TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

BLOCKADE MEASURES

Objective: Exert leverage toward elimination of missiles new in Cuba by controlled, progressively intensifying blockade measures.

Assumptions:

1. Soviets are, for the time being, moving cautiously; situation may become static unless US takes intensifying measures.
2. Objective of stopping further buildup is, for the time being, apparently attained.

Measures:

1. Expansions of contraband list.
2. Changing locations of intercepts.

1. Expansions of contraband list
   a. Present list:
      - Surface-to-surface missiles.
      - Bomber aircraft.
      - Bombs.
      - Air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles.
      - Warheads for any of above.
      - Mechanical electronics for any of above.
      - Other items of classes material hereafter designated.
b. Expansion of present list, by measures in order of increasing severity, could be accomplished as follows:

1. Rocket or exotic fuels, aviation gasoline, and additives (i.e., Blights) for refining high-performance rating aviation gasoline, and/or machinery and equipment relating to the handling or processing thereof may be added as a logical step toward degrading Cuban offensive capabilities. Cuba imports crude oil for refining impurposes, but only a limited amount of refined av gas. The rocket fuels/oxidizers must be imported as far as is known, as are the additives necessary in refining crude into high-performance rating gasoline or jet or rocket fuels.

This step would necessitate visit and search of all tankers and diversion of those carrying partial loads of the fuels named for offloading. These tankers loaded entirely with crude would be permitted to proceed.
2) **FUELS & LUBRICANTS**

Refined fuels and lubricants capable of support of offensive weapon systems and the machinery and equipment required for the handling and processing thereof would be logical additions to the prohibited list. This would necessitate the visit, search, and, in some cases, diversion of all tankers as well as the visit and search and possible diversion of a good many general cargo carriers.

This will increase the number of diversions and reduce the flow of petroleum products generally.
3. Crude oil rationing or cut-off. Crude oil, can be transformed by the Cuban refineries into the fuels required by the offensive weapons. It is therefore logical that the amount of crude oil products be rationed. This permits a flexible measure which can be tightened or loosened at will. The effect is not susceptible of exact determination by the neutrals. The rationing concept can be used to undercut the opposition by neutrals and does not have full-blockade connotations. At the same time, if strictly applied, it could soon bring the Cuban economy to a halt, cause power shortages and machinery breakdowns to the missile sites and control complexes. It would also increase domestic pressure upon Castro to come to terms acceptable to the U.S.
4) All weapons, including hand-carried weapons, can be interpreted into the list of prohibited materials. They are offensive in the sense that Cuba already has sufficient weapons for legitimate defensive purposes.

5) Machinery and spare parts usable for military purposes nature may be added to the list of prohibited materials as the third measure of increasing severity. While this addition can not be tied as easily to the "Interdiction of Offensive Weapons" Proclamation, a relationship can be shown.

This can be accomplished by interpretation of current directives in that almost all machinery parts and electrical equipment can be visualized as useable in support of a complex.

This step would permit diversion of a larger number of ships.
6. Technicians and military personnel. Removal of such personnel for detention or return to USSR would provide some intelligence potential, encourage defections, and inhibit Soviet travel to Cuba. It is, however, reminiscent of 1912 and the most severe extension of quarantine restrictions.
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II. Change locations of intercepts

(1) Intercept, visit and search at progressively less
distance from Cuba.

**Pro.** Indicates contempt for Soviet/Cuban military
capability in Cuba.

*Makes evasion of blockade more difficult.*

*Decreases surveillance effort for a given
confidence level; or increases confidence level for same
surveillance effort.*

*At very short distance, i.e., a few miles off
Havana, many Cubans and resident foreigners will see the action.*

*Domination of close-in waters will encourage
defections.*

**Con.** Greater danger to our forces as distance de-
creases.

*Increasing likelihood of an accidental incident.*

*Increasing difficulty of Soviets keeping control
of Cuban forces.*

(2) Extend area of intercept and inspection beyond the
presently established line.

**Pro.** Would make possible some intercepts before ships
could turn around.

*Would serve notice on Russia of the U.S. intent
to dominate the Atlantic area.*

**Con.** Would require additional forces to insure that
some ships did not evade the blockade.

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Would expand the area of air surveillance and thereby require an increase in level of air forces required.

Would not increase effectively, pressure on Cuba or USSR.

(3) Require Russian ships exiting into Norwegian Sea, Baltic Straits, Gibraltar to declare their destination. Announce that ships declaring falsely will be subject to seizure.

**PRO.** Increases pressure on Russians, by restricting their widely-used practice of false declarations.

Gives us opportunity of seizing one or more ships at will on basis of "misinterpretation" their declarations.

Might be practical if British would cooperate.

**CON.** Require extensive forces at above location. Particularly difficult in Norwegian Sea due to size and bad weather. Extends surveillance area to North Cape, Baltic, Mediterranean. North Cape surveillance would require Norway to cooperate, Baltic, Germans/Danes.
4. **Proscribed routes through Caribbean Island passages.**

Ships deviating from prescribed routes subject to

**Pros:**
- Increase Russian shipping time and costs.
- A further humiliating restriction.
- Decrease blockade force requirements, or allow more intensive/longer visit and search with same forces.
- Allow more efficient use of ASU forces to protect our blockade forces.

