Revised Briefing Sheet for the Chairman, JCS, on a report to be considered at the JCS meeting, 9 November 1962.

Subject: Supplement to JCS MCL - Outline for World-Wide Actions (U)

Background - On 27 Oct 62, TAB B - the Chairman, JCS directed that the Joint Staff prepare a supplement to the "JCS Master Check List for Cuban Operations", indicating the timely actions that the JCS should take on a world-wide basis in view of possible Soviet reaction to increased US military operations against Cuba.

- On 30 Oct 62, the Operations Deputies returned a J-3 outline responsive to this requirement for coordination with the Service Planners.

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- On 6 Nov 62, the Operations Deputies approved the subject outline as a supplement to the JCS Master Check List for Cuban Operations.

- On 8 Nov 62, the Director, Joint Staff directed that the Outline for World-Wide Actions be placed on the JCS agenda for consideration on 9 Nov 1962.

Current Report - TAB A - contains a list of timely actions for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Service Comments - All Services have agreed that the actions listed are actions which, in concert with the appropriate political actions and in furtherance of the requisite political objectives, may warrant definitive development within the Joint Staff and the Services.

Comment and Recommendation - The current conditions of world crisis under which both the Joint Staff and the individual Service Staffs are functioning require that maximum staff effort be directed toward prompt and effective resolution of problems relating to the Cuban crisis, the developing Sino-Indian conflict, and the continuing Berlin confrontation.

- It should be noted that blanket approval of the some 29 courses of action set forth in this paper would result in generating a massive staff effort (both JCS and the Services) which could dilute to an unacceptable degree the effort currently being directed toward resolution of the major problems indicated above.

- The Director, J-3, recommends that the rationale underlying the Outline for World-Wide Actions be used as a basis for discussions between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other agencies of the government, and that the specific actions included within the outline be developed in detail only as requisite political guidance is provided and with appropriate time-phasing.

Approved by: [Signature]
Director, J-3

Opinion as to Recommendation: [Signature] (Concur) (Nonconcour)
Director, Joint Staff

Briefing Sheet prepared by: Col John H. Elder, USA
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Supplement to
JCS MCL 8 Nov 1962

8 November 1962

SUPPLEMENT TO THE JCS MASTER CHECK LIST FOR CUBAN OPERATIONS

OUTLINE FOR WORLD-WIDE ACTIONS
OUTLINE FOR WORLD-WIDE ACTIONS

1. The actions proposed herein are designed to enhance the ability of the United States to contend with long- and short-term Communist reaction to events in Cuba. They support four basic objectives:
   a. To wage an integrated world-wide political offensive against the Sino-Soviet Bloc, supported by appropriate military measures, to develop pressure points within the Bloc for subsequent exploitation.
   b. To enhance credibility of our deterrent power and to increase the strength and resolve of our alliances.
   c. To reconstitute and to round out our strategic capabilities while remaining ready rapidly and effectively to broaden military operations against Cuba.
   d. To effect permanent improvement in the readiness and balance of our forces on a strategic scale.

2. These actions are founded in the conviction that the immediate aftermath of the President's declaration regarding Cuba is a most critical period which could constitute a turning point in our favor in the over-all East-West conflict; or, could become merely a temporary detente followed by even more persistent Communist pressures against US and Free World interests. These actions are to capitalize on any immediate advantages and to make the current crisis a turning point indeed. An essential accompaniment for these actions is a vigorous and concerted diplomatic and psychological exploitation of the current situation.

3. It is recognized that definitive actions cannot be taken with respect to many of the items suggested herein until specific political objectives have been provided. However,
this outline serves the purpose of suggesting military actions which might be taken in concert with political action in support of expanded national objectives. The individual actions reflected herein will require further development within the Services and the Joint Staff should the Joint Chiefs of Staff elect to pursue them.

