 at the Pentagon, 42 work in the ITF headquarters, 277 in the DoDJIC, 40 in the BDA Cell, 17 in the C3 Cell, and 18 in general support.

DIA sends out last Scud Cell report.

DIA sends out last daily BDA report.

DIA cancels twice daily MSS.

NMIST deploys to SOCCENT Forward, Kuwait City.
2 March  USDAO London debriefs a recently released CBS crew after its return from Iraq. Information from the CBS crew confirmed the identification of some of the US and UK POWs still in Iraq.

3 March  Iraq accepts cease-fire terms at Safwan Airfield.

**POSTWAR**

3 March  DIA sends out final DIMS report.

DC-1 develops input for a CJCS congressional testimony. The subject area involves which reconnaissance assets in the KTO can provide I&W for movement of Iraqi armor.

3-17 March  DIA and the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) deploy a Weapons Effectiveness Team to the KTO.

4 March  DIA disbands OICC imagery representation.

5 March  After-Action Report Team begins consolidating data.

6 March  CENTCOM JRC forwards plans to DC-1 for a new postwar reconnaissance program.

7 March  DA requests a plan for demobilization of the assigned reserve personnel who were recalled in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. A release date is also requested.

8 March  DIA starts compilation of master BDA.

10 March  DIA sends out last daily MSS.

DIA begins compilation of lessons learned.

11 March  OICC resumes responsibility for the MSS message for ground and air updates.

13 March  VP limits analytical briefings to weekly.
14 March DIA disseminates last BDA message.

15 March DIA releases master BDA.

DIA monitors areas of unrest in Iraq and events in Baghdad.

17 March OICC reduces staff to extended hours (16-hour coverage).

22 March DIA releases first DESERT STORM reservists from active duty.

DIA produces final glossy BDA publication.

25 March JIPIC in Riyadh terminates operations.

CS tasks DIA directorates to provide historical information on support to DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

March VP publishes Middle East: Postcrisis Issues, focusing on the Iraqi military, political developments, and postwar reconstruction.

7 April Iraq accepts UN cease-fire conditions and resolutions.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT begins.

18 April To date, the ITF reports the receipt of 5,212 taskings. Of these, OICC responded to 3,822, or 73 percent of the total.

April DX publishes, DESERT STORM BDA Imagery Review, a four volume reference guide for intelligence analysts and DoD officials.

10 May DIA disestablishes ITF.
18 June  
DOCEX team redeploy from Saudi Arabia to the US.

22 July  
General Colin Powell presents DIA with a Joint Meritorious Unit Award for exemplary performance during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

22 August  
Director of Central Intelligence presents DIA with the National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Award.

The Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO) is the area south of 31 degrees latitude within the borders of Iraq and Kuwait.
The Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO) is the area south of 31 degrees latitude within the borders of Iraq and Kuwait.
The DIA line chart is included to give the reader an idea of how DIA was organized in 1990-91. Since DIA has been reorganized or realigned twice since 1990, the organization and office symbols have changed significantly.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office Symbol</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Director</td>
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<td>DD</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>ED</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
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<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
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<td>DIO</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Officer</td>
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<td>GC</td>
<td>General Counsel</td>
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<td>OSC</td>
<td>Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence</td>
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<td>OSC-2</td>
<td>Physical/Tempest Security Division</td>
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<td>OSC-5</td>
<td>Security Programs Division</td>
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<td>DIC</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence College</td>
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<td>Comptroller</td>
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<td>D/GDP</td>
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<td>Directorate for Command Support and Plans</td>
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<td>Command Representatives</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Directorate for National Systems</td>
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**NOTE:** The only DIA organizations mentioned are those involved in support of DESERT SHIELD/STORM.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIF</td>
<td>Automated Installation Intelligence File</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIRES</td>
<td>Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACB</td>
<td>Air Order of Battle</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARCENT</td>
<td>Army Component, Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASARS</td>
<td>Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System</td>
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<td>ATF</td>
<td>Automation Task Force</td>
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<td>ATO</td>
<td>Air Tasking Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDA</td>
<td>Battle Damage Assessments</td>
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<td>BTG</td>
<td>Basic Target Graphics</td>
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<td>BW</td>
<td>Biological Warfare</td>
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<td>C3</td>
<td>Command, Control, and Communications</td>
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<td>Collection Coordination Facility</td>
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<td>CHECKMATE</td>
<td>Air campaign planning group</td>
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<td>Air Force Component, Central Command</td>
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<td>Central Command</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoDJointInt</td>
<td>DoD Joint Intelligence Center</td>
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<td>DODISS</td>
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<td>DSA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>E&amp;E</td>
<td>Escape and Evasion</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEI</td>
<td>Essential Elements of Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELINT</td>
<td>Electronic Intelligence</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
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<td>US Army Forces Command</td>
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<td>FROG</td>
<td>Free Rocket Over Ground</td>
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<td>FSTC</td>
<td>Foreign Science and Technology Center</td>
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<td>GMI</td>
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<td>GOB</td>
<td>Ground Order of Battle</td>
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<td>GREEN</td>
<td>Friendly forces</td>
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<td>GRG</td>
<td>Gridded Reference Graphics</td>
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<td>HET</td>
<td>Heavy Equipment Transport</td>
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<td>I&amp;W</td>
<td>Indications and Warning</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Integrated Data Base</td>
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<td>IMINT</td>
<td>Imagery Intelligence</td>
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<td>Intelligence Summary</td>
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<td>ITF</td>
<td>Iraqi Regional Intelligence Task Force</td>
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<td>IZKUWG</td>
<td>Iraq/Kuwait Regional Working Group</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Center</td>
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<td>JIPC</td>
<td>Joint Imagery Processing Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRC</td>
<td>Joint Reconnaissance Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSTARS</td>
<td>Joint Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance System</td>
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<tr>
<td>KTO</td>
<td>Kuwait Theater of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAN</td>
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<td>Marine Corps Component, Central Command</td>
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<td>Military Intelligence Detachments</td>
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<td>MINX</td>
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<td>Military Situation Summary</td>
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<td>MTI</td>
<td>Moving Target Indicator</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Disclosure Policy</td>
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<td>National Military Intelligence Center</td>
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<td>NMIST</td>
<td>National Military Intelligence Support Team</td>
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<td>MNF</td>
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<td>Operational Intelligence Crisis Center</td>
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<td>Operational Plan</td>
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<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSP</td>
<td>Operational Support Package</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGWG</td>
<td>Persian Gulf Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>RGFC</td>
<td>Republican Guard Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCIF</td>
<td>Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCJD</td>
<td>Soviet-made surface-to-surface missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCCENT</td>
<td>Special Operations Command, Central Command</td>
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<td>Special Operations Command</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Short Range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>Senate Select Committee on Intelligence</td>
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<td>TARPS</td>
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<td>Transporter-Erector-Launcher</td>
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<td>Target Material</td>
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<td>Time Sensitive Collection Requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>WATCHCON</td>
<td>Watch Condition</td>
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<td>WWIMS</td>
<td>Worldwide Warning and Indicator Monitoring System</td>
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