MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP-SECRET/SENSITIVE
(CONTAINS CODEWORD) April 1, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Weekly National Security Report #7

1. Opinions

After two months in office, let me give you a highly subjective assessment of where we stand with our foreign policy:

The public clearly understands that the Carter foreign policy is derived from an affirmative commitment to certain basic human values. Moreover, you have defined these values as "human rights," which is both broader and more flexible than such words as "liberty" or "freedom." This gives our foreign policy a wider appeal, more in tune with the emerging political consciousness of mankind -- which is concerned both with liberty and equity.

Starting from that moral base, your basic priorities for our foreign policy, both in terms of actual substance and specific focus, are coherent and consistent: (1) we will seek to coordinate more closely with our principal allies in order to provide the foundation for a more stable international system; (2) we will engage in a North-South dialogue in order to deal with wider human needs; (3) we will seek accommodation on the East-West front in order to avoid war and to widen trans-ideological cooperation. In addition, we will seek to halt the spread of arms, both conventional and nuclear.

The record is more mixed, in my judgment, when we look at more specific aspects of this broad policy:

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Here I think we have done very well. Our commitment to human rights has put the Soviet leadership on the defensive in an area where it had a free ride for at least the last eight years, and perhaps even for the last
fifteen -- if we count from the start of the Vietnamese War. The reason that Brezhnev et al are reacting so strongly to your insistence on human rights is not because they fear that we will make human rights a condition for our relations with them; they fear this insistence because they know that human rights is a compelling idea, and that associating America with this idea not only strengthens us, but it also generates pressures from within their own system. Ideologically they are thus on the defensive.

Moreover, with regards to SALT, by committing ourselves to reductions, we have made the Soviets seem opposed to genuine arms limitations. In the past, they have often made the United States look as if it was opposed to arms limitations. The tables have now been turned, though the chances for a comprehensive agreement this summer are very uncertain.

The next step should be this: we should ask the Soviets to explain what specifically they did not like about the package, thus drawing them into a discussion of it.

The Middle East

Your basic statement has created a flexible framework for dealing with hitherto intractable issues. By combining the need for a comprehensive peace with minor territorial changes but transitional security arrangements and with a homeland for the Palestinians, and by doing so publicly, you have made a real breakthrough. The need is now for the parties concerned to understand that we are committed to these basic principles and that they provide the point of departure for more substantive negotiations among themselves. Again, this is a significant step forward from almost everything that the United States has said on the subject for at least ten to fifteen years, but persistance on our part will be required.

Latin America

We are still shaping our basic approach, but I am hopeful. I use the word "approach" advisedly; it will not be a new policy, something which every new Administration has tended proudly to proclaim -- and then forget. Instead of focusing on Latin America as something special, to be protected by the Monroe Doctrine (which most Latin Americans resent), you are moving towards an approach which stresses bilateral relations, of various types, with individual Latin American states, and which deals with their broader problems in a wider global context. I believe this is responsive to their pride and to their needs.
The major cloud is the deterioration in our relationship with Brazil, something which ought to be repaired, given Brazil’s present and potential role in the Western Hemisphere. Brazil is an emerging superpower and it is clearly in the U.S. interest to have it on our side. It can be a source of stability and influence not only in regard to Latin America but even in regard to Africa, in which it is likely to become increasingly engaged.

**Trilateral Relations**

We have made an excellent start, especially with the Mondale visit which put so much emphasis on genuine consultations. This reflected your emphasis on the primacy of these relations; and was further underlined by your meetings with Callaghan and Fukuda, and by your phone calls to Giscard and Schmidt. However, the nuclear proliferation issue has become a serious bone of contention. Your statement next week and the subsequent consultations might help to relieve this irritant, while the forthcoming summit should provide us with the opportunity for an affirmative recommitment to basic unity among the trilateral countries.

I should note, however, that our human rights policy has evoked rather mixed feelings in Western Europe. This is not surprising, given West European political traditions and their proximity to the Soviets, but for some Europeans -- especially the Germans -- it is a source of concern.

**China**

Our policy towards China is yet to unfold and it needs to be unfolded. Nonetheless, Soviet efforts to promote Sino-Soviet normalization and/or reconciliation have so far failed. This gives us the needed time to develop the required initiatives, though these should be forthcoming in the course of the spring, lest the Chinese begin to think that we ignore them or take them for granted. I will be making some concrete proposals soon.

**South Asia**

With the political change in India, we have again the opportunity for a significant improvement in U.S.-Indian relations. Though my own view of India’s future remains pessimistic, such an improvement -- at least in the short run -- is highly desirable.