4. The military actions in Appendices A and B hereto, related to the objectives in paragraph 1 above, are placed in two categories:

   a. Those actions which can be initiated in the short term and which will be productive of an early impact on the situation. These are shown in Appendix A.

   b. Those actions which will require a more protracted period for development and application. These are shown in Appendix B.
ENCLOSURE A

ACtions for Immediate Consideration

1. To develop pressure points within the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
   a. Consider covert assistance to Chinese Nationalist
      conduct of unconventional warfare and guerrilla operations
      on the Chinese Mainland.
      This could establish a pressure point for possible
      future exploitation, as well as constitute a drain
      on Communist Chinese resources and a rallying point
      for dissatisfied Chinese.
   b. Consider expanding operations in Asia, to include
      development of resistance movements in North Vietnam and
      North Korea.
      For 12 years we have joined the issues in Asia on
      Communist chosen grounds. Our highest aspiration
      here has been to "not lose." There has been nothing
      at issue to win, Conversely, the Communists have
      had nothing to lose. At worst they could "not win."
      We should take the initiative in this contest, with
      the immediate objective of forcing Ho Chi Minh to
      turn inward in North Vietnam to defend what he now
      has, and with similar action in North Korea.

2. To increase the strength and the will of our Alliances.
   a. Consider designating specifically, where desirable
      and feasible, the Army units which most likely would be
      sent to Europe if a decision were made to reinforce USCONCEN.
      and sending advance parties from these units to Europe now
      to complete planning which will facilitate attainment of
      early post-deployment effectiveness.
      This would constitute both a visible evidence of
      resolve and readiness, and a sound military measure
      to improve our capabilities.
b. Review our positions and objectives relative to Berlin and press for actions which will increase Allied capability and readiness to respond militarily.*

We should reassess our position in view of the current situation and consider expanding our operating objectives. Tripartite plans for military response to Soviet/GDR actions which impinge on US and Allied vital interests in Berlin are in a high state of development and ready for prompt implementation. To enhance NATO capability for timely, cohesive military action, every reasonable pressure should be applied toward reaching early NATO agreement on:

(1) Tripartite-NATO relationship paper.

(2) Preferred sequence of military actions in a Berlin conflict.

(3) HERCON/MARCON plans.

c. Consider proposing an increase in the number of NATO exercises as a vehicle for sustaining an improved readiness posture.

Western Europe is a critical area. With the commitments there, it is not likely to become embroiled in a Bloc/Free World collision short of general war. NATO posture is a reflection of the collective willingness and resolve of the NATO nations to run risks and to stand firm in defense or pursuit of important issues. Over a period of months, NATO could visibly improve its defensive readiness by rotating its troops through a series of field exercises. In addition to training value, these exercises could provide a covering force in critical areas.  

* These actions, although fruition will be long-term, are identified as items for immediate consideration in view of the impending meeting of the North Atlantic Council and the necessity for early action with regard to US position and the tactics to be employed.
d. Consider initiating action to induce the United Kingdom to retain THOR missiles.

These missiles are programmed for early phase-out. They provide visible and credible capability in a deterrent role - though vulnerable, they could not be eliminated from this deterrent role except by a direct unequivocal attack on UK territory. Should general war occur, these missiles provide a significant contribution to the attack of Soviet MR/IRBMs threatening Europe, particularly if a pre-emptive option was required.

e. Consider measures to establish a more forthright position in the NAC regarding an MRBM for NATO.*

The requirement continues to exist for a NATO MRBM to counter the Soviet IRBM/MRBM array which threatens NATO. Unless positive action is taken at this time, there is danger that this matter will come to be accepted as a parallel to Soviet MRBMs in Cuba to the detriment of long-term military capabilities.

f. Consider action in NAC to encourage early meeting of MC 26/4 force goals and NATO support and infrastructure requirements.*

With the current evidence of US resolve and the strengthened psychological position in which we may find ourselves, it is a propitious time to press for attainment of force goals. Consideration might be given to an increase in US commitment as an incentive to other nations. Action should include the updating of SACEUR's critical item shortage list for NATO.

