MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
February 19, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Weekly National Security Report

Starting this week, I propose to give you each Saturday, as part of your weekend reading, a highly concise Weekly National Security Report. I think of it as a highly compressed statement, containing the following elements: some candid thoughts on the major trends or issues of the week (1. Opinions); capsule summaries of some salient facts which may not have been brought to your attention in the course of the week (2. Facts); brief signals of things to think about or to look out for (3. Alerts); summary expressions of concern or of criticism (4. Concerns); and brief indications of foreign reactions to your policies and initiatives (5. Reactions). The NSC Staff and I will be glad to elaborate on any of the above, and I hope that this format will be useful to you. Perhaps after a few weeks you can let me know whether this is helpful or whether it is merely a redundant reading item.

1. Opinions

Foreign policy during this week was dominated by two issues: US-Soviet relations, and US policy towards the Middle East.

With regard to U.S.-Soviet relations, both domestic and foreign reactions were heavily focused on the unfolding human rights debate. Unaware of your efforts to stimulate a serious discussion of the central and concrete issues in the U.S.-Soviet relationship (especially through your direct correspondence with Brezhnev), the mass media focused almost exclusively on the question of whether you are right or wrong in commenting directly on the issue of human rights in the Soviet Union. We are running the risk of this issue escalating in the course of the next week, with the Bukovsky visit to the White House and with the possibility of Soviet reprisals against dissidents in the Soviet Union.

It may be necessary, therefore, to take the initiative early in the coming week to define more broadly your overall posture on human
rights, underlining the position that it is based on principle and that our concerns are applicable to all nations -- in other words, that this is not a matter of anti-Soviet tactics. A broadly gauged statement to that effect might also enable us not to have to comment on every particular instance involving a violation of human rights.

You will be seeing in the coming week a special emissary from Romania. We do have a stake in Romanian independence but the Romanian Government has just cracked down hard on its dissidents. On balance, it would be unwise to cancel the visit but it might be appropriate to convey privately to the Romanian Government our very strong views on this matter. We have a stake in Romanian independence but we also have a stake in human rights.

With regard to the Middle East, the Vance and Clifford missions were perceived as reflecting serious U.S. intent to generate movement towards needed settlements. However, initial reactions indicate that such movement will be, at best, very slow. The Turks and Cypriots have reacted to the Clifford mission with suspicion.

In the Middle East the governments so far visited by Secretary Vance have essentially restated their positions and it is not yet clear that any real movement towards a more precise definition of the underlying principles of a settlement or towards serious negotiations has been generated. Sadat's suggestion of a PLO-Jordan link may be a hopeful sign but Cy's reporting cable gave it no particular emphasis. Following his report when he returns, we will have to bite the bullet on the extent to which we are prepared to push and press the parties towards a settlement which we, even if only indirectly, will also have to help to define.

2. Facts

Cuba. Many signals were exchanged between both sides but it is not clear whether we have moved one step forward or three steps backward. After Cy Vance's statement that the U.S. would be willing
to begin discussions without preconditions, two issues that could be dealt with quickly -- the hijacking agreement with a deadline of April 15, and the fisheries jurisdiction issue with a deadline of March 1 -- were quickly placed on the agenda.

Representative Jonathan Bingham, however, brought back a message from Cuba saying that the Cubans have upped the ante on the hijacking agreement -- insisting that discussions can only begin after the embargo is lifted. You then said that if Cuban troops were withdrawn from Angola, it would be a step toward normalization of relations, but there is no indication that the Cubans are withdrawing completely from Angola, but as you know another convoy of ships carrying some troops are headed to Cuba from Angola.

Vietnamese Negotiations. There has been no answer to your proposal for a delegation to visit Hanoi. The story is now leaking out after being held together by a large number of Americans and foreign governments.

Philippines. We have also tentatively agreed with the Filipinos to resume base negotiations in May.

Korea. The story of your exchanges with Kim II-song through Bhutto have leaked. Newsweek is seeking confirmation.

Saudis holding firm on oil prices. Saudi Arabia is continuing to expand oil production in an effort to undermine the 10% increase agreed to by other OPEC members. Crown Prince Fahd refused outright a compromise promoted by the President of OPEC under which the Saudis would accept the 10% price hike while other OPEC members would forego the additional 5% increase scheduled for July.

