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Cinclac and Cincpac also for polads

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, PINS, PINT, AF, IR, PK, US

SUBJECT: SIX WEEKS AFTER AFGHANISTAN'S REVOLUTION: A SUMMING UP

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF MY ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY SIX WEEKS AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF APRIL 27-28 AND ON THE EVE OF MY FINAL DEPARTURE FROM KABUL.

2. THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (DAI) IS OVERWHELMINGLY DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION. IT CANNOT STAY IN POWER WITHOUT SOVIET
HELP, IT RELIES ON HUNDRED PERCENT ON THE SOVIET UNION FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT, AND Increasingly ON THE SOVIET UNION FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, BOTH TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL, AND FOR TRADE.

3. THE LEADERS OF THE ODA HAVE BEEN IDEOLOGICALLY INSPIRED BY THE SOVIET UNION—THEIR ADHERENCE TO MARXISM-LENINISM IS REVEALED IN THEIR RHETORIC, IN THEIR STATED INTENTION TO FOLLOW THE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT MODEL BY EMOTIONALIZING HEAVY INDUSTRY AND COLLECTIVIZING OF AGRICULTURE, IN THE WAY IN WHICH THEY HAVE ORGANIZED THEIR PARTY AND GOVERNMENT, AND IN THEIR CLOSE AFFINITY TO THE SOVIET SATELLITES.

4. THE NEW LEADERS OF THE ODA ARE ELATED BY THE SUCCESS OF THEIR REVOLUTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY CLEARLY FEAR THE POSSIBILITY OF ACTION AGAINST THEM FROM BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FORCES, AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ARE HIGHLY VISIBLE AND STRICT. A NATIONWIDE NIGHTTIME CURFEW IS STILL IN EFFECT.

5. I AM NOT AWARE THAT ANY OPPOSITION TO THE ODA IS BEING ORGANIZED BY ANY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. IT IS, HOWEVER, CLEAR THAT THE ODA REPRESENTS A MINORITY OF THE AFGHAN POPULATION AND THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE APPREHENSION AND OUTRIGHT OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME INSIDE AFGHANISTAN, IN THE MIDDLE CLASS, THE CLERGY, AND THE TRIBES. AT THE MOMENT, THIS OPPOSITION IS FRAGMENTED AND LEADERLESS AND, HENCE, POSES NO IMMEDIATE THREAT TO THE REGIME. WHETHER IT CAN COALESCE AROUND A LEADER IN THE MONTHS AHEAD REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

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EVEN IN THAT CASE, IT WOULD HAVE TO OVERCOME THE CONSIDERABLE MILITARY POWER OF THE ODA, BACKED BY THE MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE USSR. IN ORDER TO OVERTHROW IT, A POSSIBLY MORE LIKELY SCENARIO INVOLVES ASSASSINATIONS, TERRORIST ACTS, AND QUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE MOUNTAINOUS TRIBAL AREAS ADJOINING PAKISTAN. OTHER POSSIBILITIES WHICH ARE HARD TO EVALUATE AT THE MOMENT INCLUDE SPLIT WITHIN THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP OR BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERS.

6. THE NEW LEADERSHIP IS INEXPERIENCED IN GOVERNMENT.
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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODD-00 PM-00
H-01 INR-10 L-03 MSAE-00 MXC-05 EPA-01 JSP-02
BB-16 ICA-11 OMB-01 TBRE-00 ID-13 EB-08 AID-05
AGRE-00 HA-05 MCT-01 CTME-00 INT-06 DOE-15 BOE-02
NRC-05 147 W.