* These actions, although fruition will be long-term, are identified as items for immediate consideration in view of the impending meeting of the North Atlantic Council and the necessity for early action with regard to US position and the tactics to be employed.

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Allies and determination of additional actions required to alleviate shortages, and requesting NATO to expedite necessary infrastructure projects.

g. Consider whether adjustments or expedited actions are necessary in the Military Assistance Program.

There may be a requirement to increase combat capabilities in key countries such as Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, China, Korea, and internal security in Latin America concurrent with provision of arms to India. If considered necessary to make adjustments, seek the CINC's recommendations. Increased funding will be required to cover any program increases.

3. To reconstitute and to round out our strategic reserve.

a. Consider the particular requirements for rounding out STRICOM, the strategic reserve, by selective call-up of Army and Air Force Reserve units to meet the requirements of an anticipated range of contingencies.

Whatever the course of events in Cuba, we will undoubtedly need to be prepared, over an extended period, for military action against Cuba. With forces set aside for this job, our strategic reserve is unbalanced. This is a vulnerability. The requirements for tactical air squadrons, communications, and logistical support units appear to be particularly critical in the event of contingencies elsewhere.

b. Consider the highest sustainable level of readiness in the Strategic Air Command, and the POLARIS force under CINCLANT command, for various time periods and consider a phased reduction to an appropriate level when Soviet offensive weapon systems are out of Cuba, however they are removed.
The current SAC/POLARIS readiness level probably cannot be maintained indefinitely without an adverse effect on over-all capabilities. We should foreclose the possibility that these strategic forces might lose some of their effectiveness as an essential part of our actions in Cuba or elsewhere.

c. Consider means to assure increased responsiveness to potential sealift/airlift requirements.

Support of Cuban contingency plans requires a substantial proportion of the MATS, MSTS and amphibious shipping capabilities which are available. If these plans are executed, timely action will be required to re-establish the essential capability to meet other potential requirements. This may require authority for extension of commercial ship requisitioning; diversion and positioning of MSTS ships; activation of CRAFT; civil airlift augmentation available under the expansion provisions of the current MATS contracts; or activation of some or all of the Reserve Fleet of troop transports and LSTs.

d. Consider requesting the Secretary of Defense to authorize the Services selectively to speed up critical construction and procurement programs where operations are currently limited or may be limited in the near future.

Cutbacks stemming from the Gold Flow problem have delayed construction programs related directly to the readiness of our forces. This includes such items as nuclear weapons storage and construction in support of the NATO air defense program. The Services also are short critical items of combat equipment and combat consumables the procurement lead-times of which in some cases are so long as to affect significantly combat deployment capabilities.
4. To effect permanent improvement in our forces on a strategic scale:

   Consider extending and expanding the Nuclear Test Program.

   Extend the test program. Continue proof tests of stockpile weapons and more particularly the confidence testing of complete weapon systems. Many of the new devices recently tested have not been completely successful and interpolation on the order of 100 times are required to estimate effects.
ENCLOSURE B

ACTIONS FOR LONG-TERM CONSIDERATION

1. To develop pressure points within the Sino-Soviet Bloc:
   a. Consider expanding covert actions within the Sino-
      Soviet Bloc.
      On a selective basis it should be possible to foment
      disorder and discontent within the Communist Bloc.
      In addition, it may be desirable to cause diversions in
      the form of riots or sabotage in order to relieve
      Communist pressure in adjoining areas. Each such
      action should be designed to support achievement of
      a specific objective.

2. To increase the strength and the will of our Alliances:
   a. Consider becoming a signatory member of CENTO.
      The current and foreseeable situations warrant the
      United States joining CENTO in order to provide a
      greater US presence and evidence of intention in
      Middle East area. This action would contribute to
      the solidarity and strength of the CENTO Alliance.
   b. Consider capitalizing on the current situation to
      bring India more closely into alignment with the West.
      India is a key link between the Middle East and Asia.
      Current difficulties in Ladakh and the North East
      Frontier provinces could be used to resolve Indian/
      Pakistani disputes to our long-term benefits. Simul-
      taneously we must recognize the interests of Pakistan,
      a long-term ally. It may be possible to encourage a
      resolution of major Pakistani/Indian external differ-
      ences by a formal framework of alignment against
      common enemies.
c. Consider increasing frequency of US military deployments overseas.