Designates a line along which Russian ships may be visited and searched regardless of distance from Cuba.

**Cons:**
- If Russian ships choose to escort, will simplify their escort problem.
- Increased concentration of our blockade forces reduces flexibility their use. Also,
- Might encourage Russian attempts to disguise their ships and proceed via little-used routes.

**Offer Russians use of a Navigator System.** Russian ships not carrying prohibited materials could obtain a certificate exempting them from visit and search, either from US DIPLOMATIC representatives in Russia or any parent port. Violation would subject ships to seizure.
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Pers.: Lends some faint tinge of legality to our blockade. Precedent for this system, World War I and II.

Implies our determination to maintain tight control of blockade by every means.

Com.: Requires prior diversion and long, thorough search in a part of one or more Russian ships to give Russian motivation to use the system.

S. Summary: Most useful measures under changing location of intercept appear to be:

Intercept at least distance.

Prepared routes.

Extend area, and

Check focal straits.
III. Changing Blockade Procedures

1. Establish Prohibited Zone (sea, possibly air)
   a. Provisions: declare a zone including Cuba and approaches in which all (or Bloc, or Soviet) surface ships and aircraft are forbidden to operate without a U.S. document (NAVICERT), and submerged operations are forbidden entirely. Violators would be subject to diversion, seizure, or destruction.

   Provide NAVICERTS for ships, after appropriate inspection, at certain U.S. and perhaps foreign ports and at, perhaps, three chosen locations off Cuba, where certifying ships with inspection teams would be stationed.

   Provide NAVICERTS for aircraft at, MIAMI and SAN JUAN, or other airports.
   b. Pros and Cons

   With, probably, some static from neutrals and friends, would publicly provide a complete control system over all ingress to Cuba which could be tightened up or relaxed at will.

2. Inspect all Soviet (or Bloc) ships leading for or declaring for:
   a. Cuba
   b. Ports previously used as false destinations for ships bound for Cuba, e.g. CONAKRY.
   c. Gibraltar, under theory that these ships will proceed to Cuba by devious routes.
3. Inspect all Soviet (or Bloc) ships intercepted in the Eastern Atlantic (or expand to include entire Atlantic) regardless of heading, answers provided to challenges, and apparent cargo.

   Pro - Would result in a much tighter blockade.

   Con - Would tend to lose identity with Cuba as distances increased from southwest Atlantic.

4. Conduct time-consuming and elaborate at sea inspections of all Soviet (or Soviet Bloc) ships which are stopped. Hold up while small boarding parties make meticulous inspections of all compartments and equipments. Inspection parties should take many photographs approaching ship and while on board.

5. Increase of number of ships brought into U.S. ports for inspection. Inasmuch as it requires the judgment of an expert to determine what material, for instance electrical components or materials, can be used to support offensive missile installations, a majority of general purpose cargo ships will have some material that would need further examination by our qualified experts. Even if there is no visible material that could be considered as contraband, it would require an extensive search to certify that there are no small items, such as transistors.

6. Increase thoroughness of in-port inspections of diverted ships. The thoroughness of the inspections can be such as to delay release of the ships. Limited numbers of laborers, and inspectors, feather-bedding, lack of overtime, re-inspections, clumsiness, etc. can extend the in-port time indefinitely. The number of ships in port can be raised to disrupt availability of shipping. This, combined with reluctance of non-Bloc nations...
to have their ships involved, can cut the flow of traffic to a trickle.

7. Harass Soviet ships in the Atlantic (or Mediterranean, or world-wide) by putting them in embarrassing situation at sea (involving crossing or potential collisions); U.S. ships to be in position for right of way.

   Pro - Would provide unmistakable evidence of U.S. determination to continue pressure on USSR until Cuban situation solved to U.S. satisfaction.

   Con - Could provide embarrassment to U.S. if accidents result therefrom. Also it might take some time for sufficient Soviet ships to recognize this measure and report on it to establish the pattern.

8. Keep guns trained on all ships challenged, stopped, or ordered diverted.

   Pro - Harassing action.

   Con - Not normally done as a blockade measure.
III. Changing Blockade Procedures

1. Establish prohibited zone (sea, possibly air).
2. Inspect all Soviet (or Bloc) ships -- various destinations.
3. Inspect all Soviet (or Bloc) ships in Atlantic regardless of heading, answers to challenges, or apparent cargo.
4. Conduct elaborate at-sea inspections.
5. Increase number of ships brought into U.S. ports.
6. Make extremely thorough in-port inspection of diverted ships.
7. Harassing actions against Soviet (or Bloc) ships at sea.
8. Keep guns trained on challenged, intercepted, and diverted ships.
IV. Soviet Bloc Ships which could be Selected for Interception and Search

1. **VOLKERFREUND SCHAFT** - East German Communist passenger ship. Should be at interception line now (25 1500). USS PIERCE now nearby. Suspect high East German officials aboard and students who might defect.


3. **VINNETSA** - Russian tanker which should arrive in Havana tonight (25 2000). Would have to be intercepted along north coast of Cuba this afternoon.

4. **YURI GAGARIN** - Eastbound after turning around. Probably carrying military cargo. Should be about 1000 miles from barrier this afternoon.