MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject: Checklist of Operation Raincoat (U)

1. Submitted for your information is a check list of actions to be taken beginning at Strike Hour (S) minus 48 hours which was prepared by the Department of State in collaboration with OSD/ISA. Its purpose is to provide a list of actions which should be taken in connection with the implementation of the subject operation to eliminate by direct means the IREMs and MRBMs in Cuba.

2. The list of actions set forth in the subject plan are considered feasible, appropriate and timely if modified as indicated by the proposed Joint Staff changes.

3. The modifications proposed by the Joint Staff have been furnished to OSD/ISA.

4. At one time this paper was being given considerable impetus as to the actions to be taken prior to initiation of a military operation. Obviously, its importance has diminished, but it might be worthwhile for the Chiefs to review it at their convenience.

Paul S. Emrick
Major General, USAF
Director for Plans and Policy
STATE DEPARTMENT DRAFT

OPERATION RAINCOAT

The objective of this operation is to eliminate the MRBM's and IREBM's in Cuba by:

a. A sequence of actions oriented toward Cuba that will increase pressure on the Soviets and the Cuban regime to dismantle and remove them; failing that

b. To destroy them in an air attack.

The major prerequisites before a decision to strike at S-12 hours are as follows:


b. Evidence that no major actions are being made to dismantle the MRBM's, IREBM's and IL-28's in Cuba.

c. The rejection, or low probability of implementation of the US version of the Latin American nuclear free zone proposal.
The Problem of Timing

Some problems in warning of use of force against offensive systems and the timing of action:

In favor of visible crescendo pointing towards air strike;
1. We would like to have prior consultation with Allies.
2. We would like to have increasing pressure succeed in removing build-up prior to strike.

In favor of generalized pressure not specifically keyed to air strike:

3. We would like to have good security for military reasons.
4. We would like to preempt commitments by Khrushchev.

To have thorough consultation risks letting Soviets and Cubans learn of the operation. They could take military action to lessen its effectiveness and increase our losses; prior launch of some of their aircraft and conceivably a few missiles in attack on the US is conceivable. Politically the Soviets could bring strong pressures to bear by quickly announced threats or commitments.

To omit consultation risks a disunited Alliance at the very time when unity may be most essential. If the major Allies lack the sensation of having been heard before final decision were taken, and especially if the Soviets react in Europe, we are open to the serious charge of unilateral recklessness if the outcome does not at once look hopeful. Should Berlin access be blocked following a Cuba strike about which we had not consulted, there is a real risk that we might not get the contingency plans executed in a way convincing to the Soviets.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Political Action</th>
<th>Military Action</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S-48</td>
<td>1. Letter to Castro to be delivered by Brazilian Ambassador</td>
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<td>2. Statement to Dobrynin that intolerable build ups continuing and that those involved in Cuba may suffer.</td>
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<td>3. OAS request US act as agent for OAS to continue surveillance and help OAS evaluate threat.</td>
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<td>4. White House statement that offensive build up continuing; dangerous and provocative act which increases gravity of situation. State instruct embassies to follow up</td>
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<td>White House</td>
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<td>5. Advise GINCEUR DOD all unified and specified commanders concerning possible US actions, likely timing results expected and schedule of notifications and consultations with NATO governments, ask for recommendations about USG actions to facilitate NATO readiness.</td>
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<td>REASON: All commanders particularly CINCSAC, CINCLANT, CINCARIB and USCINCEUR should be thoroughly apprised of the course of action contemplated in Operation RAINCOAT. Decision as to the need for recommendations for increasing readiness in NATO, SEATO or other areas/alliances should be left to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.</td>
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<td>6. Consult with (i.e., advise concerning latest intelligence, range of possible US actions, and results expected) the following: a. UK, France, FRG b. Canada</td>
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7. Inform CINCEUR concerning nature and timing of operation. Authorize CINCEUR to place USEUCOM on appropriate NATO alert at 3-hour but not more than measures contained in Defcon.

S-36 8. Consult with Quadripartite Group, NAC and OAS on continuing US concern about weapons in Cuba; latest evidence of continued construction; negotiation track being pursued but not promising; have communicated with Castro; restate determination to remove weapons.

S-24 9. Rejection, or low probability of implementation in Cuba of US version of nuclear free zone proposal.