Morocco has reportedly rejected an offer of Soviet military equipment and has decided to make no further military purchases from the USSR except support items for Soviet equipment currently in their inventory. King Hassan has decided to join Saudi Arabia, Egypt and
Iran to combat Soviet influence in Africa, and he believes that closer relations with the USSR are incompatible with that objective. He is reviewing Morocco's relations with the Soviets in a number of other sectors as well. At the same time we have informed the King that we are closing down our base there but are willing to undertake other cooperative programs in the military area.

The Board for International Broadcasting and the Portuguese Government signed an agreement on February 15 extending RFE's transmitter base there for 15 years; the transmitter may now also be used for RL broadcasts to the Soviet Union. If new transmitters are added or power increased, the Portuguese will get increased compensation. They thus have an incentive to permit expansion of these facilities. These radios provide the most important US access to the Soviet and East European people.

More Savings from Congress

Initial Congressional budget committee action indicates mixed receptivity to our efforts to rescind certain FY 77 monies not yet spent and designated for programs which we wish to terminate. The two largest programs of this type are the CVN-71 aircraft carrier and the AEGIS modification of the nuclear cruiser, Long Beach. These programs total over $700M, which should be recoverable minus any non-refundable portions already obligated. The House Budget Committee assumed such savings in their "Third Concurrent Resolution," and this amounts to a committee recommendation that the House vote for the rescissions. On the Senate side, the Budget Committee resolution does not reflect such rescissions. The Congress must vote out the resolution by March 10.
3. Alerts

Proliferation. A U.S. team which recently investigated nuclear research activities in the Republic of China has concluded that the ROC is continuing to work toward the development of a nuclear explosives capability, and may achieve this capability within two-to-four years. Concrete measures will be required to bring them to heel, and recommendations will be forthcoming soon.

CTB. Aviation Week has been leaked the JCS objections to a comprehensive test ban which are part of the response to PRM 16.

SALT. We are putting the finishing touches on SALT options. Despite your urging of realism, many of those proposed by the bureaucracy are quite one-sided and reflect agency interests. There are some realistic options, however. The main point is that any Cruise Missile-Backfire compromise will be very complicated and not very verifiable. Though the strategic impact of these verification uncertainties is not great, this will contribute to the political difficulty of getting any agreement through Congress -- some of whose members are sporting for a fight on this issue. There will be an SCC meeting on these options next week.

Presidential Communications - Kagniew Station. The Defense Department is increasingly concerned about the physical threat to personnel working on the Kagniew communication site in Ethiopia. The only reason this site is being kept open is to provide Mystic Star Presidential communications support in the Middle East area. I have been in touch with DOD officials over the past several weeks to explore alternative means of fulfilling the requirement for Presidential communications while permitting the Kagniew site to be closed. Defense is in the process of completing a study of alternatives, and we will meet next week to develop some specific options.

Egyptian/Libyan Situation. No decision is likely, however, before the spring.

Strategic Stockpile. Congressional and press interest is growing regarding likely Carter Administration approaches to managing the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile, a $7.5 billion government
supply of over 90 different raw and semi-processed materials. Previous administrations have vacillated widely in their determinations of appropriate stockpile size, from a 1973 Nixon goal of less than $2 B to a recent Ford objective of more than $10 B. Throughout all of this, Congress has prevented any major sales or acquisitions to the stockpile, and a vast array of mining, processing, and speculative investment interests have lobbied fiercely on both sides of the issue. We have placed a moratorium on any stockpile actions by withdrawing from the Ford budget its acquisition/disposal plan. I believe the Domestic Council should take this over and will be working with Stu Eizenstat.

Portugal's Prime Minister Soares indicated that his only realistic choice was to arrange loans from the U.S. and EC, which would provide critically needed capital. He said his government would have to impose austerity measures to obtain such funds, and asked for the full support of the Armed Forces. Questioned about what appeared to be a "over dependence" on the U.S., Soares said the U.S. had the resources and willingness to assist Portugal. He challenged members of the Revolutionary Council to obtain similar large loans from the Socialist Bloc. Soares' commitment to take "whatever actions are necessary" to get the economy in working condition, and his strong backing from President Eanes, is essential to Portuguese economic success.

