MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

SUBJECT: Cuba

1. Khrushchev may:
   a. Agree to remove IL-28s, permit US to inspect them at sea, and ask that the quarantine be lifted.
   
   b. Repeat that USSR cannot persuade Castro to accept on-site verification and argue that since US had inspected outgoing offensive weapons at sea, there was no need for on-site verification of missile and aircraft removal.
   
   c. Request that, in light of these USSR moves, the US cease overflights of Cuba immediately, and give Castro the promised assurances against invasion.
   
   d. Maintain that no inspection against the re-introduction of offensive weapons is necessary but indicate willingness to accept U Thant’s UN Observation Group idea to inspect the “Caribbean area” (which will include the US) with respect both to the reintroduction problem and to the inspection of US assurances against invasion.

   e. Broaden the Cuban issue by suggestions such as (1) agreeing to liquidate the Soviet base in Cuba on return for elimination of US base at Guantanamo and say, in Turkey or Greece, (2) repeating the offer to have Western troops temporarily under UN supervision in West Berlin asking for a solution to the Berlin problem on this count.

2. Depending on how badly the Soviets want to have us underwrite Castro, they might agree to remove their forces as part of the conciliatory move to gain US assurances with no inspection and no over-flight.

3. Khrushchev is a devious man; he may throw in a hooker along the line, but if he plays it straight, and makes his views known at the UN, he will put tremendous pressure on the US to give assurances either with no inspection and no over-flight, or under a UN inspection system that would include possible inspection of the US any place, any time but would not necessarily provide the US adequate safeguards against a Soviet or ChiCom future buildup in Cuba.
4. In response to Khrushchev's offer, we should:

   a. Accept inspection of IL-28s at sea and lift quarantine.

   b. Continue to insist on a one-time on-site verification of missile removal, under UN auspices if necessary. (We would argue this to be necessary because Soviet forces capable of handling nuclear weapons are present in Cuba. Thus we would drop this demand if the Soviets left Cuba.)

   c. Offer to trade off long term ground inspection in Cuba for the removal of Soviet troops.

   d. Make our assurances contingent upon continued US aerial surveillance, preferably under authority of an OAS resolution. (But we might possibly accept, after much negotiation, Soviet acceptance of continued high level (and low level?) overflights. We would make this concession most reluctantly, and only if it would wrap up the US-USSR agreement. The fact that we would conduct overflights would have to be made known publicly to placate our Latin American allies who fear greatly any underwriting of Castro. We must continue overflights, one way or another.)

   e. Make our assurances as vague as possible and contingent upon a cessation of subversive acts by Castro groups in other Latin American countries.

5. Our objectives would thus be:

   a. Get the Soviet military forces out of Cuba.

   b. Keep the pressure on the Castro regime.

   c. Assure our OAS allies that Castro will not be allowed to subvert them.

6. We have the preponderance of power—both locally and globally—in the Cuban situation, and we should continue to use this condition to force agreement on our terms. Our objective should be to achieve our objectives, if possible, in a way which provides the Soviets ways to avoid a direct confrontation with us. But we should not eschew all confrontations. The Soviets are the ones that must be worried about this possibility. They over-extended themselves.