Increase frequency of US military exercises and other training deployments to Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. Such deployments would be a constant reminder to the Soviets and to Allied countries of US ability to react to Communist pressure points with an immediate strike capability.

d. Consider pressing discussions to lead to positioning of nuclear weapons in France.

US nuclear posture in Europe is unbalanced and vulnerable because nuclear weapons cannot be positioned in France. Steps should be taken to correct this situation through US/French nuclear cooperation.

e. Consider negotiations with Japan to bring it more fully into the Free World security structure.

Japan possesses a potential for support of a more active Free World program in Asia. The lack of governmental agreements to permit storage of nuclear weapons in Japan affects adversely CINCPAC's readiness posture. The new evidence of Soviet and Communist Chinese aggressive designs furnishes a basis for new approaches to the Government of Japan.

f. Consider development of a policy study relative to contingency plans and command arrangements for the use of combined forces in operations in the Western Hemisphere.

Present US plans do not include provision for the use of combined forces in the Western Hemisphere. This subject is now under study at the State/ISA level.

g. Consider a reappraisal of our position on materiel support for our Allies.

Present restrictions do not permit computation of requirements for our Allies, nor do they permit procurement of assets for this purpose. The
items our Allies will require, in the event of large
scale conflict, generally require long lead-time. The
CINC's recommendations and projected requirements
should be sought.

h. Consider expanding the scope of our present education
program to provide internal security training to all our
allies.

Expansion of this service, presently conducted for
Latin American countries, could improve the chances
for internal stability of governments friendly to
the US. The CINC's recommendations and projected
requirements in this regard should be sought.

i. Consider measures to consummate a satisfactory nuclear
weapons arrangement with Canada.

US-Canadian arrangement to provide a nuclear capability
to Canada and for US forces in Canada have been held
in abeyance for an extended period because of Canadian
reluctance to consummate the necessary arrangements.
Canada should be pressed to complete these arrangements,
particularly those relating to air defense.

3. To effect permanent improvement in our forces on a
strategic scale.

a. Consider improvement of regular force readiness.

Effect permanent improvement to the readiness and
effectiveness posture of regular forces. Force
improvement will include the necessary construction,
modernization, and increases in manning, mobility,
supplies, war reserves, reserves, combat equipment,
and support units.

b. Consider expediting development and/or installation
of warning systems which will be effective against SLBMs.

With the Soviet Union unable to gain the advantage
of missiles in Cuba, increased priority may go to
SLBMs, perhaps supported from "fishing fleet" bases
in Cuba. We have spotty warning against submarines and missiles, and a defense against short-range SLBMs of exceedingly limited effectiveness attained through modification of the NIKE HERCULES system. Improvement of missile defense and submarine detection systems should be prosecuted.

c. Consider acceleration of Civil Defense Programs.
The tensions attendant on US actions relative to Cuba perhaps have generated intense interest in Civil Defense programs. This would be a propitious time to move ahead with public indoctrination and with priority portions of the program.

d. Consider initiating a study of the adequacy of Service authorizations for mobile communications and electronics units.

Present and planned contingency communication requirements have gravely reduced our capacity to respond in new areas of tension or conflict. Long-range plans for the National Communications Systems, the National Military Command System, and expansion of the Defense Communications System will eventually provide increased capability. However, further mobilization or commitment of forces will require the use of mobile facilities.

e. Review the provisions of and provide necessary modification to invoke selectively the "Command Relationship Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency" in all critical areas. The Command Relationship Agreement should provide for implementation in advance of hostilities so that there is a minimum loss of control and effectiveness.
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Approved by: [Signature] Director, J-3

Opinion as to Recommendation: page 3, line 2, insert "at appropriate times" after word "taken"