4. Concerns

Israeli Anxiety. The American Jewish Community (reflecting also Israeli anxieties) showed growing concern over several unrelated incidents which together could be interpreted as indicating a cooler Administration line towards Israel. The denial of U.S. approval of the Kfir fighter plane sale to Ecuador, the withholding of the CBU's, and the sharply critical statements by the State Department spokesman on the Israeli position regarding oil drilling in the Suez Gulf were interpreted as part of a broader
campaign designed to send a tough message to Tel Aviv. These reactions, to be sure, may be tactical, but one should not underestimate the Israeli sense of insecurity, and some gestures of reassurance (e.g., the appointment of a top level U.S. Ambassador to Tel Aviv) may be in order.

Concorde. Your message on the Concorde got through loud and clear -- everyone heard something different. This is likely to provide only temporary surcease of concern and pressure on you may soon resume.

5. Reactions

England. Lord Chalfont has written a two-part series for the London Times comparing this Administration with its predecessor in the field of arms control and commenting on the differences in style and substance. He notes that the new team includes a number of people who regard arms control and disarmament as an integral part of national security, who reject the Metternichean balance-of-power politics which came to be associated with the name of Henry Kissinger, and for whom the concept of strategic superiority in nuclear weapons is at best a meaningless irrelevance and at worse a slogan designed to perpetuate the arms race between the superpowers.

After reviewing the American debate over the significance of the Soviet arms build-up, he concludes that your concentration of effort on the pursuit of arms control agreements assumes a tremendous significance in light of the extreme positions taken in the debate: if the Soviets respond positively, the central problem is open for a serious attack; if not, the West may have to draw some somber conclusions about its military requirements; thus the Soviet Union has a compelling reason for meeting the President at least half way. The President is assuming a fearful responsibility, deserving the support of the free world. If he acts wisely, Chalfont writes, he will go down in history as the President who changed the basic assumptions of international relations.

FRG. Die Welt commented on February 10, 1977, "President Carter has roughly outlined his SALT offer to the Soviets. Details remain unclear. It is reassuring that the U.S. apparently is not ready to shackle its cruise missile. There is reason to take a skeptical view of the possibility of eventual U.S.-Soviet agreement on cruise missiles and Backfire bombers. It would not be wise to pursue a policy of gentlemen's agreements with Moscow or even a policy of good examples, because such a policy might lead to a dangerous shift of the nuclear balance. American advance concessions have never been honored by the Soviets."
Latin America

In general your quick attention to Latin America has been received with mixed feelings in the region. Some leaders, such as President Perez of Venezuela, predict smoother relations, others take a wait-and-see attitude. Here is a sample of opinion in the Hemisphere on the Carter Administration:

Mexico. A carton in a Mexico City newspaper the other day showed a benign Uncle Sam riding with a Mexican on a bicycle built for two.

It was a switch from the usual picture of the United States as an aggressive, all-powerful intruder. It reflected the high spirits generated by the meeting this week between you and President Portillo.

Argentina. Officials of the military government said privately they would have preferred the Ford-Kissinger Administration to continue because they believe it viewed military regimes in Latin America more as anti-communist bulwarks than as violators of human rights. But in Argentina and Paraguay, another military dictatorship, hundreds of political prisoners have been released since you took office, and this apparently was designed to impress the new U.S. Administration.

Brazil. The Jornal de Brasilia, an independent, wrote on February 13 that the US and the USSR are exerting "colonialist pressures against the Brazil-West German nuclear agreement... Why this orchestrated action? The nations now pressuring us not to carry out the nuclear agreement -- arrogating to themselves the role of defenders of world integrity -- did they employ this same reasoning 32 years ago when they began the arms race?"

India

The visit of your mother to India was a great success. The Indian Government obviously welcomed the opportunity to make a forward step in Indo-US relations and ensured that all went smoothly. Press coverage of the event was probably the most favorable that the US has received in India since our response to the famines in the late 1960s. The only potential problem is that the Indians may see more in the gesture (plus your favorable comments on the Indian elections) than we intend. This is a manageable problem, but we will have to be sure that they read our signals clearly. A letter from you to Mrs. Gandhi (under preparation) should set the tone.