R 1311412 JUN 76
FM AMBASSADORES KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8553
INFO AMBASSADORES ANKARA
AMBASSADORES DACCA
AMBASSADORES ISLAMABAD
AMBASSADORES LONDON
AMBASSADORES MOSCOW
AMBASSADORES NEW DELHI
USL PEKING
AMBASSADORES TEHRAN
CINCEUR
CINCPAC

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7. IN FOREIGN POLICY, THE DRA WILL UNQUESTIONABLY NOT WANT TO ENGAGE IN ANY ACTIONS WHICH WOULD DISTURB THE PEACE IN THIS REGION -- AT LEAST UNTIL IT HAS CLEARLY SOLIDIFIED ITS POSITION WITHIN AFGHANISTAN. THEREAFTER, ITS FOREIGN POLICY, PARTICULARLY TOWARD PAKISTAN AND IRAN, IS LIKELY TO BE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY THE WISHES OF THE SOVIET UNION. THERE IS NO QUESTION IN MY MIND THAT THE SOVIETS WANT TO KEEP THE PAKISTAN AND BALUCHISTAN CARDS AVAILABLE FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE USE, AND THAT THE DRA WILL BE THEIR INSTRUMENT.

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ACTION MEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODD-00 PM-00
H-01 INR-10 L-03 MSAE-00 MXC-05 EPA-01 JSP-02
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8. ONE QUESTION THAT COMES TO MIND IS WHETHER THE DRA WILL WANT TO OR BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN ANY DEGREE OF
AND ADMINISTRATION AND WILL HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME
WITHOUT EXTENSIVE EXTERNAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN
COMING TO GRIPS WITH AFGHANISTAN'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
PROBLEMS. THE ECONOMY MAY MOVE AHEAD ON ITS OWN STEAM
FOR A WHILE, AIDED BY A FAVORABLE AGRICULTURAL SITUATION
THIS YEAR, BUT DIFFICULTIES COULD BECOME EVIDENT WITHIN
SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR. THE PRIVATE SECTOR, FOR EXAMPLE,
IS SLOWING DOWN RAPIDLY, AND THE PRINCIPAL FORM OF
GOVERNMENT REVENUE, CUSTOMS RECEIPTS, HAVE FALLEN SHARPLY.
INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THE LEADERSHIP SAYS IT WANTS TO. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER IT IS ABLE TO. MOST SIGNS SO FAR INDICATE THAT THE SOVIET EMBRACE IS PRETTY TIGHT.

9. ANOTHER QUESTION IS WHY THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF WANTS TO DOMINATE AFGHANISTAN. DURING THE DAUD -- AND EVEN THE ROYAL -- REGIMES, THE SOVIETS GOT WHAT THEY WANTED OUT OF AFGHANISTAN STRATEGICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY. WHY DO THEY WANT TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS FRACTIOUS COUNTRY, AND WHY DO THEY WANT TO ASSUME AN EVEN GREATER SHARE OF THE COSTLY ECONOMIC BURDEN OF AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE DEVELOPMENT? MY BELIEF IS THAT SOVIET IDEOLOGY PERSUADERS THEM THAT HISTORY IS ON THE SIDE OF MARXISM-LENINISM AND IF MINIMAL RISKS ARE INVOLVED, HISTORY SHOULD BE NUDGED ALONG, PARTICULARLY IF IT INVOLVES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOVIET-DOMINATED REGIME. IN THE CASE OF THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION, IT WOULD APPEAR FOR THE MOMENT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE GOTTEN AWAY WITH IT WITHOUT ANY SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO THEIR RELATIONS WITH US OR WITH THE INDIANS, AND THAT THEY HAVE ACHIEVED SOME NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE IN THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, THEY ARE GIVING AWAY NOTHING FREE HERE--ANYTHING THEY WILL SPEND IN AFGHANISTAN WILL BE REPAID WITH AFGHAN MINERAL RESOURCES, ESPECIALLY PETROLEUM, GAS, AND COPPER, BUT POSSIBLY ALSO IRON AND URANIUM.

10. IN THIS SITUATION, WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES BE DOING? WITH RESPECT TO AFGHANISTAN, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD DO OUR BEST TO MAINTAIN A SUFFICIENT PRESENCE.

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