Talking Paper for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the Meeting with the President, 16 November 1962.

Subject: Military Aspects of the Cuban Situation (U)

Background - The Cuban situation has required the preparation of forces for a range of contingencies up to invasion of Cuba and readiness to counter any Soviet response. Concurrent negotiations have led to apparent withdrawal of Soviet missiles but have not attained all US objectives. Meanwhile, assembly of IL-28s in Cuba has progressed, and defensive preparation of Russian and Cuban forces in Cuba has continued. Readiness of US forces cannot be maintained indefinitely, and decisions will be required soon whether direct US military action should be undertaken in the near future to assure attainment of US objectives or whether alert posture can be relaxed.

Discussion - Military factors which should be considered are:

a. Impact of continuation of current alert posture (TAB A).

b. Additional forces for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62 (TAB B).

c. JCS views on the following matters under negotiation (TAB C).

   (1) Importance of IL-28 removal.
   (2) Importance of remaining weapons if IL-28s removed.
   (3) Recommended course of action if IL-28s not removed.
   (4) Military factors involved in US assurance against invasion of Cuba.
   (5) A satisfactory verification system for the future.
   (6) Point at which invasion preparations should be ended.
   (7) Risks of blockade compensated by its advantages.
   (8) Coalition type inspection in the context of a de-nuclearized zone.

Approved by Director, J-5

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DECLASSIFICATION BY JOINT STAFF
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GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
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1. Maintenance of current alert levels degrades training and equipment maintenance in the units concerned. If maintained for protracted periods, the capability of the force may be reduced because of maintenance and training shortfalls.

2. Principal impacts on personnel are extended working hours and absence from normal duty stations. While these are not critical problems at this time, should there ensue a period of long, inconclusive discussions we would anticipate a substantial morale problem in the military forces involved.

3. Specific effects of continuation of current alert levels are:

   a. **Strategic Air Command.** Current alert levels can be maintained until about 15 December 1962 with no problems. Continuation beyond this date would result in progressive degradation of force capability and hardship on personnel, with these becoming severe problems in about six months.

   b. **Continental Air Defense Command.** A principal factor which will tend to degrade general war capability and to lower morale and efficiency is the continuous dispersal of interceptor aircraft to bases which are lacking in adequate support facilities. If CINCONAD is authorized to recall aircraft except in Southeast US to home bases, maintaining a limited operating capability on dispersal bases and one-third of interceptors on 15 minute alert at home bases, he will be able to maintain the resultant posture indefinitely without degradation of capability or undue personnel hardship.

   c. **Atlantic Command**

      (1) **Army Forces.** Current peak posture can be maintained until about 16 December 1962 without degradation.

      (2) **Naval Forces.** Current peak posture can be maintained until not later than 20 December 1962 without serious effect. However, there will be serious degradation of combat effectiveness and hardship to personnel unless measures are taken by that time to offset the training and maintenance shortfalls which are accruing.

      (3) **Air Forces.** Although current strike force readiness can be maintained indefinitely, the maintenance of high morale in the face of personnel hardships will become a serious problem if there is little probability of employment.

4. In summary with respect to readiness, the troops have borne up well under the present requirement. However, early measures involving some relaxation of the readiness must be taken to avoid a drop-off in force capability due primarily to the deferral of normal maintenance requirements. Although there are clear personnel hardships, it is judged that these will not become a critical factor so long as there is a general feeling of "purpose". In order to maintain optimum posture through mid-December, CINCONAD should be authorized to recall interceptor forces except those in 32d CONAD Region to home bases, and CINCLANT should be authorized to extend the OPLAN 316-62 reaction time to an over-all 10 days.