**REASON:** Execution of a leaflet drop in Cuba with the attendant possibility of the loss of the delivery aircraft is militarily unsound at this point. Loss of the aircraft over Cuba would provide the Cubans with propaganda that could defeat the objectives of Operation RAINCOAT. It further might trigger off overt action against the US by the Cubans. Instead of the leaflet drop, we should use radio for greater coverage of Cuba and announce to the Cubans that they should stay clear of all military installations rather than missile sites, as proposed in the paper.


12, 11. Appropriate military alerts in US and abroad

13, 12. Appropriate military readiness measures being taken by US forces.

16-15. Inform Washington Ambassadorial Group

17-16. Continuing absence of any evidence that major actions being taken on dismantling of missiles and bombers.

18-17. Presidential DOD White House order to strike.


S-6 20-19. Notification of Turkish and Italian Prime Ministers that Soviets might attempt some counter-action with regard to Jupiters and to remain calm.

21-20. SACEUR asks NATO governments for authority to place forces on slot at S-Hour
22.21. Inform of nature of operation:
   a. All other NATO governments
   b. NAC

23.22. Air strike DOD against all known MREB and IREB sites followed immediately by low level recce; have follow up strike in air ready for release.

24.23. Notify Dobrynin of attack

25.24. Notify Ambassadorial representative at UN


27.26. Briefing of NATO Ambassadors

28.27. Call for Security Council Meeting that afternoon

29.28. Briefing of Congressional leadership

30.29. Brief, public announcement of fact of attack and preliminary results

31.30. Inform Standing Group, Military Committee and UK, French and FRG Ambassadors of details of results.

32.31. Inform Congressional Leadership of details of results

33.32. Presidential announcement of attack and results

34.33. Leaflet drop DOD in Cuba stressing fact that attack limited to Soviet bases; weakness of Soviet strength in Cuba.

35.34. Briefing in friendly capitals in Western Europe

36.35. Briefing for CENTO
37. Continue DOD military preparedness measures to include deployments recommended by SACEUR and agreed by the United States.

S+14 38-37. Meeting of OAS followed by Organ of Consultation Meeting

ADVANTAGES OF THIS COURSE

1. Carries out President's pledge to eliminate offensive threat to US and Hemisphere from Cuba and avoids any erosion of US momentum and position. The pledge carried out shows that US has will to fight and to protect vital interests (of great importance vis-a-vis Berlin).

2. Since directed at offensive weapons, keeps issue focused on Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba in defiance of OAS and majority of Security Council.

3. Sharp, possible one time action, may carry smaller risks of further escalation than a series of confrontations over a period of time. Soviet decision to risk major war unlikely to be decisively affected by this action in an area non-vital to the Soviets.

4. Prompt action will avoid danger of a growth of hands-off Cuba movement throughout Latin America which might make it increasingly difficult to strike at offensive weapons. Present willingness of Latin Americans to support strong action probably cannot be maintained indefinitely.

5. Signals clearly that US not prepared to bargain bases in Cuba for positions in Berlin, Nato and elsewhere.

6. It could demonstrate to Cubans, Castro and others, the weakness of Soviet position in Cuba. In the absence of a strong Soviet reaction in defense of Cuba, we would start the process of disenchantment and disaffection requisite to undermining Castro and Cuban reliance on the Soviet Union. We would also weaken any tendencies to rely on Soviets elsewhere in world.

7. Removes a military threat to US from Cuban territory.

8. Denies Khrushchev a possible cheap victory through successful maintenance of offensive weapons in Cuba.

9. Pressure preceding strike may be sufficient to accomplish objective without execution of attack - especially if a suitable out available to Khrushchev and Castro.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

DISADVANTAGES

1. This action may force Khrushchev to react strongly and could result in some type of war. Khrushchev will not order launch of a missile from Cuba unless he is ready for war essentially on other grounds. There is greater likelihood of a riposte in kind. However, it is unlikely that the risks of major war are greater than through escalation of blockade.

2. There is remote possibility that some local Soviet commander in Cuba may order firing of a missile.

3. Adverse effect on US image of initiation of use of force against a small country. This can be minimized by making attack selective and focused solely on Soviet offensive weapons. At same time there would be positive increments to our image from demonstration of clear willingness to take on the Soviets in protection of our vital interests.

4. Unless carefully handled could damage long-range US-Cuban relations.

5. May not totally eliminate offensive weapons thus calling for follow up attacks and/or invasion, unless full and unlimited international inspection is agreed to.