**Africa**

It is a morass. Current African events can be seen in terms of two broad interpretations, both of them probably right but each yielding a
contradictory conclusion. The first is that Africa is in the midst of a social-political upheaval, with post-colonial structures simply collapsing. In that case, it is clearly inadvisable for the U.S. to become involved. On the other hand, events in Africa can also be seen as part of a broad East-West struggle, with pro-Western regimes being challenged by the pro-Soviet regimes. This dictates resistance to Soviet efforts. Both interpretations are probably right, and they point to the conclusion (in my mind) that we should press the Soviets to desist, but do so outside of Africa, through diplomatic leverage, trade denial, etc., but not through direct involvement in Africa per se. In the meantime, the situation remains grave and it is possible that pro-Soviet developments in Ethiopia may soon be matched by a collapse of the pro-Western government in Zaire. This, together with the likelihood of very little progress in Southern Africa, portends a rather dark future.

Defense

Our basic position is strong, and a comprehensive reassessment of our force posture and fundamental strategic concepts is now under way. Under Brown's direction, I feel quite confident that by late summer we will be well under way towards a renovated and relevant strategic doctrine. However, in the conventional field and in long-range rapid strike capability much remains to be done, and NATO standardization is not moving forward as much as it should.

North-South Relations

We are yet to define our basic position. You made a good start in your UN speech, but the basic North-South strategy is yet to be shaped. I think it is quite clear that on this issue there will be major divisions within the Cabinet, and probably a tough fight in Congress. However, if one looks ten or twenty years ahead, it is clear that the United States needs desperately to fashion a comprehensive and long-term North-South strategy. Such a strategy is an essential component of your wider architectural effort.

International Economics

The Summit will be vital in this respect, especially with protectionism becoming increasingly appealing. The United States has to provide
definite and clear-headed leadership, and our weaker allies (and all of them are much weaker than we) will be looking to you for personal leadership.

2. Facts

Europe

Financial Assistance to Portugal Still Uncertain. The most recent Portuguese emissary to Bonn has returned with empty hands. Apparently, the Germans were not prepared to make a definite commitment on the financial support package for Portugal or to propose alternatives to the consortium approach. Nonetheless, they did agree to give the problem further consideration.

FRG Arms Sales. The West German ambassador in Paris has told his Saudi counterpart that the FRG may be easing its restrictive Mideast arms sale policy, and that he is "personally convinced" that such easing is required. These comments arose during a discussion of a proposed Saudi purchase of the joint French-German HOT anti-tank missile.

Middle East

Israeli Poll. A Pori poll (considered reliable) recently asked Israelis for their views of an overall settlement with the Arabs: 33.3 percent favored an overall settlement; 33.1 percent preferred interim accords; while 21.7 percent oppose any kind of settlement.

Latin America

Panama. The negotiators returned from Venezuela and Colombia this past weekend. President Perez, who was well briefed by the Panamanians, offered his help as a mediator. It appears that President Lopez Michelsen would prefer to play a less direct role.
Paraguay. Some 20 middle-grade Army officers were arrested for having sent a memorandum to the Army Command urging the "democratic institutional normalization" of the country. This could represent the first significant sign of dissension within the armed forces since February 1973.

Africa

Angola. A message relayed through our Embassy in Lisbon notifies us that the Angolans accept our offer to open negotiations on the normalization of relations. They suggest the UN as the best site and will be ready anytime after April 1.

Far East

PRC. In a remarkably candid interview with Dennis Hamilton of the Sunday Times, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien surveyed the state of Sino-American relations. Li wished to wait before making any judgment on you, but he expressed satisfaction with your public statements to date.

Japanese Exports. We now have the February figures on Japanese color TV exports. They are up 21 percent over February 1976. This surge may reflect the effort of the manufacturers to unload large volumes of exports prior to a restraint agreement. But certainly we should bring this to the attention of the Japanese.

4. Reactions

Vance Mission to Moscow

Major world media prominently reported a U.S.-Soviet impass over SALT proposals as a severe setback to detente, but editorial treatment revealed expectations that the disarmament debate would go on much as before.

Thus while headlines stressed "rejection" of the U.S. proposals and "failure" of the Vance mission to Moscow, correspondents and editors said the outcome was no great surprise to the U.S., that the way was open to resumed negotiations, and that much had been clarified about
Kremlin and Carter Administration tactics. Meanwhile, they noted, ten "working groups" were being set up to discuss non-SALT problems.

The Times of London said "it has been suggested that the President's outspokenness on human rights has soured the Russians. But the hard-nosed men of the SALT negotiations do not believe the Russians let such irritations affect strategic interests."

Le Figaro of Paris observed that "Washington hardly expected the Soviets to jump at taking up these proposals . . . . The Carter Administration seems to have chosen an initially tough position in its first contacts with the USSR . . . . It intends to show the Soviets that it has come into power with new ideas and new methods that the Kremlin will have to reckon with."

Die Welt of Bonn judged that "Moscow is playing for time. The only adequate response to this is to act likewise. Apparently Vance used such tactics in Moscow. This is encouraging."

Milan's Corriere della Sera declared that "for the first time in 60 years the West is on the offensive and the USSR is on the defensive. La Nazione of Florence mused, "There must be a limit to the recklessness of Moscow's policy and Carter apparently is trying to measure its extent."