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ADDITIONAL FORCES FOR CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62

1. The President has expressed concern that the forces programmed for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62 may be "thin." He has requested therefore, that consideration be given to augmenting CINCLANT's present forces. On 7 Nov 62, CINCLANT was instructed to develop an outline plan to augment his OPLAN 316-62 by the addition of the 5th Infantry Division (M), 2nd Armored Division and two Marine BCTs. Additionally, he was to consider the mobilization of National Guard Divisions. CINCLANT's response was submitted on 10 Nov 62.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the plan on 15 Nov 62, and conclude that:

   a. No new information is available that would invalidate the adequacy of forces originally included in CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62.

   b. The proposed commitment in Cuba of 5th Infantry Division (M), and a Combat Command of 2nd Armored Division will seriously degrade our ability to react to simultaneous contingencies elsewhere in the world.

   c. The reinforcement of Guantanamo is not considered necessary except for selected units of artillery and armor.

   d. The time to reactivate ships from the Reserve Fleet is estimated at 30 days, plus an additional 15 days to sail some of these ships to East Coast ports.

   e. National Guard divisions which could be mobilized for the strategic reserve probably would require a minimum of 120 days for training and equipping before they would be combat ready. National Guard divisions mobilized for occupation duty could probably be ready for deployment in an estimated 30 days.

   f. Eleven LSTs should be activated immediately to provide increased lift for either the original and/or the augmented OPLAN 316-62.

3. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the 5th Infantry Division (M) and a Combat Command of 2nd Armored Division should be earmarked for possible commitment to CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62, but no movement from home stations should be authorized until the results of initial operations against Cuba are assessed.

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JCS VIEWS ON MATTERS UNDER NEGOTIATION

1. Importance of removal of the IL-28's.
   a. Practical importance: These aircraft are capable of nuclear weapons delivery and are a threat to the SE United States and Central America.
   b. Symbolic Importance: IL-28's are included in the published Presidential list of offensive weapons which must be removed. In subsequent negotiations, IL-28's have become a widely publicized issue on which we cannot yield without loss of prestige.
   c. Psychological importance: Continued presence of IL-28's in Cuba would cause internal public pressures in the United States and OAS member states.
   d. An appropriate quid pro quo for removal would be temporary extension of "hail and pass" quarantine. Complete removal of the quarantine is too high a price to pay.

2. Importance of remaining weapons if IL-28's removed:
   a. The air defense system including MIG's and SAM's could interfere with aerial reconnaissance.
   b. Four Soviet regiments equipped with armor, nuclear capable FROG rockets, and other modern weapons are a threat to Guantanamo and could be exported quickly to support a communist regime elsewhere in Latin America. Most important, these Russian forces perpetuate the Castro regime.

3. Recommended course of action if IL-28's not removed:
   a. Revert to "board and inspect" quarantine and intensify it to include POL.
   b. Continue aerial reconnaissance, maintain ready invasion forces, and maintain adequate air defense posture in SE United States.

4. Military factors involved in assurance against invasion of Cuba.
   a. Assurance must be contingent upon removal of offensive weapons (including IL-28's and nuclear warheads), ground and air inspection, and insurance against reintroduction of weapons. Since any assurance would limit US freedom of action, none should be given prematurely.
   b. Assurance must avoid implication we have agreed to preserve the Castro or other communist regime.
   c. Duration of assurance should be contingent upon continued verification and no use of Cuba as a base for subversive activities against the Western Hemisphere.
5. A satisfactory verification system for the future:
   a. Ultimately a friendly government in Cuba.
   b. Meanwhile a combination of ground inspection and regular aerial reconnaissance.
   c. Ground inspectors must be reliable, competent, and free to visit on a frequent, random schedule sites of their own choosing or as requested by the US.

6. Point at which invasion preparations should be ended:
   a. Attainment of a satisfactory operational inspection system.
   b. Meanwhile ready invasion forces are leverage in negotiations.

7. Risk of blockade is compensated for by advantages derived:
   a. Quarantine is a flexible instrument for applying pressure.
   b. It is most effective course of action other than invasion.

8. Coalition type inspection in the context of a denuclearized zone:
   a. UN inspections in Laos and Korea were ineffective.
   b. A denuclearized zone would create an illusion of security and result in relaxation of alertness in Latin America.
   c. U Thant proposal for inspection by neutrals in the Caribbean and Central America area is equally dangerous and would jeopardize our aerial surveillance capability.
   d. Inspection by third parties would constitute a delegation of some measure of responsibility for US security.

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