10/20/62 White House

1) Intelligence - 25 man direct RRF team went to Cuba
   - N.S.A. - approved
   - NSC - approved
2) Subcommittee activities - Civil Defense policy - no changes,
   except to new domestic air defense program
3) Military
   - blockade activity
   2) expanding blockade coverage to include P.O. of Cuba;
   USF might receive word by period
   - surveillance program - day flights approved
4) Cuba leaflet drop approved
5) Berlin council
   2) Full talks - no further arms to Cuba, no missiles
      - UN observers corps - technical qualification
      - UN personnel
      - UN guarantee - to take me from U.S. site
      - press would be kept in background
6) Brezhnev (probably Khrushchev) plan to make U.S.S.R. non-nuclear,
   except U.S. territory, extension to Africa, O.A.S.
7) Should U.S. promise not invade Cuba if missiles are
   removed - proposed Brezhnev message approved
Stevenson - concept of U-boat proposal - standstill

10-12 days - nuke ships to Cuba carrying 10
no further construction of missile bases

suspension of guarantees
rendering means unsafely still open
in long term negotiations - possible points

1) Put up any criticism
2) " U.S. bases in Turkey & Italy
3) nuclear free zones in L.A. & Africa
4) "Put out (from White House) statement as to work group on
 addresses - Salinger & Sillviete & workup, R.H. approves
5) Presentation by DoD

TOP SECRET
1. Problem: To devise a means by which Cuba can demonstrate by immediate steps her intention to remove the threat of offensive weapons.

2. Considerations:

   a. Rarming. It must be recognized that permanent disarming of these weapons may take time and that in the interim the possibility of rearming remains.

   b. Intent. Principal effort should be devoted to immediate measures which will clearly demonstrate Cuba's willingness to remove the threat and will have the immediate effect of making it difficult for the weapons to be restored to a ready condition.

3. Possible Steps:

   a. IL 28's. These aircraft could be immediately assembled in a closely parked condition on a single field to be designated by the United States. Cuba's willingness to do this would demonstrate her intent and the concentration of the aircraft would facilitate photographic reconnaissance and destruction by the United States, should that be required. Naturally, dismantling or other effective disarming measures should be undertaken with dispatch. These measures should likewise be subject to visual or photographic verification, e.g. removal of wings.

   b. IRBM's. The most immediate step that is visualized in this case is the physical separation of the missile from the launcher area by a substantial distance, e.g. ten miles. Missiles should be located in an easily identifiable open area. Ideally, they might be placed on the runways of the same fields on which the IL 28's are parked. This would facilitate reconnaissance and would deny use of the runways to the IL 28's. Should this not be possible due to the difficulty of moving the missile, some similar location should be designated by the United States or suggested by Cuba.

   c. MRBM's. The fixed MRBM's should be treated in the same manner as the IRBM's. The movable MRBM's should deliver the missiles to a location similar to the other missiles and locate the transporters some distance away - at least 100 miles. Ideally, all missiles should be placed on the same field as the IL 28's to enhance their vulnerability to US attack, facilitate reconnaissance, and effectively close the field to air operations.

   d. Komars. These craft should preferably be deck loaded on ships for outshipment and located in a single port for ease of verification by reconnaissance. Should this not be feasible or timely, they could be placed in any dock or placed ashore pending later outshipment.

4. Follow on Actions:

   a. All of the foregoing should be followed by expeditious steps to remove the weapons from Cuba or to destroy them.

   b. At the earliest possible date OAS, UN or US teams should be introduced for the purposes of inspection.