MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

1. I have just finished going through a miscellaneous group of cables regarding Cuba. Without being completely familiar as to the exact details of Cuba planning to date, I have isolated some fuzzy areas which may justify further examination. These areas are identified by the following list of questions:

   a. Is there a formal CINCLANT plan for blockading Cuba? If so, give me the general concept and details to include patrol areas, number of ships, etc. If not, what is the status of blockade planning?

   b. What are the exact rules of engagement for ships and aircraft operating in the vicinity of Cuba? When were these rules last reviewed at a policy level and at what level? What are the precise limitations, if any, placed on ships, aircraft on ASW and shipping patrols, and peripheral flights?

   c. What are the rules of engagement for units involved in air defense of the Continental United States in regard to possible attacks from Cuba? What are the rules of engagement for fleet units in regard to possible air attacks from Cuba? Do naval units at Key West operate under any rules of engagement in view of the fact that they are included within the NORAD geographical defense limitations?

   d. What instructions are in effect in regard to Cuban aircraft which appear to be defecting to the U.S.?

   e. In regard to operational plans for Cuba, have miscellaneous airlift resources been utilized in the plans? For example, CARIBCOM, Fleet Marine Forces aircraft stationed in the Continental U.S., miscellaneous Navy or Air Force logistical or service aircraft in the CONUS.
f. To what extent has a coup de main type operation, either separately or as a precursor to one of the plans been considered?

g. What are the best estimates as to reaction times of the following:

(1) Establishing a sea and air blockade.

(2) Reinforce Guantanamo.

(3) Evacuate dependents from Guantanamo.

h. What are the rules of engagement for land, sea and air forces stationed in or near Guantanamo? What are the plans for reinforcement of Guantanamo?

2. It is my impression that most of this information is readily available in one form or another although the rules of engagement area may not have been closely scrutinized in the light of the most recent political and military developments.

J. J. E.