14 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

SUBJECT: Soviet Military Presence in Cuba

1. No one will record the Cuba episode a victory of even modest proportions for the United States if the end result is a substantial Soviet military presence in this hemisphere. A Cuban foothold would provide the USSR, in addition to a base of operations for subversive activities in Latin America, possible nuclear storage sites and staging bases for general war operations. Equally as important, their presence in Cuba would signify a change in the balance of power between East and West. In light of these possible adverse consequences, the US must begin to focus more attentively on possible steps which could eliminate the Soviet military garrison from Cuba. This expulsion must be done by means short of the use of force, since we are unlikely to take direct military action against other than offensive weapons.

2. The original US quarantine list gives us potential leverage in dealing with the Soviets. The list of prohibited items includes equipment that the Soviet forces now in Cuba must be resupplied with if they are to be effective, and some other items they may be supplied with. Specifically, supplies and armaments for torpedo boats, spare parts and bombs for bombers, air-to-surface rockets, nuclear warheads
for the FROG as well as for the other weapons mentioned—the possibility that this prohibited material may be shipped to Cuba justifies continuation of the quarantine after removal of the IL-28s and offensive missiles.

3. In negotiations in New York we have discussed with the Russians a "minimum list" of offensive weapons. Since this reduced list includes bomber aircraft and related equipment, as well as nuclear warheads of any kind, it also provides a sound basis to maintain our search of incoming ships.

4. Basically, as long as the Soviets have dual-capable Soviet forces in Cuba (even if the IL-28 problem is settled), if we are to be certain that our minimum prohibited list is adhered to, we will have to continue the quarantine. If, on the other hand, Soviet military forces were withdrawn from Cuba—again assuming the IL-28 issue is resolved—perhaps we could lift the quarantine with little or no qualms. If we could have Soviet military aid to Castro also cease, we would have achieved a major diplomatic victory.

5. We have a good case for requesting Soviet withdrawal from Cuba and for the elimination of Soviet military aid to Cuba if we give Castro assurances against invasion, although the persuasiveness of our case probably diminishes each day, we don’t mention it to the Russians. In his 26 October letter, Premier Khrushchev stated:
"If assurances were given by the President and the Government of the United States that the USA itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet, this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the Government of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if there is no threat, then armaments are a burden for every people. Then, too, the question of the destruction, not only of the armaments which you call offensive, but of all other armaments as well, would look different." (Underscoring added)

Later in the same letter Khrushchev wrote:

"I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear."

6. Although the US government has thus far been reluctant to give Castro any assurances, it would seem that we would be willing to give him assurances of some significance if we received in return:
(1) the offensive weapons removed, (2) the Soviet military forces out of Cuba, (3) a Castro government receiving no Soviet military aid, and (4) some long term inspection system. Even if we do not achieve these four optimum objectives, if we got the first two and a firm commitment on the third, we might be able to adopt a very restricted long term inspection plan for Cuba, and agree to similar inspection of the Latin American "training camps" as well. If we got only the first
two, the inspection would have to be more comprehensive and there would be no reason why we should agree to its extension beyond Cuba. Of course, the Chinese might try to pick up the Soviet military aid tab, but given their problems with India, it seems unlikely that they could do so effectively. Moreover, with aerial and sea lanes surveillance--covert if not overt by means of an open skies formula--hopefully we could detect a buildup early in the game and take action to prevent it.

7. In short, Soviet military presence in Cuba would seem to demand that either we live with the uncertainty of possible nuclear and offensive weapons in Cuba, and hence back down from our present public position, or else that we continue the quarantine--and hence search of Soviet ships--for as long as the Soviets are there. Given these alternatives, the desirability of encouraging the Soviets to leave Cuba should arouse considerable support.

8. The Soviet need to resupply their Cuba garrison in the face of our quarantine, Khrushchev's 26 October statements cited above, our public stand on the quarantine, and Soviet-Cuban relations, taken together should offer some negotiating prospects that could be exploited. For example, if the Soviets are truly having difficulties with the Cubans, they may be almost ready to pull out, and all we will have to do is
encourage them by referring to their commitment of 26 October, and giving on some points we are not likely to get anyway, e.g., comprehensive UN inspection of Cuba. Another possibility could occur if we became convinced the Soviets could do nothing about the IL-28s in Cuban hands. We should consider an offer that we would accept reluctantly IL-28s in Cuban hands if the Soviet forces departed, agreed formally not to return, and ceased giving Castro military aid. It would seem more desirable from the US long run point of view to have the Soviets out and the Cubans with IL-28s than to have the reverse. There are various other combinations or packages that the experienced State negotiations could devise which might serve to have the crisis end with the Soviet military forces out of Cuba.

9. The problem of whether to inspect Soviet military supplies may be soon upon us. Intelligence reports show a large number of "wheat-bearing" ships enroute to Cuba. In the past these type manifests have been a cover for arms and related equipment. Because of the hurried Russian deployment to Cuba over the last months, some of the ships enroute must be carrying badly needed resupplies to the Soviet forces. We should have a course of action decided upon before the ships get too close. Will we inspect or not? (Parenthetically, the Soviets will undoubtedly exploit any lifting of the quarantine to resupply quickly, and in depth, their forces if they intend to stay in Cuba.)
10. **Recommendation:** That the NSC Executive Committee (1)
have the State Department evaluate alternative negotiating tactics
to urge the Soviet forces to leave Cuba, and (2) decide upon the US
course of action when the Soviets try to resupply their Cuban garrison.

W. Y. S.